Studies in HISTORY OF BUDDHISM

Editor A.K. NARAIN

The Book

This consists of papers presented at the first International Conference on the History of Buddhism held at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI USA, in 1976, the purpose of which was to study the course of the history of Buddhism in a global perspective. These papers are edited by Professor A. K. Narain, who organized the conference, and include his introductory paper. The papers in the volume deal with various aspects of the History and Historiography of Buddhism in India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Tibet, China, Japan, Mongolia and other parts of the world. The contributors include Harvey B. Aronson, A.L. Basham, Heinz Bechert, George D. Bond, B.G. Gokhale, Padmanabh S. Jaini, Sechin Jagchid, Minoru Kiyota, Alexander W. Macdonald, Joanna Rogers Macy, Eleanor Zelliot, Beatrice Miller, Robert J. Miller, Gadjin M. Nagao, Charles S. Prebish, Theodore Riccardi, Sheng-Yen Chang, Bardwell Smith, Nathmal Tatia, Shunsho Terakawa, Robert A. Thurman, K.N. Upadhyaya, Alex Wayman, Turrell V. Wylie, Isshi Yamada, Erik Zurcher, and Leonard Zwilling.

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[Papers presented at the International Conference on the History of Buddhism at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, WIS, USA, August, 19-21, 1976]

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Preface

In 1976 I took the initiative in organising an international conference on the history of Buddhism at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. It was held from the 19th to the 21st of August. There were over sixty participants. Thirty-nine papers were presented. Twenty-seven of those papers are included in this volume and four of them were included earlier in *Studies in Pali and Buddhism*, a volume of homage to the memory of Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap, which was published last year. The remaining papers with due revision were not returned to me for publication and therefore they have been left out. I am glad however to be able to publish almost eighty percent of the papers presented at the conference. It gives me great pleasure to express my thanks again to the contributors for their co-operation in bringing out the present volume.

The original intention in organising the conference was to discuss problems relating to the history of Buddhism, in a transnational and cross-cultural perspective, incorporating the inputs from the various sub-disciplines of Buddhist studies. But due to certain unavoidable circumstances in the process of its organisation and on account of the fact that this conference was the first of its kind, I had to make adjustments in regard to participation which resulted in having papers of a little broader interest than perhaps required for our objective. This, I think, made us richer in knowledge and experience and the conference thereby also served one very useful purpose in that it brought international scholars devoted to the study of Buddhism from such diverse disciplinary backgrounds as philosophy, religion, history, politics, sociology, anthropology, art history, archaeology, language and literature for the first time together round the table. It provided thus an international and interdisciplinary group to exchange ideas and in that process gave a visibility to Buddhist studies as an independent discipline in its own right. It was because of this feeling that the occasion of the conference was used also to found a corporate academic body for the first time to be devoted only to intellectual

pursuits of Buddhism and things Buddhistic in their entirety free from sectarian and political goals. The International Association of Buddhist Studies was thus born on the 21st of August 1976. This is just the beginning of a process which may hopefully lead to a more integrated study of Buddhism in a much wider perspective and to a better understanding of the contributions and interdependence of the diverse subdisciplines of Buddhist studies than hitherto.

Going through the list of papers included in this volume it may be noted that areawise, while almost fifty percent of them deal with India, Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand and Nepal, the remaining fifty percent are concerned with Tibet, Mongolia, China and Japan. So also, subjectwise, while it is difficult to make clear-cut demarcations according to disciplines, one may note that seven or eight of the papers deal with the doctrines and philosophy, eight with history, eight with the Sangha, social organisation, social action and ethics and the role of women. There is one on art and architecture and three or four may be taken to deal with methodologies and resources. Timewise the papers cover Buddhism from its origin to its contemporary period.

Manuscripts of most of the papers after due revision reached me by the summer of 1977 when I was leaving for India for a period of six months on a visiting assignment at the Visvabharati in Santiniketan. This could have delayed the editing of the volume further. But fortunately during my absence from Madison Dr. Leonard Zwilling and Mr. Roger Jackson offered to handle the papers and assist me in their preliminary editing as they arrived. By the time I returned to Madison in early 1978 we had received all the papers in our hands. Finally after the completion of the editing the work was in the hands of the printers by the end of 1978. But since the contributors of the volume were spread all over the world, it was not an easy task to get the proofs corrected by the authors on time. I appreciate the patience and cooperation of the publishers and printers in dealing with the global mail problems and the *charikā* of scholars in bringing the volume out.

In the most pleasant duty of giving thanks I must first express my special thanks to Professor Manindra Kishore Verma, Chairman and Director of South Asian Studies and Program at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, for his enthusiastic support, both financially and organisationally, in the planning and at every stage of the conference and later in the production of the volume. I am pleased to acknowledge with thanks the grants-in-aid I received from the Research Committee of the Graduate School, the Humanities Foundation and the Annonymous Fund of the University of Wisconsin without which the international participation in the conference would not have been possible.

During and after the conference, as well as later in the production of the volume, I have received the cooperation and assistance of Professor Thomas E. White, the Coordinator of the Outreach Program in South Asian Studies at that time, and the office staff of the Department of South Asian Studies as well as from many of our students. I owe thanks to all of them, but I will mention particularly the names (in alphabetical order) of Ed Bastian, Claudia Bryers, Sharon Campbell, Rena Crispin, Davis Dillon, Judy Dillon, Barbara Dills, Cheryl Hewitt, Mary Nutter, and Douglas Rasmussen. My special thanks are due to Dr. Leonard Zwilling and Roger Jackson for their valuable assistance not only at the conference recordings but more particularly in the editorial work at very crucial stages. In the end, I must express my indebtedness to my wife Usha for her

ungrudging help in spite of her household preoccupations all through the conference and afterwards in the preparation of the volume. I would not like to complete the list without mentioning my youngest collaborator, my little grandson, Siddhartha, who enjoyed tearing up page after page of rough drafts and forcing me to retype them, which always helped.

A.K. Narain

Introductory Toward a New History of Buddhism*

A.K. NARAIN

I

The reasons for organising this conference on the history of Buddhism emanate partly from classroom needs and partly from my own, perhaps, ambitious, quest for an 'integrated' and 'total' history of Buddhism in a transnational and comparative perspective utilising the inputs made by the various disciplines concerned. My purpose here is more to explore than to direct.

It was not until I started teaching the history of Buddhism and searching for suitable advanced textbooks for university students that I realized the inadequate and limited nature of the available resources. I came across books which dealt with what they called 'Indian Buddhism,'[1] 'Chinese Buddhism,'[2] 'Japanese Buddhism,'[3] or what may be called 'regional' Buddhisms, like Buddhism in Sri Lanka,[4] in China,[5] in Japan, [5a]in Tibet,[6] in Burma[7] and so on. Then there were books which dealt with the history of Buddhist thought and were more concerned with textual and philosophical studies of the doctrines.[8] I did not come across any book of a substantial nature which did away with the territorial compartmentalisation of Buddhism and which treated it more as a cultural system or as a civilisational factor of global dimension than mere religion and philosophy. And even such national histories of Buddhism as were available did not cover the entire time span of their own histories.[9] This is not to say that there are no exceptions. There are exceptions, but they are feeble ones; they are of the nature of brief introductions for beginners or survey accounts and general readers.[10] They in fact heighten the need for more adequate and scholarly treatment of the subject.

Not that the problem was not taken note of earlier. E.J. Thomas wrote in 1933

* This introductory exercise consists of the opening remarks at the Conference on the state of modern historiography of Buddhism and the specific issue of the contextual genesis of Buddhism.

that, "A history of Buddhism in the sense of a connected account of the chief events of all the Buddhist communities throughout the centuries is an ideal not yet attainable."[11] In this statement one can see a pointer to the ideal and an indication of hope that perhaps it could be attained in future. But when, in 1960, Edward Conze wrote what has been claimed as "the first book which attempts to cover the entire history of Buddhism from the sixth century B.C. down to the present day", he noted in his introduction that, "to the modern historian, Buddhism is a phenomenon which must exasperate him at every point—and we can only say in extenuation that this religion was not founded for the benefit of historians."[12] This statement is neither fair to Buddhism nor to the historians. Surely they are not mutually exclusive. Robinson's statement that, "Buddhist responses to the waves of social and cultural change originating in Europe have been distinctive in some ways, and have conformed to patterns well enhanced in the Buddhist past,"[13] in fact should provide a new incentive. It makes the world larger for the historian and may add to his exasperation but it should also make him realize the urgency of the task of writing a new history and keeping the wheel of Clio moving.

What has led to the present lack of historical writing on Buddhism? It is not gainsaying that the material is so vast and in so many languages, dead and living, that it is indeed an "unattainable" ideal for one man to write such a history. But could it not have been attempted by a team? To me it seems strange that neither the independence of some of the Buddhist countries in Asia from colonial domination after the Second World War, nor the sentimental occasion provided by the 25th centenary of the Mahāparinirvāṇa of the Buddha,[14] nor even the renewed vigorous interest in Buddhism which took place in the war-torn world of the fifties and sixties, particularly in the West, proved sufficient to motivate an individual or a group to undertake this task. Surely the complexity of sources and variety of languages involved cannot be taken as reasons for not doing it; in fact these should provide more of a challenge to a historian.

But, is the exasperation of Conze justified? Should we agree with him that Buddhism was not founded for the benefit of historians? What are, after all, his complaints? According to Conze the reasons for this exasperation are (i) "an almost complete absence of hard facts about its history in India," (ii) "the date, authorship and geographical provenance of the overwhelming majority of documents are almost entirely unknown," (iii) "even its doctrine must strike the historian as most unsatisfactory and elusive," and (iv) "Buddhists tend to cancel out each statement by a counter-statement, and the truth is attained not by choosing between the two contradictory statements, but by combining them."[15]

These reasons are far from satisfactory. The first two are such with which modern historians are too familiar to get discouraged. They only highlight the difficulties and problems which must be solved but which have always been the fate of the historians to tackle. The third reason, given as it is by Conze, surprises me. For, in my opinion, there is nothing in the doctrine which 'must strike the historian as most unsatisfactory and elusive.' On the contrary, it seems suitable and motivating to a historian. What better doctrine could a historian, or for that matter a social scientist, need than the one which is intimately based on the theory of causation (*paṭicca-samuppāda*) and to which the idea of change (*anicca*) is fundamental. The fourth, is in fact no reason at all, for, it only refers to an aspect of historical explanation, as related to the subject.

It is interesting that Conze himself seeks to identify the common factors "which

allow us to call all of them Buddhist' and asserts that, "Throughout its history, Buddhism has the unity of an organism, in that each new development takes place in continuity from the previous one. Nothing could look more different from a tadpole than a frog, and yet they are stages of the same animal, and evolve continuously from each other. The Buddhist capacity for metamorphosis must astound those who only see the end-products separated by long intervals of time, as different as chrysalis and butterfly. In fact they are connected by many gradations, which lead from one to the other, and which only close study can detect. There is in Buddhism really no innovation, but what seems so is in fact a subtle adaptation of pre-existing idea. Great attention has always been paid to continuous development, and to the proper transmission of the teachings. These are not the anarchic philosophizings of individualists who strive for originality at all costs. Instead, we have groups of teachers, known as sects or schools and lines of masters which maintain continuity over many centuries."[16] And let me add, "over many lands."

Conze has rightly noted that, "Other religions may perhaps have undergone changes as startling as these, but what is peculiar to Buddhism is that the innovations of each new phase were backed up by the production of a fresh canonical literature which, although clearly composed many centuries after the Buddha's death, claims to be the word of the Buddha himself. The scriptures of the first period were supplemented in the second by a large number of Mahayana Sutras, and in the third by a truly enormous number of Tantras."[17]

Moreover, it would be incorrect to say that the Buddhist lacked a historical sense. One has only to go through the traditional history of Buddhism, albeit ecclesiastical, the record of councils, and historical and biographical accounts almost throughout the Buddhist world to find an answer in the negative.[18] In the context of India, it is generally agreed now that the idea of history and historical sense were much better developed in the Buddhist tradition than in the Hindu.[19] Outside India, the Buddhist tradition has left more tangible evidence in this regard, *e.g.*, in China, Tibet and Sri Lanka.

So far we have indicated the need for, and the lack of, a history of Buddhism which takes into consideration the entirety of the system and the movement through time and space. We have also noted that there is no ground for exasperation and there is nothing in the sources and tradition which should discourage the modern historian from undertaking the task; on the contrary, it provides a challenge which must be met.

However, questions of approach and methodology do arise. There is no one way or method which can be handed down from one generation of scholars to the next, because the approach will have to be adapted to the specific needs of each generation, to different conditions and to newly-acquired knowledge. It is true that *Religionwissenschaft* has become an autonomous discipline, but I am not talking of the subject of history of religions. *Religionwissenschaft* is neither normative nor solely descriptive, even though it is related to both. From Max Müller's time to the present, history of Buddhism has somehow remained a subject in the domain of this *Religionwissenschaft*, and its fate has been tossed along with *Religionwissenschaft's* changing modes. Of course history of religion does not claim to be a self-sufficient discipline, and it does depend upon others. But as long as Buddhism is tagged with *Religionwissenschaft* its history will always be studied merely as history of a faith, and that too from a Judeo-Christian or "Western" point of view, but it is from this viewpoint that most of its study has hitherto been done. What has really been missed in the case of Buddhism is the recognition that it is not just a form of faith or system of religion to be treated through its doctrines and

philosophies, the sects and schools, its relations with other schools of thought, be it in India or China, but it is most intimately linked to the life of the people and their culture as a whole. It is these cultural and civilisational aspects of the behaviour of men and societies through time, and over space, which are historically significant and have an universal message. Unless, therefore Buddhism is liberated from the introverted view and until it is treated in a holistic and universal manner, free from a unilinear approach and free even from the dichotomy of the sacred and profane, its history will continue to suffer from limitations of various kinds.

There are some other dangers too, and we must steer clear of them. One of them is the Pan-Asian approach, which, for historical and emotional reasons tends to romanticise and even politicise Buddhism. Another is the new escapist Western approach, which enjoys emphasizing the spiritual and mystical experiences, and for which history is a meaningless and unnecessary exercise. And then there are some radical approaches which expect and insist to find in it an instrument of revolt against social oppression and economic inequities. But I do not ask for ignorance of these trends; what is needed is an understanding of the deeper historical issues which have created them.

They only way to face it is to have an open-ended approach to start with, and not become a victim of 'isms', 'schools' and other disciplines and their presuppositions. Without going into the details of postulates and without quoting the high priests of 'isms', we may take an all-inclusive, holistic, at once comprehensive and comparative, view of Buddhism in *all* its roles and expressions in the movement of ideas and institutions unrestricted by the political boundaries of space. If we do need at all a philosophical justification for this simple approach we can find that in Buddhism itself, *i.e.* in the ideas of "continuum" and "context", and need nothing more. The third dimension of history is always furnished by the historian himself. History is after all a "process", a flowing "stream", a moving "wheel", of which the driving force is the law of 'dependent origination', *i.e.*, relatedness, the 'context', in which men and environment enact their drama of conflict and resolution, discovery and enlightenment.

In a new history of Buddhism, therefore, I contend that India, China, Japan, Korea, Tibet and Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand do not exist as exclusive or definitive entities. This is not to say that I am against the 'particular'. I am not, as long as we do not become a victim of the 'particular'. We have done enough counting of the trees. It is high time we see the forest too. If it is still found necessary, we should by all means study the 'process' and the 'context', in smaller, even the smallest, areas of the world, but always with a positive awareness that this is a part of the wider world and it must be contextualized against that, for then alone can it be meaningful to a universe which has indeed become smaller and will perhaps become more so further. The Buddhist sense of identity is not that of an absolute. Everything is composite. The chariot, says Nāgasena to Menander, cannot be identified with its various components and yet is so-called because of them. It is the 'totality' which imparts its true personality.

Methodologically, the movement on the historical path is only a process to be studied in an ever changing variety of contextual framework. Whether it is the problem of the origin of Buddhism or that of its spread and decline, whether it is related to the doctrinal and sectarian growth, or artistic traditions and architectural forms, whether it deals with the discipline of the Saṁgha or with the ideas and institutions influencing

socio-political life, we must look into the relationship which would enable us to understand the continuity of the process as well as the identity of the movement. In short, this is just a plea for what may in fact be called a Buddhist approach to history, which indeed flows like a stream of consciousness.

History as a discipline now cuts into both humanities and social sciences. It is so broad-based and inclusive that within its orbit the subject of the history of Buddhism, in the sense in which we have envisaged it, can be dealt with most satisfactorily. But how are the contents of the history of Buddhism, and things Buddhistic, to be sorted and organized for historical treatment? Should we use the framework of political dynasties and chronology? Should it be given topical treatment and divided as intellectual history, monastic organization, art history, sectarian history, literary history and so on? Is there an inner dynamic in Buddhism itself which shows its path through history? Or, can the contents be examined on the basis of external factors interacting with them in a pattern-setting manner? It is not easy to answer these questions and confidently select one or the other as our basis for classification and historical treatment of Buddhism and Buddhistic culture and civilization. Perhaps several attempts will have to be made before we will discover the more rewarding one. We have noted one such attempt, made by Conze, who claims to cover the entire history of Buddhism. How has he organized his material? To quote him :[20]

"Buddhism has so far persisted for about 2,500 years, and during this period it has undergone profound and radical changes. Its history can conveniently be divided into four periods. The first period is that of the old Buddhism, which largely coincided with what later came to be known as the "Hīnayāna"; the second is marked by the rise of the Mahāyāna, the third by that of Tantra and Ch'an. This brings us to about 1000 A.D. After that Buddhism no longer renewed itself, but just persisted, and the 1000 years can be taken together as the fourth period.

"Geographically first-period Buddhism remained almost purely Indian; during the second period it started on its conquest of Eastern Asia, and was in its turn considerably influenced by non-Indian thought; during the third, creative centres of Buddhist thought were established outside India, particularly in China. Philosophically, the first period concentrated on psychological questions, the second on ontological, the third on cosmic. The first is concerned with individuals gaining control over their own minds, and psychological analysis is the method by which self-control is sought; the second turns to the nature (*svabhāva*) of true reality, and the realization in oneself of that true nature of things is held to be decisive for salvation; the third sees adjustment and harmony with the cosmos as the clue to enlightenment and uses age-old magical and occult methods to achieve it. Soteriologically, they differ in the conception of the type of man they try to produce. In the first period the ideal saint is an Arhat, or a person who has non-attachment, in whom all craving is extinct, and who will no more be reborn in this world. In the second it is the Bodhisattva, a person who wishes to save all his fellow beings, and who hopes ultimately to become an omniscient Buddha. In the third it is a Siddha, a man who is so much in harmony with the cosmos that he is under no constraint whatsoever, and as a free agent is able to manipulate the cosmic forces both inside and outside himself."

Justifying his classification further, Conze says, "The division of Buddhist history in periods of 500 years not only agrees with facts, but it is mentioned in many Buddhist

writings dating from the beginning of the Christian era. These five hundred years each are enumerated as marking the continued degeneration of the doctrine."[21]

To say the least, this arrangement of periodisation is too simplistic. It accepts the traditional use of the number 500 as well as the prophetic diagnosis of decay without any question. It also fails to work beyond the so-called 3rd period because the 4th one is not made to be of 500 years but of more than 1000 years without any reason, traditional or otherwise. Moreover, it is not clear how it agrees with facts as claimed by Conze, because the third period of Tantric predominance, that of the Siddha as an ideal, is only of limited application. In fact Conze's study seems to be too "internal" and "textual" and is conveniently oblivious of the "external" factors governing the historical process. His classification is very introverted indeed and it ignores the wider context. It isolates Buddhism and treats it only as a doctrinal phenomenon.

The subject of periodisation may seem a fruitless task to some but it can hardly be avoided in any treatment of history. I also realize that it is not easy to devise a scheme of *universal applicability*. Nonetheless we cannot run away from the challenge. After all, successful and meaningful attempts have been made to write well periodised world histories which include many movements of ideas and peoples. Why should it be difficult to try a world history of only *one* such movement, that is, of Buddhism? We may not find the perfect solution but surely that is no justification for not making attempts to explore an acceptable scheme. Perhaps several attempts will have to be made before we may reach an agreeable arrangement. Periodisation has been a problem even with national histories of Buddhism. Such convenient and conventional classifications as Ancient, Medieval and Modern of even general political histories have been found wanting and have not been accepted universally. We must therefore appreciate the attempt made by Conze in his very brief history, which incidentally is the first one of its kind; by not agreeing with him, in fact, we are only taking his work futher.

I venture to suggest provisionally an alternative chronological classification of periods of the history of Buddhism as follows :

(i) From 6th century B.C. to mid-third century B.C.
(ii) From mid-third century B.C. to mid-first century A.D.
(iii) From mid-first century A.D. to *circa* 300 A.D.
(iv) From *circa* 300 A.D. to *circa* 600 A.D.
(v) From *circa* 600 A.D. to *circa* 1000 A.D.
(vi) From *circa* 1000 A.D. to *circa* 1500 A.D.
(vii) From *circa* 1500 A.D. to *circa* 1950 A.D.
(viii) From *c.* 1950 A.D. to the present.

In suggesting this chronological division, I have avoided exact dates because they hardly work satisfactorily for determining periods of history anywhere. In the case of Buddhism, it is all the more advisable to avoid using absolute dates, not only because so few are known but also because Buddhism itself does not believe in the identity of absolute moments. And, I am willing to make minor adjustments by a few decades at the one or the other end, or even at both ends, of the units proposed.

In arriving at my classification I have tried to include in each period the great men, and remarkable events which by weight of their importance,

extended the universalistic character of Buddhism and ensured its continuation through time and space. There are gaps, but it is certainly not a story of continuing decline as the tradition would like us to believe. This periodisation, of which the doctrinal and sectarian growths, become parts, but not the determining factors as sought by Conze, in my opinion, should hold good for the total composite history of Buddhism.

The Fisrt Period naturally concerns itself with the milieu in which Gautama the Buddha was born and with the Śarmāṇa movement of Buddhism he led after his Bodhi. This also includes the first two Councils. The Second Period starts with the conversion of Aśoka and is concerned with his activities including the Third Council. It is also concerned with the participation of the foreign ethnics in South Asia as well as outside of it *e.g.* in Sri Lanka and in parts of Central Asia and West Asia. This was the first period of transnational interaction and that of Buddhism's emergence in a universal role. In the Third Period the interaction with external elements intensified and Buddhism began showing definitive results in a transnational context in various fields of human activity. This period includes the reign of Kanishka and the Fourth Council and it coinsides with what has been called 'the period of preparation' in the history of Buddhism in China. The Fourth Period witnessed the process of synthesis and classicism taking place in India and that of the 'domestication' of Buddhism in China. It was a period of maturity and intense intellectual activities. It ended with the end of the political and cultural unity obtaining in large parts of India and with the end of the period of disunity in China. In spite of disparate trends in the political and cultural history of China and India, the next period, the Fifth, exhibits common elements, or related developments, in both areas, *e.g.* the growth of Tantra in India and Ch'an in China. The vitality of the Fifth Period is shown by Buddhism's new conquest of Japan and Tibet, and its flourish in Central Asia, Korea and Sri Lanka. It is marked by the creative leadership of the T'ang in China, the Pāla in India and of Śri Vijaya in Indonesia. The Sixth Period may rightly be called 'the period of appropriation', both for China and India, the two nuclear areas, but of new vigor in other areas, like Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Tibet and Burma. The Seventh Period showed signs of inertia and insularity, and it witnessed the dominance of the Western powers in, and their withdrawal from, Asia. In this period Christianity and Buddhism met in a context different from their earliest encounter. Toward the end of the period, a process of revitalisation started almost everywhere and thus, by the beginning of the Eighth Period, *i.e.* after the last World War, Buddhism was ready to be studied against the background of a capitalist economy and industrial society as well as against the contracting world of speed and insecurity—but with new tools of understanding.

I can give descriptive titles to the periods of time mentioned above, but I do not insist on labelling them because that is not necessary. Moreover labelling may depend upon the orientation of various historians, their discipline, approach, emphasis and methodology; and, for that matter, I think once the chronological divisions are found to be generally workable one should have the freedom to label them according to one's judgement. Anyway, periodisation is only an initial problem of classification. It may be solved in a variety of ways. But it must be admitted that we cannot run away from it.

There are, however, other problems related to the content and context of the history

of Buddhism which require consideration or reconsideration because many new materials and methodologies have now become available. Unfortunately, far from discussing them here, we cannot even recount them all; only some of the questions may be listed.

Was Buddhism just a product of the sixth century B.C. in India, a period known for a world-wide ferment in the field of intellect and spirit? Was its origin rooted in still older times and trends and was it only a re-individualisation of a continuing process and tradition? Was it merely a reaction to, a dissent from, or a revolt against an existing philosophy of life and society, or was it an alternative, albeit counter, philosophy, standing on its own independent grounds? What were the dynamics of its transmission and dispersal? How were the roles shared among king, merchant and monk? Was Buddhism essentially elitist or populist? Or, did it form a bridge between the high and the low? Why has its leadership throughout history been, by and large, in the hands of the upper social strata, in spite of its egalitarianism? How is it that, while supporting the ideal of the Chakravarti and the principle of unification, Buddhism did not develop a centralised authority of the Saṁgha in India and elsewhere until much later, and that, too, only in some places? How did Buddhism flourish for so long without providing its own alternative system of social organisation and *rites de passage*? How far are the causes of the disappearance of Buddhism in India internal and how far external? Are their common denominators in the matter of its decline in India, China and elsewhere, and do they indicate some inherent weaknesses of Buddhism or the strength of the external factors? How is it that while the Buddhists suffered persecution there are hardly examples of persecution by them of others, in spite of the fact that Buddhism enjoyed sometimes very favourable royal patronage? How could, or did, Buddhism provide at times grounds for, and symbols of, legitimation of power and authority even though lacking its own specific rituals of consecration, etc.? Do the various revitalisation movements in the history of Buddhism in different regions indicate common factors? The list can go on.

Further, in addition to the problems of social, religious, and cultural history, there are many questions related to intellectual, literary and artistic currents, which have affected the movement of ideas and institutions, their formation and development and must be taken up in a wide-dimensioned history of Buddhism and treated through the various periods of its history. To what extent, for example, are such original and essential ideas as those of dependent origination, suffering and renunciation, non-absolutism and universal flux, Karma and rebirth, transfer of merit, individual freedom and universal friendliness reflected in the life and society of people and in their literature and art? It is not necessary for me to list more questions, but suffice it to say that a discussion of them will not only indicate the contribution of Buddhism to world history but will also help determine the phases through which its own history of two thousand and five hundred years has passed in the world covered by it and how the continuity has been maintained. I have neither the competence nor the desire to deal with many of the questions I have listed. For some I may venture to make a good resolution that I will tackle them as and when I get an opportunity to do so. But all encounters with history somehow begin with the beginnings or origin of its subject matter. This is my

justification for selecting the issue of the origins and background of Buddhism in what follows.

II

Buddhism too often has been treated as a dissent or reform movement in the history of that elusive system of socio-religious organisation which, in due course of time, became loosely known as "Hinduism", and of which, in an inscrutable manner, the Vedas still constitute a source of authority.[22] In my opinion, this is not correct. I consider Buddhism as a part of an independent tradition of indigenous origin, which antedated the Vedic Brāhmaṇic and was known as Śramaṇa. It is an irony of Indian history that Buddhism, and for that matter Jainism too, are regarded as heterodox against the heterogenous Vedism-an "Indo-European" gift to South Asia—which is taken as orthodox. This Śramaṇa tradition ran counter, and sometimes even parallel, to the Brāhmaṇa. It lay dormant and subdued for a period of almost one thousand years after its political and economic bases were destroyed by these incoming Indo-European speaking peoples, but survived in peripheral and refuge areas of India, until it started reacting on the Vedic people and their culture. The response in the Vedic camp to this older Śramaṇa tradition is reflected in the intellectual ferment of the Upanishads. It is not unlikely that some of the innovative ideas in the Upanishads owe their origin to the Śramaṇic sources. But, of course, credit must also go to the enlightened liberal elements among the Indianised "Aryans" for such a fruitful interaction. In fact, if we want to look for dissent or reform movements in the Vedic Brāhmaṇic form of "Hinduism", the right place to look for them is in the Upanishads and the Āraṇyakas. After all, dissents and protests, reforms and revolts are endemic in a social system and they are part of the internal mechanism; they arise from within on account either of internal or external pressures. The Śramaṇa tradition may at best claim to be only a part of the external pressures which inspired the Upanishadic dissents, reforms, or even revolts. Since Buddhism's roots did not lie in the Vedic Brāhmaṇa system, the question of its being a reform or rebel movement within that system does not arise. In fact, it is surprising that Upanishadic thought is not regarded as dissent or protest, but as a continuation of the Vedic ideology.

Further, to consider Buddhism as issuing out of the Upanishads[23] and as a phase in the evolution of the Upanishadic thought is also preposterous. It was, on the contrary, a downright external attack on it. For Buddhism, the Upanishadic views were *Micchā-diṭṭhī*. It is striking that the early Pāli texts hardly mention the Upanishads and their philosophers, even though there are several references to the views of the six teachers of pre-Buddhistic and contemporary thought. The fundamental query of almost all the Upanishads is about the nature of soul and its transmigration from one existence to another. Whereas in the Upanishads the existence of soul is taken for granted, its non-existence is basic to Buddhism.

What the Upanishads do is provide a record of the confrontation situation, the dialectics of the age, the meeting of various ways of life and thought. They do not represent one homogeneous thought arising from, and in elaboration of, the Vedic ethos, and, for that matter, I think, they need not even be taken wholly as an integral

part of the Vedic corpus. Their so-called Vedism is a later Brāhmaṇic acceptance of an agree-to-differ compromise, in a Brāhmaṇic bid to contain opposite ideas. Such concepts as Karma, Rebirth and Suffering, and such methods as Yoga formed an integral part of the thought and practice of the non-Vedic systems, and they were recorded in the Upanishads with or without qualification in so far as they attracted the attention of the Vedic drop-out elities and inquisitive adventurers-in-thought. It would be misleading to think of Buddhism, Jainism, and perhaps even of the original Śaivism,[24] as a product or continuation of the so-called Vedic-Upanishadic ideology.

Much of the problem has arisen because of the myth that Vedism was the fountainhead of the major aspects of the culture and civilisation of India, and because of the false assumption that, by about the middle of the first millennium B.C., the Brāhmaṇic norms had found general acceptance throughout the Indo-Gangetic plains. The fact of the matter, however, seems to be different. We know from the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* that, at least up to the 8th century B.C., the Vedic fire had not crossed the Sadānīrā river in the east; thus the whole area of the cultural geography of Buddhism and Jainism lay outside the Brāhmaṇa milieu. Although by the time of the Upanishads, newcomers expanding the frontiers eastward had grown sufficiently familiar with the interacting local traditions, the Brāhmaṇa looked upon a *yati*, *muni* or Śramaṇa with suspicion.[25] The latter, too, in turn, were not convinced of the merits and intentions of the Brāhmaṇa. The two groups headed naturally for a confrontation in the 6th century B.C., a significant period of intellectual and spiritual ferment throughout the world. While things were happening within the Vedic Brāhmaṇic camp, the Buddha, and other founders of similar new movements of the Śramaṇa tradition, a counter tradition, took the leadership roles with a view to gaining freedom from the encroaching system of a discriminatory class society. Buddhism provided an alternative system which had the advantage of being at once native and grassrooted. Whereas the dissenters within the Brāhmaṇic system could not afford to decry the Vedas, the keynote of Buddhism, and other similar movements, was that they did not recognise the Vedic authority, the Vedic ritual, the Vedic way of life, and above all the Brāhmaṇa supremacy. Moreover, Buddhism did not worry so much about social structure, hierarchy and institutions as about the personal problems of the individual and his way of life. The Arhat and the Pratyeka Buddha of early Buddhism were ideals meant for individuals, and it was only later that the ideal of the Bodhisattva, with much wider responsibility to society, was developed. Buddhism presented for the individual a way of life with an independent social ideology of renunciation and vigilant exertion, an ideology which ran counter to the Vedic Brāhmaṇic. This is why Buddhism's philosophy was not merely an exercise in abstraction, nor did it indulge in idle speculations on such questions as the origin and end of the world, or on the existence or otherwise of a God. On the contrary, its philosophy consisted either of an intellectualisation or rationalisation of the causal basis of the movement and its ideology; it demanded vigilance (*appamāda*) and asked for the practice of good conduct and meditation for achieving the goal. The two ideologies, the Śramaṇa and the Brāhmaṇa, represent, in fact, two independent Great Traditions. They sometimes confronted, and at other times ran parallel to, one another until, at times, they drew closer to help revitalise one another, and ultimately even to merge their identities. When the two Traditions came face to face in the first

phase of their confrontation they were, indeed, so hostile that even three hundred years after the Buddha, Patañjali, the Brāhmaṇa priest and grammarian, cited the "Śramaṇa-Brāhmaṇa" together with the "cat and mouse," the "dog and fox" and the "snake and mongoose" as illustrations of great hostility.[26] Several centuries later, Hemachandra, the Jain grammarian, repeated the same examples in the same context,[27] thus confirming the traditional hostility between the two, the bitterness of which found expression in the literatures of both traditions. It is misleading to accept a common origin for these two Traditions. It is, in fact, anachronistic, because the confluence, or the ocean, of "Hinduism" is a phenomenon of later times; and, just because all the streams meet there it does not mean that they do not have independent origins. Much confusion has been brought to the study of the history of Buddhism because of the confusion in "Hinduism" itself. If some have a tendency to find the ultimate solution in a consensus or a synthesis and co-existence theory, there are others who are used to an unilinear approach. Some can at best recognise only the model of one Great Tradition and many Little Traditions. But, if at all, here we are dealing with a model of at least *two* Great Traditions, with their own satellite little traditions, with varying loyalties and interacting with one another in a complex manner at various levels. Thus, the problem of the origin of Buddhism has suffered more from these attitudes and approaches, methodologies and models used in the interpretation of the sources than from the facts themselves.

The origin of Buddhism cannot be wholly explained only by answering whether or not it was a dissent or reform movement of "Hinduism". There are many causal considerations which were not known to the early historians and some of which have been taken notice of only recently.

Nothing has given a more shattering blow to the myth of the Vedic origin of the ethos of Indian culture than the archaeological findings of the last fifty years.[28] It is common knowledge now that the nature and quality of the material culture of South Asia before the advent of the authors of the Vedas were not only different, but also superior in many respects to, those represented in the latter. It is true that until the Harappan script is successfully deciphered our information on the philosophical bases and the belief system of the Indus valley civilisation will be far from complete. Yet, none has been able to ignore the visibility of the mysterious Muni on the seals of the first cities of South Asia. That Muni might represent a proto-Śiva or a Jina, or an Ādi Buddha, or an anthropomorphic form of a vegetal spirit, or even a combination of more than one element.[29] Be that as it may, the poise of the figure and transcendent quality of his personality certainly endue him with a super character that distinguishes him from ordinary human beings. His manner of sitting cross-legged has attracted everybody's attention and it is difficult to deny its association with meditation and asceticism. One cannot help coming to the conclusion that this "Yogi" was an integral and respected part, or an outgrowth, of the civilisation and traditions of the first cities of India. We may recognise in him a symbol of what later on became known as the Śramaṇa tradition.

The significance of the association of this tradition with urbanism cannot be underestimated. It is more than coincidance that leaders of this tradition become visible again only after the second spurting up of cities takes place in northern India. It is

also not without significance that in the pastoral culture of the Vedic people there were no Śramaṇas and that the authors of the Vedas looked down upon the Yatis and the Munis. The conclusion seems irresistible that the Śramaṇa tradition is intimately linked with the cities which rose on account of new technological developments, surplus agricultural produce and resultant growth of trade and commerce. This urbanism led to material prosperity, conflict situations arising out of the problem of demand and supply, reaction against the mechanisms of affluence, suffering on account of tensions of life and insecurity of the person, and also to a concern for the preservation of the fauna and flora, which were being destroyed by the rise of cities and self-indulgent, savage rituals and games. All these factors were indeed sufficient to drive some out of the cities to wander forth in search of an end to suffering, and others to seek help from those who exerted and found means to alleviate the pain. The householders and merchants of the cities, and kings and courtesans alike, therefore, respected the Śramaṇas and supported them. The Śramaṇa tradition was in a way a natural concomitant, or an outgrowth, of the urban culture. (The present reaction against the affluent society and economy in the West is only a new reminder of this feature.) In the milieu of the pastoral culture of the Vedic people there was no scope for it. The Śramaṇa did not belong there. But after, and to a large extent because of, the second spurting up of the cities in the 7th-6th centuries B.C., in the central and eastern parts of northern India, those conditions emerged again in which the new representative movements of the Śramaṇa system could rise and flourish, though this time in the Gaṅgā valley instead of the Indus.[30] This is not the place for me to examine the details of the causal factors which led to this second urbanisation or its link, or otherwise, with the processes of material culture of the other regions of South Asia. Archaeologists are deeply engaged now in the pursuit of such relevant problems as the discovery and use of iron, ecology, the introduction of plough cultivation, rice culture, the industry of pottery and its distribution, and the nature and interaction of various material cultures and their authorships. While we must wait for the results of their investigations, here we are concerned with the *consequence* of this urban development rather than with its *cause*. We may, however, note in passing that the Vedic people had by now ceased to be the barbarian destroyers of cities they originally were in the northwest, and that their tribal society and polity had already yielded to territorial life style, organisation and ambitions. And so, the "Aryans" as well as the "Non-Aryans" had become exposed to the hazards and tensions, albeit the benefits too, of the new urban life and its material affluence. No wonder both elements of the population were receptive to the Buddha and other leaders of the Śramaṇa system of thought.

The urban basis of Buddhism is overwhelmingly clear from the fact that most of the *vassāvāsa* of the Buddha were spent in the cities, and for that matter in the chief ones of the various States of the time. Most of the sermons recorded in the Pāli *Nikāyas* were delivered in large cities like Rājgaha, Sāvatthi and Kosambi.[31] The appeal of his doctrine primarily to men of urban background is unmistakable. It is revealing that as many as 71% of the monks and nuns listed in the *Thera* and *Theri Gāthā* came from urban areas and nearly 86% came from the four great cities of the time, Sāvatthi, Rājgaha, Kapilavatthu and Vesāli. Of the other cities 6 belonged to Sāket, 5 each to Kosambi, Vārāṇasi and Ujjeni, 4 to Champā, 3 to Pāṭaliputra, 2 to Bharukaccha and

1 to Suppāraka.[32] So also the tradition that Ānanda was concerned as to where the Buddha should enter Mahāparinirvāṇa, and that he listed the big cities as possible locations for it,[33] are again significant pointers to the urban association. The Pāli texts are replete with references that indicate the involvement of the Buddha and his disciples with the urban society and its problems. A large number of monks and nuns belonged to the upper classes of society. Many of them came from the Rājakulas and the Setthi class. About 51% of those mentioned in the *Thera* and *Theri-Gāthā* came from the Khattiya and Vessa classes and about 40% from among the Brāhmaṇa, out of whom about 20% were the wealthy ones, the Brāhmaṇa *Mahāsālas*.[34] The concern of the Buddha, on the one hand, for the new nobility, the burgeoning merchants and the flourishing *mahāsālas* and *gahapatis*—both of Brāhmaṇa and non-Brāhmaṇa categories—and on the other hand such alienated products of the new urbanism as the women who took to the prostitution, like Āmrapāli, or the robber Angulimāla, cannot be missed in his teachings. It also is interesting to note that some of the earliest descriptions of the planning and architecture of the cities of this second period of urban growth are found in Buddhist and Jain sources, not in the Brāhmaṇic.

By showing the urban connection of Buddhism, and for that matter of the Śramaṇa movement as whole, I do not mean to deny its vital environmental source of inspiration and wisdom. After all, the Buddha and the other Munis of the Śramaṇa tradition received their enlightenment not in the cities and its palaces but in the sylvan suburbs and forests. The honey of peace and wisdom was collected by these Śramaṇa bees far from the maddening crowd of the cities, where of course it was naturally much in demand by the tormented beings. It is true that the Śramaṇas delivered the goods to their urban clients in their *vassāvāsa* and received patronage and, in return, injected the urbanites with the amount of spiritualism necessary for the relief of their materially-based tensions. But two-thirds of the year, after all, they did their *chārikā* outside the urban environment, and in these journeys they frequented many villages. To be sure, among the outstanding disciples of the Buddha, Sāriputta and Moggalāna came from rural areas.[35] It would be wrong to say that Buddhism was of no appeal to the villagers or was not meant for them. Human problems and suffering are not confined to urban boundaries. In fact, Buddhism provided a bridge between the city and the village. The cities depended upon the farmers and their produce; they cannot be imagined without their rural base. Buddha was in rapport with the farmers and was welcome in the villages because he spoke in their language. In the cities he was liked, and listened to, because he did not speak their language; he spoke a different language, revealing and refreshing in so far as it gave them a moment of peace.

I should make it clear that by suggesting the non-Vedic and ante-Vedic origins of Buddhism I do not mean that its doors were closed to the Brāhmaṇa social group. Apart from the fact that by its very Śramaṇa nature and background no social groups were debarred from joining the fold of the Buddha, it is indeed interesting to note that the first major group to be converted by the Buddha after his enlightenment was that of the Jaṭilas, led by the Brāhmaṇa Kashyapa.[36] One has only to go through the Pāli canonical literature to see how strong in number were the Brāhmaṇa followers of the Buddha who had rejected the claim of their Brāhmaṇahood by birth. It has been shown that over 40% of the leading monks and nuns taken together belonged to the Brāhmaṇa

caste.[37] Many of the key personalities of Buddhism through its history in India came from this social group. But this does not mean that Buddhism in its origin was linked with the Vedic Brāhmaṇic tradition or with the Upanishads and that it was a dissent or a reform movement. What it shows is that these Brāhmaṇas who joined the Buddha were themselves dissenters, rebels or drop-outs, and they strengthened the Śramaṇa movement by lending their support to Buddhism or other such groups.

So, also, if one is struck by the use of the word "Ārya" in the Buddhist texts one has to be careful. Not only are the Four Noble Truths are referred to as *Ariyasaccāni*, but even the Sākyas claimed to belong to the same Okkāka descent as king Pasendi of Kosala.[38] But here again I should warn that the word *ārya* is not used in the ethnic sense but in the sense of "cultured", "civilized", as against the *puthujjana*, *gāmadhammika*, and such other expressions denoting the common man. In fact, it is high time the whole myth of the Āryan people and their so-called problems are buried. But, if for the sake of an argument we accept even for a moment that Siddhārtha and his father Śuddhodana belonged to the Āryan ethnic group, the Buddhist Śramaṇa movement need not for that reason be considered as Vedic Āryan. It is just a case of another drop-out from the Vedic Āryan joining the tradition of an earlier origin, a person of another social group and background providing leadership to a movement which derived its origin and inspiration from a tradition quite different and hostile to his own.

Similarly the discussion of, and importance given to, the Kshatriyas in the Buddhist and Jain texts have been overemphasised in favor of the dissent theory. Buddhism and Jainism have been even taken as Kshatriya revolts against Brāhmaṇa pre-eminence. But here again this may be misleading. Attention may be drawn to a derivation of the word *Khattiya* in Pāli as *Khettānam patīti Khattiya*,[39] which means that the Kshatriyas were known as such also because they were lords of farm lands. This interpretation is significant. The increased availability of new land and its economic potential in the sixth century B.C., a factor relevant to the second urban growth, led to a scramble for its possession, and the Kshatriya, who knew how to fight well, was naturally the first to take advantage of the new opportunity and he became the lord of the new land in the eastward extending frontiers of the Gaṅgā valley. He had already the coercive power of the *daṇḍa*; now he also got the economic control. What else was needed to acquire the social pre-eminence ! The Buddhists and the Jains were only being realistic in recognising the priority of the Kshatriya in the existing Indian social order. The Buddhists who were the first to propose a form of social contract theory for explaining the origin of kingship and the first to reject any divine interference by Brahmā or Vishṇu, were by no means interested in the supremacy of the Brāhmaṇa priesthood. After all, even the land which the Brāhmaṇa received and which might make him a *mahāsāla* was in most cases a gift to him. By praising the pre-eminence of the Kshatriya, the Śramaṇas were only telling the truth and emphasising their relatively important role of leadership as well as of protecting the society as a whole, albeit ensuring by such praise Kshatriya support and patronage for themselves.

To conclude let me restate briefly that,

(i) Buddhism was a part of the Śramaṇa tradition, as Jainism, etc.
(ii) The Śramaṇa tradition was much older than the Vedic Brāhmaṇa, and was a

counter tradition that had nothing in common with the latter.

(iii) Buddhism did not come out of the Vedic Āryan milieu in any form and it did not evolve out of Upanishadic thought, as very commonly believed.

(iv) The Śramaṇa tradition was a response to the growth of cities, a phenomenon which had existed even before the coming of the authors of the Vedic tradition. Various movements of the Śramaṇa tradition emerged from the very first cities of India. These movements lay dormant in the period of the decline of cities. Buddhism arose out of one of them, and was ultimately linked in its origin with the second spurting up of the cities in the Gaṅgā valley.

(v) From its very beginning Buddhism served the needs of the urbanites, the land-owners, the merchants and of the ruling class, though it was grassrooted and in tune with nature and the human mind.

III

In discussing an aspect of the genesis of Buddhism and its urban association, I have touched upon only one of the issues of the First Period of the history of Buddhism. The fact of the origin of Buddhism is limited by its geography. But it would be interesting to examine the fact of its urban and other associations in a much wider context of space. Buddhism was internal to India and external to China. They provide interesting models for a rewarding comparative and contrastive study. The urban connections of Buddhism and its relationships with the ruling and mercantile classes are features available in both places. Just as Buddhism ran counter to the Brāhmaṇic establishment in India, it did so to the Confucian in China. Also, in a way, what Taoism was in relation to Buddhism in China, Jainism was in relation to Buddhism in India. The 'barbarians' who invaded China after the Hans and the ones who invaded India after the Mauryas both patronised Buddhism and sought legitimation of their authority through Buddhism. The link of Buddhism with the land-owning class and the implications of the land grants to the Buddhist monasteries are fruitful topics for comparison. So also, appropriation of Buddhism in China and India as well as the revitalisation movements are useful subjects of the history of Buddhism in transnational and comparative perspective. The currents and cross-currents of intellectual curiosity and philosophic speculations running through various countries form vital links in the history of Buddhism and may be studied in a wider perspective than hitherto. The task is challenging but it is bound to be rewarding.

FOOTNOTES

1. A.K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism* (Delhi-Patna-Varanasi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1970).
2. Joseph Edkins, *Chinese Buddhism* (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1983, reprinted by Paragon Book Reprint Corp. New York, 1968).
3. Charles N.E. Eliot, *Japanese Buddhism* (London, 1935, reprinted 1959).
4. E.G.E.W. Adikaram, *Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon* (Colombo, M.D. Gunasena & Co. Ltd., 2nd impression 1953) and Walpole Radhula, *History of Buddhism in Ceylon : The Anuradhapura Period* (Colombo, M.D. Gunasena & Co. Ltd., 2nd edition 1968).

5. Kenneth K.S. Ch'en, *Buddhism in China, a Historical Survey* (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1972), E. Zürcher, *The Buddhist Conquest of China*, 2 vols. (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 2nd edn., 1972).

5 a. E. Dale Saunders, *Buddhism in Japan* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964).

6. L.A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet or Lamaism* (Cambridge, W. Heffer & Sons, 1934) D.L. Snellgrove, *Buddhist Himalaya* (Oxford, Bruno Cassirer, 1957) H. Hoffmann, *The Religions of Tibet* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1961) E. Schlagintaweit, *Buddhism in Tibet* (1863, reprinted London, Susil Gupta, 1968).

7. Niharranjan Ray, *An Introduction to the Study of Theravāda Buddhism in Burma* (Calcutta, University of Calcutta, 1946).

8. E.J. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought* (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 2nd edn. 1951, 1st edn. 1933), E. Conze, *Buddhism : Its Essence and Development* (London, New York, 1951), *Buddhist Thought in India* (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962).

9. *e.g.* E. Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien : des origines a l'ére Saka* (Louvain, 1958) covers only up to 1st century A.D.; E. Zürcher, *op. cit.*, covers only the period from the first to the fifth century A.D. and deals with the main aspects of the particular type of Buddhism which developed in Southern China *i.e.* Gentry Buddhism; Walpola Rahula, *op. cit.*, deals only with the Anuradhapura period, *i.e.* from third century B.C. to 10th century A.D.

10. *e.g.*, Richard H. Robinson, *The Buddhist Religion, A Historical Introduction*, (Belmont, CA, Dickenson Publishing Company, Inc. 1970), E. Zürcher, *Buddhism, Its Origins and Spread in Words, Maps and Pictures* (New York, St. Martin Press, 1962); Edward Conze, *A Short History of Buddhism* (Bombay, Chetanā Ltd., 1960).

11. E.J. Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. ix.

12. E. Conze, *A Short History of Buddhism*, pp. x-xi.

13. R. H. Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

14. Most of the publications on this occasion were nothing more than regional surveys of Buddhism on parochial or sectarian lines. One of the exceptions is *2500 Years of Buddhism* ed. by P.V. Bapat (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Delhi, Publications Division, 1956, 1959).

15. Conze, *op. cit.*, p. xi.

16. *Ibid.*, p. xii

17. *Ibid.*, p. x.

18. For example such works as *Dīpavamsa, Mahāvaṁsa, Sāsanavaṁsa, Theragāthā, Therīgāthā* and the Chinese biographies of eminent Buddhist monk scholars.

19. See L.S. Perera, "The Pali Chronicles of Ceylon", pp. 29 ff.; A.K. Warder, "The Pali Canon and Its Commentaries as an Historical Record", pp. 44 ff.; C.E. Godakumbura, "Historical Writing in Sinhalese", pp. 72 ff. in C.H. Philips, *Historians of India, Pakistan and Ceylon* (London, Oxford University Press, 1961). See also the remarks of C.H. Philips in his introduction, p. 4.

20. E. Conze, *op. cit.*, pp. x-xi.

21. *Ibid.*, p. x.

22. E.J. Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 2; A.K. Warder, *op. cit.*, ch. 2; G.C. Pande, *Origin of Buddhism* (Allahabad, 1957), pp. 251 ff.; V.P. Varma, *Early Buddhism and Its Origins* (Delhi, 1973), pp. 41 ff.; Kenneth Ch'en, *op. cit.*, pp. 3 ff.; J.M. Kitagawa, *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropaedia* (Chicago, 1979) Vol. 3 p. 403; R.H. Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 10; T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Conception of Buddhism* (London, 1955) p. 20.

23. S. Radhakrishnan, Foreword to P.V. Bapat, *op. cit.*

24. I consider Śaivism as the earliest appropriation of a Śramaṇa sect by the Brāhmaṇa. It is interesting to note the later close relationship between Śaivism and Buddhism both in India and outside.

25. See Haripada Chakrabarti, *Asceticism in Ancient India*, (Calcutta, Punthi Pustak, 1973) for references.

26. The *Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali* edited by F.L. Kielhorn. Third edn. revised and enlarged by MM. K.V. Abhyankar. (Poona, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1962). Vol. I, p. 476.

27. *Siddhahemacandra* III, 1, 141.

28. In addition to the vast amount of material, and discussion thereon available on the Harappan and related cultures there are now ample evidence for the material cultures of various parts of the Gaṅgā valley which have come to light during the last two decades. See A. Ghosh, *The City in Early Historical India* (Simla, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1973); D.P. Agrawal and A. Ghosh, *Radiocarbon and Indian Archaeology* (Bombay, Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, 1973); H.D. Sankalia. *The Prehistory and Protohistory of India and Pakistan*, 2nd edn. (Poone, Deccan College, 1974). Vibha Tripathi, *The Painted Grey Ware*, (Delhi, Concept Publishing Co. 1976). D.P. Agrawal and B.M. Pande, *Ecology and Archaeology of Western India* (Delhi, Concept Publishing Co. 1977). D.P. Agrawal and Dilip K. Chakrabarti, *Essays in Indian Protohistory*, (Delhi, B.R. Publishing Corp. 1979) Gregory Possehl, *Ancient Cities of the Indus* (Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1979). See also the preliminary reports of excavations in *Indian Archaeology : A Review* of the Archaeological Survey of India and such reports of the excavated sites published by the excavators as on Kausambi, Rajghat, Vaisali, Kumrahar, Rajgir and others and the discussions on Painted Grey, Ochre Colour, Black & Red, and N.B.P. wares in the *Purātattva, Bulletin of the Indian Archaeological Society of India.*

29. The best known identification and the oft quoted one is with Paśupati, a form of Śiva. But the Jains have claimed him too. Recently A.H. Dani in one of his lectures at the University of Wisconsin suggested that the figure might well represent an anthropomorphic form of a vegetal spirit. The three heads and the horn indicate combination of more than one element.

30. It is interesting to note that so far we have practically no evidence, literary or archaeological, for the spurting up of cities in the Indus region during the 7th-6th centuries B.C. with the exception of Taxila and Charsadda.

31. See B.G. Gokhale, "The Early Buddhist Elite", *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. XLIII, Pt. II (1965), pp. 391 ff, for this and other useful statistical information for relevant discussion.

32. B.G. Gokhale, *op. cit.*, p. 401.

33. T.W. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Pt. II, p. 161.

34. B.G. Gokhale, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 394 fn. 7.

36. *Vinaya Piṭaka*, I. p. 24.

37. B.G. Gokhale, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

38. G.P. Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pali Proper Names*, Vol. I, p. 462, doubts if Okkāka of Pali sources meant Ikshvaku of the puraṇas.

39. T.W. Rhys, Davids, The Pali Text Society's *Pali-English Dictionary*, s.v. *Khetta*. See *Dīghanikāya*, (P.T.S. edn), III, 93.

1

Motivations to Social Action in Theravada Buddhism : Uses and Misuses of Traditional Doctrines[1]

HARVEY B. ARONSON

IN CEYLON over the last four hundred years, and in both Burma and Thailand over the last two hundred years, the traditional role of the Buddhist monastic community has undergone a complete change.[2] Earlier, the Buddhist monastic community was the major educational institution, serving the population at large in royal, urban, and rural settings. The life of the monk-educator was held in high esteem, and it thus attracted creative and talented individuals. The Buddhist community also served the cause of national unity by vocally supporting righteous rulers among the polity at large.[3] This support was reciprocated by royal patronage of the monastic community.

The monks' educational activities were based on Buddha's injuction to the monks to go out into the world and teach dharma out of sympathy for the world, out of concern for the welfare and happiness of the multitudes.[4] In their teachings, monks would try to inspire laymen to become monks, or teach them how to achieve material success in this world and a pleasurable rebirth after death.[5] In the South Asian Buddhist communities, a young man often would spend a few years in a monastery as part of the process of growing up.

The intimate relationship between the monastic community and the ruling monarchies suffered a mortal blow with the arrival of Western colonists and the advent of the modern period. This period also saw the end of the monks' monopoly in education. In Burma and Ceylon, the path to success no longer was through monastic education, but through Christian missionary schools with their Western curricula. During the same period, Thailand began to set up state-run schools following the Western model. Creative, ambitious individuals no longer looked to the monastery as a viable institution but rather to the missionary or state school which would lead to a career in either business or the civil service.

Over the years, these historical trends have taken their toll, and today the Buddhist

monastic community finds itself in a weakened position. On the practical level, its formerly dominant role in education has been destroyed.The classical monastic curriculum, with its traditional approach to Pali, Sanskrit, Grammar, and History, is inadequate to the needs of our time. It leaves the monks out of the race to attract students who are interested in an education attuned to the issues of the modern period. The Christian and state schools have been much more responsive to these needs. As a consequence of the above trends, the monastic community is failing to attract the dynamic individuals that it needs, and this is having a debilitating effect.[6]

If Buddhism is to maintain a vigorous lay and monastic community, it must come to grips with the vast array of practical and idological challenges that are facing it from the forces of secularism, Marxism, and Christianity. The close relationship between the Christian church and the colonial regimes gave Christianity a circumstantial edge over Buddhism that it no longer enjoys. It can safely be said that the more serious threats to Buddhism come from secularism and Marxism. Of the many complex issues that confront Buddhism because of the ascendency of other religions and ideologies, two that are receiving much attention today are, *a*) the scope, and *b*) the motivation for social activism in Buddhism. Since the monks have lost their traditional role in education, they must now decide what types of activities to pursue. Should they become farmers or doctors—members of professions traditionally proscribed—or should they update their educational skills and teach languages, philosophy, and mental culture in a modern way, thereby competing with the state and Christian educational institutions?[7] These questions are being addressed today in South Asia,[8] and their resolution will be fateful for the Buddhist religion. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to pursue these *practical* questions within the confines of this paper. However, these issues are worthy of sustained critical attention from those who are interested in the Buddhist community.

A consequence of Buddhist contact with other ideologies and a corollary of the search for proper practical expression of social concern is a renewed interest among South Asian Buddhists in the *doctrinal basis* for social concern and activity. This renewed interest is, in part, a response to the implicit and explicit challenges from the secular, Marxist, and Christian camps, which question whether there is in Buddhist doctrine even the theoretical possibility of social concern or social activity.[9] These challenges to Buddhist theory take on more importance today precisely because of the dormant state of the Buddhist monastic community's social activity. To ward off these challenges, it is necessary for Buddhist leaders to articulate clearly the doctrinal basis for social concern and social activity that is found in the Buddhist canon. This at least they must do, to stay in competition for the hearts and minds of the people. A clear articulation of the motivations for social activity will complement and facilitate the difficult task of ascertaining the proper ways of expressing social concern in the modern world.

In the effort to articulate Buddhist motivations for social activity, several Buddhist leaders have cited the terms "love" (*mettā*), and "compassion" (*karuṇā*). Venerable Bhikkhu Paññānanda, one of Thailand's most famous monks, considers love and compassion to be the basis for an altruistic social activism. He says that love and compassion together (*mettā-karuṇā*) constitute a "love that is self-sacrificing and self-forgetting, a love that '*helps one's neighbor* [emphasis added]."[10] Colonel Pin Mutugan, of the Thai Department of Religion in the Ministry of Education, "describes *mettā-karuṇā* together as sacrificial and *self-giving love* [emphasis added], the kind of love a parent has toward

his child in contrast to a selfish love whose concern for others is only in terms of one's own self-aggrandizement."[11] He adds that when men can conquer selfish attachment, love becomes "*useful* [emphasis added] and beneficial."[12] Venerable Nyanaponika Thera, the eminent editor of the Buddhist Publication Society of Sri Lanka, says that love and compassion are "a sublime nobility of heart and intellect which knows, understands, and is *ready to help* [emphasis added]."[13] Finally, U. Thittila, a prominent Burmese monk, says, "The Pali word Metta means literally...friendliness...also love without desire to possess but *with a desire to help* [emphasis added]..."[14]

In an attempt to judge the scriptural justification for these modern claims concerning the helpfulness of love and compassion, and in order to ascertain the full scriptural presentation of the motivations for social action, I have investigated the material on social attitude and motivation found in the first four collections of the Theravada discourses of the Buddha and their related commentaries.[15] These discourses represent a relatively homogeneous body of material dating back to about the fourth century B.C.[16] The commentaries systematized by Buddhaghoṣa in the fifth century A.D. represent the basis for much of Theravada Buddhism today. Significant material on social attitudes can be found in the discourses on "love", "compassion", "simple compassion" (*kāruñña*), and "sympathy" (*anukampā*). Each of these will be discussed in turn.

A. Love and Compassion

Love is epitomized by the heart-felt wish, "May all beings be happy."[17] In the discourses, apart from one instance where "love" is used metaphorically, the feminine noun *mettā*/"love" always is qualified or contextualized in such a way as to indicate that love at the level of access concentration or absorption is intended.[18] In other words, the material on love is strictly limited to the meditative cultivation of the *wish* for others' welfare. Love is particularly recommended for abandoning anger and preventing its recurrence.[19] In fact, it is the practitioner's ability to quiet anger with love that is the indication that he has succeeded in cultivating love properly.[20] One who cultivates universal love at the level of absorption gains eleven rewards : (1) He sleeps well; (2) dreams pleasant dreams; (3) wakes up easily; (4) he is dear to humans; (5) nonhumans; (6) the deities protect him; (7) he quickly concentrates his mind; (8) his complexion is radiant; (9) he is not affected by fire, poison, or weapons; (10) he dies unconfused; and (11) if he has no higher achievement than his love, then at death he ascends to the pleasurable world of Brahmā.[21] One who develops love in absorption can use the resultant purified state of mind to develop insight into the nature of conditioned phenomena.[22]

The discourses elaborate on the subjective characteristics and benefits of developing concentrated love. *In the discourses, love is never described or prescribed as the motive for social activity.* To those who associate love with a recipient-oriented fraternalism, it may be something of a jolt to become acquainted with the Theravada usage of this term, which is subject-oriented. However, the recognition of the dimensions of love in the Theravada ethical framework *along with* the other major pieces of that framework will prevent the shock that might otherwise result from a too-facile comparison of words from different cultural contexts. It must be remembered that though love is the wish

for others' welfare, it is not cited as a motive for social activity. In Theravada Buddhism, not every social attitude is discussed in terms of social activity. Those attitudes that do lead to social activity will be discussed below. Here, it should be noted that those modern authors who claim that "love" leads to activity for others are not reflecting the actual usage of this term in the discourses.

"Compassion" (*karuṇā*) is epitomized by the heartfelt wish, "May all beings be free from suffering."[23] In the discourses, the feminine noun *karuṇā*/"compassion" always is qualified or contexualized in such a way as to indicate that compassion at the level of access concentration or absorption is intended.[24] The material on compassion is limited strictly to the meditative cultivation of the *wish* that others be free from suffering. If a practitioner cultivates compassion at the level of absorption, he will be rewarded with visions of Brahmā in this life and rebirth in the world of Brahmā after death.[25] Compassion is particularly recommended for abandoning harmfulness.[26] The practitioner's ability to quiet harmfulness through the cultivation of compassion is the mark of his successful cultivation of compassion.[27] The eleven benefits that arise through the cultivation of universal love at the level of absorption are said to arise as well through the cultivation of compassion.[28] Compassion also can be used as a basis for insight.[29] *In the discourses, compassion is never described or prescribed as the motive for social activity.* Like "love", "compassion" is a social attitude that is not discussed in terms of social activity. What was said about possible preconceptions concerning the usage of the term "love" applies equally to the usage of the term "compassion". It is important to note that those modern authors who claim that "compassion" leads to social activity are not reflecting the actual usage of this term in the discourses.

B. "Simple Compassion", "Sympathy"

The Theravada teachings on "simple compassion" (*kāruñña*), though few in number, do offer some guiding principles for social action.[30] In contrast to the feminine noun *karuṇā*/"compassion", which refers only to concentrated states of mind, the neuter *kāruñña*/"simple compassion" is not qualified in such a way as to indicate that it refers to a specific level of concentration. In other words, "simple compassion" is not a technical term—it can refer to any level or strength of compassion, and generally seems to refer to unconcentrated compassion. The usage of "simple compassion" is sufficiently different from the usage of "compassion" to warrant separate consideration of these terms. Whereas the discourse material on "compassion" entails no discussion of social activity, the material on "simple compassion" does entail such discussions. Simple compassion motivated Buddha to survey the world after his enlightenment, to see if there were beings ready to be taught the path he had discovered.[31] He discovered that there were such beings, and he committed himself to his career of teaching. In a similar fashion, it is said that simple compassion motivated Kassapa to teach others.[32]

The most illustrative use of "simple compassion" occurs in the description of an incident in which Ānanda stood by quietly when the monk Udāyin stubbornly and erroneously contradicted on a point of doctrine the more elder and learned Sāriputta.[33] When Gotama heard of this he chided Ānanda :

Ānanda will you look on when a monk who is an Elder is being bothered?

> Will there be no simple compassion [in you] for an Elder monk who is being bothered?[34]

The commentary states :

> With regard to this, the meaning is : 'Ānanda, I do not approve or accept your conduct of looking on when an Elder monk is being bothered.' Why did the Fortunate One speak in this way just to the Elder Ānanda? Because he was the dharma-treasure-guard. It is the dharma-treasure-guard's duty to control an individual who speaks in that way. Also, this was his duty just because he was the Elder Sāriputta's companion. In this context, it should be understood that whatever the Fortunate One said in this way reproaching Ānanda was a reproach not just to him, but to all the individuals who were present as well.[35]

Gotama's instructions to Ānanda can be understood as applicable to all Buddhists. In fact, the commentary points out that Gotama included in his exhortation all the "individuals" (*bhūta*) present, not just Ānanda or the monks (*bhikkhu*). Besides Ānanda's special obligations as dharma-treasure-guard, he had obligations (*bhāra*) of companionship (*sahāya*). These obligations dictate that an individual should not stand idly by when his companion is being bothered. Rather, simple compassion should move the individual to intervention. This teaching on "simple compassion" should certainly be considered carefully by those who wish to expose the canonical teachings on the motivations to social action.

It is the Theravada teachings on "sympathy" (*anukampā*) that present the greatest amount of material on the motivation to social activity. "Sympathy" is variously defined as the preliminary aspect of love,[36] tender-mindedness,[37] tender care,[38] and simple compassion.[39] Though "sympathy" is semantically related to "love" and "compassion," it is kept doctrinally distinct from these terms. "Sympathy", and the words and phrases that tend to occur along with it, are not meditative terms. There are no instructions that relate sympathy to the verb "cultivate" (*bhāveti*), which figures so prominently in instructions on meditation.[40] "Sympathy" is not qualified by other terms or contexts in such a way as to indicate that it refers to one specific attitude at a specific level of strength. It is not a technical term.[41] "Sympathy" refers to a broad spectrum of fraternal concerns at *any* level or strength. It generally seems to refer to unconcentrated states of mind. The audience Buddha addressed understood the notion of sympathy.[42] It was an emotion easily discovered in their experience. Gotama justified the cultivation of love by the great number of benefits that this cultivation brings, but he did not feel it necessary to justify sympathy. Sympathy never was justified by present or future reward, or in relation to some higher ethical principle. Its justification was self-evident.[43] Sympathy was to Buddha's ethics what the first cause was to Aquinas' theology.

Sympathy motivated all of the activities of the Bodhisattva, from his commitment to become a Buddha to his realization of the four noble truths and Buddhahood.[44] After his enlightenment, Buddha continued his religious life "[out of concern] for the welfare of the multitudes, [out of concern] for the happiness of the multitudes, out of sympathy for the world...."[45] The primary manifestation of Gotama's concern and

sympathy for others was his teaching. His teaching was timely, purposeful, and truthful, but not always immediately pleasurable.[46] Gotama, motivated by sympathy, took an especially active interest in the lives of the neophytes.[47]

Gotama lived an active live, suffused with sympathy, and he urged his monks to do the same. He exhorted them to undertake practices leading to nirvana out of concern for the welfare and happiness of the multitudes and out of sympathy for the world.[48] In achieving personal religious progress, the monks would be able to exemplify for others the contentment, balance, and satisfaction that comes from the religious life. Furthermore, those monks who made progress would have the proper experiential base for conveying the teachings to others. Gotama, in fact, urged the monks to go out into the world and teach others out of concern for their welfare and happiness and out of sympathy for them.[49] Within this context, we can see that both personal practice and active instruction of others are equally valid expressions of sympathy. It can be noted here that, in general, the word "monk" (*bhikkhu*) can mean "any individual who is practicing."[50] Thus, Gotama's exhortation to the monks to cultivate the religious life leading to nirvana out of sympathy for others, and his exhortation to the monks to teach others out of sympathy would be applicable to all Buddhist practitioners.

The importance of these two exhortations for understanding the canonical teachings on social concern and social activity cannot be underestimated. To date, these exhortations have not been emphasized by modern South Asian Buddhist authors,[51] and it is unfortunate that some Western scholars too have missed their importance.[52] It is by ignoring Gotama's instructions to the monks to both practice and teach out of sympathy, and by ignoring the historical records of Buddhist clerical activity, that one modern author can say :

> The holier a [Theravada Buddhist] person is, the more he turns from physical action goodwill toward those few persons he might thus affect, to radiated goodwill to all creatures in the universe. Indeed there is a deep distrust of physical action good will and social service....[53]

The life of wandering and teaching undertaken by Gotama after his enlightenment involved him in "physical action" and "social service" for others, Gotama actively propagated his teachings for forty-eight years after his enlightenment and exhorted his disciples to follow his example. Historical records show that his followers did so quite actively until the advent of the modern period.[54] If a Buddhist really should "turn from physical action goodwill," Gotama, the holiest Buddhist, upon becoming enlightened, would have withdrawn to a cave and kept his mouth shut; none of us would be discussing the Buddhist religion today. While it is true that the Buddhist monastic system is weakened today, there is no reason to lose sight of the doctrinal bases for its social concern and activity, found in the teachings on simple compassion and sympathy.[55]

Why did Gotama describe his own social orientation as "sympathy" and prescribe a similar orientation for others? Why did he not use "love" or "compassion" to describe his orientation toward others? "Love" and "compassion" are meditative terms. If Gotama had used these meditative terms to describe the fundamental motivation necessary for the religious life of practice and teaching, those with little or no meditative ability or experience might have felt closed off from that way of life. He wished to avoid that so he never used those terms to describe the motivation necessary for the religious life. In

describing his own motivation for leading the religious life, and the motivation necessary in others, he talked of sympathy and concern for others, welfare and happiness. The discussions of motivation did not require of the audience experience in meditation, an inclination to meditation, or an acquaintance with meditative terms. The motivation was accessible to a broad range of individuals. Insofar as sympathy and concern for others' happiness and welfare are never justified in terms of some higher purpose, we can understand that these attitudes were acceptable in and of themselves as motives for fraternally-oriented activity.

Sympathy for others and concern for their happiness and welfare are primary motivations for the Buddhist path, and they require no meditative development. In the traditional Theravada teachings on sympathy for others and concern for their happiness and welfare, modern lay and monastic South Asian Buddhists can find the fullest treatment of the religious motives for beneficial social activity. It is clear that *teaching* was Gotama's preferred manner of expressing sympathy. This preference has survived in the community of monks. Today, the question is whether the traditional forms of teaching are any longer the only viable expressions of sympathy and if not, what are.[56] The problems involved in determining valid clerical expressions of social concern are many. It is clear, however, that there are in the canon teachings on the motivations to beneficial social activity, and that more attention must be paid to an accurate articulation of these teachings as the framework for choosing expressions of social concern.

C. Conclusion

In the discourses, "love" and "compassion" are discussed in terms of their personal, psychological, and soteriological benefits. To seek in the discourses on "love" and "compassion" for teachings on the motivation to social action is to seek in vain.[57] For modern South Asian Buddhists, to take "love" and "compassion" as the basis for an ethic of social concern is to ignore their actual usage and to give them a field of application that they lack in the original canon. The teachings on love and compassion were directed to those practitioners with an interest in meditation. Motivations for social activity were discussed in the teachings on sympathy and simple compassion, so it was unnecessary for Gotama to discuss them in the teachings on the meditative cultivation of love and compassion. It no doubt is true that in practice those who cultivate love and compassion in meditation will deepen their sympathy and simple compassion. What must be emphasized however, is that a practitioner *need not* cultivate love or compassion in order to have sympathy or simple compassion.

It is a mistake for those who wish to describe the motivations for social activity in Theravada Buddhism to ignore the most accessible levels, namely sympathy and simple compassion, for within the teachings on sympathy and simple compassion one finds traditional instructions that can serve as a framework for an ethic of social action.[58]

FOOTNOTES

References to Pali texts are, unless otherwise noted, to the standard Pali Text Society editions. The abbreviations used in the Pali Text Society Dictionary have been used. References to the commentaries are to the standard Pali Text Society commentaries. The commentaries to the discourses are referred to by a capital A, following the appropriate discourse abbreviation. For example, the commentary to the Dīghanikāya would be referred to as DA.

1. The initial stages of the research for this paper were carried out in India (1971-72) under the auspices of the American Institute of Indian Studies.

2. For an overview of the recent religious history of Sri Lanka *see* Walpola Rahula, *The Heritage of the Bhikkhu : A Short History of the Bhikkhu in Educational, Cultural, Social and Political Life*, trans. K.P.G. Wijayasurendra (New York : Grove Press, Inc., 1974), pp. 55-92; on Burma and Thailand *see* Fred von der Mehden, "Secularization of Buddhist Polities", in Donald E. Smith, *Religion and Political Modernization*, (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 50ff.

3. Rahula, *Heritage of the Bhikkhu*, p. 69; and Melford Spiro, *Buddhism and Society : A Great Tradition and Its Burmese Vicissitudes* (New York : Harper Paperbacks, 1970), p. 381.

4. S. i. 105.

5. That Buddha taught the path to liberation from the suffering of cyclic existence is relatively well-known. However, it is not so well-known that he offered practical advice on such decidedly "unspiritual" matters as business and finance. *See*, for example, the "Siṅgālovāda Suttanta" D. iii. 184.

6. Rahula, *Heritage of the Bhikkhu*, pp. 90-92; Spiro, *Buddhism and Society*, p. 326.

7. Except for certain basic moral restraints, the social activities of Buddhist laymen traditionally were not limited in any specific way. Thus, laymen do not really face any problem today in finding *ways of expressing* their social concern. In the discourses, laymen are urged to plant trees, build dams, dig wells, and offer shelter to the homeless. We can assume that the first three of these activities are to be performed for the good of the community at large. On this *see* C.A.F. Rhys Davids trans., *Kindred Sayings* (*Saṃyutta nikāya*) (London : Pali Text Society, 1971), I, pp. 45-46. This passage is referred to by Emanuel Sarkisyanz in his *Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution.* (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), p. 41.

8. Rahula, *Heritage of the Bhikkhu*, pp. 94-95, 101-08.

9. Two western representatives of this genre are Winston King in his *In the Hope of Nibbana* (LaSalle : Open Court, 1964), pp. 161-68, and Spiro, in his *Buddhism and Society*, pp. 47-48, 427.

10. Donald Swearer, *Buddhism in Transition*, (Philadelphia : Westminster Press, 1970) p. 69.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

13. Nyanaponika-Thera, *The Four Sublime States*, The Wheel Publication, no. 6 (Kandy: Sri Lanka, 1960), pp. 10-11.

14. King, *In the Hope of Nibbana*, pp. 151-52.

15. Material from other parts of the canon has been consulted and referred to when appropriate.

16. A.D. Pusalkar, "Religion and Philosophy in the Pali Canon", in

History and Culture of the Indian People, 2nd ed., general ed. R.C. Majumdar (Bombay : Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1953), II : 408.

17. "...'sabbe sattā sukhitā hontū' ti ādinā nayena hitasukhupanayanakāmatā mettā..." *Sutta Niāpta Commentary Being Paramatthajotika II* (London : Pali Text Society, 1916), p. 128. This and all other translations from Pali in the paper are by the author.

18. Since the material relevant to establishing the level of strength of love is often relevant to establishing the level of strength of compassion, I will refer to both attitudes in the present note when it is appropriate to do so.

The fourfold instructions for developing the sublime attitudes (*brahma-vihāra*) of love, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity occur at D.i.251; ii.186, 250; iii. 50, 78, 224; M. i. 38, 283-4, 297, 335, 351, 369; ii.76, 195, 207; iii.146; S.iv.296, 322; v. 116; v. 116; A. i. 183, 192, 196; ii. 128, 130, 184; iii. 225; v. 299-300, 344-5. In these instructions, love and compassion are said to be cultivated in association with a "measureless" (*appamāṇa*) mind. The "measureless" mind is at the level of absorption (*jhāna*), and the love and compassion that occur therein are at the same level. *See*, Harvey B. Aronson, "Love, Compassion, Sympathetic Joy and Equanimity in Theravada Buddism" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1975), pp. 66-76.

Love and compassion are described as "liberations of the mind" (*cetovimutti*) at D.iii.247-8, 280; S.v.119-21; A.i.38, 42; iii. 291; v. 360, 360-1. The qualification "liberation of the mind" indicates that love and compassion at the level of at least the first absorption are meant (DA.ii.405-06).

Love and compassion appear as the objects of various forms of the verb "cultivate" (*bhāveti*) at M.i. 424 (where they are said to mean access [*upacāra*] or placement [*appanā*] love and compassion according to MA.iii.140); at M.iii.81-82 (without comment); at A.iii.185 (where they are said to mean placement love and compassion according to AA.iii.294); at S.v. 131 (where they are said to mean placement love according to SA.iii.176); A.iii.445-6 (just love without comment). Following the general commentarial pattern that emerges from the above noted examples, it can be assumed that the unnoted instances of love and compassion as objects of the verb "cultivate" refer to these attitudes at the level of access or placement. ["Placement" indicates that a mental factor is occurring at the level of absorption. *See*, Buddhaghoṣa, *The Path of Purification* (*Visuddhimagga*), trans. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli (Colombo : A. Semage, 1964), chap. iii. nt. 4. "Access" is the level of concentration immediately preceding absorption. *See*, Buddhaghoṣa, *Visuddhimagga*, ed. Henry Clark Warren, Harvard Oriental Series, 41 (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1950), chap.iv. sec., 74. Henceforth this work will be referred to as Vism. References will be given to chapter, in Roman numeral, and section, in Arabic numeral.]

Love appears individually and qualified as "measureless", or as a "liberation of the mind", or as occurring in a "measureless mind" at M. i. 127; A. iv. 390; S. ii. 264, 265; v. 105; A. i. 4; iv. 150. "Measureless" love and love occurring in a "measureless mind" both refer to love at the level of at least the first absorption. *See*, Aronson, "Love... in Theravada Buddhism", pp. 66-76.

Love and compassion are unqualified at A. i. 42 (where they can be understood to refer to placement love and comp-

assion following the model of S. v. 119-2-, discussed at SA. iii. 172-3, and Aronson, 312-23). Love is unqualified at A. i. 26 (where it can be understood to refer to love in absorption, according to Vism. xii. 30-35). Love is unqualified at A. iii. 443 (here, love refers metaphorically to insight, according to AA. iii. 415). Love is unqualified at S. i. 208 (where it can be understood to refer to access or placement as according to the commentary, it is said to be "cultivated", SA. i. 305).

Compassion appears in opposition to the term absorption (jhāna) at D. ii. 237, indicating that compassion at the level of absorption is meant.

Out of all the instances of the feminine nouns love and compassion, the only one that clearly is not related to love and compassion at the level of absorption is A. iii. 443, where love metaphorically refers to insight.

19. A. i. 4; Aronson, pp. 195-206.
20. Vism. ix. 93.
21. A. v. 342.
22. M. i. 36-39, 351; S. v. 115-21; and Aronson, pp. 295-323.
23. "...'aho vata imamhā dukkhā vimucceyun' ti adinā nayena ahitadukkhāpanayanakāmatā karuṇā..." *Sutta Nipāta Commentary*, p. 128.
24. *See* note 18.
25. D. ii. 220-252; A. iii. 371-73; Aronson, pp. 236-42.
26. D. iii. 248, 280; M. i. 423-24; A. iii. 290-2.
27. Vism. ix. 94.
28. Vism. ix. 83.
29. *See* references in note 20.
30. There are only five instances of this term in the first five collections of discourses—M. i. 167-69; S. i. 136-38; ii. 199-200; A. iii. 192-96; iv. 186-90.
31. M. i. 169; S. i. 138.
32. S. ii. 199-200.
33. A. iii. 192-6.
34. A. iii. 194.
35. AA. iii. 298-99.
36. *mettāya pubbabhāgo*, DA. ii. 456.
37. *muducittatā*, SA. ii. 169.
38. *anuddayā*, *Ibid.*
39. *kāruñña*, *Ibid.*
40. There is just one instance where monks are instructed to "establish" (*upaṭṭhāpetabbā*) sympathy (A. iii. 189). Apart from this one instance, the monks are never urged to create or generate sympathy. Their sympathy is appealed to, as if it were ready and waiting to be called upon.
41. In contrast to the commentaries on the terms "love" and "compassion," which almost always specify the level of strength of these attitudes, the commentaries on "sympathy" do not specify its level of strength. It is once identified as the preliminary level of love (note 36). However, even this identification is not unambiguous. The preliminary level of love can refer to either "the most preliminary level of love," which would be love at any level below access concentration (AA. i. 70), or it can refer to love at the level of access concentration (Vism. iii. 6; Aronson, pp. 113-14). Except for this one instance in which sympathy's level of strength is specified, sympathy otherwise is glossed by a diverse group of non-technical terms (notes 37-39).

It can be noted here that phenomenological commentary *The Atthasālini* states that sympathy means love at the level of access or placement concentration. *See*, Buddhaghoṣa, *The Atthasālinī : Buddhaghoṣa's Commentary on the Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, ed. Edward Miller (London : Pali Text Society, 1897), p. 362. Though this explanation may serve the purposes of economy of concept in the phenomenological works (*abhidhamma-piṭaka*), it

cannot be said to adequately mirror the non-technical usage of sympathy in the discourses (*sutta-piṭaka*). In the discourses, the usage of the non-technical term "sympathy" stands in clear contradistinction to the usage of the technical terms "love" and "compassion."

42. Aronson, p. 123.

43. There is no explicit justification of sympathy in the discourses, apart from the one instance in which it is taught as an antidote to hostility (see note 40). From the phenomenological works and the commentaries, it is clear that sympathy would be associated with all the benefits entailed in a wholesome state of mind and could be justified by these benefits, see, Vism. xiv. 133-56; Buddhaghoṣa, *Path of Purification*, trans. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, xiv. nt. 35; Aronson, pp. 174-5, 190-1. Apart from the benefits mentioned in these references, it may be noted that wholesome states of mind serve as the causal nexus within which liberating wisdom can be developed. Thus sympathy, like the other wholesome mental factors, can serve to create the proper atmosphere for the cultivation of wisdom. This would be yet another justification for sympathy. For an excellent discussion on wholesome states of mind, see Nina Van Gorkom, *Buddhist Outlook in Daily Life*, (Bangkok, 1969), pp. 46-50.

44. A. i. 22; AA. i. 98-99.

45. D. ii. 212, 222.

46. M. i. 393-5.

47. A. iii. 5-6.

48. D. ii. 119-20.

49. S. i. 105.

50. *Bhikkhū ti paṭipattisampādaka-puggala-nidassanam etaṃ* (DA. iii. 755).

51. Walpola Rahula is a notable exception. *See*, Rahula, *Heritage of the Bhikkhu*, pp. 3, 119.

52. *See* note 9.

53. King, *In the Hope of Nibbana*, p. 155.

54. *See* for example Rahula, *Heritage of the Bhikkhu*, pp. 16-70.

55. For a full discussion of sympathy and simple compassion, see Chapter One of my forthcoming *Love and Sympathy in Theravada Buddhism*.

56. Laypersons face no great problems in choosing ways of expressing their social concern (note 7). It would, however, be helpful for them to know more about the motivations for social activity. They would benefit from knowing the nature of sympathy, its benefits (note 43), and its importance as a motivation for the whole religious life (note 48).

57. The sources of the trend of discussing the motivation for social action in terms of "love" and "compassion" are not immediately obvious. It is possible to speculate that one source is the urge to match the Christian usage of "love". Another source may be culturally imbedded uses of "love" and "compassion" that have come from the Sanskritic and Mahayana traditions of Buddhism. These traditions were influential in South Asia during the first millenium of the common era. [*See*, Emanuel Sarkisyanz, *Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution*, (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), pp. 44-46, 60.]. If modern Theravada apologists wish to maintain this Sanskritic and Mahayana influence, they should consciously and openly assert its genesis. The danger in not doing so is that Theravadins who wish to assert "love" and "compassion" as the motivations for social activity end up using these terms in a way that is unsupported by their own canonical tradition. Any individual who searches for the canonical validation and elaboration of this purported

usage will search in vain.

58. In some sense, it can be said that the teachings on "simple compassion" represent the active side of "compassion", and, analagously, that the teachings on "sympathy" represent the active side of "love". "Simple compassion" and "sympathy" are active insofar as they are said to motivate action on behalf of others.

2

*The Background to the Rise of Buddhism**

A.L. BASHAM

FOR THE purposes of this paper we assume that the Theravāda school more closely reflects the doctrines of the founder of Buddhism than does any other sect, and that the Theravāda canon contains more authentic reminiscences of the historical Buddha and his times than do the Buddhist Sanskrit sources. The fashion affected by many students of Buddhism since the days of Louis de la Vallée Poussin, of disparaging Pāli Buddhism to the advantage of Mahāyāna, is already becoming unpopular and it never had much to be said for it from the historian's point of view.[1] By this we do not mean to imply that the Buddha taught pure Theravāda, or that the Pāli texts contain many of his authentic utterances. So much of the material attributed to him in those scriptures is so obviously inauthentic that we cannot but suspect almost everything. It seems in fact impossible to establish what the Buddha really taught. We can only know what early Buddhists believed that he taught.

The question of the exact chronology of the Vedic literature and of the texts of Buddhism and Jainism is still a very obscure one, but it is possible that the later Vedic literature refers to a period of indefinite length which ended about 600 B.C.,[2] while the earlier strata of the Pāli texts mainly reflect conditions in the 5th century B.C. and perhaps also the 4th. The contents of the fifth *Nikāya*, especially the prose *Jātaka*, and I believe also much of the *Vinaya Piṭaka*, evidently belong to an appreciably later period and much of this material is certainly post-Mauryan.[3]

If we compare this earlier stratum of the Pāli texts with the later Vedic literature we find great differences in the cultural background against which they were respectively composed. These differences are no doubt partly due to geography, for the Vedic texts refer to a region further to the West than that in which the Pāli scriptures arose. But the main reason for the difference must surely be chronological. The Buddhist texts reflect a period of at least a century, and probably much more than a century, later than the

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Brāhmaṇas. In the *Brāhmaṇa* texts we meet a society which is still to a considerable extent tribal in character, ruled by kings who, though wealthy and powerful, have only the most rudimentary governmental machinery.[4] Though we cannot be certain from purely negative evidence, later Vedic society appears to have been quite illiterate, and to have had no coinage, and only a very weakly developed mercantile system.[5]

The society of the Buddhist scriptures, on the other hand, reflects the presence of a very influential mercantile community organized in guilds.[6] The kings have a full corps of officials, the *mahāmattas*, who seem to have developed into a staff of regular civil servants.[7] Writing is probably known[8] and a system of coinage already exists.[9] It is clear that by this time iron, unknown in the *Ṛg Veda*[10] and probably still a rare metal in the later Vedic literature,[11] is widely used,[12] with obvious consequences in the easier clearing of jungles for cultivation and the spread of agriculture.[13]

It is evidently a period of expanding material culture, with far wider trade relations than in the previous period and much greater amenities of life for the wealthy, though a town proletariat has arisen which is perhaps much poorer than the humbler tribesmen of older times.[14] In the Vedic text cities are hardly referred to. Now, in the time of the Buddha, populous towns and cities exist in all districts of the Ganges valley. A great and apparently very rapid change has taken place in the structure of Indian life and society.

Such a change could not but be reflected in the religious thought and practice of the time. The first definite criticism of the old Vedic sacrificial religion appears in the early *Upaniṣads*, but only in a mild form. The sacrifices may have some validity, but they cannot save a man from death.[15] The older ritualistic religion is not wholly satisfactory as an explanation of the cosmos, and the speculative search for a first principle, which is indeed as old as the later strata of the *Ṛg Veda*, is hence intensified by the Upaniṣadic seers. New proposals and doctrines are put forward, based on the supernatural insight gained from penance and meditation.

This stirring of thought, which produced first the early *Upaniṣads* and then the numerous heterodox systems of which Buddhism was the chief, seems to have been in some way connected with the belief in transmigration. In our opinion, one of the greatest unsolved problems of Indian history is the origin of this doctrine and the reason for its rapid spread.[16] There is no clear evidence of it in the *Ṛg Veda*.[17] In some passages of the *Brāhmaṇas* there may be suggestions of it in a rudimentary phase.[18] In the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* it occurs in a more developed form, but only as a new and more or less secret doctrine, which is imparted by a teacher to his disciples in private, and is not to be divulged to the uninitiated.[19] In the Pāli texts, on the other hand, transmigration is quite taken for granted.[20] With the exception of the school of materialists, who completely denied any form of survival after death,[21] there is no difference of opinion whatever in the fact of transmigration, or in the desirability of achieving the salvation which frees a man from the cycle of birth and death. The only differences between one sect and another in this respect concern the mechanics of the process of rebirth and the nature of the state of final equilibrium which is attained when the individual escapes from the toils of *saṃsāra*. Nowhere, to the best of our knowledge, do we find in the Buddhist texts a teacher trying to convince his hearers of the actual fact of transmigration. This must surely imply that, by the time of the Buddha, the doctrine was almost universally accepted by ordinary people throughout the civilized part of India.

Just how this great change came about, and why it did so, is completely unknown. The suggestion that it is derived from indigenous non-Aryan beliefs is little more than a guess, and the evidence of the texts themselves rather suggests that it began in small circles of high class people, whether Kṣatriyas or Brahmans.

It does not necessarily follow that belief in the cycle of birth and death should entail a pessimistic view of the world. The doctrine of transmigration, offering as it does infinite opportunities for infinitely varied experience, need not logically lead to a desire to escape from the weary round of birth and death. Indeed, some people might even consider transmigration as much more desirable than the static heaven of western religious systems. The craving for salvation, which seems to have possessed many of the best minds at the time of the Buddha, must have sprung from a deep-seated fear of change and a profound sense of insecurity. While material culture was advancing by leaps and bounds, while trade was expanding, and while the geographical horizons of Aryan India were rapidly being pushed forward, at a time when one might expect positive and pragmatic world-views to develop, thoughtful men were seeking for an end of change in something permanent, immutable and absolute. There is perhaps a vague comparison to be made here with the rise of messianic religions, chief of which was Christianity, in the days of the Roman Empire, or with weird cults which have appeared in recent years in many parts of Africa and elsewhere among semi-civilized peoples who have been forcibly brought into contact with Western civilization. But in such comparisons there is a striking contrast. The religious movements which we have mentioned may well be reflections of a desire for security in the midst of change, but they arose chiefly among uninformed, under-privileged people. Most of the leaders of the new movements of thought in India, on the other hand, apparently came from the upper classes. Some were brahmans who were looking for something better than sacrificial ritualism; others, including the founders of the two chief heterodox sects, were members of the kṣatriya order and, according to tradition, the sons of tribal chieftains. It is this fact that may suggest the social context of the growth of the pessimistic world-view, of the quest for *mokṣa*, of the search for the single principle or essence which is fundamental and ultimate, and union with which was believed to give permanence in the midst of change.

The society of the Vedas was still tribal in structure. A man's loyalty was not to the king of the land, but to his tribe and in particular to the chief of his tribe. His fellow tribesmen were his brothers and among them he might find security, both practical and psychological. Tribes might split up or coalesce, either by war or otherwise,[22] but the tribe was always there as a source of strength and courage for the individual tribesman. Within the tribe, septs and extended families reinforced this sense of security which the tribe gave. It may be that strains and tensions in the tribal structure of Vedic society began to appear very early.[23] By the time of the *Brāhmaṇas* they are clearly in evidence.[24] Chiefs were beginning to look on themselves as absolute owners of the tribal lands, and to apportion them to whom they chose.[25] The Aryan tribe, probably always divided into two classes of nobility and plebeians, was now theoretically split into four divisions hierarchically graded, each with distinct rights and duties, and further subdivisions were appearing. The rājā was no longer a mere tribal leader, first among his peers, but a real king, with a rudimentary governmental system, claiming, with brahmanical support, almost unlimited rights over his subjects.[26] The old tribal assemblies

had largely disappeared, to be replaced by royal courts.[27]

By the time of the Buddha, this process had gone very far indeed in much of India. In the cities, men of many tribes rubbed shoulders together, uprooted from their lands and separated from their own clansmen. In most parts of the Ganga valley, ambitious kings had virtually eliminated the tribal institutions which had prevailed in earlier times.[28] New groups of merchants and skilled craftsmen were gaining in wealth and influence. Their values were not those of the Vedic priesthood and aristocracy, and they no doubt demanded innovations in the field of religion. Only here and there to the north of the Ganga did the old tribal oligarchies survive. The confederation of the Vajjis, the most important of these republics, was still, apparently, a force to be reckoned with,[29] but there is good indication that its assembly, the governing body of the confederate tribes, was rapidly becoming inadequate to cope with new situations,[30] and the tribal structure was undergoing great strain. Towards the end of the Buddha's life, or just after his death, the Vajjian confederacy was overwhelmed by the rising kingdom of Magadha.[31] There is ample indication that many men feared for the future in this period of rapid change, although, in the light of history, it appears to us as a period of advance on all fronts.

In a similar age of transition, Chinese sages put forward conflicting theories on the means of regenerating society, also with reference to first principles. But the best minds of India had no illusions about society, which was in any case degenerating by an inevitable process of cosmic decline. Salvation, for the Indian sage, was something which only a few individuals could achieve, and not society as a whole. Later, learned men were to codify the norms of orthodox social usage in *sūtras* and *śāstras*, but, in the time of the Buddha, men's thoughts turned to finding freedom from the bonds of custom rather than to preserving the traditional way of life.

The old theory that the rise of the heterodox sects represented a protest on the part of the kṣatriya order against brahmanical pretensions,[32] is hardly adequate to explain it, though there may be a little truth in the suggestion. Certainly Buddha and Mahāvīra both came of kṣatriya stock, or of families which, in a community fully accepting the brahmanical four-class system, would be rated as kṣatriya. Buddhism placed kṣatriyas before brahmans in the class hierarchy,[33] and the kings of the time gave considerable patronage to Buddhism, and to other heterodox movements. But they certainly patronized the orthodox clergy as well, and if Buddhism had received nothing but the patronage of a few members of the ruling class, it would have been merely an artificial growth, and its fate would probably have been similar to that of Akbar's *Dīn-i-Ilāhi* two thousand years later.

The fact that Buddhism survived in India for so long and had such a brilliant history is evidence enough that it responded to the needs of a wide and important section of the Indian population. We can infer the character of the most important patrons of early Buddhism from the Pāli text themselves. Among the lay supporters of the new sect and its teacher referred to in the Canon are a number of kings and chiefs,[34] and a few members of the poorer classes of the community, such as peasants and small craftsmen;[35] but by far the greatest number of such patrons are members of the rising "middle class" of merchants, and craftsmen of the better and more highly skilled sort. As far as we can gather from the votive inscriptions, it was chiefly these who, some centuries later, provided the funds for the construction of the great *stūpas* and cave

monasteries, and it was the wealthy merchant for whose support one sect vied with another, in contests which occasionally resulted in bitter altercations, sometimes perhaps even leading to blows.[36]

It is at first sight surprising that this other-worldly movement, with its rather pessimistic attitude, and its emphasis on detachment and the renunciation of most of the material pleasures of life, should have made an appeal to the mercantile class at a time when trade was expanding rapidly. But this is not really very strange. We can find other cases of merchants adhering in large numbers to new religious movements of a rather pessimistic kind, which tended to promote frugality. Early Christianity, Islam and Calvinism are examples in point. The merchants of 16th century Europe who gave their support to Calvinism and other protestant sects may have had other conscious motives, but the fact remains that the new sects appealed to their pride by giving them a much more important place in the cult than did Roman Catholicism. Moreover they were less expensive, in that they did not require large bodies of wealthy priests for their rites, and, by their mistrust of most kinds of pleasure, they encouraged thrift, a very necessary virtue in a merchant community at a time when trade was rapidly expanding and when heavy reinvestment was desirable.

Allowing for many obvious differences, it may well be that the appeal of Buddhism to the merchants of ancient India was very similar to that of protestant reform movements to the merchants of 16th century Europe. The great body of the Pāli scriptures is, of course, addressed primarily to monks and to laymen whose attitudes and ways of life have been much influenced by monkish ideals. But within the Pāli canon, if we look for it, we can find a good deal of material which is primarily addressed to the householder and his family. Buddhism had its practical everyday side, which is especially manifested in the *Jātaka* stories, but may also be found in many verses of the *Dhammapada* and the *Sutta Nipāta*,[37] and in a few of the suttas, particularly the fine *Sigālovāda-sutta*.[38] These texts, far from urging the layman to break the bonds of everyday life, encourage many practical virtues : friendliness to all and sundry, loyalty to family and friends, industry, self-control and frugality. The moral of more than one *Jātaka* story is that a man should be shrewd and on his guard in his dealings with strangers.[39] There are also a few passages in the Pāli canon, notably the *Cakkavatti-sīhanāda-sutta*[40], which are primarily intended for the ruling classes, giving advice on how a state should be governed according to Buddhist principles. But these are very scanty in comparison with the quantity of material intended for the well-to-do middle class layman, the *kulaputta*. Early Buddhism, in fact, made its chief appeal to the rising middle class of the times, and the same seems true of the other heterodox sects also.

Despite the fact that the scriptures depict the Buddha as resoundingly successful in making converts, as being favoured by great kings, and as having an enormous number of yellow-robed followers, it is quite possible that, in the days of its founder, Buddhism made a comparatively small impression, in comparison with some of the other heterodox sects, and that the evidence in the texts to the contrary is in fact the invention of the monks responsible for the oral transmission and redaction of the canonical traditions. This conclusion may be inferred from a comparison of the references in the Buddhist and Jaina scriptures to the opponents of the founders of the respective sects. In the Pāli scriptures the chief sectarian opponents of Buddha are the Ājīvikas, led by Makkhali Gosāla; second to the Ājīvikas come the Nigganthas or Jains, led by Niggantha Nāta-

putta, who is certainly the same as Mahāvīra. In the early Jaina texts, the chief opponents of Mahāvīra are again Gosāla and his Ājīvikas, while the Buddhists are hardly mentioned. This would suggest that in fact the most influential sect of the time was the Ājīvikas, followed by the Jains. The Buddhists were not important enough to merit serious consideration from their opponents.

We have no very good evidence of how Buddhism progressed in the years between the death of its founder and the rise of the Mauryas, but the tradition of the Council of Vesāli, said to have taken place a hundred years after the Buddha's death, indicates at least that the order was active and reasonably flourishing, though schisms had already appeared in it.[41] The numerous references in the older scriptures of Buddhism to schismatics and dissidents within the order may well refer to events of this period, when the Pāli canon was taking shape. In order to suppress an innovation, whether in doctrine or practice, it would be simple enough to produce evidence that this heresy had existed in the time of the Buddha himself, and had been explicitly condemned by him. Such a procedure was common enough in the religions of the ancient world—indeed, in a sense, much of the Mosaic code is an example in point.

Until the days of Asoka we have no evidence that Buddhism was a very important force in Indian life, and it seems to have been in this reign that Buddhism took its first "Great Leap Forward". We cannot be absolutely certain how far Asoka was personally responsible for the spread of Buddhism, for his own inscriptions only partially confirm the tradition in this respect. Asoka's *dhamma* is certainly not Buddhism; nowhere in his major edicts does he urge his subjects to become Buddhists, but he merely asks them to lead moral lives, and in these inscriptions the word *dhamma* evidently has no special implications but merely means virtue or piety, as is proved by the Greek inscription of Asoka from Kandahar, where *dhamma* is translated by *eusebeia*,[42] which has no doctrinal or sectarian connotation whatever, and the meaning of which approximates to piety. It is only in the minor inscriptions that Asoka proclaims himself a Buddhist, with a deep interest in the welfare of the Saṅgha.[43] Admittedly he calls on his subjects to respect all sects,[44] and he gives finely polished caves to the Ājīvikas.[45] But he goes so far as to advise the monks on what portions of scripture they should specially study,[46] and he instructs the government officials to ensure that heretical or ill-behaved Buddhist monks are turned out of their monasteries.[47] The minor edicts of this character remind us forcibly of the later *kātikāvata* inscriptions of Sri Lanka, wherein the kings, no doubt with clerical advice, took it upon themselves to regulate the discipline of the state church. In his later years at any rate, Asoka's attitude to Buddhism seems to have been similarly erastian, and, though it is not clearly stated in the major rock edicts, one cannot but suspect that the envoys sent to the kings of the West included Buddhist monks among their number.

The Mauryan empire was a centralized bureaucracy, covering nearly the whole of the sub-continent. Without rapid transport and with comparatively undeveloped propaganda methods the emperor, however benevolent and energetic, could not but seem remote and detached from the great majority of his peoples. Governed by civil servants appointed from the centre, rather than by sub-kings and feudal chiefs, the Mauryan state must have appeared impersonal and almost super-human to people who remembered traditions of smaller realms under the control of local monarchs. For such an empire the creed of Buddhism seems quite appropriate, for the state would thus be,

in a sense, the microcosm of universal order, controlled not by arbitrary gods, but by a single immutable principle.

Buddhism, however, was not so inseparably linked up with the Mauryan state that it could not survive without it. Indeed, whatever the truth of the traditions of persecution by Puṣyamitra Śuṅga,[48] after the fall of the Mauryas, Buddhism continued to spread, undergoing all the while very important internal changes until, early in the Christian Era, it began to penetrate through central Asia, and found a home in China. The Buddhism of this period of the second "Great Leap Forward" was however, of a different character—a theistic Buddhism, which, although backed by very subtle systems of philosophy, might have been calculated to appeal to simple ordinary people of many races.

The post-Mauryan period was one which saw great changes in India, and it is probably to this period that we must attribute the growth and spread of the early devotionalism reflected in the *Bhagavad Gītā* and the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*.[49] The relationship of god and worshipper exemplified in such early texts is strikingly different from that most common in the Vedic literature, including the earlier *Upaniṣads*. In place of salvation by works (chiefly in the form of sacrifice and ritual), or by knowledge (acquired through introspection and meditation), the worshipper is invited to serve his divinity with love and devotion, when he will receive divine love and grace in return and will be raised by God from the round of birth and death. This new religious attitude seems to have affected Hinduism and Buddhism at about the same time, no doubt as the product of developments in popular religion which the leaders of organized sects could not afford to overlook.

It seems indeed that Mahāyānist tendencies began quite early, if we accept the truth of the tradition of the Mahāsaṅghika schism at the Council of Vesāli. And it must be remembered that Buddhism was always ready to compromise with folk-cults. It adopted and made its own the sacred mound and the sacred tree. It in no way denied the existence of the gods, either great or small, though it insisted that they were finite beings,[50] and made Brahmā and Indra into devotees of the Buddha.[51] While we are told in the Pāli canon that the seeker after truth should not accept the Buddhist doctrine on trust, but should think it out for himself,[52] the virtue of *saddhā*, comparable to, though not identical with, the Christian virtue of faith, is much encouraged,[53] and we are also told that faith in the Buddha's teaching ensures rebirth in heaven.[54]

Even more significant in the progress of Buddhism towards theism is the formula of the Three Jewels (*Triratna*) or Three Refuges (*Triśaraṇa*), the Buddhist confession of faith. The three are frequently mentioned in the canon,[55] though this does not give assurance that the formulation was actually in existence in the Buddha's day. But it is quite certain that the Three Jewels were current in Mauryan times, for they occur in one of Asoka's inscriptions.[56]

Buddhāṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi; dhammaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi; saṅghaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi : "I go for refuge to the Buddha; I go for refuge to the Doctrine; I go for refuge to the Order (of monks)." In considering this formula we must remember that Siddhattha Gotama the Buddha, according to orthodox Theravāda doctrine, completely ceased to exist on his *parinirvāṇa*.[57] The chain of cause and effect which constituted his specious body, mind and soul came to a full stop; the aggregate of the five elements of being which formed the human personality known as Buddha was completely

dissipated—only Nirvāṇa was left, and in Nirvāṇa there is no person or personality, no individual. The Buddha had vanished completely, he was no longer to be found anywhere.

The word *saraṇa* is used in the general sense of protection. A roof gives *saraṇa* against rain, and a parasol against the heat of the sun. In the religious sense it is clear that the Order of monks is quite capable of giving *saraṇa*, protection, that is of helping a man to defend himself against the evil impulses which produce suffering in this world and the next. The *Dhamma*, the doctrine, is also capable of doing so. But how can the non-existent Buddha protect anyone or anything? The ordinary man can find no *saraṇa* in the Nirvāṇa into which the Buddha has been dissolved, since he needs many lives of earnest striving to attain it. In fact, on a strict interpretation, the formula *Buddhaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi* is meaningless. It probably gave some trouble to commentators and theoreticians,[58] who did the best they could to interpret it rationally according to their own systems of Buddhism, but it has also been repeated with deep reverence and faith millions of times by millions of simple Buddhists for well over two thousand years. These have had no doubts about its implications—the Buddha is in some sense still present; greater than the greatest of the old gods, it is he, even more than the Doctrine and the Order of monks, who offers protection against all evil to those who take refuge in him. Thus the formula of the Three Jewels contains all Mahāyāna in embryo.

Mahāyānist tendencies were perhaps to be found among the Buddhist layfolk and the less spiritually developed monks even in the Buddha's lifetime. New circumstances must have given such tendencies a great stimulus, so that they were formulated in definite systems. After the fall of the Mauryas, India was again divided into many regional kingdoms. Much of the northern part of the land was a prey to invasion; and the Greeks, Scythians and Kuṣāṇas, in their first incursions, must have caused great loss of life and human misery. In times like these, the ordinary man would find solace in a personal divinity whom he might trust and from whom he might find grace and comfort, rather than in an impersonal principal. This was a time when many old values were shaken, when the brahman foresaw the impending end of the age,[59] and the Buddhist monk, the decay of the Good Doctrine.[60] It is not surprising that men felt the need of a savior.

Moreover, the new rulers of western India were of a type more likely to take kindly to a theistic religion than to an impersonal system of self-discipline. The Indo-Greek king Menander became a lay Buddhist, probably a Sarvāstivādin,[61] but a little later, the Greek Heliodorus of Taxila left us one of the most important monuments of the growth of devotional Hinduism in the famous Besnagar column, in which he expresses his devotion to the god Vāsudeva.[62] The Śakas and Kuṣāṇas had already been exposed to Iranian influences when they entered India, and were probably men of action rather than men of thought. They would require a Buddhism which satisfied the needs of simple humanity, rather than a recondite system which could be fully understood only by the learned.

Western influence may have had some effect on the development of the new Buddhism, but this influence can hardly have been Christian, for the Buddhist pantheon was well developed long before Christianity had ceased to be a small and persecuted sect. In later times, Buddhism undoubtedly influenced Christian legend,[63] though certain

striking similarities may be ascribed either to minds thinking alike, or to common origins in some gnostic source in the Middle East. The latter may account for the fact that the story of a prodigal son occurs in both religions,[64] though the differences in the way in which the story is worked out are perhaps more striking than the similarities. Certain resemblances between the legend of Buddha and that of Jesus may also be due to a common source, or even to coincidence.[65]

We need not look to Christianity for heavenly spirits striving to help the righteous in their struggle for perfection, or for a savior who in the future will descend to earth and inaugurate a new age of righteousness, for we can find them in Ancient Iran. Perhaps the Śaośyant of Zoroastrianism[66] is the prototype both of the heavenly Messiah of Christianity and the Maitreya of Buddhism, as the Zoroastrian Amesha Spentas[67] are of the Bodhisattvas. But both Maitreya and the Bodhisattvas follow logically from the premises of the older Buddhism, and the new Mahāyānist pantheon may well be more indebted to the internal development of Buddhism in India itself than to any outside influence. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that these great changes took place at a time when much of Northern India was governed by people who spoke an Iranian language and were in close touch with Iran, and thus the possibility of influence from the West cannot be ruled out. That at a somewhat later time Zoroastrians, Buddhists and Christians rubbed shoulders in Persia is quite evident from the new religion of Manichaeism, which contains elements borrowed from all three.

At this time, Indian Buddhism was in the period of its greatest strength. In succeeding centuries, Hinduism developed and adapted itself until Buddhism slowly merged with it and lost its identity. That is the simplest and most popular explanation of the decline of Buddhism in India, though it may be too sweeping a generalization; for recently, evidence has appeared to show that Buddhism did not wholly die out even after the Muslim invasion, and that Buddhist monasteries were still active in some parts of South Bihar as late as the 15th century A.D.[68] But that is another story. The history of Buddhism is replete with problems to which we can give only tentative answers, or no answers at all, and our speculations on the causes of its decline, or for that matter on the causes of its rise, cannot be more than hypothetical.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Buddha of the Pāli scriptures is a human being; supernatural elements are less strongly developed, and blatant and obvious exaggerations are less frequent. The Pāli texts have all the marks of a tradition of hagiography much less developed than those of the Mahāyāna. From the point of view of doctrine, the claims of the Mahāyāna do not seem to be very strong. The impersonal dynamic phenomenalism of the Pāli scriptures appears to reflect the outlook and predilections of the heresiarchs of the Sixth century B.C., when Mahāvira evolved a comparable system, and when several other free-thinking teachers, whose doctrines are summarized in the *Sāmaññaphala Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (*Dīgha* i, 47 ff., see Basham, *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, London, 1951, ch. ii) and elsewhere also produced similar systems, interpreting the world as based on an impersonal first principle. Mahāyānism, with its special mythology of heavenly Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, backed up by very sophisticated philosophies, is hardly in keeping with the pioneering thought of the Sixth century B.C., but rather seems to reflect a period when on the one hand theism had become popular and, on the other, formal philosophical thinking had reached a stage of development much in advance of that to be found in the sources which certainly emanate from the time of the Buddha or soon afterwards.

2. The chief criterion is the more advanced civilization reflected in the Pāli texts, which will be discussed later in the text of our paper, but the differences may also be partly due to cultural variations between localities from which the texts originated. However, it is hardly likely that the region now known as Western U.P. should have been markedly less developed in its civilization than Eastern U.P. and Bihar at the same time, and archaeological evidence gives no backing to this hypothesis. It is to be noted that the later Vedic literature (*e.g. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* IV; *Ait. Brh.* viii, 14, *Pañcaviṃśa Brh.*, xiv, 1-12) seem to look on Janaka, king of Videha, as a comparatively recent monarch, while in the Buddhist tradition he is an almost legendary figure (see especially *Jātaka*, vi, 52). Moreover none of the contemporaries of the Buddha or Mahāvīra referred to in the scriptures of their respective sects are mentioned in the Upaniṣads. (Ajātaśatru, king of Vārāṇasī, mentioned in *Brh. Up.*, ii, 1 as Janaka's contemporary is obviously not the same person as the king of Magadha during whose reign the Buddha died.)

3. It is well known that according to the Sri Lanka tradition, the texts were transmitted orally for some 400 years, and this leads to doubts as to the reliability of even the earlier strata of the Pāli canon as a record of conditions in, or soon after, the time of the Buddha. But certain features of the first four *Nikāyas* of the *Sutta Piṭaka* suggest a very considerable antiquity. Their geographical horizon is very limited The ports of Tāmalitti and Bhārukaccha, frequently referred to in later Pāli literature, and certainly important in the time of the Mauryas,

are not mentioned. Sri Lanka is outside the geographical horizon of the earlier Pāli texts, and the Deccan is rarely referred to. This suggests that they were compiled at a time when Aryan culture was confined mainly to the northern part of India, well before the days of Chandragupta Maurya. The main body of the first four *Nikāyas* contains no clear reference to the Mauryas, and the Buddha's prophecy on the site of Pāṭaliputra in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* (*Dīgha*, ii, 87-8) contains no hint of Asoka, as might have been expected if the passage had been inserted during or after his reign. Pāṭaliputra became the capital of Magadha in the reign of Udāyin (c. 450 B.C.) (Raychaudhuri, *Pol. Hist. Anc. India*, 4th ed., 217) and we would thus expect the passage in question to apply to a period between that date and c. 250 B.C.

The only prophetic passage in the earlier stratum of the Pāli texts which does suggest a late date is the Buddha's well known forecast of the disappearance of the true Dhamma in 500 years, because of the admission of women into the Order. This passage occurs in the *Aṅguttara* (iv, 278) and the *Vinaya* (II, 256), neither of which suggests a very great antiquity. It is always possible, of course, that the duration of 500 years was suggested at a very early period, long before it had elapsed, though for obvious reasons these cannot be the authentic words of Buddha himself; but we cannot escape the suspicion that the passage is the work of anti-feminist monks, at a time when heretical tendencies were very strong in the Order, and when not much less than 500 years had elapsed since the Nirvāṇa. This is linked with another passage (*Saṃyutta*, ii, 224) in which the Buddha is purported to have said that when the Good Dhamma disappears, an imitation (*paṭirūpaka*) of it will appear in the world. Buddhaghoṣa seems to interpret this as meaning various forms of Mahāyāna, and such may have been the intention of the author.

References to the Yonas or Greeks occur chiefly in the commentaries, but there is one important mention of them in the earlier canon (*Majjhima*, ii, 149). This is not absolutely conclusive for a late date. The Kandahar Greek edict of Asoka has given conclusive proof of the presence of Greek-speaking settlers on the borders of India in the third century B.C. and these may well have been there long before Alexander, since the Achaemenians established settlements of Asiatic Greeks in Bactria (A.K. Narain, *The Indo-Greeks*, Oxford, 1957, 1-7, ably surveys the evidence of early Indian contacts with Greece). One obviously late text in the four *Nikāyas* is the *Cakkavati-sīhanāda Sutta*, occurring towards the end of the *Dīgha Nikāya* (iii, 58 ff.) among a number of suttas of uncertain date, which have a rather inauthentic flavour. The story of Nami, the Universal Emperor, owes much to Hindu legend; he conquers all India by peaceful persuasion with the aid of his magic wheel, and such a tale could hardly have been composed before the time of Asoka, though it is of course possible to suggest that it inspired Asoka's policy rather than the reverse. Its warning that by introducing harsh legislation the magic wheel would disappear and the empire would crumble, suggests a post-Aśokan date, and this may well be a political tract composed by a critical Buddhist monk during the time of the later Mauryas. To this is added a prophecy of the future Buddha Metteya, who is mentioned very rarely in earlier Pāli literature and appears to be a comparatively late arrival on the scene, the

result of the influence of Iranian soteriology.

Exceptional suttas and passages in them, however, do not invalidate our broad contention that the main body of the four *Nikāyas* reflects the life and thought of pre-Mauryan times. We have grave doubts, on the other hand, about the *Vinaya Piṭaka*. Whatever the antiquity of the *Pātimokkha* rules, the *Vinaya* as a whole appears to be a late production, with little relevance to the Buddha's own day. The minute regulations of every aspect of the monastic life, and the minute classification of faults and lapses of discipline, strongly suggest a powerful and widespread Order with many years of development behind it and not a religious movement in its infancy. The stories of how the rules came to be formulated by the Buddha have scarcely any more authenticity than similar accounts of how the *Jātaka* tales came to be told. Some of these may contain tradition handed down from an early period but most, if not all, are evidently *post hoc* anecdotes concocted to give authority to the rules to which they are related. Moreover, the *Vinaya* contains more frequent references to writing and coined money than do the four *Nikayas*, and its geographical horizon is probably wider. The conclusion of the *Cullavagga* (ii, 284-308), containing an account of the Councils of Rājagaha and Vesāli, is obviously much later than the time of the Buddha, and the *Parivāra* is explicitly stated to have been composed in Sri Lanka, the work of the monk Dīpa. We believe that most of the Pāli *Vinaya* reflects conditions in the Order no earlier than the days of Asoka, when there were evidently severe "purges" of the Buddhist church.

Much of the miscellaneous material of the *Khuddaka Nikāya* is evidently very late. The prose *Jatāka*, which is still often taken to reflect conditions in the Buddha's day, or even before it (R.N. Mehta, *Pre Buddhist India*, Bombay, 1939, *passim*), is evidently on a par with the commentaries of Buddhaghoṣa and his school, and though the plots of some of the stories may go back to a very remote antiquity, the conditions reflected in them are very different from those of the main body of the canon, and the geographical horizon is far wider. It is possible that the stories were put into something like their present form in the Sātavāhana Empire around the beginning of the Christian Era (D.D. Kosambi, *Introduction to the Study of Indian History*, Bombay, 1956, 259-60). The *Jātaka* verses show wider geographical knowledge than the four main *Nikāyas*, and we are not convinced that they are particularly ancient. It is generally thought that much of the *Sutta Nipāta* is very old, chiefly on linguistic grounds, and this may be the case. The *Petavatthu* (iv. 3), on the other hand, contains a definite reference to the Mauryas in a context which indicates that their empire had ceased to exist.

4. The widespread notion that the *ratnins* of the *Brāhmaṇa* texts represent an embryonic ministerial council, or even a rudimentary cabinet, is quite without foundation. The king performs sacrifices at the houses of these people in the course of his lengthy consecration ceremony (*rājasūya*) in order to ensure their loyalty. The list includes not only the court priest (*purohita*), and the general (*senānī*), but also such figures as the court carpenter (*takṣan*), the king's messenger (*pālāgala*), the king's favourite queen (*vāvātā*), and the queen who has lost the king's favour (*parivṛktī*). It is clear that the highest common factor of this motley collection of people is not that they

have power in the realm, but that they have easy opportunities of assassinating the king or otherwise harming him. The commentarial interpretation of the *saṃgrahītṛ* as the treasures and the *bhāgadugha* as the tax collector, which is repeated in many works on ancient Indian polity, is certainly false. The former word is interchangeable with *sārathi*, "charioteer", while the later certainly means a sort of butler or waiter. W. Rau (*Staat und Gesellschaft im alten Indien*, Wiesbaden, 1957, 109-111) has shown this quite clearly by references which admit of no other interpretation.

5. Rau, *op. cit.*, 28-29.

6. Rhys Davids (*Buddhist India*, London, 1903), still the most interesting and readable account of the period, uses *Jātaka* and other later material in his description of trade and commerce (ch. vi), but there is enough in the older portions of the canon to indicate that these aspects of life had developed far beyond the stage depicted in the *Brāhmaṇa* literature (e.g. *Dīgha*, i, 51; i, 222; *Saṃyutta*, iii, 155 etc.).

7. References to governmental officers are, however, comparatively rare in the four major *Nikāyas*, and the textbooks rely mainly on material from the *Vinaya Piṭaka*, *Jātakas* and commentaries, which, as we have shown, are of doubtful validity as sources for the time of the Buddha. But see *Dīgha*, i, 7, 136; iii, 64; *Aṅguttara*, ii, 154, 279 etc.

8. In the four major *Nikāyas* the only reference I have found is *Aṅguttara*, i, 283, and it is doubtful if it means more than a mark or line. Drawing is referred to in *Majjhima*, i, 127. The *Vinaya Piṭaka* and *Jātakas*, on the other hand, seem to take writing for granted (*e.g.*, *Vin.*, iii, 76; iv, 7; iv, 305; *Jāt.* ii, 174; vi, 369 etc.). This gives further evidence of the lateness of these texts.

9. *Majjhima*, iii, 163; *Aṅguttara*, i, 250; v, 83; *Saṃyutta*, i, 82. These are all references to *kahāpaṇa*, and there are few others in the first four *Nikāyas*. *Nikkha* occurs in *Saṃyutta* ii, 234, but may there mean a weight of gold, as elsewhere in Pāli. References to *kahāpaṇa* are much more numerous in the *Vinaya* and the *Jātakas*, which also mention *māsaka* and *kākaṇika*.

10. If *ayas* in the *Ṛg Veda* means iron, we must revise all our conceptions of the date of the text, for on a generous estimate no iron is attested in Indian archaeological sites before about 950 B.C. 'Small fragments and shapeless bits of iron' were found at S.P.I. 3, Kauśāmbī (G.R. Sharma, *Excavations at Kauśāmbī*, Allahabad, 1960, 45) but the dating (*ibid.*, 22) is doubtful. Iron was in fact hardly known outside Anatolia before the 13th century B.C. (O.R. Gurney, *The Hittites*, London, 1952, 83).

11. *Śyāma ayas*, "black bronze", in the *Atharva Veda*, xi, 3, i, 7 etc., suggests something new and uncommon, for which no specific word was yet coined. Similarly the adjective *kārṣṇāyasa* in the *Chāndogya Up.* (iv. 17.7).

12. *Ayo*, frequent in Pāli, appears regularly to mean iron (*Aṅg.* iv. 70, *Saṃ.* v. 92 etc.). For the date of the introduction of iron into India see S.D. Singh, *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, v, 1962, 212-16, and D.D. Kosambi, *ibid.*, vi. 1963, 309-318. These articles sufficiently disprove the over-cautious theory of some archaeologists that

iron only entered India in the wake of the Achaemenids. Excavations at Atranji Khera in U.P. strengthen the view that iron first came to India around 1000 B.C. Iron has also recently been found at an early level at Pandu Rajar Dhibi in Bengal (P.C. Das Gupta, *Excavations at Pandu Rajar Dhibi*, Calcutta, 1965, 15), but the dating of this is far from certain.

13. D.D. Kosambi, *Culture and Civilization of Ancient India* (London, 1965), 89ff. The point has also been made more than once by Professor Kosambi in his earlier works.

14. The optimistic view of T.W. Rhys Davids (*Buddhist India*, London, 1903, 49 ff.) that the age of the Buddha was a time of great prosperity for the lower orders has been convincingly controverted by A. N. Bose (*Social and Rural Economy of Northern India*, Calcutta, 1945, 424 ff.), though this scholar employed *Jātaka* material, probably referring to somewhat later times.

15. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.*, iii, 8, 10; *Muṇḍaka Up.*, i, 2, 7-11; *Kauṣītaki Up.*, ii, 5.

16. Professor S.K. Chatterji (in *The Vedic Age*, ed. R. C. Majumdar, London, 1951, 151) traces transmigration back to "Austric Proto-Australoids". In the same volume (p. 496) Professor V. M. Apte questions the theory that the Aryans derived transmigration from "the animistic views of the aborigines". Professor L. Renou tends to minimize the non-Aryan influence involved, suggesting that the doctrine arose from "une lente reflexion" (*L'Inde Classique*, vol. i, Paris, 1947, 341-2). See L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Indo-Européens et Indo-Iraniens* (2nd ed., Paris, 1936, 279-290, 376-378) for fuller treatment and references to earlier work on the subject.

17. *R.V.*, x, 163, suggests that after death a man might pass to water or plants. *R.V.*, x, 58 suggests that the *manas* becomes one with the cosmos rather than that it is reborn.

18. *Punarmṛtyu* (*Śatapatha Brh.*, xii, 9, 3, 12 and elsewhere) seems to refer to a second death in heaven. In *Aitareya Brh.*, vii, 13, 6, a man survives in the person of his son.

19. *Brhadāraṇyaka Up.*, vi, 2, 16. The implication that the soul is transmitted through eating the plant which it temporarily inhabits suggests that the doctrine looks back to very primitive people, ignorant of the true process of conception. But the Aryans were certainly not in this low phase of development, and archaeological evidence of recent years tends to show that the peoples of the Ganga Valley whom they conquered were by no means savages. The passage is probably connected with belief in the *gandharva*, the disembodied soul which enters the woman at the time of conception. Such a doctrine, which La Vallée Poussin believes to have played an important part in the growth of the idea of transmigration (*op. cit.*, 288-9), would obviously explain the fact that coitus does not always result in conception, and in no way indicates a very primitive stage of culture.

Further evidence of the secret character of the doctrine of transmigration is found in *Bṛhad. Up.*, iii, 2, 13, where Yājñavalkya enunciates the doctrine of *Karma* in secret to Jāratkārava Artabhāga. On the basis of this, some have suggested that the doctrine was devised by Yājñavalkya himself (Oldenberg, *Die Lehre der*

Upanishaden, Göttingen, 1915, 97), apparently supported by Renou (*L'Inde Classique*, i, 342). This view is rejected by La Vallée Poussin (*op. cit.*, 286), following Senart.

20. The problems connected with this point seem to be generally ignored by scholars of Buddhism. Even the recent monumental study of Professor Lamotte (*Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, Louvain, 1958) gives little attention to the origin of the doctrine of transmigration, merely repeating the generally accepted view that it was derived from the autochthonic animists of the Ganga Valley (pp. 6-7).

21. For the doctrine of Ajita Kesakambalī see *Dīgha Nikāya*, i, 55. The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (i, 1, 2-22), of uncertain date, gives evidence of disbelief in a future life.

22. A. B. Keith in *Cambridge History of India*, vol. i. (1922), 118 ff.; A. D. Pusalker in *The Vedic Age* (London, 1951), 252 ff.

23. Even the *rājā* in the *Ṛg Veda* sometimes appears as a grandiose, almost superhuman figure, by no means *primus inter pares* (R. V. i, 65, 4; i, 67, 1, ix, 7, 5 etc.).

24. The tremendous sacrifices might have been deliberately designed to exalt the rājā to a semi-divine status. References to tribes by name are far less frequent than in the Ṛg Veda. The well known passage of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (vii, 29, 3) describing the brahman as "to be expelled at will", the vaiśya as "to be oppressed at will" and the śūdra as "to be slain (or possibly 'beaten') at will" suggests the emergence of absolute monarchy, or the absolute oligarchy of a small class of nobles, where all traditional rights were in abeyance.

25. This is clearly indicated by the famous story of King Viśvakarman Bhauvana, recorded in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (viii, 21, 8) and referred to in passing elsewhere (*Śatapatha Brh.*, xiii, 7, 1, 15). This king attempted to give away his whole kingdom to the sacrificial priests, whereupon the goddess of the Earth appeared before him and rebuked him, declaring that she was not to be given away, since she was the common property of all men. The story evidently developed at a time when kings were claiming ultimate ownership of all the land in their domains, and reflects an attempt to curb them by referring to ancient precedent.

26. *Ait. Br.*, 29, 3. (See n. 24 above.)

27. For references see Macdonell and Keith, *Vedic Index*, s. vv *sabhā samiti*.

28. The list of sixteen mahājanapadas, named after their inhabitants, and frequently mentioned, seems to look back to times before the Buddha, when tribal states were still influential. It clearly has no political relevance to the Buddha's day (*Cambridge History of India*, i, 172-3; H.C. Raychaudhuri, *Political History of Ancient India*, 4th ed., Calcutta, 1950, 95). The presence of comparable lists in non-Buddhist sources shows that this was a very widespread and popular formulation which survived, with significant variations, long after it had ceased to reflect either the political or the ethnic conditions of the time (Raychaudhuri, *op. cit.*, 96, 151-2).

29. Raychaudhuri, *op. cit.*, 119 ff.; Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names* (London, 1937), s. vv. *Licchavi*, *Vajji*.

30. The famous formula of the "Seven

Conditions of the Welfare of the Vajjis" (*Dīgha* ii, 73-5), is attributed to the Buddha, but it seems to be a popular gnomic passage, perhaps originally current among the Vajjis themselves. Soon after uttering it the Buddha is purported to have adapted it as a much longer formulation of the conditions of the welfare of the Buddhist *saṅgha (ibid.*, 76-81), and this shakes our faith in its attribution to him. Its call for a return to the old republican norms is clearly a reflection of tensions in state and society. The traditions about the Licchavis and Vajjis transmitted by Buddhaghoṣa (Malalasekera, *loc. cit.*, above) give similar evidence.

31. Raychaudhuri, *op. cit.*, 210-15. For chronological problems see A.L. Basham, *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas* (London, 1951), 66-78.

32. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, 256-7. Other references in *CHI*, i, 144 f.n.

33. See especially *Dīgha*, i. 87 ff., particulary 99. The classification of the four *varṇas* in the order *kṣatriya-brāhmaṇa -vaiśya-śūdra* is regular in the Buddhist texts.

34. Pasenadi of Kosala and Bimbisāra of Magadha are so well known that they hardly need mention. See Malalasekera, *op. cit.*, s. vv.; also *ibid.*, *s. vv. Ajātasattu, Avantiputta, Udena, Caṇḍappajjota.*

35. Upāli, the son of a barber, is the most outstanding example of a low-born convert to Buddhism (Malalasekera, *op. cit.*, s.v.). Also famous is Cunda the smith, from whom the Buddha received his last meal (*ibid.*, s.v.). Interesting in this context is the story of Puṇṇa, a farm servant, who while ploughing gave water to the *thera* Sāriputta, with the result that the clods turned to gold and the pious toiler became a wealthy merchant. The story occurs only in the commentaries (Malalasekera, *op. cit.*, s.v., *Puṇṇa*) but it gives clear evidence that Buddhist piety was believed to confer temporal as well as spiritual blessings. A story similar in purport to the "widow's mite" of the Gospel is told of a slave woman Puṇṇā (Malalasekera s.v.). Sopāka Thera, an orphan, the foster-son of a night-watchman, became a monk at the age of 7 and later converted his foster father's son, Suppēya (*ibid.*, s.vv.). The Order evidently included many monks of brahman origin (among them the famous ex-bandit Aṅgulimāla) but brahman lay supporters were perhaps less numerous. A statistical study of the evidence is much to be desired.

36. The story of Migāra in the *Dhammapada* commentary (i, 390 ff.) is very significant in this respect (see Basham, *Ājīvikas*, 137-8; also *ibid.*, 60-61.) The *Divyāvadāna's* account of the miracle contest at Sāvatthī (p. 143 ff.) suggests a riot of ascetics (Basham, *op. cit.*, 84 ff.).

37. E.g., *Dhammapada*, 76-80, 106-109 116-125, 195-196, 223-224, etc. *Sutta Nipāta*, i, 2, 7, 8; ii, 3, 4 etc.

38. *Dīgha Nikāya*, iii, 180-193. For other *suttas* addressed chiefly to laymen see Lamotte, *op. cit.*, 85, n. 44.

39. E.g., *Jātakas*, nos. 1, 21, 57, 113, 174, 189, 208, 277, 315, 344, 383, 445, 462, 481, 516, 536, etc., etc.

40. *Dīgha Nikāya*, iii, 58 ff.

41. In recent decades, the Councils have been the object of much study and speculation by the specialists. For bibliography, Lamotte, *op. cit.*, 136, n. 1. Lamotte (pp. 136-154) also gives a brief and very lucid analysis of the traditions.

42. Carratelli and della Vida, *Un Editto bilingue greco-aramaico di Aśoka*, Serie

Orientale Roma, xxi, Rome, 1958, 11. The Aramaic version gives *qšyt* which means 'truth' (Eggermont and Hoftijzer, *Moral Edicts of King Āśoka*, Leiden, 1962, 6). For further discussion of this inscription, see Schlumberger, *et.al.* in *J.A.*, 1958, 1-48; Lamotte, *op. cit.*, 789 ff. Note that on bilingual coins *Dh* (r) *amika* is regularly translated *dikaios*, 'just' (i, 587, 591, etc.).

43. The Minor Rock Edict, announcing his conversion refers to him as an *upāsaka*, but the Maski version has *buddhaśake* (perhaps "Sākyan follower of Buddha") and the Rupnath version possibly reads *prakāsa sake* ("an openly avowed Buddhist") (Bloch, *Les Inscriptions d'Asoka*, Paris, 1950, 145; Hultzsch, *C.I.I.*, vol. i., 166). The other minor edicts (Bloch, *op. cit.*, 154 ff.) give ample evidence of Asoka's personal faith in Buddhism.

44. Especially in the 12th Rock Edict (Bloch, *op. cit.*; Hultzsch, *op. cit.*, 64 ff.).

45. Bloch, *op. cit.*, 156-7; Hultzsch, *op. cit.*, 181-2; Basham, *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, 150 ff.

46. In the Bairat or Bhabra Edict (Bloch, *op. cit.*, 154-55; Hultzsch, *op. cit.*, 172-3).

47. In the minor Pillar Edicts of Kosambi, Sanchi and Sarnath, issued late in his reign (Bloch, *op. cit.*, 152-3; Hultzsch, *op. cit.*, 159-62).

48. Rapson in *CHI*, i, 519; Raychaudhuri, *PHAI*, 4th ed., 389. The sources are surveyed by Lamotte (*op. cit.*, 424 ff.), who believes (430) that a few monasteries may have been pillaged, with the consent of Puṣyamitra's government. The Buddhist monks might be expected to be supporters of their former patrons, the Mauryas, and whatever persecution took place may have had political reasons.

49. We know of no good reason why the *Śvetāśvatara* should be much, if at all, earlier than the *Bhagavad Gītā*. The language and verse structure of both are similar and both inculcate a similar religious attitude. Both the *Gītā* and the *Svetāśvatara* refer to the Sāṅkhya and Yoga schools of philosophy, and to the doctrine of *guṇas*.

50. See especially the *Agañña Sutta* (*Dīgha Nikāya*, iii, 28 ff.).

51. For references see Malalasekera, *op. cit.*, s. vv. *Brahmaloka, Sahampati, Sakka.*

52. *Dīgha Nikāya*, ii, 100 *(atta-dīpā viharatha)*; ii, 222 *(paccattam veditabbo)*; i, 240 ff. (against blind faith); *Samyutta Nikāya*, ii, 170-71, etc.

53. *Saddhā* or faith is the first of the five virtues of the disciple, the others being virtuous conduct *(sīla)*, self-denial *(cāga)*, learning *(suta)* and wisdom *(paññā)*. The list occurs in several places in the *Nikāyas* (for references see Lamotte, *op. cit.*, 74, n. 5). For the definition of *saddhā* see *Aṅguttara*, i, 207.

54. *Majjhima Nikāya*, i, 142; *Saṃyutta*, i, 34.

55. The formula is elaborated in *Saṃyutta*, iv, 304, in a confession of faith often used liturgically by Theravada Buddhists. References to the Three Jewels, or more accurately perhaps the Triple Jewel *(Triratna)*, are numerous in the canon. See the *P.T.S. Pāli Dictionary* s.v. *Dhamma* sec. C 2.

56. The Bhabra or Bairat Edict. Hultzsch, *op. cit.*, 172 f; Bloch, *op. cit.*, 154.

57. *Dīgha*, ii, 100. On his death Buddha was like a flame blown out by the wind. He could do no more for his disciples, and urged them to take the Dhamma for their refuge (*saraṇa*). This has an authentic ring about it, and one would wish to believe that the Master's call to self-reliance were his *ipsissima verba*. But the

suspicion remains that this passage may be inserted as a counterblast to Buddholatrous tendencies developing after his death. It occurs in the Sanskrit version (Waldschmidt, *Das Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra*, Berlin, 1950, 200), which proves at least that the passage is not a late Theravāda interpolation.

58. *Dīgha*, iii, 84, where the Dhamma is said to be the body of the Buddhas, who are identified with both Dhamma and Brahman, appears to be an important milestone in the direction of Buddhist theism and the idea may well have arisen out of speculation on the implications of the *Triratna* formula, though it fails to cope with the obvious anomaly. It also reflects a stage in the growth of the *Trikāya* doctrine of later Buddhism. The Buddha in his earthly form may well have dissolved in Nirvāna, but the *Dharmakāya*, or Buddha in the form of Dhamma, remains. The *Milinda Pañha* (ed. Trenckner, 73) states that the Buddha has passed away completely, but that he still exists in his doctrine, because he taught it, presumably in the same sense as Shakespeare survives in his plays. Such sophistries can hardly solve the logical objections to the formula of the Three Refuges.

59. Several descriptions of the end of the Kali Yuga are to be found in the Epics and Purāṇas. Most significant is *Mahābhārata*, iii, 187 where the Kali Yuga is said to last one thousand years with an additional dawn and evening of one hundred years each. The standard formulation in Manu (i, 69-71) agrees with this, but interprets the 1200 years as years of the gods, each equal to 360 human years (i, 65). Thus the end of the Kali Yuga is placed in the distant future. But the author of the Epic passage appears to have believed that the years of the *yugas* were normal human years, since the text gives no indication to the contrary. Among the signs of the approaching world cataclysm he mentions the confusion of caste, the decay of morals, especially those of women, the prevalence of sexual aberration, drought, crop failure, plague and, more important for our purpose, the domination of India by the *Mlecchas*, including Andhras, Śakas, Yavanas, Vahlikas and Ābhīras. This firmly dates the passage early in the Christian Era, when some of these peoples were making, or had recently made, incursions into India, and had gained power in some parts of it. There is good reason to believe that an early tradition placed the great war which heralded the Kali Yuga in the 10th century B.C. (Raychaudhuri *PHAI*, 4th ed., 27-36). Thus at the time of the composition of this passage, it must have been believed that the last dark age was drawing to its close, and the destruction of the world was impending. Probably Manu's innovation of the "years of the gods" was devised to account for the fact that the world did not come to an end as had been expected.

60. For references see Lamotte, *op. cit.*, 217-222.

61. From the fact that the Chinese version of the *Milinda Pañha*, translated in or after A.D. 317, contains only the second and third books of the Pāli Theravāda version, it is generally believed that the latter was much edited and enlarged in Sri Lanka. Theravāda made little impact in the N.W. of India, and it is intrinsically probable that the monk Nāgasena, who converted Menander, was a member of the Sarvāstivāda school, which was apparently then

most influential in the region. For a detailed study of the subject see Demiéville in *BEFEO*, xxiv, 1-259. Lamotte (*op. cit.*, 461-69) gives a valuable survey of the evidence for Menander's connexion with Buddhism.

62. E.J. Rapson, *Ancient India* (Cambridge, 1914), 157; D.C. Sircar, *Select Inscriptions*, vol. i (2nd ed., Calcutta, 1965), 88-89.

63. The Eastern Christian legend of Barlaam and Josaphat, based on the story of the Buddha's "Great Retirement" is well known to all students of the subject and there is no controversy on the subject, though other possible borrowings are far less certain. For a survey of this legend see D.M. Lang, *The Wisdom of Balahvar* (London, 1957).

64. *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, iv, 101 ff., c.f. Luke, xv, 11-32. See A.L. Basham in *Sources of Indian Tradition* (New York, 1958), 165-69.

65. The work of A.J. Edmunds (*Buddhist and Christian Gospels*, Tokyo, 1905), now practically forgotten, is still interesting, though his parallels are very forced. Recent scholars tend to minimize, or reject altogether, all possibility of influence in the traditional accounts of the life of Buddha and that of Christ, believing that the resemblances are so remote that they can be accounted for as coincidence. Foucher (*La vie du Bouddha*, Paris, 1949, 20-21) followed by Lamotte (*op. cit.*, 743-48) even rejects the incident of the her mit Asita, which has been widely compared with the story of Simeon in Luke, ii, 25-35. In this case the arguments against any form of mutual influence are quite strong. The story of the Buddha being taken to the Śakyas' temple soon after his birth and being reverenced by the image or images therein, occurring in the *Divyāvadāna* (ed. Cowell, 391), *Mahāvastu* (ed. Senart, vol. ii, 26) and *Lalitavistara* (ed. Lefmann, 118-20), has been compared to a similar incident recorded in the apocryphal gospel of Matthew (Foucher, *op. cit.*, 55, Lamotte, *op. cit*,, 742) and the similarities attributed to coincidence. Evidently the legend is a late one, because temples and images of gods hardly appear in India before the Christian Era, and there is no trace of such a story, even in rudimentary form, in the Pāli canon. But though the resemblances are far from striking, one wonders why a story of the Buddha's presentation in a temple should have been concocted in any case, since such a practice is uknown in Indian religion. Despite the learned opinion against us, we cannot but suspect that the legend of the infant Gautama being taken to the temple arose in circles which had heard something of the legends of Jesus, or *vice versa*.

66. See R. C. Zaehner, *Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism* (*London*, 1961) 58-9, 317-18.

67. *Ibid.*, 45 ff.

68. Some years ago an unnoticed illustrated Buddhist manuscript in the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge, was examined and found to have been produced in Bihar two centuries after it was believed that Buddhism bad been eradicated by the Muslims. This manuscript is of primary importance for both the history of Indian art and the history of Buddhism in India (Pratapaditya Pal in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London, 1965, 103-11).

3

The Structure of the Sangha in Burma :
A Comparative View

HEINZ BECHERT

AT FIRST sight, the structure of the Buddhist Sangha seems to be identical, or at the very least similar, in the various countries where Theravāda Buddhism is the established religion. The Sangha of the Theravāda monks is governed by laws and rules that are codified in the *Vinayapiṭaka*, the canonical law-book, and interpreted in the *Samantapāsādikā*, Buddhaghoṣa's aṭṭhakathā (commentary) on the Vinaya, as well as in a number of other Pāli works. Theravāda Buddhists always have insisted that these works are to be considered as authoritative, and that no change of rules is to be considered. Though the Buddha had allowed the Sangha to abolish minor rules,[1] the first Buddhist Council resolved that the Sangha cannot alter the Buddha's laws.[2] This decision is considered binding by all orthodox Theravāda Buddhists.

There is, unfortunately, still much confusion on the nature of Buddhist "sects" (*nikāya*) or "schools" (*vāda*), despite the enormous amount of writing on Buddhist sects. This confusion is caused by confounding different types of sects. We can differentiate three main types of sects : the so-called vinaya sects, the doctrinal sects, and the philosophical schools. A "vinaya sect" or *nikāya* is characterized as a community of monks who mutually acknowledge the validity of their ordination (*upāsampadā*), and make use of the same redaction of the vinaya texts. In the course of time, many of the vinaya sects split into sub-sects.

The second type of sect came into existence during the period of doctrinal dissensions and controversies, when different notions on the issues under discussion were accepted in the different nikāyas. They turned into communities, distinguished not only as different "vinaya sects", but also as upholders of certain doctrines. However, only very few of the sects mentioned in the context of the early doctrinal controversies succeeded in developing a system of philosophy consistent enough to have an impact on the progress of philosophical thought in India. These, then, were the philosophical

schools. Later non-Buddhist sources usually list four schools of Buddhist thought, *viz.* Sarvāstivādin (or Vaibhāṣika), Sautrāntika, Śūnyavādin (or Mādhyamika) and Vijñanavādin (or Yogācāra). The first two of these are Hīnayāna schools, the other two professed Mahāyāna.

It is well-known to historians that Theravāda was one of the vinaya sects.[3] But the Theravāda Sangha also has split into "sects", which should rather be termed "sub-sects". In ancient Ceylon, three such nikāyas coexisted for several centuries, *viz.* the Mahāvihāravāsin, the Abhayagirivāsin and the Jetavanavāsin.[4]

As for recent suggestions by Prof. D.J. Kalupahana and Dr. R.A.L.H. Gunawardhana concerning the identity of the nikāyas of the ancient Ceylonese Sangha, I refer to my study on "Buddha-Field and Transfer of Merit : Mahāyāna Concepts in Theravāda Buddhism of Ceylon", published in the *Bulletin of the Royal Academy*, in Brussels.[5] In that contribution, I have also discussed the Jetavanārāma Sanskrit Inscription.[6] There cannot be much doubt that the Abhayagirivāsin and the Jetavanavāsin, together with the Mahāvihāravāsin, formed three sub-sects of Theravāda in Ceylon, and that all these nikāyas made use of the Tripṭiaka in Pāli.[7]

Sangha Structure in Ceylon afier Parākramabāhu I

The co-existence of the three nikāyas ended with the reform of the Sāsana[8] enacted by King Parākramabāhu I of Ceylon (1153-1186), by which the three-nikāya structure was abolished. It is interesting, however, to note that no "head of the Order", or *sangharāja*, was formally nominated, although Mahākāśyapa acted as *de facto* head of the Sangha when he formulated the text of a *katikāvata*, a lawbook for the Sangha. The *katikāvata*, however, finally was enacted not in a Sangha council, but by royal decree. Buddhism had been integrated into the state to such a degree that the king was entitled to promulgate a lawbook for the Sangha.[9]

King Parākramabāhu II (1236-1271) issued a second *katikāvata*, which was to replace the earlier one. It is known as the Dambadeṇi Katikāvata. In this document, we find detailed references to the organizational structure of the Ceylonese Sangha, which from that time up to the end of the Sinhalese kingdom, remained essentially unmodified. This structure has formed the organizational basis of the Sangha for Ceylonese and Southeast Asian Buddhism up to this day. The Sangha of Ceylon was in Parākramabāhu II's time divided into two sections : *gāmavāsin* (village monks) and *araññavāsin* (forest monks). Each of these sections was headed by a *mahāsthavira*, who was the president of a central council, or *kārakasanghasabhā*. These two mahāsthaviras were elected not by the particular section, but by the leading theras (elders in the Order) of both sections, so that in spite of the practical division of the Sangha, a juridical unity existed in the form of the two mahāsthaviras. One of them was appointed *mahāsvāmi* (called *sangharāja* since the 15th century). Together, the two mahāsthaviras (later called mahānāyakas, resp. mahānāyakatheras) exercised considerable authority and power over the gaṇas, *i.e.* groups of vihāras or monastic units, and over the vihāras, headed in turn by a *vihārādhipati*.[10]

Thus, a highly-developed hierarchical structure arose. By this, the Sangha was incorporated or integrated within the framework of the state. This integration of the Sangha was worked out within the tradition of practical politics, but it had to be justi-

fied in terms of religious ideology.[11]

The hierarchical structure of the Sangha in Ceylon, however, did not survive the lapse of time. The political unity of the country was broken up, parts of the island came under the control of colonial powers, and there was general deterioration of the cultural and religious conditions in the free parts of the country. No longer was there a strong central authority of mahāsthaviras or the kārakasanghasabhā. To prevent the Sangha from becoming a potentially stronger power than their own, the monarchs did not appoint a mahāsvāmi.

Within the Sangha 'itself discipline was at a low point. The re-introduction of the upasampadā from Arakan did not achieve lasting success.[12] So-called "gaṇinnānsēs", priests who had undergone lower ordination, or pabbajjā, but not upasampadā, inhabited the monasteries of the island. It was with great difficulty that King Kīrtiśrī-Rājasiṃha and the monk Väliviṭa Saraṇankara achieved in the middle of the 18th century a reform of the Sangha, which was connected with the promulgation of a new katikāvata. Under a comparatively strong government, a mahāsvāmi or sangharāja once again was appointed, namely Saraṇankara. The reform, however, did not go deep enough. Certainly, the "gaṇinnānsēs" had to undergo an ordination, and some of them left the Sangha, but in general the reform seems to have remained more or less a compromise.[13]

The greatest hindrance to a thorough reform of the Ceylonese Sangha was the system known as "monastic landlordism", which developed as a peculiarity of Ceylonese Buddhism from the late Anurādhapura period (about the 10th century). The administrative head of a monastery had been elected by his particular Sangha or monastic community, and in the early period was removable. In the course of time, however, the position of monastery head came to entail a nearly absolute ownership of the monastery.[14] Though this development was completed only in the 19th century,[15] the principle that the head of a monastery—in official terminology, a *vihārādhipati* or "chief incumbent"—could appoint one of his pupils as his successor, had long since been generally accepted.[16] This so-called "pupillary succession" (*śiṣyānuśiṣyaparamparāva*) was widely used to keep the monasteries in the hands of certain influential families. In a number of monasteries, it was replaced by another rule of succession, termed *jñātiśiṣyaparamparāva* or *sivuruparamparāva*, which was developed to ensure that the succession of the vihārādhipati remained within the same family. This rule was, however, known only in Ceylon.[17]

Thus, the reform of the 18th century resulted in the formal re-establishment of a valid upasampadā, but not in a reform of the administration of the "Buddhist temporalities". The disintegration continued in the colonial period, though there were repeated attempts to take up the task of providing the Buddhist institutions with a working constitution to prevent misuse and misappropriation.[18]

The breakdown of state control, however, did not result in decay of the entire Sangha. There always were tendencies for reform from inside, *i.e.*, for purely religious reasons. The reformist movements, called into being by communities that had become influential as a consequence of social change in the early 19th century, were closely connected with the controversies of the castes. Already, in the Dambadeṇi Katikāvatā, is reflected the custom of excluding from membership in the Sangha all persons who did not belong to the highest caste (the Goyigama caste, which is the majority caste of the Sinhalese).[19] The main group of the Sangha, the Syāma-Nikāya,

retained this rule after the end of the Sinhalese monarchy. The other castes, which had succeeded in gaining considerable economic influence in various parts of the island, reacted by founding new nikāyas (Amarapura-Nikāya and its subdivisions, Rāmañña-Nikāya), which introduced their upasampadā from Burma. The further splits that occurred within these reformist groups of monks were due partially to religious subtleties and partially to a resurgence of the caste-consciousness in the new nikāyas.[20]

This impact of the caste system, which did not exist in any other country professing Theravāda Buddhism, is a striking feature of Ceylon Buddhism, particularly when compared to that of Southeast Asia. In addition, however, many structures without foundation in canonical law, *e.g.*, the aforementioned "pupillary succession" in its Ceylonese form, were taken over from the old or Syāma-Nikāya by many of the new sects which, according to their ideology, should have avoided it. These structures, developed in Ceylon under the island's social and political conditions, had been too well-suited to those conditions to be abolished, though they were not justified by canonical Buddhist law. On the other hand, the elements of self-administration, which can be observed as early as in the mediaeval structure laid down in the Dambadeṇi Katikāvata, has been instrumental to the survival of an organizational structure in all nikāyas of Ceylon Buddhism, to this day.

Sangha Structure in Siam (Thailand)

Before we discuss the structure of the Sangha of Burma, we will describe the Sangha organization in Siam (Thailand), as a second model for a comparative view. The official introduction of Theravāda in Thailand can be dated in the reign of Rāma Khamheng (*ca.* 1275-1317). The introduction of the Sinhalese tradition was the result of a mission sent by king Thammaraja Lüthai to the head of the Sangha in the country of the Mon, in 1361. The development of the Sangha structure in Thailand is characterized by a strong tendency towards centralization. The Sangha structure was based on the ancient duality of *gāmavāsin* and *arañña vāsin*, known in Ceylon as *ganthadhura* ("the observance of the study of scriptures") and *vipassanādhura* ("the observance of meditation"). It also was based on an administrative structure rooted in the geographical divisions of the country. In the 19th century, the Sangha structure was further complicated by a reform group called Dhammayuttika-Nikāya, founded by Mahāmakuṭa, who later ascended the throne as Rāma IV (Mongkut). By a law promulgated in 1902 (replaced by new laws in 1941 and 1962), final steps were taken to complete this development. The resulting structure was described by Kenneth E. Wells in these words :

> "It is a pyramidal system, by which instructions can be disseminated quickly from the top to monks in the most distant temples, and information from village monasteries can be readily dispatched to the Council of Ecclesiastical Ministers in Bangkok. Under this system, temple activities are kept under careful supervision, and good discipline is maintained among the quarter-million monks and novices."[21]

This structure still persists, notwithstanding the fact that the Thai Sangha is not free from problems resulting from the rather rapid cultural change which takes place in Thailand today.

Sangha Structure in Burma

In Burma, a comparatively well-organized hierarchy developed in a social environment quite dissimilar to that of Ceylon. I do not intend to enter here into a discussion of the history of Buddhism in Burma prior to the success of the Sīhalasangha, *i.e.*, the Sinhalese tradition that was brought to Burma in 1181 A.D., and finally after a long sectarian struggle that was ended by the active intervention of several kings superseded all other traditions. In the 13th century, the division of *gāmavāsin* and *araññavāsin* (as known in Ceylon) was introduced in Burma, but it did not remain a formative element of the Sangha structure for long. The great *pārupana* controversy over the method of wearing the monk's robes, which began around 1700 A.D., finally was ended by order of king Bodawpaya in 1784 A.D. He favoured the *pārupana* section of the Sangha, which considered the covering of both shoulders to be the correct way of wearing robes outside the vihāra.[22]

In the course of time, Burmese rulers were remarkably successful in their attempts to bring the whole Sangha under the control of the central ecclesiastical administration, which was itself controlled by the government. The hierarchy of the Sangha in old Burma has been repeatedly described, so a few remarks may suffice here. It was headed by a *sangharāja* or *sāsanā puiṅ* (Thathanabaing), who was appointed by the king. The validity of the appointment, however, automatically ended with the death or dethronement of the king, a fact that underlines the close connections between secular government and Sangha administration. The Thathanabaing was advised by a council of eight to twelve *sudhamma charā-tō* (Thudama Sayadaws), which had a function similar to that of the kārakasaṅghasabhā in the Sangha of Ceylon. In the provinces, a *guiṇ: khyup* (Gainggyok) headed the ecclesiastical administration, and under him a *guiṇ: up* (Gaingok) headed the ecclesiastical district administration. This system closely cooperated with the secular administration, and it controlled appointments to the ranks of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the supervision of Sangha property, the registration of bhikkhus, and the yearly Pāli examinations.[23]

This order, which had depended on the efficiency of the secular government, broke down completely when the Burmese kingdom was taken over by the British. The fact that the break-down was more complete than in similar circumstances in Ceylon can be attributed to the non-existence in Burma of a tradition of self-administration. That tradition, as we have seen, survived in the Sangha structure of Ceylon from the early period.

As in Ceylon, reform activities from inside the Sangha resulted in the 19th century in the formation of new "sects". We observe three types of sects in modern Burmese Buddhism, the first one consisting of new nikāyas similar to the reformist nikāyas in Ceylon. The two groups officially recognized as nikāyas in this sense, namely, Dvāra-Nikāya and Shwe-gyin-Nikāya (Rhve-kyaṅ-nikāya), were formed after the middle of the 19th century. They have built up a well-organized hierarchical structure after the model of the Ceylonese reform nikāyas. In some parts of Burma, these two nikāyas have split again into subsects with separate hierarchical organizations. The Dvāra-Nikāya is, *e.g.*, divided into two separate nikāyas in Arakan. The "Weluwun sect" (founded 1897) is a subsect split from Shwe-gyin-Nikāya.[24]

The bulk of the Burmese Sangha, which had no functioning organizational structure

after the break-down of the old hierarchical order following the defeat of the Burmese monarchy, is called Sudhamma-Nikāya. It cannot be compared with the two other nikāyas. Sudhamma-Nikāya is simply a term to denote the majority of the monastic communities, which no longer had central or over-regional organization. Attempts to reinstall a hierarchical organization undertaken during the colonial period ended in complete failure.[25]

There were, however, reformist and organizational developments within the Sudhamma-Nikāya similar to those that led to the establishment of the two other nikāyas and their subsects. Even the Shwe-gyin-Nikāya began as a movement within Sudhamma-Nikāya before it was organized as a separate nikāya. Such movements consisted of groups that still were considered within the Sudhamma-Nikāya, but which succeeded in the formation of effective organizations and allegiances. Well-known among these sects are the so-called "Pakkoku sect" and the "Ngettwin sect", the former having played an important part in political activities during U Nu's government. It was useful for these groups to retain an outward and non-committal affiliation to Sudhamma-Nikāya, in order to be able to speak for "the Sangha" in their proclamations.[26] A third type of reformist movement within the framework of the Sudhamma-Nikāya was the Sulagaṇḍi (Cūlagaṇḍi) movement of the last decade of the 19th century. This movement tried to impose a stricter observance of certain vinaya rules by the Sangha.[27]

Attempts at a reorganization of the Sangha were made during the period of the AFPFL government in Burma, between 1949 and 1962. Much has been written about these attempts and the reasons for their failure.[28]

Apart from the traditional Sangha structures, new organizations of monks arose when the Sangha entered the field of political activities, in the course of the struggle for national independence, and of their attempts to influence cultural change and political decisions in the post-independence period. This development can be observed in Burma and Ceylon, but not in Thailand, where political activity by monks was strictly prohibited by the government.

The emergence of monks' associations outside the traditional structures of the nikāyas began in Burma soon after 1920, and in Ceylon only much later. In both countries, the traditional hierarchy professed to be politically uninterested in observance of the rules of vinaya. Behind the scenes, of course, there was political influence of the hierarchy. Generally, however, it was against the interest of these privileged groups of monks to permit rapid political change. Therefore, they supported the establishment in one way or the other. They did not, however, have the means of enforcing their opinions among other groups of monks. The associations formed by the politically active monks were organized along lines similar to those of Buddhist laymen's organizations, *i.e.*, under modern secular law. Thus, a particular form of duality originated in the life of the Sangha in monastic and religious matters, the traditional structure was retained, but for political and social activities, many bhikkhus joined associations totally unconnected to the traditional nikāya organization.

A Comparative View

A number of similarities and dissimilarities in the development of Sangha structures

already have been hinted at in the foregoing remarks. A number of congruences between Sangha structure in Burma and that in Sri Lanka (Ceylon) must be explained by the impact of colonial rule in both countries. Here and there, the building of an effective hierarchical organization in the Sangha was interrupted by its "disestablishment", *i.e.*, the separation of state and religion. As a result, ecclesiastical jurisdiction ceased, the Sangha was broken up into several sects. There are a number of features common to the Buddhist ecclesiastical law of both countries that originated from the impact of British law. Some similarities, particularly those in the organization of reformist sects, can be seen as a consequence of the close connexions among the monastic reform movements in both countries from the beginning of 19th century.

On the other hand, the political development in Thailand favoured a modernization of the traditional hierarchical structure and its transformation into an effective modern administration. A recent attempt (by Hans-Dieter Evers, in his comparison of the situations in Ceylon and Thailand) to explain the differences in Sangha structure as a consequence of the social structure, is completely out of place, because the theory is contradicted by basic historical facts.

Between the Sangha of Sri Lanka and those of Burma and Thailand, there also are important dissimilarities, which rest on the difference of functions of the Sangha in these societies. In Ceylon, the community of the bhikkhus has developed into an order that may be described as an order of priests, because the return of a bhikkhu to secular life, though permissible by the rules of the vinaya, is seen as contemptible by the general public. Membership in the Sangha is more or less permanent in Sri Lanka. In Burma and Thailand on the other hand, temporary membership in the Sangha is a highly-respected social practice, which results in a very close connexion between the majority of the male population and the monastic community. In traditional society, temporary membership in the Sangha functions as a "rite de passage" for the initiation of young men into the world of the grown-up members of the society. It also serves to master crises in the personal life of a Burman or Thai, and serves purely religious purposes, too.[29]

FOOTNOTES

1. See *Dīghanikāya*, ed. T.W. Rhys Davids and J.E. Carpenter, London : Pāli Text Society, 1903, p. 154.

2. See *Cullavagga* XI. 1, 9 (*The Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, ed. Hermann Oldenberg, Vol. 2, London : Williams and Norgate, 1880), pp. 287 f.

3. For more information on early Buddhist sects, see Étienne Lamotte : *Histoire du bouddhisme Indien* (Louvain : Publications Universitaires, 1958), pp. 571-606.

4. See Wilhelm Geiger : *Culture of Ceylon in Mediaeval Times*, ed. Heinz Bechert, (Wiesbaden : Otto Harrassowitz, 1960), pp. 207-210; Heinz Bechert : "Zur Geschichte der buddhistischen Sekten in Indien und Ceylon", *La Nouvelle Clio*, vol. 7-9 (1955-57), pp. 328-344.

5. Heinz Bechert; "Buddha-Feld und Verdienstübertragung : Mahāyāna-Ideen im Theravāda-Buddhismus Ceylons", *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques, Académie Royale de Belgique*, 5th series, vol. 62 (1976), pp. 27-51. The two papers referred to are : D.J. Kalupahana : "Schools of Buddhism in Early Ceylon", *The Ceylon Journal of the Humanities*, vol. 1, (1970), pp. 159-190; R.A.L.H. Gunawardhana : "Buddhist Nikāyas in Mediaeval Ceylon", *The Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies*, vol. 9 (1966), pp. 55-66.

6. The so-called Jetavanārāma Sanskrit Inscription (published by D.M. de Z. Wickremasinghe in *Epigraphia Zeylānica*, vol. 1, pp. 1-9) preserves a set of regulation for the life in a monastery, which is said to be the residence of 25 monks, each of "four great nikāyas". The historical introduction of the inscription is lost, and it can be only tentatively dated to the first half of the ninth century. Prof. Kalupahana identified these four nikāyas as Sthaviravāda (Theravāda), Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika and Mahīśāsakas, while Dr. Gunawardhana argued that they were Sarvāstivāda, Mahāsānghika, Sthaviravāda and Sammitīya. Both explanations are wrong. The existence of Mahīśāsaka monks in ancient Ceylon is mentioned in the Jātaka Commentary by the Chinese pilgrim Fa-hsien and in the Mahāvaṃsa, but there is no conclusive evidence that Sarvāstivādin, Sautrāntika, Mahāsanghika or Sammitīya sects ever were present in Ceylon. Therefore, I propose a different explanation of the inscription, in the contribution quoted above, note 5 : The particular monastery for which this inscription was set up was a royal monastery, housing monks of Indian descent belonging to the four main nikāyas of contemporary Indian Buddhism. This explanation would fit in well with the tradition among Sinhalese kings of inviting learned bhikkhus from abroad, and thereby strengthening the international connections of Ceylonese Buddhism, and enhancing its prestige in the world. It also becomes clear why "four nikāyas" (which was the traditional number of nikāyas in India) are mentioned in the inscription, whereas there were "three nikāyas" in Ceylon, and why the inscription was written in Sanskrit and not in Sinhalese or Pāli as we should expect if it was set up for a Ceylonese Sangha. For want of more evidence, it is premature to speculate which of the nikāyas known from India were represented in the monastery in question.

7. There is a note in the *Mahāvaṃsa-ṭīkā* saying that the Abhayagirivāsa sect used a different text of the Parivāra of the Vinaya (on the interpretation of this passage see Bechert : "Zur Geschichte der buddhistischen Sekten", quoted above, note 4, pp. 332). It seems that a text named Upāliparipṛcchā, which is known from its Chinese translation (Taisho Nr. 1466) only represents the text which replaced the Parivāra in the Tripiṭaka of the Abhayagirivāsin. See Valentina Stache-Rosen, "Das Upāliparipṛcchāsūtra", *Buddhism in Ceylon, and Studies on Religious Syncretism in Buddhist Countries, Report on a Symposium in Göttingen*, ed. Heinz Bechert (Göttingen : Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1978, pp. 58-60.), and Introduction to this volume, p. 16 f.

8. On problems of Sāsana reform, see H. Bechert : "Aśokas 'Schismenedikt' und der Begriff Sanghabheda", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens*, vol. 5 (1961), pp. 18-52; id. : "Sāsana—Reform im Theravāda-Buddhismus", *50 Jahre Buddhistisches Haus*, ed. Sri Gnanawimala, G. Auster and R. Leu (Berlin-Frohnau : German Dharmadūta Society, 1974), pp. 19-34.

9. The Ceylonese Katikāvatas were edited and translated by Nandasena Ratnapala : *The Katikāvatas, Laws of the Buddhist Order of Ceylon from the 12th century to the 18th century* (Muenchen : Kitzinger, 1971).

10. See Dambadeṇi Katikāvata in Ratnapala : *Katikāvatas, loc. cit.* This structure survives in the division into the Malvatta and Asgiriya branches of the present Syāma-Nikāya of Ceylon, the Malvatta branch being the direct successor of the Gāmavāsin and the Asgiriya branch that of the Araññavāsin.

11. See H. Bechert : "Sangha, State, Society, 'Nation' : Persistence of Traditions in 'Post-Traditional' Buddhist Societies", *Daedalus, Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Winter, 1973, pp. 85-95.

12. The upasampadā was reintroduced by inviting monks from Arakan during the rule of Vimaladharmasūrya I (1592-1604) and of Vimaladharmasūrya II (1687-1707); see *Mahāvaṃsa* 94, 15 ff.; 97, 8 ff.; P.E.E. Fernando; "The Rakkhanga-Sannas-Cūrṇikāva and the Date of the Arrival of Arakanese Monks in Ceylon", *University of Ceylon Review*, vol. 17 (1959), pp. 41-46.

13. See Koṭagama Vācissara : *Saraṇankara Saṅgharāja Samaya*, Colombo, 1960.

14. W. Rahula : *History of Buddhism in Ceylon, The Anuradhapura Period* (Colombo, 1956), p. 135, note 1, states that "the law of succession and incumbency of Buddhist temporalities in the early period is not clearly known". Rahula traces the first evidence for the "pupillary succession" from the Buddhannehaela Pillar Inscription dated in the third year of king Kassapa V. (913-923) and edited by D.M. de Z. Wickremasinghe, *Epigraphia Zeylanica* 1, pp. 191-200.

15. See Heinz Bechert : *Buddhismus, Staat und Gesellschaft in den Laendern des Therāvada-Buddhismus*, vol. 1, (Frankfurt : Metzler Verlag, 1966), pp. 224-230.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 225 ff.

17. Dambadeṇi Katikāvata, par. 35 prescribes that the heads of an *āyatana* (a particular type of large monastic institutions) should belong to particular families; see Ratnapala, *loc.cit.*, p. 53, 147, 206. See also Hans-Dieter Evers : "Kinship and Property Rights in a Buddhist Monastery in Central Ceylon", *American Anthropologist*, vol. 69 (1967), pp. 703-710.

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18. See K.M. de Silva : "Buddhism and British Government in Ceylon, 1840-1855", *The Ceylon Historical Journal*, vol. 10 (1960-61) pp. 91-159; H.D. Evers : "Buddhism and British Colonial Policy in Ceylon, 1815-1875", *Asian Studies*, vol. 2 (1964), pp. 323-333; Bechert: *Buddhismus, Staat und Gesellschaft*, vol. 1, pp. 230-244.

19. See Ratnapala : *The Katikāvatas*, pp. 294-296.

20. See Bechert : *Buddhismus, Staat und Gesellschaft*, vol. 1, pp. 211-220.

21. Kenneth E. Wells : *Thai Buddhism, Its Rites and Activities* (Bangkok : Christian Bookstore, 1960), p. 7. A detailed study of the Sangha of Thailand was very recently published : S.J Tambiah, *World Conqueror and World Renouncer, A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand Against A Historical Background* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1976).

22. See Niharranjan Ray : *An Introduction to the Study of Theravāda Buddhism in Burma* (Calcutta : University of Calcutta, 1946). Further information in a recently published monograph on the Sangha of Burma : E. Michael Mendelson, *Sangha and State in Burma, A Study of Monastic Sectarianism and Leadership* (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1975). For a survey of the history of Buddhism in Burma, see also Manuel Sarkisyanz, "Die Religionen Kambodschas, Birmas, Laos, Thailands und Malayas", *Die Religionen Südostasiens* (Stuttgart : Kohlhammer, 1975), pp. 449 ff.

23. Bechert : *Buddhismus, Staat und Gesellschaft*, vol. 2 (Wiesbaden : Harrassowitz, 1967), p. 16 (with further references in note 1373a).

24. On Burmese nikāyas see Bechert. *op. cit.* vol. 2, pp. 21-24, and Mendelson, *Sangha and State in Burma* (quoted above, note 22).

25. See Bechert : *op.cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 18-24 and 59 f.

26. See E. M. Mendelson : "Buddhism and the Burmese Establishment", *Archives de Sociologie des Religions*, vol. 17 (1964), pp. 85-95.

27. Bechert : *op.cit.*, vol. 2 pp. 23f. ; Mendelson, *Sangha and State*, pp. 88 ff.

28. Bechert : *op.cit.*. vol. 2, pp. 60-73; Donald Eugene Smith, *Religion and Politics in Burma* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 140 ff. ; Mendelson, *op.cit.*, pp. 262 ff.

29. The present contribution is based on a paper read at the Seminar on the History of Buddhism, held by the University of Wisconsin, Madison, August 19-21, 1976.

4

Theravada Buddhism and the Aims of Buddhist Studies

G.D. BOND

IN RECENT years the study of Theravāda Buddhism and of the Pāli Canon has fallen out of favour with many Western scholars of Buddhism. Although Theravāda represents the earliest school of Buddhism still surviving in its South Asian context and although it is the dominant religion in many countries of South and Southeast Asia, one would be hard-pressed to name more than a handful of scholars in Europe or America who concentrate exclusively upon Theravāda research. In this essay we shall examine the aims of Buddhist studies and advocate both the importance of scholarly research on Theravāda Buddhism and the Pāli Canon and the significance of the Pāli Commentaries for such research.

Several reasons might be given for the decline in research interest in Theravāda Buddhism. One explanation is given by Constantin Regamey and Edward Conze who divide the development of Buddhist studies in the West into three phases: the Anglo-German school, the Leningrad school, and the Franco-Belgian school.[1] These writers argue that both of the two later schools represent advances in their interpretive techniques and their understanding of Buddhism. Hence, Conze says the older Anglo-German school has been superseded to the extent that its position has become "untenable."[2] Since the Anglo-German school concentrated upon the Pāli Canon of Theravāda Buddhism, the decline of this school of study naturally led to a decrease in interest in Theravada and in the materials which the Anglo-German school had studied. The swing of the pendulum away from Theravāda was accelerated by the increased availability of important and interesting texts representing other Hinayana and Mahayana schools of Buddhism.

Although the Anglo-German scholars concentrated their attention upon the Pāli Canon, they had as their main aim the investigation of early Buddhism rather than the study of Theravāda Buddhism. To be sure, the patriarch of the Anglo-German school,

T.W. Rhys-Davids, recognized the importance of examining Theravāda Buddhism for he said, "We have not solved the problem of Buddhism when we have understood the faith of the early Buddhists. It is in this respect that the study of later Buddhism in Ceylon, Burma, and Siam ... is second only in importance to the study of early Buddhism."[3] But, although the study of "later Buddhism" had importance, it remained secondary to the importance of the study of early Buddhism, and so the major scholarly interest and activity of the Anglo-Germans focused upon early Buddhism. As an index of this scholarly interest we might note the article "Buddhism" which T.W. Rhys-Davids wrote for *The Encyclopaedia Britannica*, eleventh edition, 1910. Such a topic might seem to require a broad treatment, but he dealt only with the "essential doctrines" of early Buddhism and with the Pāli Canon, omitting entirely any discussion of Theravāda or "later Buddhism."[4] The Pāli Canon had value for the Anglo-Germans because they regarded its works as "our authorities for the earliest period of Buddhism."[5] Both T.W. Rhys-Davids and Hermann Oldenberg agreed that in the investigation of early Buddhism, "we must not use as our source of evidence, the very interesting Sanskrit or Tibetan writings...."[6]

Mrs. Caroline Rhys-Davids also regarded the identification of early Buddhism as the aim of Buddhist studies; however, unlike her husband, she saw no value whatsoever in the investigation of Theravāda Buddhism. She believed that "historical study" was "the only and only right study of 'Buddhism'."[7] For, as she said, "When we come to study a religion, it is the birth of it that most interests us."[8] Even the name of the subject should be changed, she suggested, so that scholars no longer spoke of "Buddhism" but of "Sakya," a term which specifically indicated the first few centuries of the religion.[9] She argued that Buddhist scholars should adopt the model of the archaeologists who "dig for the original Troy beneath more than one superimposed city."[10]

Mrs. Rhys-Davids followed the other Anglo-Germans in employing the Pāli Canon as the source for early Buddhism, but she warned that it must be used with caution precisely because it represented the interpretation of the Theravāda School. With regard to the reliability of the Pāli Piṭakas, she said, "We have to get rid of the notion, if we have it, that in them we are reading records faithfully wording what the first Sakyans said or would have said."[11] Her distrust of the Pāli Canon stemmed from her belief that the Theravadins had obscured the original teachings of Gotama by their emphasis upon monastic values. Buddhist scholars must accept only the "earlier portions" of the Piṭakas as authentic and disregard "the relatively late statements emanating from the altered ideals of the monk."[12] The later views of C.A.F. Rhys-Davids differed significantly from those of T.W. Rhys-Davids on the questions of the nature of early Buddhism and the extent to which Theravāda had faithfully preserved the intentionality of the Dhamma. Thus, in the opinion of Mrs. Rhys-Davids, the Pāli Canon should be investigated by carefully "sifting grain of Sakya from chaff"[13] and the Theravāda school need not be considered at all because it represents a "monastic distortion" of the original teachings.[14]

In light of the Anglo-German viewpoint, we must ask what should be the aim or motive of Buddhist studies? Many scholars of Buddhism have said, with the Anglo-Germans, that Buddhist studies should seek to identify and investigate the essence of Buddhism or "original Buddhism." The assumption here seems to be that truth in Buddhist studies is similar to truth in pure scientific disciplines; that is, there can be

only one "true Buddhism." If the "true meaning of the Dhamma" is to be found anywhere, these scholars reason, then it must be found in the original Buddhism of the earliest period.

Two questions must be raised about this understanding of the aim of Buddhist studies. First, while we grant that it would be important to know what constituted the original Buddhism of the earliest period, we must ask whether the importance of such information automatically ensures its availability. Given the sheer bulk of the Pāli, Sanskrit and Chinese Buddhist canons, the problem of refining our methodology in order to identify original Buddhism or early Buddhism with certainty becomes enormous. We have only to look at the nineteenth century's "quests for the historical Jesus" in Christian studies in order to appreciate the difficulty of our task. These "quests," which involved a much smaller body of literature than the Buddhist canons, nevertheless failed because of the subjectivism and the faulty research assumptions of the scholars.

Second, we must ask whether original Budddism or early Buddhism indeed represents the only "true Buddhist" or the only proper scope for a search for the "true" meaning of the Dhamma. Perhaps the assumption that this is the case represents an example of the problem caused by the humanities having accepted too readily the scientific notion of truth. The acceptance of the idea of the singleness of truth has forced priorities and methodologies upon humanistic studies which have not always been appropriate to the subject matter. For example, must we agree that the "true meaning" of the Dhamma can only be found in original or archaic Buddhism when we know that within the first century or second century after the Buddha's *parinibbāna* more than twenty different schools of Buddhism had arisen? Each of these schools formulated their own canon and their own distinctive interpretations of the Dhamma. Each of these schools obviously believed that its interpretation of the Dhamma represented "true Buddhism." Great debates arose between the schools concerning the "truth" of various points of doctrine, as we learn from the *Kathāvatthu*. If the early Buddhists could not agree about the "true meaning" of the Dhamma, then how can we as Western scholars living over two thousand years later hope to resolve this debate or claim to identify with certainty the single "true meaning" of Buddhism?

One of the most interesting practical examples of the problem of what constitutes truth in Buddhist studies occurred recently at the annual meeting of one of the learned societies in America. A Theravāda Buddhist Mahāthera, or Elder, presented a paper on a particular aspect of the Dhamma. When he completed his presentation, a Western scholar arose to challenge the Mahāthera's interpretation of a certain Pāli term. The Mahāthera explained the meaning of the term according to the Theravāda canonical and commentarial tradition. The Western scholar, however, appealed to other sources for the meaning of the term and questioned the Theravādin's understanding of the meaning. The ensuing discussion failed to resolve the disagreement because both parties held different ideas about the nature of and sources for truth in Buddhism. Since the Westerner was familiar with a different meaning of the term in a Sanskrit source which he regarded as earlier, he refused to accept as the "true meaning" the traditional Theravāda definition of the term which the Mahāthera maintained. The irony of a Western scholar implying that a learned, orthodox Theravāda Buddhist Mahāthera did not know "true Buddhism" should convince us that we must reconsider our understanding of what constitutes truth in Buddhism and what the aims of Buddhist studies should be.

The principles of the Franco-Belgian school as described by Regamey would seem to represent appropriate aims for Buddhist studies. Regamey says, "They (the Franco-Belgians) have abandoned as fruitless the attempt to reconstruct a pure Buddhism, and are convinced that Buddhism is as much the work of the Buddhists as of the Buddha himself, and find the entire wealth and true face of this religion in the manifoldness of its aspects, and the multiplicity of its sects or schools."[15] Conze, who cites this statement of the school's principles, also says that "the principles of the Franco-Belgian school have now been universally adopted by all scholars working in this field, whatever the country they may live in."[16]

If we were to judge from these statements alone, we might conclude that all is well with Theravāda studies because the Franco-Belgian principles, which everyone apparently accepts, provide a good rationale for the study of Theravāda Buddhism as an important early school. However, the situation is more complex than it appears, for some of the same scholars who proclaim these principles have also contributed to the present imbalance in Buddhist studies by discouraging the study of the Pāli Canon and of Theravāda Buddhism. Edward Conze, who considers himself a member of the Franco-Belgian school and proclaims the principles of that school, demonstrates in his writing that his study of Buddhism is governed by aims which are very different from those principles. We shall examine Conze's position in some detail for it represents, and has been very influential in determining, the viewpoint and priorities of a substantial segment of Western scholarship of Buddhism.

In his article "Recent Progress in Buddhist Studies" Conze repeats approvingly Regamey's statement that the Franco-Belgians "have abandoned . . . the attempt to reconstruct a pure Buddhism . . . ," and he goes on to say that the scriptures of each of the eighteen schools in the first period of Buddhist history "can equally well claim to represent the teaching of the Buddha."[17] Despite these liberal statements, however, Conze devotes the first part of his article to a discussion of what he regards as the progress made in identifying the "original Canon" or the original tradition of Buddhism, and in this discussion his central theme is a rather impassioned criticism of the Pāli Canon.

In his assessment of the "status of the Pāli Canon," Conze not only betrays the principles attributed to the Franco-Belgian school, but he also bases his argument largely upon unsupported generalizations and unwarranted inferences. His main thesis seems to be that the Pāli Canon has been regarded as important in Western Buddhist studies in the past because it stressed "the ethical side of Buddhism to which Protestants would readily respond."[18] He says, "Its prestige among Europeans owed something to the fact that it fitted in with their own mood, in being more rationalistic and moralistic than some other traditions and much less given to religious devotion, mythology, and magic."[19]

It is true that some Westerners in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries regarded Buddhism as a "rational religion devoid of revelation"[20] and espoused it for that reason. Some of the Anglo-Germans, as well, seem to have been interested in the Buddhism of the Pāli Canon partly for this reason. However, the motivation for a century of Western scholarship on the Pāli Canon and on Theravāda Buddhism cannot be established by this kind of gratuitous psychological generalization. Although Conze seeks to challenge the validity of Pāli and Theravāda studies, he demonstrates nothing

by this generalization, except, possibly, his own attitude toward the Pāli Canon and toward Protestants.

Conze clearly has not abandoned "the attempt to reconstruct a pure Buddhism" for when he speaks of the "status" and the "prestige" of the Pāli Canon he is referring to its value as a source for discerning the "original Canon". Ironically, both the Anglo-German scholars' confidence of the Pāli Canon and Conze's criticism of it stem from the same cause, their respective estimations of its usefulness in understanding "early Buddhism". For both, the Pāli Canon represents a means to an end, and their ideas about that end necessarily influence their judgments about the sources for reaching it. Neither the Anglo-Germans, nor Conze, however, evaluate the Pāli Canon in its own right, as the canon of the Theravāda school of Buddhism. We must be aware of this, for certainly, the "prestige" or lack of "prestige" of the Pāli Canon among European scholars does not affect the meaning and value of the *Tripiṭaka* itself. Thus, in his review of recent scholarship relating to the Pāli Canon, Conze expresses a strong bias against the Pāli Canon because of his opinion of its value as a reliable interpretation of the Buddha's Dhamma and its usefulness as a source for reconstructing the "original Canon".

In support of his thesis that the Pāli Canon was valued in the West only because of its ethical emphasis, he compares the Theravādin and Sarvastivadin versions of the last words of the Buddha; however, his argument fails to prove either that the Pāli Canon is less reliable because of its ethical stress or that the Pāli version of this saying was chosen by Western scholars for this reason.[21] In the Pāli Canon we find "*vayadhammā samkhārā appamādena sampādetha,*" which he somewhat loosely translates as "doomed to extinction are composite things; exert yourselves in wakefulness." The Sarvastivadin version of the saying, however, lacks the two final words and reads, "*vyayadharmāh sarvasamskārāh,*" or "doomed to extinction are all composite things." Conze takes the difference in these two versions of the saying to be indicative of the reason the Pāli Canon gained such wide acceptance in the West. He implies that the Sarvastivadin version is more authentic and at least as old, if not older, but was not recognized as such by the Europeans because it contained "a mere statement about the facts of life, and no word about the need for 'striving', so dear to the European moralist!"[22]

We must ask several questions about this example. First, did the early European scholars have the Sarvastivadin Canon available to them so that we can assume they consciously chose the Pāli version over the Sanskrit version? If they were generally unaware of the Sarvastivadin scriptures or if these writings were not available to them, then it is pointless to charge that they preferred the Pāli Canon because it spoke of "striving". Second, how can we be certain which of the two passages represents the more authentic version of the saying? Why should we think it more probable that the Theravadins added the two words "*appamādena sampādetha*" than that the Sarvastivadins lost or omitted them? To imply, as Conze does, that the Buddha had more interest in descriptions of the "facts of life" or metaphysical theories than in the practical application of his teachings goes against a widespread tradition depicting the Buddha as a teacher who emphasized the relevance of the Dhamma to human life.

In the *Cūḷa-Māluṅkyasutta* the Buddha refuses to answer Māluṅkya's speculative and metaphysical questions because they are "not related to the goal" and do not "conduce to turning away from, to dispassion, . . . or to super-knowledge, awakening

and Nibbāna."[23] With regard to the practical intent of the Dhamma, the Buddha is reported to have said, "Thus, indeed, O Bhikkhus, the Dhamma taught by me is like a raft, it is for the purpose of crossing over, not for seizing (and carrying)" (M.I. 135). Such passages would seem to indicate that "striving" was dear to the Buddha also. We might almost be tempted to ask whether the Sarvastivadin omission of the call for striving could have been a factor in the school's becoming extinct, whereas the Theravadins' emphasis upon striving contributed to their survival.

Conze's survey of the advances in our knowledge of the writings of schools such as the Sarvastivada and the Mahasanghika demonstrates further his view of the Pāli Canon. Although he says that students "must henceforth pay equal attention to all the sources", the point of his passage is to depreciate the Pāli Canon.[24] He cites the opinions of several scholars concerning the relation of Pāli and Sanskrit sources to the earliest tradition. Objectivity and balance characterize the judgements of two of the scholars whom he cites. Waldschmidt says that "it is not infrequently the (Sanskrit) *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* which has probably preserved the original tradition more faithfully, and it has at least the same value as the Pāli text" and that "both 'Northern' and 'Southern' sources are equally important for ascertaining the oldest tradition."[25] Conze also quotes J.J. Jones who says, "We must proceed from the assumption that both Pāli and Sanskrit texts preserve as a fixed core a very primitive tradition".[26]

In his desire to diminish the authority of the Pāli Canon, however, Conze seems to force his evidence a bit. Although he cites the above statement from J.J. Jones, he fails to cite the very important statement which Jones makes two sentences after the one cited in the introduction to the *Mahāvastu*. Jones says in the two following sentences :

> In all texts moreover, irrespective of language, earlier or later strata may be distinguished. It is just an accident of history that some of the Pāli texts were fixed and codified first and so became less exposed to modernisation and corruption."[27]

Jones, who worked closely with both Sanskrit and Pāli texts, has a balanced judgment of their value and supports to some extent the relative authenticity of the Pāli Canon. Without mentioning this, however, Conze sums up his evidence with a quotation from Hofinger, who, he says, "expresses the same opinion" as these two scholars. Hofinger says, "Once again the Pāli Canon has come down from the pedestal on which it has stood for so long; it has no more value than the Chinese and Tibetan canonical documents, and occasionally it is even somewhat inferior to them".[28] Although this statement may express Conze's opinion, it does not seem to express quite "the same opinion" as the other two writers. They speak of Pāli and Sanskrit sources being more or less equal; whereas, Hofinger says the Pāli Canon compares unfavorably with Chinese and Tibetan texts.

As a further example of Conze's bias in his quest for the "original Canon", we call attention to the following argument. Conze asks how we can identify the earlier strata of the Canon since some sections "must surely be quite early, while others are certainly rather late."[29] He observes that in the North "successive datable versions" of a text are sometimes found, indicating that the Buddhists seem to have been "in the habit of keeping their holy books up-to-date by repeated additions over the centuries".[30] With

regard to the Pāli Canon, however, he observes that in Śri Lanka we do not find "successive datable versions". But instead of concluding from this situation, as an impartial scholar might, that the absence of "successive datable versions" could indicate that the Pāli Canon has not been "revised" and "kept up-to-date", Conze infers that it means "all documents representing earlier stages have perished".[31] He does not tell the reader what "documents" he is referring to, nor how he knows that they ever existed. His prejudice against the Pāli Canon prevents him from even entertaining the possibility that the Pāli Canon was closed much earlier than those Northern scriptures and that the Theravādins preserved it unchanged after it was closed. Certainly, the Pāli Canon contains earlier and later strata of material which developed over a period of time until the Canon was closed, but the lack of "successive datable versions" extending well into our era, as Conze finds in the North, probably testifies to the conservativeness with which the Theravadins transmitted the completed Canon. Unwittingly, Conze has introduced by this example evidence supporting the relative authenticity of the Pāli Canon.

In support of his argument against the Pāli Canon and its "status", Conze says, "It is now well known that Pāli was not the language of the Buddha, but a dialect of the West of India. The Buddha himself spoke some kind of Māgadhī, and all his sayings, like those of Jesus, are lost in their original form".[32] This can hardly be regarded as "recent progress". Although orthodox Theravādins have maintained that the Pāli Canon represents the literal "word of the Buddha," Buddhist scholarship has made the distinction between Pāli and Māgadhī for over forty years. C.A.F. Rhys-Davids said in 1931 that we must free ourselves "from the orthodox tradition of Buddhists, that Pāli is only another name for Māgadhese."[33] Likewise, E.J. Thomas, whose work Conze describes as a summary of the knowledge of the Anglo-German school, recognized the difference between Pāli and Māgadhī. He said that although the Theravāda commentators described Pāli as Māgadhī, "Pali as we know it must have developed in the West of India, and the probability is that the present Pāli Canon comes from a Buddhist community of monks in the region of Ujjenī (Ujjain), who adapted it to their own dialect."[34]

Since the distinction between Pāli and Māgadhī has been well understood by scholars for decades, Conze's stating this fact as if it constituted "recent progress" fails to strengthen his argument against the Pāil Canon. Even though Pāli does not represent the "language of the Buddha", the "status" of the Pāli Canon is not affected thereby. The Sanskrit and Chinese canons of the Sarvāstivāda and other schools do not represent the "language of the Buddha" either, although Conze does not mention this point. All of the existing canons represent the preservation and interpretation of the Dhamma by various schools of Buddhism at various distances from the original Sthaviras. A pure Māgadhī Canon does not exist, but if one is attempting, as Conze is, to trace the teachings back to an "Original Canon", then he must recognize that the Pāli language is at least as closely related to Māgadhī as Sanskrit and much more closely related than Chinese. Theravādins who lived to the southwest of Magadha and who employed some "Māgadhisms" recited the *Tripiṭaka* in Pāli, just as Sarvāstivādins and others who lived northwest of Magadha recited the *Tripiṭaka* in Prākrit and in Sanskrit.[35]

Conze's sources, at least, recognize the similarity of the status of the Pāli and Sanskrit canons in relation to the Māgadhī original. He tells us that Lūders has

demonstrated that "large portions of both (Pāli and Sanskrit) recensions have been translated from a Māgadhī original".[36] The value of this hypothesis lies in its enabling the textual critic to identify corruptions of the tradition in either of the recensions.

Interestingly, though, Conze adduces only an example of a corruption, occurring in the Pāli. He says that *Dhp.* 259 employs "the senseless *dhammaṃ kāyena passati*, 'he sees dharma with his body", instead of *dhammam kāyene phusati* (touches) which would have been equivalent to the Māgadhī original.[37] Perhaps the Pāli version has indeed corrupted the Māgadhī here; however, by describing the Pāli version as "senseless" Conze reveals that his understanding of Pāli in this case is hardly keener than his appreciation of it. Frequently, when kāya means the seat of feeling or the body, it does occur with the verb *phusati* which indicates contact between subject and object. The absence of *phusati* in *Dhp.* 259, however, does not render the phrase "senseless". In this passage, *kāyena* does not mean "with his body", where *kāya* would be equivalent to *sarīra.* Here, *kāyena* should be translated to signify "the person himself with his mental abilities".

In a similar sense, the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* speaks of "things to be realized by one's own person, "dhammā kāyena *sacchikaranīyā* (*A.* II 183). Concerning this passage, the Commentary explains *kāyena* as *nāma-kāyena* which the P.T.S. Dictionary describes as "Synonymous with *nāmarūpa*" (p. 350.) *The Majjhima Nikāya* has *vimokhā..... āruppā te kāyena phassttvā vihareyyaṃ* (*M.* I 33), "may I fare along having realized them (the incorporeal deliverances) by my own person," and again the Commentary interprets *kāyena* to mean *nāma-kāyena.* Radhakrishnan says in a note to his translation of *Dhammapada* 259, "*kāyena :* by body, by all his mental powers, by his acts".[38] The old Sinhala *Sanne* of the *Dhammapada* also explains *kāyena* in verse 259 by *nāma-kāyena.* We may therefore take it that *kāya* in such passages does not represent the *oḷārika kāya*, the gross or material body.

This translation of *kāyena* makes very good sense of the passage and yields a teaching which comports well with ideas expressed in other Theravāda texts. We may translate *Dhammapada* 259 somewhat as follows :

> "One is not versed in the Dhamma (*dhammadhara*) merely because he speaks much. But one who, although he has (formally) learned little, sees the Dhamma by his own person (*i.e.* personally, *kāyena)*, he indeed is versed in the Dhamma (*dhammadhara)*, one who does not neglect the Dhamma".

We find a similar idea expressed in the *Visuddhimagga* which teaches that "books", or study of the scriptures, constitute an impediment to realization for some people, and that true wisdom requires a personal, intuitive understanding of the Dhamma through meditation (*Vism.* 95-97). For example, the Elder Revata is said to have abandoned his study of the scriptures and practiced meditation for twenty years. At the end of that time he became an Arahant and discovered that, although he had not studied the scriptures for twenty years, he now knew them perfectly (*Vism.* 95-96).

Having revealed by his preoccupation with the "original Canon" that he has not truly "abandoned as fruitless the attempt to reconstruct a pure Buddhism". Conze, in the second part of his article, further undermines the Franco-Belgian ideals with which he began by demonstrating also that he does not find "the true face of this religion in

the manifoldness of its aspects and the multiplicity of its sects or schools".[39] If he did, he could not minimize Theravāda and Zen as he does. "The central tradition (of Buddhism) is that of Emptiness represented by Sarvāstivādins, Mādhyamikas, and Tibetan Lamas, By contrast, the Theravādins and Zen, which alone have caught on so far, are peripheral".[40] According to Conze, the situation of Theravāda can be compared to that of Protestant Christianity which was also a sectarian rather than a central tradition. In the Protestant sects in the "outlying districts of Europe" such as Wittenberg, Scotland, and Sweden, Conze says Christianity appeared in "quite new and unexpected guises". "As the living tradition had not sufficient strength to penetrate quite to this distance, it was replaced by fanciful ideas which claimed to go back directly to the 'original gospel', and which represented the battered remains of a mighty tradition as the 'only pure' doctrine".[41]

Similarly, he claims, Buddhism appeared in "unexpected guises" as it spread outward from the *madhyadesa* of India where it began and where the central tradition was best preserved.

> There at the confines of the sea, in Ceylon and Japan, its mentality became not unakin to that of Protestants in the outlying districts of Europe. In fact, Ceylonese Theravāda and Japanese Zen both reject the living tradition of Buddhism, the latter in the name of a 'direct transmission outside the Scriptures,' the former in the name of a Pāli Canon which alone is alleged to preserve the original 'Buddha-word'.[42]

Although Conze's statements here regarding Theravāda do not constitute a very coherent argument, we should analyze his position and its implications. His basic assertion seems to be that Theravāda represents a peripheral and sectarian form of Buddhism and that the schools stressing Emptiness represent the "central tradition". In support of this assertion he adduces or implies three basic points. First, unable to resist the temptation to expand upon his criticism of the Protestants, he claims that, like Protestantism, Theravāda represents "fanciful ideas" and the "battered remains" of a great tradition. Second, implying that the orthodoxy of Buddhist schools was directly related to their geographical proximity to the "middle-region" of India, he says that the "central tradition" which took shape in the "middle-region" was best preserved near there. Finally, he suggests that Theravāda represents a particularly peripheral school because it developed its "mentality" "at the confines of the sea", in Sri Lanka. Conze presents these points without any substantiation as if they represented obvious truths or, perhaps, the assured consensus of recent Buddhist studies. If we examine these three points, however, we find none of them to be as obvious or universally accepted as Conze would lead us to believe.

In his first point, Conze's analogy between Protestantism and Theravāda, under the best interpretation, can be termed only vague and questionable and under the worst interpretation might be termed malicious. No reputable historian of Christianity could condone Conze's facile and unfounded explanation of the Protestant Reformation. An extraordinarily complex set of religious, intellectual, social, and political circumstances led to the Reformation. It is a gross over-simplification of history to disregard all these factors and declare that the Protestants developed "fanciful ideas" which went against

the "central" or "living tradition" preserved by the Catholics. Certainly, reformers like Martin Luther in Wittenberg and John Knox in Scotland believed that the Reformation constituted a return to the "central tradition" from the excesses of medieval Catholicism. The Catholic historian Joseph Lortz said, "The Reformation set out to reform the head and the members of the one Church that belongs to all Christians".[43]

The Reformation grew in part out of a great debate concerning what constituted the "central tradition" of Christianity and that debate continued throughout the Reformation. In the reformers' view, Catholicism represented the "battered remains of a mighty tradition" rather than the "living tradition". For many years before the Reformation, voices from within and without the Church had been calling for reform and solution of problems such as the misuse of ecclesiastical power, corruption in the hierarchy, and the neglect of the Church's proper teachings. The statesman Machiavelli remarked, "If Christianity had remained what its Founder made it things would have gone differently... but there is no plainer proof that this religion is falling to pieces than the fact that the people who live nearest to Rome are the least pious of any".[44] The situation was certainly not clear-cut as Conze describes it. As a recent pastoral letter of the Catholic bishops of Germany said, "The straight forward objectivity of historical research, conducted by Catholic scholars as well as others, shows that there were many great abuses and serious scandals in the life of the Church at the end of the Middle Ages"[45].

The problem of understanding the Reformation is complex and cannot be solved by explaining it with simple generalizations based on one's own beliefs. John Dolan has observed that studies of the Reformation continue to defy "dispassionate consideration and objective inquiry" and that in order to understand the Reformation we must go beyond a "merely dogmatic evaluation of the event".[46] Conze seems to lack these qualities of "dispassionate" and "objective" inquiry regarding the Reformation and compounds the harm by using his "dogmatic evaluation" of Protestantism as the basis for on analogy explaining the places of Theravāda and Zen in the Buddhist tradition. Just as his analogy will not stand scrutiny on its Christian side, so it has no value as an explanation of the development of the Buddhist tradition.

We must also call into question the certainty of Conze's second point, that orthodoxy or the "central tradition" of Buddhism was best preserved in the "middle-region" of India and that when Buddhism spread to more distant regions it developed "quite new and unexpected guises". Conze states this idea as if it were undisputed, and does not acknowledge that this assumption runs counter to the positions taken by a significant group of scholars who have investigated the Second Buddhist Council. Jean Przyluski was among the first to interpret the Second Council as a dispute between the more orthodox bhikkhus from the Western regions and the less orthodox bhikkhus of Vesāli, a city in the East, the center of the *madhyadeśo*.[47]

According to both Theravāda and Mahāsanghika sources,[48] the Second Council was precipitated by a dispute between the *Vājjiputtakā (Vrjiputrakā)* bhikkhus of Vesāli and the Thera Yasa (Yaśas) who happened to visit Vesāli. Yasa discovered that the Vesāli bhikkhus had altered some rules of discipline and allowed unorthodox practices. The Vesāli bhikkhus' soliciting donations of gold and silver from the laity in violation of the Buddha's injunction represented the chief point of dispute. Yasa vigorously protested these unorthodox practices but the Vesāli bhikkhus charged Yasa with abusing the laity

(by depriving them of merit) and carried out an act of suspension against him (*ukkhepaniyakamma)*. Thus, Yasa left Vesāli to seek support for his position and the resulting clash between his supporters and those of the Vesāli bhikkhus constituted the Second Council.

Przyluski and others believe that Yasa went to the communities of bhikkhus in the West to obtain support. A.K. Warder says, "The versions disagree on the precise details of his movements but agree that he found support in Kauśāmbī and Mathurā (the latter a rising city further up the Yamunā) and also in Avanti".[49] The *Cullavagga* states that Yasa contacted the venerable Sambhūta Sānavāsī and summoned bhikkhus from the West and from the southern region of Avantī (*Vin.* II 298). Oldenberg's edition of the text of the *Cullavagga* says that Yasa sent a messenger to Pāṭheyya and to Avantidakkhiṇāpatha. Oldenberg understood these terms to indicate three regions as we see from his translation of this passage. "But the Venerable Yasa ..... descended at Kosambi. And he sent messengers to the Bhikkhus of the Western country, and of Avanti, and of the Southern country, saying 'Let your reverences come!"[50]

The *Mahāvaṃsa* has Yasa summoning bhikkhus from Pāveyya (Pāvā) and Avantī[51] But other MSS of the *Mahāvaṃsa* read Pāṭheyyakā rather than Pāveyyaka[52]. This variant reading would support Oldenberg's translation of "Western country" but it does not mention the "Southern country".

The choice between Pāṭheyya, Western country, or Pāveyya, Pāvā, as the destination of Yasa's messengers has significance for the question of geographical opposition within the Saṅgha. If Yasa requested support from Pāvā, then it seems difficult to argue that the Pāveyyakā bhikkhus represented a distinctively "western" viewpoint. Pāvā clearly lay in the region of India which the Buddha travelled. The Buddha visited Pāvā just before his *parinibbāna* and the Mallas of Pāvā received a share of his relics. Pāvā was actually situated further east than Lumbini and only a little west, although much farther north, than Vesāli. If, however, Yasa requested support from Pāṭheyya, then scholars such as Hofinger, Przyluski, and Warder have more reason to believe that the Saṅgha had established distinct centers in the West. The bhikkhus in these centers, located in such places as Mathurā, Kosambi, and Ujjeni, may have found themselves in opposition to the bhikkhus in Vesālī, the main center for the East.

Several factors strengthen the probability that Pāṭheyya represents the correct reading in this passage. The *Cullavagga* narrative terms the bhikkhus who answered Yasa's call as Pāṭheyyakā and Avantidakkhiṇāpathakā bhikkhus, and describes these Pāṭheyyakā bhikkhus as "all forest dwellers, all almsmen, all rag-robe wearers, all three robe men, and all arahants" (*Vin.* II, 229). Significantly, the *Mahavagga*, in another context, contains a reference to Pāṭheyyakā bhikkhus which gives the same description of them (*Vin.* I, 253). Although this description may have been applied to many groups of bhikkhus, the similarity of these two passages supports the identification of Yasa's defenders as Pāṭheyyakā rather than Pāveyyakā bhikkhus. Oldenberg cites Buddhaghosa's comment on the term Pāṭheyya which explains that it was "the name of a kingdom situated to the west of the Kosala country."[53] Oldenberg goes on to say that "Pāṭheyya, with Pācīna, Avanti, and Dakkhiṇāpatha is one of the principle divisions into which India, as then known, was divided; and that it includes most, if not all, of the great westerly kingdoms of Kuru, Pañcāla, & c. ....."[54] This interpretation seems reasonable for it is logical for Yasa to have gone to Kosambi to summon bhikkhus from the Western region and from

Avantī. T.W. Rhys-Davids observes that Kosambi was "the most important *entrepot* for both goods and passengers coming to Kosala and Magadha from the south and west".[55]

The decision about the reading in this passage, whether Pāṭheyya or Pāveyya, relates very closely to the further passage which says that the Council appointed a committee comprising four Eastern, Pācīnakā, bhikkhus and four Pāṭheyyakā or Pāveyyakā bhikkhus. The *Cullavagga* text here reads Pāṭheyyakā (*Vin.* II 305) and the *Mahāvamsa* has Pāveyyakā (*Mhv.* 25). In this context we find two good reasons to opt in favour of Pāṭheyya. First, since the committee was composed of two factions and one of them was called "Eastern", the opposing faction could logically have been called "Western". Second, at least two of the elders who constituted the second faction came from the West or from cities other than Pāvā and lack any obvious connection with Pāvā. The Venerable Sambhūta Sāṇavāsī lived on Ahogangā mountain which was on the upper Ganges. Przyluski identifies him as "no other than the apostle of Mathurā".[56] The Venerable Revata lived in Soreyya when Yasa sought to contact him (*Vin.* II 299). Thus, the faction of the committee favouring Yasa as well as his defenders should probably be identified as Pāṭheyya rather than Pāveyya.

If the scholars have been correct in interpreting this and other evidence to demonstrate the geographical basis for the dispute, then the Second Council may be said to represent one important instance contradicting Conze's generalization about orthodoxy and geography. In this case, it was the bhikkhus from the "middle region", Veāsli, who introduced "quite new" and "unexpected" innovations, and the bhikkhus from the "outlying districts" of the West who defended the traditional and orthodox position. Even Bareau, who opposes the theory of a definite geographical opposition between schools, nevertheless believes that the Second Council indicates that the Vesāli bhikkhus, from the "middle region", had liberalized the orthodox standards. Bareau thinks the dispute represented a clash between "the rigorist tendencies of the missionaries occupied with conquering new territories for Buddhism (as the northwest of the Gangetic basin, Avanti, and the Deccan) and the laxist tendencies of the monks leading an easy life in the great monasteries of the holy cities of Buddhism where the pilgrims flocked (as Vaiśālī)."[57] If Conze intended in his article to review the "recent progress" in the field, he should have acknowledged that the theories of these scholars, recent and not-so-recent, disagreed with his own view.

As the third and major thrust of his argument, Conze maintains that Theravāda represents an especially peripheral and sectarian form of Buddhism because it developed its "mentality" at "the confines of the sea" in Śri Lanka. Although this idea rests upon his two previous points which we have questioned, it seems also to depend upon other assumptions. Since he does not disclose his support for the idea that Theravāda developed in Śri Lanka, we cannot be certain how he would argue for this idea. Perhaps, he would argue that the Pāli Canon developed in Śri Lanka. The internal evidence of the *Tripiṭaka*, however, suggests that it probably did not evolve in Śri Lanka. The Pāli Canon contains none of the references to people or events in Śri Lanka which we would expect if it had developed there. The indications are that the Pāli Canon was complete or largely complete when it reached Śri Lanka from India. The Sinhalese Theravādins seem to have preserved the *Tripiṭaka* without substantial additions or alterations. A.K. Warder defended the authenticity of the Pāli Canon when he said :

> Of the eighteen or more recensions of the *Tripiṭaka* handed down in the schools, the Sthaviravāda *Tripiṭaka* now preserved in the Pāli language (a West Indian language apparentlyt hat of Avantī when the schools had its main center in that country) is certainly one of the most authentic, in the sense of preserving the discourses of the Buddha in their wording as recognized before the schisms."[58]

Thus, if the Theravādins did not formulate the *Tripiṭaka* in Śri Lanka, then Conze cannot employ this assumption to support his argument that Theravāda developed in Śri Lanka.

But again, perhaps Conze would argue that Theravāda developed in Śri Lanka by indicating that the Pāli Commentaries to the *Tripiṭaka* developed there. This point would offer more support for his position because the Commentaries which represent the Theravāda interpretation of the Dhamma did undergo development in Śri Lanka. But this idea alone would not establish the broad claim which Conze makes. He maintains that Theravāda developed its "mentality" as a school in Śri Lanka in isolation from Indian developments. The Commentaries, however, seem to have ancient origins, possibly going back to India. The Theravādins believe that the Commentaries embody the interpretation of the Dhamma handed down by the Buddha and his immediate followers. Scholars who have investigated the Commentaries have found evidence which, although not entirely confirming this belief, does support the view that the Pāli Commentaries developed very early. Adikaram, for example, points out that all of the Theras mentioned in the *Samantapāsādikā* in a list of teachers who handed down the *Vinaya* from the time of Mahinda "up to the present day" lived before the second century C.E.[59] This list indicates that an important part of the tradition had been fixed at that time and was not brought up to date by later Buddhists, Buddhaghoṣa, who translated the Commentaries back into Pāli in the fifth century C.E., emphatically stated that he simply edited the ancient Commentaries and took pains to avoid "advertising his own standpoint".[60] Therefore, although the Commentaries obviously underwent development in Śri Lanka and contain numerous anecdotes and illustrations drawn from Śri Lanka, it does not seem improbable that the central ideas of the Commentaries took shape either at a time when the activity of the Theravāda school remained concentrated in India, or very early in Theravāda's history in Śri Lanka when the Theravādins had frequent contact with India.

Conze's argument has as one of its central premises the idea that the Theravāda school developed in isolation from the "central tradition". He emphasizes this point by referring to the school as "Ceylonese Theravāda" and saying that in its isolation it even rejected the "living tradition of Buddhism". However, both the legends of the Theravādins and the judgments of some recent Buddhist scholars dispute Conze's view that Theravāda developed in isolation from the "central tradition".

The Theravāda chronicles, *Mahāvamsa* and *Dīpavamsa*, record the legend of Mahinda's mission bringing Buddhism from Aśoka's kingdom to Śri Lanka. In this way, the Theravādins maintain, the Theravāda school was directly related to the predominant Buddhism of Aśoka's India. Interestingly, Fraüwallner, in his book, *The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature*, which Conze himself praises, corroborates the traditional Theravāda view. Fraüwallner defends the historical relia-

bility of chronicles on the grounds that they date from a time very close to the events related in them, no more than "150 years at the utmost".[61]

Fraüwallner goes on to demonstrate the that Buddhist missions reported by the chronicles receive confirmation from archaeological discoveries in India. In excavating stupas in the region of the ancient Vidiśā, archaeologists discovered relic caskets bearing the names and descriptions of the accomplishments of two bhikkhus who correspond exactly to two of the missionary bhikkhus listed in the chronicles.[62] On the basis of this correspondence, Fraüwallner says, "The historicity of this mission is thus confirmed by epigraphic evidence of an early date. At the same time this throws a favourable light on the data of the other missions".[63]

Further support for the story of the missions occurs, Fraüwallner believes, in the inscriptions of Aśoka. He finds a remarkable similarity between Aśoka's lists of the peoples to whom he sent his envoys of *Dhāmma* and the lists of the missions given by the chronicles. In Aśoka's inscriptions, Fraüwallner observes, "Here too we are confronted with the frontier territories to the North, West and South of the Maurya empire; and here too the East is characteristically missing. This is certainly no freak of chance".[64] Thus, Fraüwallner says that Aśoka's inscriptions provide "a confirmation of the missions account of the Singhalese chronicles".[65]

On the basis of this evidence, Fraüwallner concludes that the Sarvāstivāda, Dharmaguptaka, Mahīśāsaka, and Theravāda schools all descended from the missionaries of Aśoka and that the *Vinaya* of each of these schools was based upon a common *Vinaya* transmitted by these missionaries, "this was the *Vinaya* current about 250 B.C. in the region of Vidiśā."[66] Other Buddhist scholars have questioned Fraüwallner's conclusion because this explanation of the origin of the Buddhist schools disregards the traditional accounts that the schools developed by branching off from other schools.[67] Conze, however, does not seem to doubt Fraüwallner for he refers to Fraüwallner's book as "a remarkable piece of inspired detective work".[68] But Conze does not recognize, or at least does not discuss, the extent to which Fraüwallner's work contradicts Conze's own view of the "status" of Theravāda.

Whether or not the mission theory explains the origin of all four of these Buddhist schools, the archaeological and epigraphic evidence brought forward by Fraüwallner provides important support for the validity of the Theravādin account of their school's origin through the mission of Mahinda. The chronicles depict Mahinda as a resident of Vidiśā and say that he introduced the *Dhamma* to Śri Lankā during the time of Aśoka. Fraüwallner finds that Vidiśā "in the last centuries B.C. enjoyed a quite extraordinary importance as a religious centre."[69] Considering this along with other information from the chronicles and from Indian history, he says, "We can therefore assert with a fair amount of certainty that the Singhalese mission came from Vidiśā on the sea route through Bharukaccha."[70] To be sure, nothing has been definitely proven here, but the evidence does strengthen the probability of the Theravādin beliefs about their origins. If Mahinda came to Śri Lanka as part of a mission from an important religious center of Asoka's India, then the Theravādins have good reason to believe that their school grew directly out of the "central tradition" of Buddhism, in contrast to Conze's view that the Theravāda school developed in isolation from the "central tradition".

Theravāda Buddhists have also employed the legend of the Third Council to explain the authenticity of their school and its relation to both the "central tradition" and the

other Buddhist schools. The chronicles record that under the patronage of Aśoka, the bhikkhus at the Third Council purged the Sañgha of heterodox bhikkhus and recited the *Tripiṭaka*. The Theravādins have held that their school issued directly from the Vibhajjavāda, the orthodox Sañgha of the Third Council.

Western scholarship of Buddhism has maintained a cautious skepticism about the Third Council because the accounts of it occur only in Pāli source which had a vested interest in the matter. However, some prominent Western scholars have argued for the validity of the accounts of the Third Council. Arguing from the evidence of Asoka's edicts, A. Bareau has said, "As we have seen, it is certain that a council following a serious menace of schism took place under the reign of the great Asoka . . . . Consequently, the recitations of the Singhalese chronicles relate well to a concise historical fact."[71] A.K. Warder supports this view when he says, "The claim of the 'Mahāvihāravāsins' in Ceylon to be the original Sthaviravāda of the First Schism as opposed to the Vātsīputrīyas, Sarvāstivādins, and others can be upheld."[72]

If the Theravāda account of the Third Council can be supported, then we have further reason to question Conze's supposition that the Theravāda school had a peripheral place among the many schools of Buddhism. Although this article does not provide the proper forum for us to discuss fully the question of the Third Council or to untangle the relationships of the Theravāda school and the other early schools to the original Sthaviras, we would merely point out that some scholars investigating the evidence on these matters have reached conclusions which support the traditional Theravāda view and run contrary to Conze's position. We would wish that Conze had discussed this evidence and the work of these scholars in order to debate his assertion that Theravāda represents a "peripheral" school.

Finally, we have difficulty in assessing Conze's charge that the Theravāda school developed "fanciful ideas" and rejected "the living tradition of Buddhism" because the vagueness of his terms, "living tradition" and "central tradition", renders the meaning of his charge unclear. These terms could refer either to the early tradition of Buddhism or to the continuing development of Buddhist thought in India, or to both in some sense. If by these terms Conze intends to say that Theravāda rejected the early tradition of Buddhism, then, as we have indicated, he stands in opposition to those scholars whose research supports the Theravādins' contention that Theravāda sprang from the "living tradition" of Indian Buddhism during Aśoka's time. But by "living tradition" Conze could mean the ongoing evolution and elaboration of Buddhist thought in India for he refers to the "central tradition" represented by "Sarvāstivādins, Mādhyamikas, and Tibetan Lamas."[73] If he means this tradition, then he undoubtedly is correct that Theravāda rejects this "living tradition". But the Theravādins would say that they reject these later, continuing developments of Buddhist thought because these schools devised "fanciful ideas" which diverged from the "central tradition".

In order to resolve the question of which Buddhist schools are "central" and which "fanciful" or "peripheral", however, one must engage in what Conze himself has elsewhere called "idle speculations about the orthodoxy of the various schools."[74] Conze's willingness to engage in such speculation, or his inability to avoid it, constitutes the basic defect in his article. Although he cites the Franco-Belgian ideals, he refuses to accept Theravāda as a school which represents the "true face of this religion" just as he is unable to accept the Pāli Canon as one of the scriptures which reliably represents the

teaching of the Buddha. Despite his declared intention to be objective, he has certain preconceptions which preclude objectivity on these matters.

Michael Pye has observed this inconsistency and pointed out that the Franco-Belgian method employed by Conze and Regamey involves an extra element and "concerning this extra both Regamey and Conze seem to be rather vague if not naive."[75] The extra element is an unstated or hidden assumption about the nature of early or essential Buddhism. As we have seen, Conze obviously has definite assumptions about early Buddhism and the "central tradition" and he minimizes Theravāda and the Pāli Canon according to these assumptions.

Pye, however, regards the application of an "abstracted concept of the essence of Buddhism" to be essential for the historical method. He argues that the Franco-Belgians have been unrealistic in professing "to give up all attempts to discriminate within the tradition."[76] We would not deny the importance of formulating an "abstracted concept of the essence of Buddhism" in order to pursue historical studies; however, this does not mean that the attempt to discover the historical essence of Buddhism should be the only goal of Buddhist studies.

Although it may be important or even inevitable to formulate our own conception of the essence of Buddhism, it is equally important to study the interpretation of the Dhamma made by each of the early schools. In a real sense, these interpretations of the Dhamma also represent "abstracted conceptions of the essence of Buddhism" made by Asian Buddhists themselves. As both Conze and Pye would seem to admit, Asian Buddhists have a certain advantage in interpreting Buddhism.[77] They have a greater probability of participating in a context of meaning similar to that of Buddhist texts and Buddhist thought. The interpretations and positions of the various early schools of Buddhism represent conceptions of the essence of Buddhism made much nearer in time and much closer in culture and outlook to the origins of Buddhism than those of Western scholars. Western scholarship should listen to the Asian Buddhists' own interpretations and study the richness and diversity of the Buddhist tradition. By investigating the schools' interpretations of the Dhamma and the expression of these interpretations through the various cenobitical, ethical, and cultic elements, Buddhist scholarship will develop a more comprehensive understanding of the Buddhist tradition and will have a better perspective on the conception of the essence of Buddhism. Thus, Buddhist studies must not only investigate the nature of early Buddhism but also must take seriously what Regamey described as "the manifoldness of its (the Buddhist tradition's) aspects and the multiplicity of its sects or schools."[78]

In the light of these priorities we see the need for increased scholarly investigation of Theravāda Buddhism and the Pāli Canon. The importance of research on the Theravāda tradition becomes obvious as soon as we recognize the value of investigating the various schools and realize that prejudices and speculative assumptions about what constitutes the "central tradition" and the "peripheral traditions" should not be allowed to control the agenda of Buddhist scholarship in the West. Although the exact relation of the Theravāda school to the original Sthaviras remains a matter of debate we need not demand certainty in this matter, especially when many scholars such as Andre Bareau and A.K. Warder have differed from Conze in their evaluation of Theravāda's authenticity. Western scholarship should examine the Pāli Canon because it represents an early formulation of the *Tripiṭaka* which has come down to us in a very complete

form and constitutes the scriptures of the Theravāda school. The Theravāda school of Buddhism must be investigated both because of its position as an important early school and because it survives today as a living religion for millions of people in Asia.

Given the need for increased study and understanding of Theravāda, how should we proceed? I suggest that a promising and appropriate way of approaching the essential tradition of Theravāda is through the Pāli Commentaries. Western scholarship of Buddhism has frequently overlooked the Commentaries and focused only on the *Tripiṭaka*. Theravāda Buddhists themselves, however, have traditionally relied upon the Commentaries for their interpretation of the Pāli Canon. For them, Canon and Commentaries constitute an inseparable source. The Commentaries provide the authoritative interpretation of the Canon, and indeed, the only nccessary and permissible interpretation. Because Western scholars tended to go directly and solely to the Pāli Canon their interpretation of the texts differed from those of Theravāda Buddhists who often charged that Western scholars misunderstood and misrepresented the Buddhism of the *Tripiṭaka*. If our objective is to understand the Theravāda viewpoint, then we must study the *Tripiṭaka* in the light of the Commentarial interpretation rather than interpreting the Canon in whatever way our own common sense and Western frames of reference suggest to us. Indeed, we may be able to derive a meaning from the texts by using our wits or we may be able to pick out what seem to be early teachings, but we will miss the Theravāda view of the meaning and significance of the Dhamma which constitutes the distinctive basis of the Theravāda tradition.

We can explain the Theravādins' insistence upon the Commentarial interpretation by saying that they conceive the hermeneutical problem differently from Western or Christian interpreters. In Biblical studies and Western scholarship the hermeneutical problem involves the situation of a text within history and the necessity of developing an historical interpretation which both discerns the original meaning and provides ways of bridging the historical and cultural distance in order to relate the ancient text to the modern context. For Theravāda Buddhism, however, the uniqueness of the Buddha's teachings constitutes the crux of the hermeneutical problem. The wisdom of the Buddha is believed to have been as immense as the ocean. For all practical purposes, he had what can be called omniscience (*Dhs. A.* 11-13, *Netti* 103). His teachings were similarly unique and profound. The Dhamma which he set forth transcends historical time and cultural conditions. The hermeneutical problem for Buddhism thus involves how ordinary human beings can understand this profound Dhamma which can be fully perceived only through the ultimate intuitive knowledge. The Pāli Commentaries receive their authority and significance for Theravādins because they provide the only avenue of approach to the meaning of the Dhamma and represent the only solution to this hermeneutical problem.

According to the Theravādins, following the Commentarial interpretation enables one to understand the true meaning of the Dhamma because the Commentaries represent the Buddha's own explanations of the suttas. In Śri Lankā, Theravāda bhikkhus, whom I interviewed and with whom I studied explained that we know the Buddha taught more than is contained in the Canon; for example, his first dialogue is said to have lasted all night and yet in the Canon it is only a few pages in length. Therefore, the elaboration of this sutta in the Commentary preserves, the Theravadins believe, the authentic

remaining portions of that first dialogue and is the appropriate explanation of the condensed sutta. As we noted above, this Commentarial tradition is believed to have been transmitted by the Buddha to his immediate disciples who recited it at the Councils and entrusted it to the *ācariya paramparā*. From this succession of teachers Mahinda brought the Commentarial tradition to Śri Lanka where it was preserved in Sinhalese translations by the Theravāda elders of the Mahāvihāra.

Even though Buddhist scholarship cannot accept uncritically this claim that the Buddha himself originated all that is included in the Commentaries, the Commentaries remain significant for the study of Theravāda Buddhism because they represent the fully developed Theravāda interpretation of the Dhamma. The works in the *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* and early post-canonical works such as the *Milindapañha* and the *Netti-Pakaraṇa* constitute an earlier expression of the distinctive Theravāda viewpoint. The Pāli Commentaries conserve a core of traditional interpretive material which probably originated in India and other material which developed in Śri Lankā as a continuation and exemplification of the basic viewpoint. All of this Commentarial material expresses the Theravāda interpretation in a way which incorporates and moves one step beyond the Abhidhamma and post-canonical works both in the Commentarial reflections upon the essence of the tradition and in the completeness with which the Commentaries set out the Theravāda interpretation.

Buddhaghoṣa and other commentators produced the Pāli Commentaries as translated editions and collations of the Sinhalese Commentaries and the authoritative tradition preserved by the Mahāvihāra. By the fifth century C.E. when Buddhaghoṣa wrote, the Theravāda Commentarial tradition had attained its settled form and constituted the orthodox Theravāda viewpoint. Thus, it would have been inconceivable for Buddhaghoṣa to produce new commentaries, but his work involved more than simply translating the Sinhalese Commentaries back into Pāli. Drawing upon a variety of ancient Commentaries and traditions on many of the books of the *Tripiṭaka*, Buddhaghoṣa produced the Pāli Commentaries on those books. Buddhaghoṣa described what he had accomplished in one of his Commentaries by saying, "The whole essence of the Commentary and the entire meaning of the text has been extracted and there is no sentence here that might conflict with the text or with the Commentaries of the dwellers in the Mahāvihāra or with the Ancients."[79]

Buddhaghoṣa's dependence upon his sources can be seen from his comments on points about which his sources said nothing. On such occasions he offered his own comments, but always distinguished his views from those of the Commentaries by a phrase like "but this is my own opinion" (*MA*. I 28). With regard to these passages, Nāṇamoli Thera, the outstanding Pāli scholar, noted that "The rarity of such instances and the caution expressed in them imply that he himself was disinclined to speculate and felt the need to point the fact out when he did."[80] He did not intend to disagree with the Commentaries; when he encountered interpretations which went against the Commentaries, he rejected them by saying, this is "the opinion of teachers out of touch with the Commentaries" (*Dhs. A*. 107).

The evaluations by modern scholars of Buddhaghoṣa's characteristic dependence upon his sources have been varied and interesting. T.W. Rhys-Davids attributed it to "the limitations of his mental powers" and went on to say, "Of his talent there can be no doubt, it was equalled only by his extraordinary industry. But of originality, of

independent thought, there is at present no evidence."[81] A quite different evaluation of this same phenomenon is made by Adikaram who cites Buddhaghoṣa's "diligence and precision" as early forms of the "scientific accuracy of the present day scholar."[82]

Buddhaghoṣa's lack of original exposition, however, might best be regarded as further evidence of Theravāda's insistence upon orthodoxy in interpretation. Thus, Buddhaghoṣa was neither mentally limited nor scientifically precise in not giving his own opinions, but he merely placed very little value on his own opinions because of the Theravāda evaluation of the orthodox interpretation. In one of his comments he explicitly says, "One's own opinion is the weakest authority of all and should be accepted only if it accords with the *suttas*" (*DA.* 567-68). Buddhaghoṣa believed the entire *Tripiṭaka* to be the word of the Buddha and considered the Commentaries next in authority to the Canon.

Buddhaghosa seems to have had as his purpose the presentation of the total religious system of Theravāda Buddhism as it was preserved and practiced by the Mahāvihāra. The Commentarial material which he transmitted not only explains the literal and detailed meanings of the central concepts, but also explains the place of these doctrines within the actual practice of the religion. Although the basic doctrines of Theravāda are also explained in the *suttas* and in the Abhidhamma literature, only in the Commentaries do we learn how the entire system functioned, *i.e.*, how the doctrines relate to each other and to the development of insight meditation. If we take the *Visuddhimagga* as the heart of the Commentarial tradition, we see that it is an exposition of the central elements of Theravāda Buddhism organized according to the development of the religious path leading from *sīla* to *samādhi* to *paññā*.

Studying the Commentarial presentation of the fully developed Theravāda system not only reveals to us the value of the Commentaries in understanding Theravāda Buddhism, but also demonstrates to us the difficulty of infering for ourselves apart from the Commentaries the meaning of the concepts within the Theravāda religious system. For example, if we encountered in the texts the terms *upacāra samādhi*, access concentration, and *appanā samādhi*, absorption concentration, we could only form conjectures about their meanings; however, the Commentaries explain the technical meanings of these terms, describe in detail the characteristics of the states of mind indicated by them, and give the traditional methods for developing them as stages of the total process of meditation (*e.g. Vis.* 126 ff.). What holds true in this regard for precise technical terms also holds true for the major doctrines of the tradition. That is, we cannot fully know the meaning for Theravāda Buddhism of doctrines such as the Four Noble Truths or the five aggregates, *pañca kandhā*, until we understand how the Theravādins related these doctrines to the stages of the development of *paññā*. Although Western presentations of Theravāda Buddhism frequently begin by recounting the Four Noble Truths, the *Visuddhimagga* indicates that these ideas have their true place in the Theravāda religious system as concepts which must be made the focal point of advanced meditation and insight in order to progress beyond *samādhi* to develop *paññā*.

Therefore, we may conclude this discussion by summarizing our view that the study of Theravāda Buddhism should be assigned a higher priority by Western scholarship of Buddhism than it has received in recent times. Almost from its inception, Buddhist studies in the West has had as its aim the elucidation of early Buddhism. As a result of this aim the values and priorities of Buddhist studies often have been deter-

mined by the preconceptions of Western scholars about the nature of early Buddhism. In many respects, Buddhist studies today continue to be controlled by an interest in and preconceptions about early Buddhism. Despite the declared intentions of the Franco-Belgians, they too follow this trend and contribute to the imbalance in our understanding of the Buddhist tradition with its sects and schools. We have seen that Conze's preconceptions about the "original Canon" and the "central tradition" of Buddhism cause him to minimize the value of the Pāli Canon somewhat arbitrarily and to declare Theravāda "peripheral" without presenting a cogent argument in support of his position.

It is indeed inevitable that in the course of their work scholars of Buddhism formulate a conception of the essence of Buddhism, and the refinement of such conceptions represents an important goal. Western scholarship of Buddhism, however, should not restrict its attention to the search for monolithic truth by concentrating exclusively upon winnowing the traditional material to isolate the essence of early Buddhism. Neither should the meaning and value of various Buddhist ideas and schools be determined entirely by reference to the prevailing scholarly concensus about early Buddhism. In order to attain a more comprehensive understanding of both the total phenomenon of Buddhism and the essence of Buddhism, Buddhist scholarship should examine the interpretation of the tradition presented by the varied schools of Buddhism.

Thus, Buddhist scholarship should devote serious attention to the Theravāda Buddhist viewpoint as represented in the Pāli Canon and interpreted in the Commentaries. The Pāli Commentaries have significance for the study of Theravāda Buddhism because, first, they present the distinctive interpretation of the Dhamma which has been accepted as authentic by Theravādins and which continues to shape the living Theravāda tradition; second, because they confront us with the Theravāda system in its most complete form, and third, because they enable us to enter an unfamiliar spiritual world and to perceive the tradition through the eyes of the Theravādins themselves.

FOOTNOTES

1. Constantin Regamey, *Buddhistische Philosophie* (Bern, 1950), pp. 14-17. Edward Conze, "Recent Progress in Buddhist Studies", originally published in *The Middle Way* 34, 1959, pp. 6-14; 1960, pp. 144-150; 1960, pp. 93-98, 110. This article was reprinted in *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies* (Oxford; B. Cassirer, 1967), pp. 1-32. This volume was also published by Columbia : University of South Carolina Press, 1968. (Subsequent references to this article will indicate the page numbers in *Thirty Years.....*)
2. Conze, p. 1.
3. T. W. Rhys-Davids, *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion* (New York : G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1882), p. 191.
4. T. W. Rhys-Davids, "Buddhism", *The Encyclopaedia Britannica*, eleventh edition, Vol. IV (New York : 1910), pp. 742-749.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 746.
6. T. W. Rhys-Davids, *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion*, p. 197. cf. Hermann Oldenberg, *Buddha, sein Leben, sein Lehre sein Gemeinde* (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1920), p. 84.
7. C.A.F. Rhys-Davids. *Sakya or Buddhist Origins* (London : Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd., 1931), p. 2.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 387.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 401.
14. C. A. F. Rhys-Davids, *Outlines of Buddhism* (London : Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1934), p. 105.
15. Constantin Regamey, *Der Buddhismus Indiens*, pp. 247-8, cited by Conze, p. 3.
16. Conze, p. 3.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
19. *Ibid.*
20. See T. H. Huxley, "Romanes Lecture", London 1893, p. 21, cited in T. W. Rhys-Davids, *Early Buddhism* (Chicago : The Open Court Publishing Co., n,d.), pp. 88-89. Also see Henry S. Olcott, *The Buddhist Catechism* (London and Madras : The Theosophical Publishing House, 1881), p. 59.
21. Conze, p. 3.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Majjhima Nikāya*, Vol. I (London : Luzac and Co., 1964), pp. 426-432. For references to this passage in the literature of other schools, see Etienne Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, (Louvain, 1958), p. 52.
24. Conze, p. 5.
25. *Ibid.*
26. *Ibid.*
27. J.J. Jones, (translator), *The Mahāvastu*, Vol. II (London : Luzac and Co., 1949), p. x.
28. Cited by Conze, p. 5.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
33. C. A. F. Rhys-Davids, *Sakya or Buddhist Origins*, p. 429.
34. Edward J. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought* (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1933), p. 264.
35. cf. Lamotte, p. 626.
36. Conze, p. 9.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *The Dhammapada*, trans. S. Radhakrishnan (Madras : Oxford University

Press, 1950), p. 141.
39. Conze, p. 3.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 21
41. *Ibid.*
42. *Ibid.*
43. Joseph Lortz, *How the Reformation Came* (New York : Herder and Herder, 1964), p, 16.
44. Cited in John Dolan, *History of the Reformation* (New York : Desclee Co., 1965), p. 199.
45. Cited by D. J. O 'Hanlen, S. J. in Preface to Lortz, p. 7.
46. Dolan, pp. 3-4,
47. Jean Przyluski, *Le Concile de Rājagaṛh* (Paris : Paul Geunther, 1926-28), pp. 309-314.
48. The Theravada accounts of the Second Council occur in *Cullavagga* khandaka XII, *Mahāvaṃsa*, *Dipavamsa*, *Sounaṅgalāvilasinie*, *Samantapāsādikā*, and the *Nikāya Sangrahawa*. For the Mahasanghika account see M. Hofinger, *Etude sur le Concile de Vaisāli* (Louvain : Bureaux du Museon, 1946), and A. Bareau, *Les Premiers Conciles Bouddhiques* (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1955).
49. A.K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism* (Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), p. 210.
50. *Vinaya Texts*, part III, trans. H. Oldenberg and T.W. Rhys-Davids, volume XX of *Sacred Books of the East*, ed. Max Muller, (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1885), p. 394.
51. *Mahāvaṃsa*, trans. W. Geiger (London : Luzac and Co., 1958), p.22.
52. *Ibid.*, n. 17.
53. *Vinaya Texts*, part II, trans. H, Oldenberg and T. W. Rhys-Davids, volume XVII of *Sacred Books of the East*, ed. Max Muller, (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1882),p. 146, n. 1.
54. *Ibid.*
55. T. W. Rhys-Davids, *Buddhist India* (Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass 1971), p. 36.
56. Jean Przyluski, *The Legend of Emperor Asoka in Indian and Chinese Texts*, trans, D.K. Biswas (Calcutta : Mukhopadhyay, 1967), p. 17, n. 2.
57. Bareau, pp. 82-83. For further discussion of this controversy and Bareau's viewpoint, see Charles S. Prebish, "A Review of Scholarship on the Buddhist Councils", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Feb. 1974), pp. 246-351.
58. Warder, p. 296.
59. E. W. Adikaram, *Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon* (Colombo : M.D. Gunasena and Co., Ltd., 1953), p. 3.
60. Buddhaghosa, *Visuddhi-Magga* (edited) C.A.F. Rhys-Davids (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1920-21), p. 522.
61. E. Frauwallner, *The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature*, Serie Orientale Roma (Rome : Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1956), p. 14.
62. *Ibid.*
63. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
65. *Ibid.*
66. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
67. For a summary of this position see, G.S.P. Misra, *The Age of Vinaya* (New Delhi : Munshiram Manoharlal, 1972), pp. 26-27.
68. Conze, p. 8.
69. Frauwallner, p. 18.
70. *Ibid.*
71. Bareau, pp. 131-132.
72. Warder, p. 295. See also Prebish, p. 254, who says, "It does appear that Moggaliputta Tissa presided over an assembly of 1000 monks, ultimately concluding that the Buddha was a Vibhajyavādin."

73. Conze, p. 21.
74. E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1967), p. 59.
75. Michael Pye, "Comparative Hermeneutics in Religion", in M. Pye and R. Morgan, eds., *The Cardinal Meaning* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1973), p. 28.
76. *Ibid.*
77. cf. Pye, p. 30 and Conze, p. 2.
78. Regamey, *Der Buddhismus Indiens,* p. 248.
79. *Pāṭimokkha Commentary,* epilogue. Cited in Bhadantacariya Buddhaghosa, *The Path of Purity* (Visuddhimagga), (trans.) Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli (Colombo: A. Semage, 1964), p. xix.
80. *Ibid.*
81. T.W. Rhys-David, "Buddaghosa", *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics,* II, ed. James Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910), pp. 885f.
82. Adikaram, p. 3.

5

Early Buddhism and the Brahmanas

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THE *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* states that Māthava, the Videgha, crossed the Saraswati with Agni in his movement toward the east. "Now that (river) which is called 'Sadānīrā' (either modern Gandaki or Karatoya), flows from the northern (Himālaya) mountains. That one he did not burn over. That one the Brāhmaṇas did not cross in former times, thinking, "it has not been burnt over by Agni Vaiśvānara".

"Now-a-days, however, it is very cultivated, for the Brāhmaṇas have caused (agni) to taste it through sacrifices".[1] Hermann Oldenberg, writing in 1882, stated that the land of the Māgadhas (the "original" homeland of Early Buddhism) was "still farther off from the old centres of Vedic culture", and that some parts of the *Atharva Veda* and a host of other passages in the Vedic literature combine to show that the Māgadhas were looked upon as strangers and were regarded by no means with favour".[2] Two assumptions are made regarding this special relationship between Buddhism and its Māgadhan background, *viz.*, that sacerdotal Brahmanism was a relatively recent phenomenon in Māgadha and that Buddhism represented a revolt against an attempted Brāhmaṇa domination in the land.[3] These assumptions are then made the basis for the assertion that Buddhism began as an anti-Brahmanical movement, and was a "Kṣatriya" protest against Brahmanical domination. Evidence for this may obviously be found in the Early Buddhist texts, in statements articulating an antipathy against the Brāhmaṇas. Derogatory remarks about the pretensions of Brāhmaṇas are scattered through many parts of the Pāli canonical literature. The *Anguttara Nikāya*, for instance, has the Buddha compare the high ethical standards of the Brāhmaṇas of yore with their current depravity, in which they are compared to dogs. Brāhmaṇa secrecy concerning their ritual lore

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is denounced, and they are described as greedy for women and wealth. Likewise, Brahmanical literature also betrays a rather low opinion of the Buddhists. It is decreed, for instance, that a fine of 100 *paṇas* be imposed on anyone inviting a Buddhist (*Śākya*) to ritual dinners honoring the gods or Manes.[4]

Interesting as this mutual exchange of compliments is, it conceals a situation much more complex than simple antipathy or continuing hostility. The time between the composition of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* and the rise of Early Buddhism saw extensive demographic and cultural changes in Māgadha and the adjacent territories. Brahmanical penetration and dispersal in these areas had proceeded apace, and within the Brahmanical group great diversities in occupations and philosophical pursuits had taken place. Early Buddhism itself had seen a gradual but continuing change in the social composition of its votaries, monastic and lay, and during this time of change, gradual accomodation—if not a partial synthesis on certain levels—between Buddhism and the Brāhmaṇas had been accomplished. The purpose of the present paper is to analyze the social background of Early Buddhism to ascertain signs of such accomodation, the nature and content of the Brāhmaṇa-Buddhist encounter and its effect on the history of Early Buddhism.

It is necessary to define at the outset the two terms that will be used in this discussion. These are Early Buddhism and Brāhmaṇas. By Early Buddhism is meant the movement called Theravāda, whose texts are in Pāli and are included in the collection called the Pāli Canon, whose chronological limits may be set between *circa* 485 B.C. and the end of the First Century B.C. The earlier date is postulated on the assumption that the Buddha's *Parinibbāṇa* occured in 486 B.C., and that the First or Rājagaha Council was held immediately following. The historicity of the Rājagaha Council has been generally accepted, and the purpose of the Council was to prepare an authoritative corpus of "texts" embodying the Buddha's enunciations on the *Dhamma* and the *Vinaya*. We also will have occasion to use some post-canonical texts and the commentaries of Buddhaghoṣa (first half of the Fifth century A.D.), but only to obtain clarity or greater explication of some of the terms used in the canonical texts.[5] The term Brāhmaṇa is commonly understood as a designation of a "caste", with prescribed occupations considered ritually permissible, ritual obligations, and ascription of the highest status in the Hindu social hierarchy. This view is reflected in the Brahmanical *smṛitis* and usages of later centuries.[6] What we have in the Pāli texts, however, is something very different from what is implied in these definitions. As will be shown below, our texts include four distinct religious and occupational categories under the rubric "Brāhmaṇa".

II

Of these four categories, the first, called *pubbakā isayo* (sages of yore) may need only be briefly mentioned here. These were Vasiṭṭha, Vāmadeva, Kassapa, Bhagu, Yamataggi, and others whose names figure among the composers of some of the Vedic hymns. They are called "hymn-makers" (*mantānam kattāro*), whose compositions the Brāhmaṇas of later ages simply learned by rote and recited at length. The Buddha praised the simplicity of their life-styles and the high-mindedness of their spiritual quest, lamenting the fact that their descendants had fallen so low from the standards set by their forebears. There is no criticism of these sages, much less any hostility or antipathy toward them.[7] A few others are simply called *isi*, explained as "a holy man, one gifted

with special powers of insight and inspiration, an anchoret, a Seer, Sage, Saint 'Master' ". The term "anchoret", or anchorite, has the meaning of "one who renounces the world to live in seclusion, usually for religious reasons; hermit, recluse".[8] Among such *isis* are Asita and Devala who are so called as a matter of honor and respect rather than for any hymn-making activity on their part.[9]

The second and third groups comprised professional priests such as *purohitas*, who performed ritual services for the kings and also a variety of other services, and those who are called *mahāsālas*, or wealthy Brāhmaṇas. Many of the second group were also *mahāsālas*, and the main distinction between *purohitas* and *mahāsālas*, is that while all *purohitas* could be called *mahāsālas*, all *mahāsālas* were not necessarily royal *purohitas*. The stock description of such a Brāhmaṇa is given as "a repeater (of the sacred words), knowing the mystic verses by heart; one who had mastered the Three Vedas, with the indices, the ritual, the phonology, and the exegesis (as a fourth), and the legends as a fifth; learned in the idioms and the grammar; versed in Lokāyata sophistry, and in the theory of the signs on the body of a great man".[10] The Post-canonical *Milinda Pañha* repeates this description with slight variations, saying that the duty of these Brāhmaṇas was "concerned with the Rig Veda, the Yajur Veda, the Sama Veda, the Atharva Veda; with the knowledge of the lucky marks (on the body), of legends, Purāṇas, lexicography, prosody, phonology; verses, grammar, etymology, astrology, interpretations of omens and of dreams, and of signs; study of the six Vedāṅgas, of eclipses of the sun and moon, of the prognostications to be drawn from the flights of comets, the thunderings of the gods, the junctions of the planets, the fall of meteors, earthquakes, conflagrations, and signs in the heaven and on the earth; the study of arithmetic, of casuistry, of the interpretations to be drawn from dogs, deer and rats; and the mixtures of liquids and the sounds and cries of birds". Some of these "arts," such as prognostications from comets and birds and animals, are described as "low arts" (*hīnavijjā*) by the *Brahmajāla sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*.[11] It is with these Brāhmaṇas that the Buddha had most of his argumentative encounters concerning the Brahmanical claims to the purity and greatness of their "caste" or to the efficacy of their sacrificial ritual. The *Ambaṭṭha sutta* is a fairly representative a piece of such polemics. Ambaṭṭha, a disciple of the Brāhmaṇa Pokkharasāti of Ukkaṭṭhā, in the Kosala region, behaves in a discourteous manner with the Buddha, and when queried as to whether that is his normal practice in relation to Brāhmaṇas, Ambaṭṭha says that he behaved as he did only with "Shavlings, ascetics, menials, blacks, and those born of the feet of Bandhu or Brahma or Sudras". This leads to a rather acrimonious exchange, in which the Buddha suggests that Kaṇhāyana, the *gotra* to which Ambaṭṭha belonged, was the progeny of a slave-girl of king Okkāka (Ikśvāku), the putative ancestor of the Śākya clan.[12] In the *Brāhmaṇdhammika sutta* of the *Sutta Nipāta* the Buddha denounces his Brāhmaṇa contemporaries as creatures who have fallen from the high standards of their ancestors because of greed for material wealth. At another place, it is asserted that Khattiyas are superior to Brāhmaṇas in the matter of *gotra (khattiyo settho jané tasmim; ye gotta patisāriṇo)*, and Khattiyas are placed before Brāhmaṇas as a matter of course when the four standard social groupings (*vaṇṇā*) are enumerated in the Pāli texts.[13]

Many of these learned Brāhmaṇas enjoyed royal patronage. A standard list of the leading Brāhmaṇas of the time of the Buddha contains five names : Canki, Tārukkha, Pokkharasāti, Janussoṇi and Todeyya. They are described as *Brāhmaṇamahāsālas*

explained by Buddhaghoṣa as those who have amassed great wealth.[14] That such an assemblage of wealthy Brāhmaṇas should live in one place such as Icchānangala may seem surprising, but the explanation may be found in the institution of the *Brāhmaṇagāma*. The exact meaning of the term is not quite clear, for it may mean a village (settlement) either exclusively inhabited by Brāhmaṇas (which is not very likely), a village predominantly inhabited by Brāhmaṇas, or a village designated in a proprietary way for the residence and maintenance of learned Brāhmaṇas. A number of such Brāhmaṇa settlements are mentioned by name, such as Icchānangala, Ekasālā. Opasāda and Veṇagapura in Kosala, Ambasanda, Upatissagāma, Ekanāḷā, Pañcasāla and Khāṇumata in Māgadha, Khomadussa in the Śākya country, Dunnivittha in the Kalinga country and Kalandagāma in far away Ceylon. That the institution was claimed to be of ancient origin is indicated by the mention of an Anupama *Brāhmaṇagāma* in the days of the former Buddha Anomadassi.[15] Besides these *Brāhmaṇagāmas*, which were compact settlements close to important towns, even Rājagaha, the capital of Māgadha, and other cities, such as Āpaṇa, also are described as residences of *Brāhmaṇamahāsālas*. Brāhmaṇas also owned specific tracts, like mango groves.[16]

The Pāli texts leave no doubt about the extent of the wealth possessed by these *Brāhmaṇamahāsālas*, but perhaps the most prosperous among them were those who enjoyed what are called *brahmadeyya* lands. The term *brahmadeyya* is explained by the dictionary as "a most excellent gift, a royal gift, given with full powers (said of land granted by the King), a full gift". These *brahmadeyya* gifts are further qualified as *rājabhogga* and *rājadāya*, the former obviously meaning a "royal gift" while *bhogga* is explained as "royal, in the service of king.....with power over it as if he were king". These lands are also described as places "teeming with life, with much grassland and woodland and corn". Such gifts were given to Brāhmaṇas like Pokkharasāti, Kūṭadanta, Lohicca, Soṇadanda and Cānki, who are described as learned in the Vedic texts and ritual traditions, and who had numerous disciples of their own living with them. Buddhaghoṣa adds the gloss that these gifts could not be retracted or repossessed by the king (*yathā dinnam na puna gahetabbam hoti)*, given up *(nissattham*), or abandoned (*pariccattam*). Nor was "raising the flag, with abridgement of royal authority to be enjoyed" (*chattamm ussāpetva rajasamkhepe bhuñjitabbam)*. While these *brahmadeyya* lands were given by kings such as Pasenadi Kosala and Bimbisāra to Brāhmaṇas, there is one instance where a similar gift is given to a *rajañña*, namely, Pāyāsi. This exception may be taken to mean that such land gifts were not given exclusively to the Brāhmaṇas, but were also made to others, such as the *rājañña* ("royalty" . . . . . a high courtier, khattiya).[17]

Some of the questions raised by this institution of the *brahmadeyya* lands are of great social and economic significance to the background of Early Buddhism. The explicit meaning attached to the gift of these lands shows that they were given in proprietary possession, whereby they became an absolute property of the donee. Secondly, it is fairly reasonable to assume that there was a transference of some administrative functions from the royal authority to the donees. In the case of Pāyāsi, it is clearly suggested that he discharged administrative functions over his domain, including rights of apprehension and punishment of criminals. If Pasendi Kosala, who made the land grant to Pāyāsi, could allow the latter the exercise of administrative functions, could the same be said of such grants to Brāhmaṇas? The lands included areas used for farming and

pasturage, as well as for the growing and use of fruit trees (mango-groves.) The Pāli texts refer to the *dūtas*, *parisās* and *amaccas* associated with the *Brāhmaṇamahāsālas*. If the Brāhmaṇa *brahmadeyya* donees had no administrative functions in their domains, what were these *dūtas* and *amaccas* supposed to do? Buddhaghoṣa makes it clear that the donee exercised quasi-royal authority and acted almost as a ruler (*chattam ussāpetva*) and that his lands were tax-free. The Brāhmaṇas had their own *parisās* and *sabhās*. The Brāhmaṇa *parisās* are traditionally included among the components of the state, listed as four (*khattiya*, *Brāhmaṇa*, *gahapati* and *Samaṇa*). and Brāhmaṇa *gahapatikas* (householders) are also included in the traditional lists of a *rājaparivāra* (retinue of a king).[18]

A good many Brāhmaṇas are mentioned as royal functionaries. Most of them were *purohitas* to the kings of Kosala, Uttarapañcāla, Avanti, and the Śākyas, such as Gagga, Aggidatta (father of the monk Jenta), Kevaṭṭa. Tiriṭavaccha and Asita. Others like Vassakāra were *mahāmattas* (ministers). treasurers, accountants, or superintendents of waterworks.[19] The *Mahāgovinda sutta* tells the story of the mythical king Disampati and his Brāhmaṇa Govinda, whose son Jotipāla was appointed to succeed him after his death. The term for the office used here is *Govindiya*, and Rhys Davids translates the term Govinda as "Lord of the Herds", which he construes as a title meaning "treasurer or steward", though Mahāgovinda in the story is called a *purohita*.[20] It is also specifically said that Mahāgovinda used to tender advice to the king on matters of *attha*, later specified as *diṭṭhadhammika attha*, and under him had seven *Brāhmaṇa mahāsāla* and 700 *snātakas* (obviously a round number). Though the story is fictional the points concerning the hereditary succession to *purohitaship* and its duties of advice to the king on matters pertaining to this world (*diṭṭhadhammika-attha* is invariably contrasted with *samparāyika-attha*), raise some interesting questions.[21] It seems certain that at this time the office of the *purohita* involved functions well beyond the performance of Brahmanical rituals for the king. Vassakāra and Sunidha, the former specifically mentioned as Ajātasattu's *purohita*, were involved in erecting fortifications for the city of Pāṭaliputta in anticipation of an attack by the Vajjians. In the *Culladhanuggaha jātaka* (No. 374), the Brāhmaṇa is described as well-trained and skilled in archery, while at another place a Brāhmaṇa is described as a *navakammika* Bhāradwāja, who obviously had to do with construction work.[22] Elsewhere, we are told of Brāhmaṇas going to the Yona and Kamboja regions (probably the Northwest Frontier Province and the Kabul region) for trade. The story of Kasibhāradwāja Brāhmaṇa indicates that Brāhmaṇas engaged in farming.[23] Kasibhāradwāja obviously was a rich farmer, for he used 500 ploughs (obviously a round number again).[24] The point to be made is that the Brāhmaṇas of the period discussed here formed a functionally varied group, performing not only the prescribed Brahmanical ritual but also, and often in addition, following a variety of callings. These Brāhmaṇas, from the royal *purohitas* to rich farmers, were an influential group, and their acceptance or rejection of the Buddha and Early Buddhism was of vital significance to the history of the new movement. Many of these Brāhmaṇa *gahapatikas* lived in widely scattered areas in Māgadha, Kosala, the Śākya region, Avanti, and Dakkhiṇāpatha and they especially congregated in the great cities of Rājagaha, Pāṭaliputta and Sāvatthi.[25]

Many of these Brāhmaṇas claimed to belong to and were proud of their *gotta* purity. The most common *gotta* mentioned is that of Bhāradwāja; also mentioned in our texts are Brāhmaṇas belonging to Kassapa Assalāyana, Ākāsa, Kondañña Kosiya,

Kāccāyana, Gotama, Pārāsariya, Kaṇhāyana, and different kinds of priests, such as *addhariyu (adhvaryu)* and *udicca* Brāhmaṇas.[26] Many of these *gotta* names, such as Gautama, Bhāradwāja and Kāśyapa, are Vedic, and the term *gotra*, as Brough points out, had become so elastic in its usage that it sometimes denoted an exogamous unit, a family, or even social status generally.[27]

From the above, it is possible to arrive at some broad generalizations. One is that by 500 B.C. Brāhmaṇa penetration had proceeded into areas that once had been declared unfit for Brāhmaṇa residence and functions. This was especially so in Māgadha, Kosala, Avanti and parts of Dakkhiṇāpatha, where the existence of *Brāhmaṇagāmas and brahmadeyya* lands indicates widespread Brāhmaṇa colonization and acquisition of large landed properties, with quasi-fedual rights. Secondly, the Brāhmaṇas, either as *purohitas* or ministerial functionaries, had come to occupy strategic positions in the political, social and cultural life of the regions described as the homeland of Early Buddhism and of the areas into which it expanded by the last quarter of the first century B.C. Thirdly, the Brāhmaṇa group was socially and occupationally diverse, and there was a degree of upward and downward social mobility, permitting changes in social status and intermarriages.

Many of these influential Brāhmaṇas, either following the example of the kings they served, or on their own, became supporters of the Buddha and his movement. I have been able to trace the "conversion" of Brāhmaṇas who declared themselves *upāsakas* in the *Nikāyas*, and they number 49. Of these, five were *mahāsālas* enjoying *brahmadeyya* lands. They were Cāṇkī, Kūṭadanta, Pokkharaśati, Soṇadanda and Lohicca. One, Kasibhāradwāja, was a very rich farmer. Others seem to be ordinary Brāhmaṇas in terms of wealth, and quite a few are mentioned simply as "one Brāhmaṇa" (*aññataro Brāhmaṇo*). In other cases, "many Brāhmaṇa householders" (*sambahulā Brāhmaṇagahapatikā*) are mentioned as having become *upāsakas*. In a few cases, there is no mention of the Brāhmaṇa becoming an *upāsaka*, while there is one known instance in which Brāhmaṇas are reported to have attempted to harass the Buddha and his followers by throwing garbage into a well.[28]

The standard formula for the person seeking "shelter" (*saraṇam*) in the Buddha, Dhamma and Samgha, and requesting that he be accepted as a lay devotee (*upāsaka*), occurs at the end of the *suttas* in which these encounters between the Buddha and his Brāhmaṇa interlocutors are narrated. There is no reason to reject these "conversions" out of hand, for in many cases they are preceeded by an invitation to a meal.

What was the meaning of a Brāhmaṇa's becoming a lay devotee of the Buddha? In the case of those enjoying *brahmadeyya* lands and the *mahāsālas* it simply indicated that those concerned expressed their respect to the Buddha as a "holy" man. It is nowhere said that these Brāhmaṇas ceased to hold the *brahmadeyya* lands, a condition of whose control was to devote themselves to Vedic learning and train their disciples in it. Nor is it necessary to assume that the *purohitas* who declared their devoteeship ceased to be *purohitas*. In the case of Sunīdha and Vassakāra, the two ministers of Ajātasattu, there is no specific mention that they ever formally declared themselves to be *upāsakas*. Nor is it necessary to assume that their "conversion" signified any dramatic change in their traditional beliefs and social status. Probably, some of them who were officiating at the animal sacrifices on behalf of their royal patrons desisted from offering such sacrifices in deference to the Buddha and his preaching. That they continued to function as Brāhma-

ṇas seems a reasonable assumption. Their becoming *upāsakas* did not signify their giving up the old "caste" status. We have inscriptional evidence of such Brāhmaṇa *upāsakas* continuing to regard themselves as Brāhmaṇas. An inscription from Kuda (in Maharashtra) specifically mentions a gift to the monastic settlement there by a Brāhmaṇa who calls himself an *upāsaka*. On palaeographic grounds, the inscription may be dated to a period between the first and second centuries A.D. If Brāhmaṇas who were *upāsakas* continued to call themselves Brāhmaṇas in distant Maharashrta in the second century A.D., we may reasonably assume that such a practice prevailed during the life-time of the Buddha and afterward.[29] All that such a "conversion" involved was a kind of special relationship between the Brāhmaṇa and the Buddha and his movement. It indicated the absence of resistance to the new Buddhist movement by these Brāhmaṇas, their giving up practices especially objectionable, such as animal sacrifices, and their making donations to Buddhist establishments in the area. The situation may have been analogous to relationships between *Gurus* and their disciples among Hindus today, whereby the disciples regard themselves as members of the Guru's following without ceasing to be Hindus in any way. The point is that such "conversions" did not imply a distinct and separate "religious" or social identity, as later happened when a Hindu became a Moslem or Christian. Buddhism generally failed in establishing an organized group of lay devotees who, on their "conversion", regarded themselves, other than in their frequent or periodical visits and donations to Buddhist shrines as socially different from the rest of the community. But their support was valuable to Early Buddhism, for many of them were influential either at the court or in society in general, and their acceptance of the new Buddhist movement could have meant a new prestige and respectability for the Buddha and his monastic followers.

III

The last group of the Brāhmaṇas to be considered is one that is invariably coupled with the *samaṇas* as in the stock phrase *samaṇa-Brāhmaṇa*. The justification for separating it from the *Purohita-Mahāsāla-Gahapati* groups is that this last group is always distinguished from the rest of the Brāhmaṇas in the texts of the Early Buddhists. Our texts also speak of Brāhmaṇas living in *assamas* (hermitages), as in the case of the Brāhmaṇa Rammaka, which was in the vicinity of Sāvatthi, or the case of Brāhmaṇas who lived in forest huts constructed out of twigs, branches, and leaves. These conform to the picture of the Upaniṣadic philosophers who retired to sylvan areas for meditation and philosophical discussions.[30] The *samaṇas*, on the other hand, formed a class of their own, and had "one essential characteristic in common, *viz.*, that they are all professed religieux, homeless wanderers without kinship or social bonds". The group was "varied and miscellaneous in character" and its members lived by begging, having no fixed abodes (except in the rainy season), moving about from one place to another, singly or in groups of teachers and their disciples. The Buddha himself was called a *samaṇa* in this sense by his contemporaries.[31] One text gives an interesting list of *jaṭilas* (those of matted hair), Niganṭhas (followers of Mahāvīra, the Jina), *acelakas* (the naked ones), *ekasāṭakas* (wearing only one garment), and *paribbājakas* (wandering religious mendicants), "all with hairy bodies and long nails, carrying friars' kit". The precise distinction between a *samaṇa* and a *paribbājaka* is not always clear, though Dutt observes that the

samaṇas held "a distinguished place in the Parivrājaka community".[32] Some of our texts make a distinct mention of Brāhmaṇa *paribbājakas*, indicating that whereas the *paribbājakas* lived and wandered alone, the *samaṇas* formed their own groups or communities, guided by a well-understood code of discipline (*vinaya*).[33] The theories of the *samaṇa-Brāhmaṇas* are detailed in the *Brahmajāla* and *Sāmaññaphala suttas* of the *Digha Nikāya*. They discuss the theories of the six famous sectarians, Pūraṇa, Kassapa, Makkhalī Gosāla, Ajita Kesakambali, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta and Niganṭha Nāṭaputta who were contemporaries of the Buddha. Each one is described as "head of an order, of a following, the teacher of a school, well-known and of repute as a sophist, revered by the people, a man of experience who has long been a recluse, old and well stricken in year's".[34] In the formative period of Gotama s career, he was one of these *samaṇas* and/or *paribbājakas*, and it was, only after his Enlightenment and formal conversions, along with the formation of a distinctive *Vinaya*, that his followers were called *samaṇā sakyaputtiyā* (*Śākyan samaṇas*).

This body of homeless religious wanderers provided a significant number of converts to the monastic fraternity of Early Buddhism. Many of the celebrated disciples of the Buddha came from among such groups of *samaṇas* and *paribbājakas*, and the names of Sāriputta, Moggallāna, Mahākassapa, the three Kassapa brothers (Uruvela, Nadi and Gayā), Vangīsa and Mogharāja immediately come to mind. The *Nikāyas* give us a list of ten *paribbājakas* who became *upāsakas*, the majority of whom were converted in large urban centers, such as Sāvatthi, Rājagaha and Vesāli. Names of some nine *paribbājakas* who joined the Buddhist monastic fraternity also are listed. Some of them, such as Sandaka, also asked their own followers to join the order, and one, Acela Kassapa, joined the order after being a *paribbājaka* for 30 years. Similarly, the same sources provided the names of some 27 Brāhmaṇas—outside of the list of famous monks who were Buddha's followers (Sāriputta *et al*)—and of these seven claimed Bhāradwāja as their *gotta*. Like the *paribbājakas*, these Brāhmaṇas also joined the order after their encounters with the Buddha in large cities.[35]

On the role of ex-Brāhmaṇa monks and nuns in the Buddhist movement from the time of the Buddha to about the first century B.C., further interesting evidence is given in the verses of the *Thera-Theri Gāthas* and in the biographical information given in the commentary on these collections of verses. The list contains 332 names, and its social composition gives us some idea on the nature of what, for want of a better term, may be called the Early Buddhist Elite, Of these 332 individuals, 261 are monks and 71 are nuns. Of these 332, the social origins of four (three monks and one nun) are unknown. Of the rest, 134 or 40.8% (117 monks and 17 nuns) are described as being former Brāhmaṇas; 98 or over 29% (74 monks and 24 nuns) belonged to the *Gahapati* or *Vessa* group; 75 or over 22% (53 monks and 22 nuns) may be said to belong to the Khattiya order; 10 (seven monks and three nuns) may be called members of the so-called degraded classes of society. Of the 134 Brāhmaṇas in this group, 27 were scions of *Mahāsāla* families, but 107 belonged to commoner Brāhmaṇa families.[36]

A more significant piece of evidence on the relationships between the Brāhmaṇas and Early Buddhism and the Brāhmaṇa contribution to Early Buddhism come from the *Etadagga vagga* of the *Anguttara Nikāya*. In this text, the Buddha himself is attributed with statements indicating leadership in various aspects of the Early Buddhist movement and the persons he considered foremost among them (*etadaggam bhkkhave mama*

sāvakanam bhikkhūnam.....). This list contains the names of 41 monks and 13 nuns. Of the 41 monks, 18 belonged to the Brāhmaṇa group (43.9%), nine were Khattiyas (most of them being Śākyas), 11 belonged to the *gahapati* or Vessa class, one may be called a Sudda (Upali, the master of the Vinaya was an ex-barber), and there are two whose affiliations are unknown. The *Thera-Therigātha* group gives us 40.8% Brāhmaṇas among those whose verses were considered significant enough to be included in the collections that form a part of the Theravāda Canon, while the *etadagga* list has even a larger (43.9) percentage of monastic leaders. Among the 13 nuns cited for their leadership, and their qualities of intelligence, learning, and rigorous training and practice, only two were Brāhmanas, while four were Khattiyas and seven belonged to the *gahapati* class.[37]

Further evidence of the importance attached to the Brāhmaṇa class comes from the list in the *Jataka* stories of the "former" Buddhas and the Bodhisattas. The theory of the "former" Buddhas occurs prominently for the first time in the *Mahapadāna sutta* of the *Digha Nikāya*, which may be considered a late interpolation, though certainly prior to the time of Aśoka (*circa* 272-232 B.C.), who mentions the enlargement of the stupa of a "former" Buddha Koṇāgamana in one of his inscriptions. The *Dīgha* source has a list of six Buddhas who preceded Gotama. Of these six, the last three (50%) Kakusandha, Koṇāgamana and Kassyapa, were born as Brāhmaṇas. A random check of castes ascribed to Bodhisattas in the *Jātakas* reveals that the Future Buddha in these stories (a very small part of the collection was examined) was born as a Brāhmaṇa 31 times.[38] By themselves, these figures may not mean too much, but they do add to the cumulative impression that the relationship between Early Buddhism and the Brāmaṇas was characterized by an acceptance of the prestige of the latter by the former.

In view of the foregoing, what conclusions may reasonably and legitimately be drawn, concerning the encounter between Early Buddhism and the Brāhmaṇas? That the Buddha often ridiculed the pretensions of some Brāhmaṇas to purity and social snobbery is amply borne out by many a *sutta* in the Pāli Canon. It is also clear that the Buddha completely ignored caste distinctions in admission to his order. In the famous *Cullavagga* passage, the Buddha declared : "Just as Gangā, Yamunā, Aciravati, Sarabhū, Mahi (rivers), on reaching the great ocean abandon their former names and designations (*nama-gottāṇi*), and are known only as the great ocean, likewise, these four orders (*vaṇṇa*) Khattiya, Brāmaṇa, Vessa, Sudda, when they renounce the state of householders for homelessness under the *Dhamma* and *Vinaya* preached by the *Tathāgata*, abandon their former names and designations, and are called only as ascetics (*samaṇā*) of the Sakyas (*Sakyaputt-yā*)".[39] This injunction was strictly followed in the matter of admissions to the order (subject to other conditions) and recognition of merit, as the case of Upāli, an ex-barber, being recognized as the master of *Vinaya* shows. Outside the order, however, conditions differed a great deal. Among the *upāsakas* (lay-devotees), a certain disregard for considerations of caste distinctions, may have prevailed, but the evidence is far from conclusive on this point. We have noticed above that many a royal chaplain declared himself to be an *upāsaka* of the Buddha at the end of his encounter with the Enlightened One, though it is not indicated that after that event he ceased to exercise the duties ordained by the Vedic or Brahmanical ritual. We have also cited the inscription from Kuda in which an *upāsaka* declares himself to be a Brāhmaṇa *upāsaka*, and the date of that inscription may fall between the first and the second century A.D. Similarly, the

votive inscriptions from Bharhut and Samchi contain evidence of gifts to those Buddhist establishments by persons who do not seem to have been even *upāsakas*.[40] In the case of royal donations to Buddhist establishments in Western India, the Brahmanical affiliations of rulers, such as those belonging to the Sātavahana or Kśatrapa dynasties, are clearly on record.[41] The point here is that we must consider the history of Early Buddhism in two parts, one relating to the monastic fraternity, the other to the *upāsaka* and general lay supporters of the movement. Of the specifically Buddhist (doctrinal and organizational) character of the former, there is not the slightest doubt it formed a distinct "religious" community. We cannot be as sure of the specifically Buddhist character (as a separate and distinct "religious" community) of the second category. There is reason to believe that in the history of Buddhism in India, the lay community never quite acquired the status of a separate and distinct "Buddhist" community. The distinction always existed in the monastic organization, but the unity of that organization splintered as soon as sects began to appear among the Buddhists, and sectarian donations then began to become evident. While a resurgence of Brahmanism from the time of the Śungas (*circa* 186 B.C.) cannot be ruled out as a factor in the decline of Buddhism in India, we also must consider other factors that worked against the crystalization of lay Buddhists as a separate and religiously distinctive community. Among the lay population, it seems, Buddhism remained a *sampradāya* (a part of the general social community), calling for special support from *upāsakas* and others favorably inclined toward the movement. Once the monastic communities disappeared from the surface of life, the lay supporters gradually became assimilated into the general "Hindu" community.

As mentioned before, royal support (Aśoka, Kaniṣka and Harṣa) undoubtedly was a factor in the popularity and spread of Buddhism in India. Alongside of this support, we also must consider the support given by Brāhmaṇas, either as *upāsakas* or as members of the monastic fraternities, as an important contributing factor. These Brāhmaṇas brought to the Early Buddhist movement a prestige and intellectual acumen that considerably augmented the effect of royal patronage. That the Early Buddhists clearly recognized this contribution as indicated by the (above-noted) percentage of ex-Brāhmaṇa leadership in the Buddhist "Elite" groups, and especially by the proportion of Brāhmaṇas recognised by the Buddha as foremost in scholarship and piety in the Buddhist creed, as indicated in the *etadagga* list. In view of this, to what extent are we justified in adhering to the prevalent general assumption that the Early Buddhist movement was anti-Brahmanical? Our discussion so far suggests that the accommodation between the Brāhmaṇas and the Early Buddhists far outweighed rivalry, antipathy, or hostility between the two. The anti-Buddhist bias appears in Brahmanical literature from time to time, but it is bias of more against the monastic movement in general, though in later periods (post-second century B.C.) the Buddhist monastic fraternity proved to be a highly visible target, because of its large numbers and the relative affluence of its monasteries. The withdrawal of relatively large groups of men and women, or the fear of such continuing and increasing withdrawal, from economically productive work seems to have been a potent factor in the later disapproval of monasticism in general. The economic consequences of large-scale monastic movements led to the rise of anti-monastic sentiments, reflected in the *Arthaśastra*, where Kauṭilya advised the king not to allow ascetics freely to frequent villages, for fear of interruption in their work.[42] Later, Manu too shows his disapproval of the *Sannyāsa* mode, and advised that normally

sannyāsa must follow the first three (*Brahmacarya*, *Grhastha* and *Vānaprastha*) modes or stages (*āśramas*) of life.[43] Increasingly, therefore, social and political thinking, influenced by Brahmanism, began to disapprove of monasticism. But that may have been due more to the social and economic consequences of monasticism in general than to a particular dislike of the Buddhist variety. Another factor may have been the emergence of the Brāhmaṇa as a closed group (caste) almost exclusively associated with priestly functions. The curious fact is that, as "Vedism" based on the *Ṛg Veda*, *Yajur Veda*, *Sāma Veda* and the *Brāhmaṇas* declined, Vedic ritual, in the form of the great sacrifices, became a court cult. The horse-sacrifice was performed by Puśyamitra Śunga (*circa* 186-152 B.C.), Samudra Gupta (*circa* A.D. 350-376?) and several other later kings. The masses followed one of the more popular cults centering on worship of Śiva, Viṣṇu and other deities of the emerging Hindu pantheons. The Brāhmaṇas had then emerged as an exclusive group—"a genteel literati whose magical charisma" rested on their possession of the Vedic lore and its ritual, preserved in a "holy literature, written in a holy language remote from that of everyday speech". They and their rituals, based on the *Vedas*, became the major, if not the only source, of satisfying the desire of rulers, sprung from non-descript dynastic origins, to acquire legitimacy through ritual consecration and affiliation and a share in the charisma of which the *Vedas* and the Vedic rituals were the repository. Anyone rejecting the *Vedas* and its ritual, which by this time was more or less restricted to court circles, threatened directly the sacerdotal authority of the new Brāhmaṇa caste. The Buddhist rejection of Vedic authority, which in the earlier period (500-200 B.C.) did not trouble greatly even *purohitas* who declared themselves as *upāsakas* of the Buddha, now challenged the very basis of the priestly power entrenched in the court circles. Accommodation, therefore, was practically impossible, and therewith emerged the Brahmanical ire against Buddhism. By that time, however, Buddhism itself was split into rival sects, and Theravāda had practically disappeared from large parts of India, only to find asylum in Ceylon, Burma and other countries of Southeast Asia.[44]

FOOTNOTES

1. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, I, 1, 14-16; J. Eggling (Trans.), *The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (Oxford, 1882), I, pp. 105-106.
2. H. Oldenberg, *Buddha: His Life, His Doctrine, His Order* (London, 1882), pp. 399-400.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
4. See for instance J. Kashyap (Ed.), *The Anguttara Nikāya* (Nalanda, 1960), I, p. 263; II, pp. 466-467; all Pāli texts cited here, unless otherwise indicated, belong to the series edited by J. Kashyap and published from Nalanda between 1956 and 1960. They will be cited in abbreviation as *Mahāvagga-MV*; *Cullavāgga-CV*; *Dīgha Nikāya-Dn; Majjhima Nikāya-MN*; *Samyutta Nikāya-ŚamN*; *Anguttara Nikāya-AngN*; *Khuddaka Nikāya-KhN*; *Kautilya Arthaśāstra*, III, 20, 16; P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra* (poona, 1968), I, 1, p. 219.
5. For the date of Buddha's passing away see M.M. Singh, *Journal of Indian History*, XXXIX/iii (Dec. 1961), pp. 359-363; for the chronology of the Pāli Canon see M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature* (New York, 1971), II, pp. 17 ff.
6. For a definition of caste see J. H. Hutton, *Caste in India* (Cambridge, 1946), pp. 42 ff; G. S. Ghurye, *Caste and Race in India* (Bombay, 1969), pp. 173, 177.
7. For the Pāli list see *DN*, I, p. 91; *MN*, II, pp. 433, 472, AngN, II, p. 472; for their Vedic identities, see A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index* (Delhi, 1958), I, pp. 11, 45, 145, 276; II, pp. 97-98, 109-110, 274-277, 286-287, 311-312.
8. T. W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede (Eds.), *Pāli-English Dictionary*, (London, 1959), p. 123; hereafter abbreviated as *PED*; *Webster's New International Dictionary* (Springfield, Mass.), p. 98.
9. *MN*, II, pp. 411-413; the *Nalaka sutta* of the *Sutta Nipata* calls Asita *Kanha* (Black) who forecasts the future Buddhahood of Gotama; *KHN*, I, pp. 374-379.
10. *DN*, I, p. 76; T. W. Rhys Davids (Trans.), *Dialogues of the Buddha* (London, 1956), I, pp. 109-110.
11. V. Trenckner (Ed.), *The Milindapañho* (London, 1880), p. 178; T.W. Rhys Davids (Trans.), *The Questions of King Milinda* (New York, 1963), I, p. 247; Rhys Davids regards the Milinda book as post-*Kathāvatthu* (II, pp. xxv-xxvii) while M. Winternitz ascribes the *Milinda* to the First Century A.D., *op. cit.*, II, p. 175; *DN*, I, pp. 10 ff.
12. *DN*, I, pp. 80-81.
13. *KhN*, I, pp. 311-314; *SamN*, I, p. 8; *MN*, II, p. 26.
14. *MN*, II, pp. 462, 474: *KhN*, I, p. 362; W. Stede (Ed.), *The Sumangala-Vilasini* (London, 1971), II, p. 586; hereafter abbreviated as *SV*.
15. *DN*, I, pp. 76, 109 ff; II, p. 198; *MN*, II, pp. 427 ff; *Ang N.* I, pp. 167 ff; II, p. 297; *SamN*, I, pp. 111, 113; *KhN*, I, pp. 12-13; G.P. Malalsekera, *Dictionary of Pali Proper Names* (London, 1960), I, pp, 80, 161, 203, 304-305, 393, 446, 452, 465, 534, 563, 716, 730, 1096; hereafter abbreviated as *DPPN*; see also B.G. Gokhale, "The Brahmanas in Early Buddhist Literature" in *Journal of Indian History*, XLVIII/I (April, 1970), pp. 51-61.
16. *KhN*, I, pp. 354-359; *MN*, II, p. 483; *DPPN*, I, pp. 277, 663-664.
17. *DN*, I, pp. 76 ff, 97, 109, 191, 236; *MN*, II, p. 427; *DPPN*, I, pp. 329, 658; *SV*, I, p. 246; *PED*, pp. 347, 424, 493, 568, 571, 665; T. W. Rhys Davids (Trans.), *Dialogues of the Buddha*, I, p. 108.
18. *DN*, I, pp. 109, 128, 129, 199; III,

p. 114; *AngN*, III, p. 214; *SamN*, I, p. 183.

19. *DN*, II, pp. 70-71, Vassakāra is here mentioned along with Sunidha both of whom are called *Magadhamahamatta*; *MN*, III, p. 74 calls Vassakāra a Brāhmaṇa while *AngN*, III, p. 165 identifies him as minister of Ajātsattu; it seems reasonable to assume that Sunidha may also have been a Brāhmaṇa; also see *MN*, II, pp. 354-355; III, pp. 61, 68 ff, 74, 76; *DPPN*, I, pp, 12, 208, 569, 666, 730, 884, 908, 968, 1016.

20. *DN*, II, pp. 172-173; *Dialogues of the Buddha*, II, pp. 266-267.

21. For the two terms see *PED*, p. 320.

22. *SamN*, I, p. 179; Mrs. Rhys Davids (Trans.), *The Book of the Kindred Sayings* (London, 1950), I, p, 227 and note 2.

23. *DPPN*, I, pp. 526, 542.

24. *KhN*, I, pp. 280-283.

25. *MV*, p. 35; DN, I, pp. 97, 111; *MN*, I, pp. 349, 356; II, pp. 281, 389, 403, 428, 449; for the various occupations followed by the Brahmanas see *AngN*, II, p. 470, trade, pastoralism, archery, royal service and arts are mentioned.

26. *MN*, II, pp. 198 ff, 375, 402, 432; *SamN*, III, pp. 111-113; *KhN*, I, pp. 287, 329, 339; *DPPN*, I, pp. 4, 11, 15, 18, 59, 151 ff, 228, 230, 351, 476, 489, 499, 528, 547, 552, 562, 628, 683, 699-700, 786, 787, 930.

27. For the Bramanical institution of *gotras* and *pravaras* see J. Brough, *The Early Brahmanical System of Gotra* and *Pravara* (Cambridge, 1953), pp. xii, 6 ff; G. S. Ghurye, *Two Brahmanical Institutions — Gotra and Charana* (Bombay, 1972), pp. 17 ff.

28. *DN*, I, pp. 95, 107, 126-127, 133, 135, 182, 198, 212; III, p. 76; *MN*, I, pp. 32, 234, 255, 349-355, 356, 359; II, pp. 91, 389, 394, 413, 425, 440, 448, 461, 468, 480, 497; III, pp. 67, 68, 76, 286, 397, 404-405; *SamN*, I, pp. 171-179, 181-184; II, pp. 65, 66, 156; III, pp. 111-114; *AngN*, I, pp. 54-57, 64-65, 145, 147-148, 454-455; II, pp. 40-46, 184, 185, 191-193, 249, 473, 477, 479; III, pp. 53-56, 72, 78, 166, 188, 292, 381; IV, pp. 69, 280, 292, 306-307, 350; *KhN*, I, pp. 66, 159, 283, 290, 314, 344, 368.

29. For details of the Kuda inscription see B. G. Gokhale, *Buddhism in Maharashtra—A History* (Bombay, 1976), pp. 56-59.

30. For the stock phrase *samaṇa-Brāhmaṇa* see *DN*, I, pp. 7 ff; for Brāhmaṇa *assamas* see *MN*, I, p. 209; *DN*, III, p. 73.

31. See S. Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism* (New York, 1960), pp. 31-32.

32. *Ibid*, p. 32.

33. *AngN*, I, pp. 145, 148.

34. *DN*, I, pp. 8 ff; 41-42; Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, I, p. 66, for the various views propounded by these groups also see *DN*, I, pp. 141, 147-148; *MN*, I, pp. 112-115, 203-207, 291 ff; II, pp. 193, ff; 225; III, pp. 3 ff, 21 ff; *SamN*, I, p. 182; *AngN*, I, pp. 160 ff; SV, I, p. 319.

35. *DN*, I, pp. 149, 168; II, p. 117; *MN*, I, p. 53; II, pp. 65-66, 175, 183, 197, 210, 223, 246, 266, 270; II, pp. 344-350; III, p. 193; *SamN*, I, pp. 141, 161-166; II. p. 110; III, pp. 267-268; *AngN*, I, pp. 146, 203; II, pp. 22, 105-106; III, pp. 70-71; *KhN*, I, pp. 339, 352, 354, 359, 438.

36. For details see B. G. Gokhale, "The Early Buddhist Elite", *Journal of Indian History*, XLIII/II (August, 1965), pp. 391-402.

37. *AngN*, I, pp. 23-27

38. *DN*, II, pp. 4 ff; *DPPN*, I, pp. 2, 49, 52, 63, 65, 167, 168, 201, 207, 429, 446, 499, 513, 522, 548, 568, 570, 669, 730, 886, 949, 971, 984, 1009, 1016, 1037, 1041, 1064, 1096, 1101, 1243.

39. *CV*, p. 356.

40. H. Luders (Ed.), *Appendix to Epigraphia Indica and Record of the Archaeological Survey of India* (Calcutta, 1912,)

X, pp. 38, 88 (List numbers 302, 869.),
41. B.G. Gokhale, *Buddhism in Maharashtra*, pp. 41 ff.
42. R. Shamasastry (Trans.), *Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra* (Mysore, 1924), p. 47.
43. See G. Buhler (Trans.), *The Laws of Manu* (Oxford, 1886, *Sacred Books of the East Series*, XXV), pp. 204-205, 214.
44. For the charismatic functions of Brahmanical ritual see Max Weber, *The Religion of India* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1958), pp. 139-145.

6

The Disappearance of Buddhism and The Survival of Jainism : A Study in Contrast

PADMANABH S. JAINI

ONE of the most puzzling of the many enigmas that characterize Indian history is the decline and disappearance, between the seventh and thirteenth centuries A.D., of the religion of the Buddha from its native land. Numerous theories have been put forth in the attempt to explain this phenomenon; these are summarized as follows by R.C. Mitra in his excellent work, *The Decline of Buddhism in India* :[1]

1) "Exhaustion"
2) Withdrawal of royal patronage
3) Brahmanical persecution
4) Muslim invasion
5) Internal corruption and decay
6) Divisive effect of sectarianism
7) Insufficient cultivation of the laity.

The first of these suggestions, namely, that Buddhism was simply "exhausted" or "ready to die" in India by 1200 A.D., must be dismissed as adding little or nothing to our understanding; no light is cast by such a statement upon the actual *cause* of the death in question.[2] The remaining six theories, on the other hand, deserve more serious consideration, for each takes note of a situation or set of events that certainly exerted some influence upon Buddhist fortunes. It is hard to accept, however, that any one of these factors (or even, for that matter, all of them taken together) could have been decisive in precipitating the demise of institutional Buddhism on the sub-continent, for as we shall see, similar and often identical forces were at work on another non-Vedic community and yet failed to bring about its extinction. The community referred to is that of the Jainas, whose own circumstances during the Buddhist "period of decline" have been virtually ignored by scholars. This is most unfortunate, for it is perhaps only by asking the question, "How is it that one Gangetic, non-theistic *Śramaṇa*

tradition was able to survive while another closely related one was not?", that we may discover the unique aspects of the Buddhist religion that ultimately led to its downfall. The task of the present essay, then, will be to pursue this long-neglected line of inquiry, and to produce on the basis thereof a new and, it is hoped, more plausible explanation for the strange end of Indian Buddhism.

We should at the outset establish our grounds for asserting that Buddhism and Jainism are in fact "similar" enough to warrant the sort of comparison proposed above. Gautama and Mahāvīra, respective teachers of these two traditions, both seem to have come from princely families, families that were not part of an empire, but rather headed certain small *janapadas* ("republics") of the Gangetic valley. Both are said to have left the household in the prime of life and to have spent several years in great austerities and mortifications, practices common among *Śramaṇas*, the non-Vedic ascetics of ancient India.[3] In addition, Buddha and Mahāvīra are perhaps the only two human beings in history to have claimed for themselves the attainment of "omniscience" (*sarvajñatva*).[4] Following this attainment, each man founded a *saṅgha* (congregation) consisting of both monastic and lay followers, and each attracted large numbers of brahmins and sons of wealthy families to his order. Finally, the two great teachers wandered and preached in the same general area for more than thirty years, passing at last into what was claimed to be their final death (*nirvāṇa*).[5]

The institutional histories of the religions originating from these *kṣatriya* saints also run in a parallel manner. Both movements actively sought and often gained royal patronage, and typically migrated along the trade routes (often one behind the other) in its pursuit; both developed extensive bodies of philosophical literature and were vilified for propounding anti-Vedic doctrines. Most important, both lived in what might be called a constant state of seige, struggling to preserve their integrity amidst a veritable sea of more or less hostile Hindu custom and belief. Thus, while Jainas and Buddhists often engaged in heated polemics against each other, we are nevertheless justified in viewing them as "cousin" traditions occupying an equivalent position relative to the surrounding environment.

Moving now to the theories enumerated by Mitra, let us first consider the issue of royal patronage. While Indian kings were bound by custom to assist all religions, their active support of a given sect almost always brought with it a great increase in the status enjoyed by that sect. This took the form not only of greater prestige among the common people, but also of tangible material gain (a certain percentage of tax revenues, for example, might be turned over to a mendicant community) and of access to the court itself. From the very beginning of their careers, both Buddha and Mahāvīra enjoyed the generous patronage of the Magadhan king Śreṇika and of his patricide son Ajātaśatru. Jainas have traditionally held that the Nanda kings who followed Ajātaśatru were adherents to their faith (a claim supported by inscriptional evidence),[6] and that Candragupta, first emperor of the subsequent Mauryan dynasty, was a Jaina convert who even became a monk late in life. Candragupta's grandson Aśoka, on the other hand, is well-known to have been an ardent supporter of Buddhism; indeed, his missionary zeal caused the spread of that religion to Śri Lanka and laid the foundation for its eventual successes in South and Southeast Asia. The rise of the Brahmanical Śungas, ending the Mauryan dynasty, meant the end of good times for non-Vedic sects in Magadha; thus large numbers of both Jainas and Budhhists moved out of their native

region towards Mathura in the west, thence along the mercantile routes into other areas hospitable to their cause.[7] For the Jainas, this initially meant Valabhi and Girnar in Saurashtra, and later the Karnataka region of South India (where eventually arose the great Jaina ruling houses of Ganga and Hoysala).[8] The Buddhists, for their part, obtained a tremendous amount of assistance from the Indo-Scythian king Kaniṣka. Many moved northward, penetrating into Kashmir, Central Asia, and beyond, while others followed the example of the Jainas and proceeded into the pro-*śramaṇa* regions of the South. The point to be made here is that royal patronage was definitely a significantly positive factor during the formative years of both the Jaina and Buddhist movements. Nevertheless, we cannot blindly extrapolate from this fact and assert that withdrawal of such patronage (especially during the Hindu resurgence of later centuries) meant the total eclipse of these traditions. The continued existence of Jainism, which was every bit as dependent upon royal support as was Buddhism, belies any such claim.

Certain historians have emphasized the effect of Brahmanical persecution upon the non-Vedic traditions. While isolated instances of actual violence by Hindu zealots doubtless did occur, these were probably not sufficient in number or impact to seriously cripple the groups toward which they were directed. It might be argued that Jainas came in for fewer such attacks than did Buddhists, because Mahāvīra's doctrine allowed for existence of the *ātman*, a fundamental Hindu belief which the Buddhists rejected. Even if a relative easing of anti-Jaina hostility did take place on this basis, however, it would have been more than offset by the Jainas' active and vehement condemnation of animal sacrifice in Hindu rituals, about which the Buddhists, as meat-eaters, could make little effective protest. Thus, we have here another negative situation from which both schools probably suffered to an equal extent.

The case pertaining to the Muslim incursions of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is not so easily written off. Thanks to their geographical position (largely in Western India and the Deccan), Jainas escaped the fury of the early Muslim onslaughts; Buddhist communities, especially the great "university" centers at Nalanda and elsewhere, were not so lucky.[9] It cannot be denied that the sacking of such centers of monastic learning dealt Buddhism a severe blow. Even so, one still must ask how it was that the Buddhists were not able to regroup and rebuild after the initial holocaust had come to an end. We find, for example, that although a great number of Jaina temples in Gujarat and Rajasthan were converted into mosques in later centuries, the Jainas of those areas not only survived but were able to become important leaders in the economic life and government of the Muslim regimes. Hence, the Islamic invasion, though admittedly the most destructive of the external factors considered thus far, should not have been sufficient to destroy Buddhist society altogether.

Even the earliest Buddhist texts reveal an awareness of tendencies towards laxity and corruption within the *saṅgha*, tendencies that eventually developed to the point where large numbers of monks were performing magical practices, amassing personal or community wealth, and engaging in various other improprieties. Those who have emphasized the significance of this phenomenon are certainly correct in claiming that it represented a serious weakness in the Buddhist community. It should be borne in mind, however, that probably every religious community has gone through periods of decay; those that survived seem to have responded to these situations with spontaneous internal reform, after which the movement often became stronger than ever. The

ninth-century Jaina mystic Haribhadra, for example, railed against the luxurious life style of many monks in his community and was able to arouse popular indignation to the point where such practices were greatly reduced.[10] Similarly, the dissatisfaction of certain Jaina lay people with excessive emphasis on temple ritual and with the grossly expanded power of the temple cleric-administrators led to development of an entire "anti-temple" sect in the fifteenth century. While this group, the Sthānakavāsi, failed to gain many adherents, it did manage to rouse the orthodox from their apathy and thus bring about many important and necessary reforms within the larger Śvetāmbara community.[11] Decay itself, then, need not be fatal; the inability of the Buddhists to generate any meaningful reforms must, like their failure to recover from the loss of their "universities", be ascribed to still deeper causes.

The existence of widespread sectarianism within Buddhism (as many as eighteen doctrinally-distinct schools at one point) has often been construed as indicative of internal weakness. This interpretation, however, is not necessarily valid. In fact, when dealing with the kind of non-centralized movement that Buddhism comprised, the emergence of numerous sects should probably be taken as a sign of both intellectual and spiritual vigor. Even more important, Buddhist sectarianism was confined to *interpretation* of texts; members of all schools more or less accepted the validity of the basic Tripiṭaka, shared an almost indentical code of conduct, and moved easily among each other's communities. Contrast this situation with that of the Jainas, whose major sects, though only two in number, were from almost the earliest times completely estranged.[12] Digambaras rejected the validity of nearly all texts in the Śvetāmbara canon and simply produced their own secondary scriptures. The definition of conduct suitable to a monk, moreover, was an issue of such magnitude that Digambaras viewed Śvetāmbara clerics as nothing more than advanced lay disciples. Members of these two schools have traditionally not set foot in each other's temples, and it is indeed only very recently that even the most tentative Digambara-Śvetāmbara dialouge has been initiated. It is fair to say, then, that the divisiveness associated with sectarianism was much more severe among Jainas than among the Buddhists; such divisiveness cannot, therefore, reasonably be suggested as central to the downfall of Buddhism in India.

We now come to the most important and complex of the issues raised by Mitra, that of the Buddhists' failure to pay sufficient attention to their laity. This tendency seems to have been apparent from an extremely early period, for the very term "Buddhist" itself generally referred only to those who had actually left the household and taken up the yellow robes of the mendicant. While there certainly existed large numbers of lay people who *supported* Buddhism, there seems to have been no clearly defined set of criteria (vows, social codes, modes of worship, etc.) whereby these individuals could be identified as belonging to a separate and unique group within the larger society. Whereas Jaina clerics were, according to canonical evidence, always closely involved with their lay people, their Buddhist counterparts tended to remain aloof from all non-mendicants. The Jainas, moreover, eventually produced some fifty texts on conduct proper to a Jaina lay person (*śrāvakācāra*),[13] while the Buddhists, as far as we know, managed only one (and that not until the eleventh century).[14] There can be little doubt, then, that the sense of religious participation or identification felt by the Buddhist lay community was often a weak one at best. This situation probably goes far towards explaining the lack of any "grass-roots" revival once the trappings of the monastic

establishment, *viz.*, the great university centers, had been destroyed.

Serious as their neglect of the need for lay involvement was, the Buddhists committed an even greater error by failing to respond meaningfully to the threat posed by the waves of *bhakti* that swept across India from the fourth or fifth century onwards. The popularity of the various Hindu devotional cults, and particularly of those associated with Rāma and Kṛṣṇa, must have engendered a great many lay defections from the Buddhist ranks. This problem was compounded by the depiction of the Buddha himself, in the *Mahābhārata*, certain *Purāṇas*, and Jayadeva's *Gītagovinda*, as nothing more than another *avatāra* of Viṣṇu.[15] Buddhist monks were perhaps unaware of the grave dangers represented by these developments; not a single extant text shows any attempt either to assimilate the popular Hindu deities into Buddhist mythology or to refute the notion of Buddha as *avatāra*. The latter point was perhaps most crucial, for by their very silence Buddhist writers seemed to lend tacit support to the Hinduization of their founder; this process certainly contributed to the undermining of whatever sense of uniqueness the laity may have felt.

The response of the Jainas to similar pressures was markedly different. They attempted to counteract Hindu suggestions (such as those which survive in the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*)[16] that Ṛṣabha, their first Tīrthaṅkara, had been an incarnation of Viṣṇu by attacking the "divine" status of Viṣṇu himself, particularly through a criticism of the immoral behaviour shown by the *avatāras*.[17] More important, they produced entire alternate versions of the *Rāmāyaṇa*[18] and *Mahābhārata*,[19] wherein Rāma and Kṛṣṇa were depicted as worldly Jaina heroes subject to the laws of Jaina ethics. Rāma, for instance, does not kill Rāvaṇa in the Jaina rendition of the tale; this deed is instead performed by his brother Lakṣmaṇa, and Rāma is reborn in heaven for his strict observance of *ahiṃsā*. Such a transformation was not possible for Kṛṣṇa, whose deeds of violence and treachery were too numerous to cover up; thus, he is depicted as going to hell for a long period after his earthly death. The point here is that the Jainas sought to outflank the *bhakti* movement by taking its main cult-figures as their own, while placing these figures in a uniquely Jaina context.

This effort, together with the careful attention to lay conduct referred to above, makes it clear that Jainas were much more concerned with maintaining the internal cohesion of their lay community than were the Buddhists. It is tempting to assume that in this fact we have found the key distinction between these two traditions, the fundamental element in terms of which the demise of one and survival of the other may be explained. Closer examination of Jaina history, however, calls such an assumption into question, for it seems that even the most extreme measures undertaken to hold the laity together were not in themselves crucial to the ultimate fate of the community.

We have already seen the accommodation of Hindu elements with reference to *bhakti*; this tendency was carried much further by Digambaras of the Karnataka region, who introduced, for example, a set of *saṃskāras* (worldly rituals, *e.g.*, those pertaining to birth, weddings, death, etc.) virtually indistinguishable from those of the surrounding Hindu majority.[20] While this certainly constituted "paying attention to the laity", it failed to prevent a serious decline in the overall strength of Jaina society in the South. Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras of the North, on the other hand, resorted to very few such measures, and yet remained relatively prosperous.

It will be apparent that all of the "explanations" thus far offered for the decline of Buddhism, whether referring to external pressures or to inherent structural weaknesses, reflect a purely socio-historical perspective. Having found each of these theories wanting in some degree, particularly in their ability to explain the divergent fates of Buddhism and Jainism, we should perhaps turn our attention away from strictly social issues and focus instead upon the area of doctrine. Here, one suspects, may be found within Buddhism some element that rendered it uniquely susceptible to certain of the destructive influences discussed above.

The impact of Buddhist-Jaina differences over the existence of a soul, in terms of the greater or lesser degree of Hindu hostility resulting therefrom, has already been considered. Probably, both heterodox traditions were equally subject to direct orthodox aggression. It must, therefore, be asked which of them was more doctrinally open to the force of Hindu *sabotage*, the insidious weaning away of lay support by absorption of heterodox beliefs and cults into the Hindu sphere. In this connection, one is immediately struck by the Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine of the heavenly *bodhisattvas*, a class of exalted beings having absolutely no counterpart in Jaina belief. The origin of this doctrine, which asserted the existence of numerous figures who had attained the enlightenment of the Buddha and yet chose to remain for ever in the *sāṃsāric* realm, is not entirely clear. On the philosophical level, it probably developed out of dissatisfaction with the earlier notion of the *arhats*, individuals whose apparent personal attainment of *nirvāṇa* seemed to conflict with the fundamental tenet of no-self. More to the point of the present discussion, the heavenly *bodhisattvas* may well have represented an attempt to provide some outlet for the devotional needs of the Buddhist laity. These beings, however, were conceived of in such a way that the very fact of their enormous popularity worked for, rather than against, the destruction of Buddhism in India. This took place because the great *bodhisattvas* were described as completely supramundane by nature; rather than providing a human model of struggle and attainment, they became virtual gods, who dispensed worldly boons and even spiritual grace in a manner not unlike that of the Hindu deities. At last, the place of the historical Buddha himself was functionally usurped by these figures; although the Buddha remained nominally the most hallowed of beings, the bulk of popular interest and devotion was centered not upon him but upon the great *bodhisattvas*, especially Mañjuśrī and Avalokiteśvara.[21]

While Jainas also allowed certain non-human figures to play a part in their rituals, these were always limited to mere spirits (*yakṣas*) who were of lower status than Jaina mendicants. The *yakṣas* functioned as "guardians" of the holy shrines of the Tīrthaṅkaras; no great divinities on the Hindu model ever gained legitimacy in either Jaina doctrine or worship. Thus, there was little common ground to support the development of a subversive synthesis with Hindu belief and practice. By embracing the notion of the heavenly *bodhisattvas*, however, Buddhism laid itself open to precisely this sort of synthesis, particularly with the powerful Nātha cult of the tantric Śaivite tradition. It was this fact, we believe, that finally made the essential difference in the respective abilities of Jainism and Buddhism to survive.

That various Buddhist temples fell into the hands of Hindu groups is well-known; notable examples are the shrines at Bodh-gayā and Sāranāth, returned to Buddhist control only in modern times.[22] What has remained obscure, however, is the exact sequence of developments whereby such Hindu appropriation took place. Certain

little-known discoveries by the late Indian historian M. Govinda Pai cast great light upon this question, and also provide material in direct support of our contention that Buddhism was subverted by the cult of the heavenly *bodhisattvas*.[23] In the suburbs of Mangalore, a city in southern Karnataka, stands a Śaivite temple known as Kadri-Mañjunātha; "Mañjunātha" designates the *Śiva-liṅga* enshrined therein. Now, although Śiva is commonly referred to by titles terminating in "*nātha*" (*e.g.*, Somanātha, Oṃkāra-nātha, Kedāranātha, Viśvanātha), this particular name "Mañjunātha" is *nowhere else* attested as a proper epithet of the god. Intrigued by this strange fact, Pai under-took to workout a chronological history of the temple in question. He found, first of all, that it had once been a Buddhist monastery and temple called Kadarikā-vihāra; within the shrine room stands an image of the Buddha. More important, from our point of view, is the additional presence therein of a beautiful bronze image of the *bodhisattva* Avalokiteśvara, also called Lokeśvara[24] An inscription at the base of the Lokeśvara image credits its establishment to one king Kundavarmā of the Alūpa dynasty, stating that "Kundavarmā, the Alūpa king, a great devotee of *Bālacandraćikhāmaṇi* ('he who has the crescent moon as his crest-jewel,' *i.e.* Śiva), consecrated the image of Lord Lokeśvara in this pleasant *vihāra* called Kadarikā, four thousand one hundred and sixty-eight years after Kaliyuga" (*i.e.*, 1068 A.D.).[25] The interesting point here is that an image of Lokeśvara should have been erected in a Buddhist temple by a king who was devoted to Śiva. Clearly it was not the Buddha who was being worshipped, but a *bodhisattva* who had in some way been *integrated with Śiva*.

Concerning the identification of Lokeśvara with Avalokiteśvara, see B. Bhattacarya, *The Indian Buddhist Iconography*, Calcutta, 1958, Chapter 4. Also in this connection, compare the antelope skin appearing on the image above with that of the Sanchi Avalokiteśvara (ninth century). (The latter figure is discussed by John Irwin in the *Victoria & Albert Museum Yearbook*, 1973.)

It is interesting to note that the Kadri Lokeśvara image has not been mentioned either by Irwin or by Marie-Therese de Mallman in her book *Introduction ā l'étude d'Avalokiteśvara*, Paris., 1948. Pai has shown, further, that Lokeśvara was identified with Matsyendranātha, a Śaivite saint said to have become divine by attaining oneness with Śakti.[26] Numerous caves in the vicinity of Kadri are dedicated to ascetics of the Nātha order which this saint established, and an image of Matsyendranātha himself (identified by the mark of a fish) adorns the outer wall of the "Kadarikā-vihāra" temple. Considering the name "Mañjunātha" in light of all this information, Pai concluded that the *vihāra* was originally a centre of the cult of the *bodhisattva* Mañjuśri. At a latter time, when this and other heavenly *bodhisattvas* had become identified with Śaivite deities, Nātha ascetics established a *Śiva-liṅga* in the temple and called it by the present name. Still later, disciples of Matsyendranātha, among whom should be included king Kundavarmā, arranged for the placing of the extant Lokeśvara image, an image representing what they must have regarded as the divine form of their master.

The worship of the *Śiva-liṅga* and its associated *bodhisattva* no doubt continued for several centuries, until what had originally been a Buddhist center was converted into a purely Śaivite temple.[27] Although the Kadarika *vihāra* provides the only known example of solid inscriptional evidence for this sort of transformation, it must nevertheless be the

case that the process witnessed here was an extremely typical one. The Buddhist doctrine of the heavenly *bodhisattvas* allowed not only the kind of absorption-by-identification that we have seen, but also opened the door to the myriad Śaivite gods, goddesses, *mantras*, *dhāraṇis*, and mystical tantric practices surrounding such other-worldy figures. Nātha influence on the Jainas, by contrast, was kept to a minimum; although certain tantric elements do appear in conjunction with the *yakṣas*, these are of an extremely superficial sort and cannot in any way be construed as a fundamental aspect of Jaina worship. It is true that the term "-nātha" itself came to be attached to the names of certain Tīrthaṅkaras (*e.g.*, Nemināth, Pārśvanātha); this alteration, however, was purely a nominal one, representing no change whatsoever in the nature of the saints so designated.

It has been the aim of this paper to go beyond the various theories which Mitra has set forth by searching for more basic factors, factors that underlay or made possible whatever set of circumstances each of these theories describes. This same methodology, then, should be applied to our own proposal, *viz.*, that the doctrine of the heavenly *bodhisattvas* made Buddhism uniquely vulnerable to the assimilating tendencies of the surrounding Hindu cults. The development of the heavenly *bodhisattvas* theory, and indeed that of the entire Mahāyāna in Buddhism, can perhaps be ultimately traced back to the celebrated "silence (*avyākṛta*) of the Buddha", his unwillingness to commit himself regarding certain fundamental philosophical issues. The inability of the Buddhists to agree upon the meaning of this silence led to a situation in which various contradictory absolutist doctrines could emerge, each one claiming to be the correct interpretation of the master's teachings. Of particular interest here was the doctrine of *śūnyatā*, which implied, among other things, that there was no real distinction between *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. In such a context it was a short step to postulate beings on the model of the heavenly *bodhisattvas*, beings who, unlike the Buddha, dwelt in both realms simultaneously.

In Jainism, as is well-known, no counterpart of the Buddhist *Mahāyāna* ever appeared. Again, we can understand this fact on the basis of fundamental doctrine, *viz.*, the Jaina assertion that no absolute philosophical statement could be taken as valid. This view was expressed by the term *anekānta* (non-absolutism), and led to the cardinal Jaina tenet of *syāvdāda* ("qualified assertion"). For Jainas, in other words, no synthesis of the human and the supramundane was ever possible; hence the Tīrthaṅkaras remained the highest models of spiritual development, and such Tantric practices as identification of the self with the deity were simply out of the question.

By excluding absolutism in any form, the Jainas limited themselves to a rather unexciting set of theories which probably exerted very little influence on Indian philosophical thoughts as a whole; certainly their texts cannot compare in beauty or interest with the spectacular flights of imagination and brilliant speculations found in the *Prañjāpāramitās*. Nevertheless, the tenacious adherence of Jaina *ācāryas* to the *anekānta* doctrine did have one result worth more to them than any praise for literary or philosophical merit; this was of course the survival of their religious community, an accomplishment which the Buddhists were ultimately unable to match.*

*I should like to acknowledge the assistance of Joseph Clack in the preparation of this paper.

FOOTNOTES

1. R.C. Mitra, *The Decline of Buddhism in India*, Shantiniketan, 1954.

2. This view has found favor with certain Buddhologists, notably Conze: "...what Buddhism in India died from was just old age, or sheer exhaustion", *A Short History of Buddhism*, 1960, p. 86.

3. Regarding the application of the term *Śramaṇa* exclusively to Buddhists and Jainas, see P.S. Jaini "*Śramaṇas*: Their conflict with Brāhmaṇical society", in *Chapters in Indian Civilization*, Volume I (ed. J. W. Elder), Dubuque, 1970, pp. 39-81.

4. P. S. Jaini "On the *Sarvajñatva* (Omniscience) of Mahāvīra and the Buddha", in *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner*, Dorderecht, 1974, pp. 71-90.

5. For the Jaina account of Mahāvīra's life, see H. Jacobi, *Jaina Sutras*, Parts 1 and 2, Sacred Books of the East, Volumes XXII and XLV.

6. The Hathigumpha Inscription of King Khāravela of Kaliṅga (*circa* 150 B.C.) is cited in this connection. The following line is most relevant: *nandarājanītaṃ kāliṅgajinam samnivesaṃ...[rāja] gaharatanaparihāre hi angamagadhabasum ca nagati.* See N.K. Sahu, *Utkal University History of Orissa*, Vol. 1, 1964, pp. 359 ff.

7. For a history of Jaina migration in the north, cf. C. J. Shah, *Jainism in North India*, London, 1932, pp. 187-200.

8. For a political and cultural history of the Jainas in Karnataka, cf. B.A. Saletore, *Mediaeval Jainism*, Bombay, 1938.

9. (a) For an allusion to the Śaivite persecution of the Jainas at Madurai, see *Periyapurāṇam* by Cekkilar (10th century), ed. T. M. K. Pillai, Srivaikuntam, 1964, p. 533; *Tiruvilayātar Purāṇam* by Paraṅcoti Munivar (16th century), ed. N.M.V. Nattar, Madras, 1965, pp. 441-479.

9. (b) On the destruction of Nāḷandā, see A.L. Basham, *The Wonder That was India*, New York, 1959, p. 266.

10. For Haribhadra's comments on corrupt Jaina practices, cf. Nathuram Premi, *Jain Sāhitya aur Itihās*, Bombay, 1956, pp. 480 ff.

11. On the history of the Sthānakavāsi, cf. W. Schubring, *The Doctrine of the Jainas*, Delhi, 1962, pp. 65 ff.

12. On the Digambara-Śvetāmbara schism, see *Ibid.*, pp. 50 ff.

13. For a complete bibliography, see R. Williams, *Jaina Yoga—A Survey of the Mediaeval Śrāvakācāras*, London, 1963.

14. H. Saddhatissa (editor), *Upāsakajanālaṅkāra* of Ānanda, Pāli Text Society, London, 1965 (a twelfth century Pāli work written by a Singhalese monk in South India).

15. *dānavāṃstu vaśe kṛtvā punarbuddhatvam āgatah/sargasya rakṣaṇārthāya tasmai Buddhātmane namah. Mbh.* XII, 47, 67; *Matsyapurāṇa*, 47, 247; *Gītagovinda*, I, 1, 9.

16. *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, V, iii-viii. P. S. Jaini, "Jina Ṛṣabha as an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, Vol. XL, 2, 1977.

17. This criticism appears in the *śrāvakācāras* (see note 13, above) under the description of "false gods, scriptures and *gurus*" whose worship is forbidden to the Jaina laity.

18. Atleast sixteen Jaina *Rāmāyaṇas* are known to exist (ten in Sanskrit, five in Prakrit, one in Apabhraṃśa). For a complete list, see V. M. Kulakarni's Introduction (pp.1-6) to the *Paumacariu*, Vol. I, Varanasi, 1962. Compare the extent of this collection with the fact that only one such story, *viz.*, the *Dasaratha-jātaka* (*Jātaka* No. 461) exists in the

Buddhist tradition. cf. Kamil Bulche, *Rāmakathā : utpatṭi aur vikās*, Prayag, 1950, pp. 56 ff.

19. For the Jaina versions of the life of Kṛṣṇa, see Jinasena's *Harivaṃśa Purāṇa* (ed. Pannalal Jain, Varanasi, 1944) and Hemacandra's *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣa-caritra*, Book VIII (translated by Helen M. Johnson, G.O.S. No. 139), Baroda, 1962. No comparable Buddhist texts have come down to us.

20. The *Ādipurāṇa* of Jinasena (9th century) (ed. Pannalal Jain, Varanasi, 1963) would appear to be the earliest text to mention these rituals for the Jaina laity. For further details, see V. A. Sangave, *Jaina Community*, Bombay, 1942.

21. This development is perhaps symbolically shown by the typical iconographic representation of the Buddha as a small inset in the crown of the *bodhisattva*; his position is "highest" (in accordance with doctrine) and yet relatively unimportant in the eyes of the worshipper.

22. This was accomplished through litigation initiated by the Mahābodhi Society of Calcutta, an international organization, mainly representing Buddhists of Śri Lanka and Burma. The shrines were awarded to this organization on the basis of its contention that Singhalese and Burmese kings had for many years provided funds for their maintenance.

23. M. Govinda Pai, "Dharmasthalada śiva-liṅgakke Mañjunātha emba hesaru hege bantu?" in *Samarpaṇe* (*Felicitation Volume in Honor of Shri Manjayya Heggade*), Mangalore, 1950, pp. 65-77.

24. Concerning the origin of the *Śiva-liṅga*, see note 27, below.

25. The inscription reads as follows :

śrī Kundavarmā guṇavān Āḷupendro mahīpatiḥ|
pādāravindabhramaro Bālacandra-Śikhāmaṇeḥ|6|
Lokeśvarasya devasya pratiṣṭhām akarot prabhuḥ|
Śrīmat Kadarikānāmni Vihāre sumanohare|9|
Kalau varṣasahasrāṇām atikrānte catuṣṭaye|
punar abdag(ś) ate caivāṣṭaṣaṣṭyā śamanvite|10|

Samarpaṇe, p. 70.

26. In this connection Pai quotes the following verse from a Nepalese inscription :

Śrī Lokeśvarāya namaḥ
Matsyendram yoginām mukhyàḥ śaktaḥ śaktiṃ vadanti yam|
bauddhā Lokeśvaraṃ tasmai namo brahmaśvarūpiṇe|

Pandit Bhagavanlal Indraji and G. Buhler, "Inscriptions from Nepal", *The Indian Antiquary*, June, 1880, p. 192.

27. Local Kannaḍa legend (*Sthaḷa-purāṇa*) concerning this shrine gives its traditional name as Suvarṇa-Kadaḷīvana-Śrī Mañjunātha Devasthāna (Golden-banana-grove, the temple of Mañjunātha). This account (said to be based upon the *Bhāradvāja-saṃhitā*) can be briefly summarized as follows :

"In ancient times Lord Paraśurāma (one of the *avatāras* of Viṣṇu), having (killed the *kṣatriyas* and) given the entire earth to the *brāhmaṇas*, undertook severe penances. Śiva, pleased with his performance thereof, said, "O Paraśurāma, I have a permanent abode in the Well of Ambrosia (*rasa-kūpa*), located in Suvarṇa-kadalīvana; go there and worship me". At that time, however, Suvarṇa-kadalīvana was temporarily covered by ocean water. Paraśurāma wrested the land back from the sea, and then proceeded to carry out further penances there. At last the members of the divine Trinity, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Maheśvara, came together and were spontaneously manifested in the form of the Mañjunātha (i.e., the *Śiva-liṅga*)". (Does this unusual coalescence of the

three deities perhaps reflect a confused reference to the three-faced Lokeśvara image?)

An alternate version, forming the latter part of the *Sthaḷa-purāṇa*, suggests that Matsyendranātha came to this place from the kingdom of Sati (probably Kerala, where matrilineal inheritence prevailed) and, like Paraśurāma, underwent severe penances to please Śiva. The deity thus appeared as the present *Śivaliṅga*. This latter story tends to confirm the association of Matsyendranātha with the temple in question, and even suggests that he may have been personally responsible for the establishment of the *Śivaliṅga* found there.

7

The Rise and Fall of Buddhism in Inner Mongolia

SECHIN JAGCHID

BEFORE their great empire was established, the Mongolian peoples' religion was the traditional polytheistic or animistic shamanism common to all North Asian and Altaic, nomadic peoples. The supreme deity was a personified or deified heaven, *Möngke Tenggeri* or Everlasting Heaven. Their religion led the Mongols to accept, rather than to discriminate against, the religions of the people they conquered, and aided their expansion by reducing resistance in countries they invaded.

The Mongols began as a small, unknown nomadic tribe, but in a very short time they established themselves as world conquerors, and in so doing could not avoid mingling with foreign cultures and religious beliefs. As these contacts increased, Mongolian rulers began to feel that their simple, primitive religion was inferior to the foreign religions, with their profound philosophical teachings and magnificent rituals. They felt that the Mongolian religion was inadequate for meeting the spiritual needs of a world empire. This may account in part for the tendency of different members of the Mongolian ruling class to adopt at one time or another Buddhism, Christianity or Islam. It sti'l is not certain, however, why the Mongolian Khans of the Yüan Dynasty (1260-1368) in China chose Tibetan Buddhism from among so many as the imperial court religion. In addition to interpretations usually given by monks and clergymen—that the matter was decided "by *Karma*", "the will of God," or "the destiny set by Heaven"—there are historical and cultural explanations.

The Mongolian Khans' choice of religion more than likely was based on cultural similarities between Mongols and Tibetans and their mutual distance—geographical and cultural—from the Chinese. Both Mongolia and Tibet are high plateaus of Inner Asia, and their open steppes and cold, arid climate make them well-suited for nomadism. Because of similarities in their geographic circumstances, Tibet and Mongolia had developed similar cultural style : nomadic pastoralism. Because of their

similarities, it was easier for the Mongols to mingle with semi-nomadic Tibetans than with purely agricultural Chinese, who were far different in their cultural behavior. Conversely, agricultural peoples neighboring China, such as Koreans, Japanese and Vietnamese, were more susceptible to Chinese cultural influence than were the nomadic Turks, Uighurs, Tibetans, and Mongols. This, of course, reflects the deep cultural differences between nomadic and agricultural life and suggests that the Mongols would have found it much easier and more natural to accept the religion of nomadic, shamanistic Tibetans than the religion of agricultural peoples.

Tibetan Buddhism was important in the court of Khubilai Khan (r. 1260-1294), the founder of the Yüan Dynasty. He and his descendants were "Sons of Heaven" in the Middle Kingdom, and at the same time were nomadic rulers from the other side of the Great Wall, the watershed between the nomadic and agricultural worlds in Asia. In general, the teachings of the Tibetan lamas were more easily understandable and acceptable to the members of the Mongolian ruling class than were those of the Chinese monks.

The original, primitive religion of Tibet, known as *Bon*, or the "Black Faith", was a branch of shamanism. Later, after the Tibetan empire was established in the seventh century, both Chinese Buddhists and Nepalese Buddhists came to Tibet to preach their forms of Buddhism. The real development of Buddhism in Tibet occurred, however, after the arrival in the eighth century of the great master Padmasambhāva and others from Kashmir in India. Because the esoteric doctrines of the Indian Kashmiri masters and the exoteric teachings of the Chinese monks seemed at times to contradict each other, the Tibetan rulers finally decided to send the Chinese home. This indicates that Sinicized Buddhism did not suit Tibetan cultural traditions as well as did Indian Buddhism, which had more mystical elements, color, and Tantric practices. Though it is true that this tradition of Buddhism suppressed the strongly shamanistic *bon-po* faith and pressed the Tibetans into a unique mold, it also is true that the Tibetan Buddhists reconciled themselves to some extent with the original shamanism, so as to accommodate their own nomadic religious traditions. This further indicates that the Buddhism that fit so naturally into the nomadic culture of the "Land of Snow", would have been much easier for the Mongols to accept than Sinicized Buddhism, which had naturally accommodated itself to an agricultural civilization.[1]

The Buddhism developed by Khubilai Khan and Phags-pa, the Great Master of Tibetan Saskya-pa,[2] flourished only among the Mongolian ruling class, failing to profoundly affect the masses. Consequently, following the collapse of the Yüan (1368) and the isolation of Mongolian lands, Buddhism faded away along with other foreign religions, making possible the revival of the old shamanistic faith.[3] This period came to be known as the "dark ages" in most Mongolian historical materials. During the Yüan period, of course, when Buddhism flourished, it subtly influenced Mongolia's traditional faith and culture and consequently sowed the seeds for an eventual revival.

I. National Conversion to Buddhism

The decline of Mongolian power and the Buddhist religion did not last long. The Mongols soon were able to re-establish their position as a powerful nation against the Chinese Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). In the mid-sixteenth century, Altan Khan[4] of the Tümed[5] tribe on the south of the Gobi carried out a military campaign in Tibetan terri-

tory and re-established intimate ties between Mongolia and Tibet, thus creating conditions conducive to extensive development of Buddhism in Mongolia. This military victory unexpectedly resulted in the conversion to Buddhism of both Altan Khan and his nephew, Khutughtu Sechen-Khong-Taiji of the Ordos tribe.

In 1577, Altan Khan sent an emmissary to Tibet to pay respects to the Great Master of the Dgelugs-pa, Bsod-nam rgya-mtsho. The following year, the Mongolian patrons and the Tibetan master met at the bank of the Lake of Kökönor (Chinghai) to enact a ceremony for the promulgation of the Law of the Buddha. Altan Khan presented to the master the title "Wachir-dara Dalai Lama" and the master rewarded Altan Khan with the title "Tsakrawar Sechen Khan". Consequently, with the support of a powerful Mongolian patron, the Dgelugs-pa became the sect of the Dalai Lama, and achieved eminence above all others in Tibet. In addition, Altan Khan's prestige in Mongolia increased because of the blessings of the exalted religious leader of the "Land of Snow".

The Dgelugs-pa, the Yellow Sect noted above, had been founded by the Great Master Tsongkha-pa and led after his *nirvāṇa* by his two great disciples Bsod-nam rgya-mtsho, who received the title of " Dalai Lama" from Altan Khan, was the third re-incarnation of another disciple of Tsongkha-pa, and called himself "the Third Dalai Lama". The person eventually designated as 'Panchen Lama[7] was considered the re-incarnation of one of the two great disciples.

Altan Khan's conversion, of course, hastened the spread of Buddhism in Mongolia, and the Great Khan Tümen,[8] whose headquarters were then in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia, also accepted Buddhism as his faith. Both of these conversions had far-reaching influence, bringing about the conversion even of the leader of the Central Asian Oirad Mongols, who were enemies of both the Great Khan and Altan.

After Altan Khan and other Mongolian nobles received Buddhism, the Third Dalai Lama appointed Dongkhar-Manjushiri Khutughtu as his representative, and stationed him at Köke-Khota (Chs. Kuei-hua Ch'eng), the capital city of Altan Khan, there to expound the Law of the Buddha among the Mongols.

Altan Khan died in 1583, and in 1585 the Third Dalai Lama came to Köke-Khota to pray for him and to broadcast the Law of Buddha in the Ordos and other parts of Western Inner Mongolia. This made Köke-Khota the first center of Buddhism in Mongolia. Abadai Taiji, the leader of the Khalkha Mongols of the north of the Gobi, also proceeded to the city to accept the Law from the Great Master.[9]

The Third Dalai Lama "showed the light" of *nirvāṇa* i.e. died, in Inner Mongolia in 1588, and the Fourth Dalai Lama was born in the household of Altan Khan.[10] Thus, the "Golden descendants" (*Altan uragh*) of Chinggis Khan were joined with the orthodox line of Tibetan Buddhism.

During this period, those who went to Mongolia to proselytise Buddhism came not only from the Yellow Sect but also from others, usually mistakenly known as the "Red Sect".[11] The preaching of Tibetan Buddhism soon spread all over Mongolia, even reaching Manchuria, where the Manchu Imperial household was converted.[12]

Buddhism developed among the Khalkha Mongols on the north of the Gobi mainly because of the knowledge of Buddhism and political prestige among the household of the First Jebtsundamba Khutughtu,[13] who were members of the "Golden descendents" of Chinggis Khan. As a result, a unified system of leadership was established in the

ecclesiastical world of Outer Mongolia. These unified religious institutions, together with practical politics, gradually brought together under the leadership of the First Jebtsundamba Khuntughtu the fragmented Mongolian tribes on the north of the Gobi. Consequently, all Khalkha nobles surrendered to the suzerainty of the Manchu-Ch'ing leaders, abandoning attempts to declare their independence from the Court.

The dynamics of religious and political unification and separation were most important to the history of Mongolia. The Imperial Tutors (chs. *ti-shih*) of the Yüan Court had carefully avoided political involvement in other than Tibetan affairs, but after the revival of Buddhism in Mongolia, politics and religion became entangled from time to time. For example, Ligdan, the last Great Khan of Mongolia, was a patron of the Yellow Sect. He built many monasteries, sponsored the translation of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon, the Kanjur, into Mongolian, and because of his zealous efforts for the development of Buddhism, was given the religious title of "Khutughtu Khan".[14] Later, influenced by political struggles, Ligdan shifted his support, which had been directed to the Yellow Sect, to the "Red Sect". As a result, he lost his prestige among the Mongolian majority, which mainly supported the Yellow Sect. Finally, after his defeat by the Manchus, Ligdan fled to Kökönor and died there in 1634. After his death, the influence of the "Red Sect" in Mongolia began to decline.

II. The Influence of Buddhism on Mongolian Life and Culture

As already mentioned, the acceptance of honorable titles from Tibetan religious leaders by Mongolian nobles had a negative effect upon politics, for it forced the nobles to recognize that Tibetan ecclesiastical power was greater than their own lay authority. Following a precedent set by Altan Khan, Abadai Taiji of the Khalkha received the honorable title of "Khan" from the Third Dalai Lama. Afterwards, Törölbaikhu,[15] a noble of the Khoshod Mongols, who provided full military support to the Yellow Religion, received the title of "Güüshi Khan" from the Fifth Dalai Lama. The same Master, immediately thereafter, gave the title of "Boshoghtu Khan" to Galdan,[16] ambitious lord of the Jüng-ghar (Dzungar) Mongols. All this suggests that the political position of the Dalai Lama *vis-a-vis* Mongolian lay nobles was essentially the same as that of the Roman Catholic Pope *vis-a-vis* the mediaeval lay rulers of Europe. Without the support of the Dalai Lama, a Mongolian lay ruler could not assume leadership even among his own people. This situation not only hindered the unification of the Mongolian tribes, but also increased foreign involvement in Mongolia's internal politics.

Following Chinggis Khan's unification of Mongolia in 1206, a quasi-feudalistic nomadic system began to develop. During this period, all feudal lords and all nobility were lay men, none were monks or ecclesiastics.[17] However, after the conversion of Altan Khan, there was a new development in Mongolian society—the emergence of the ecclesiastical nobility. Among these were the members of the "Golden descendents," who left their homes and became devotees of the noble class and the high lamas, who were beloved and honored as prophets.[18] This new class of ecclesiastical nobles, together with the lay nobility, eventually formed the two pillars of modern Mongolian quasi-feudalism. It was a significant change in the socio-political history of Mongolia.[19]

The ecclesiastical nobility was strengthened by the policies and statutes of the court at the time of the Manchu domination of Mongolia (1636-1911).[20] The high lamas, with

such religious title as *khutughtu, nom-un khan, pandita, chorji, shabrang,* and *khubilghan,* made up the ecclesiastical nobility. The lamas were called by the Mongols "gege'en", which literally means "enlightened one". This word was introduced to the West as "living Buddha" through the Chinese mis-translation, *Huo-fuo.* Most high lamas were the abbots of monasteries, some of them even possessing land and underlings, or *shabinar.* According to Manchu-Ch' ing Law, the number of high lamas officially recognized by the Court as ecclesiastical nobles was as follows :

> Twelve persons in Köke-Khota (Chs. Kuei-hua Ch'eng) Tümed, nine in Chakhar, two in Shire' etü-Küriye, three in Korchin, one in Gorlos, six in Eastern Tümed, six in Üjümüchin, one in Kha'uchid, one in Abagha, five in Abakhanar, two in Sünid, one in Dörben-keüked, five in Urad, and one in the Ordos; all together, fifty-five persons.[21]

Most of the above-named lamas were Mongols or others re-incarnated in Mongolia, and were officially recognized by the Manchu Ch'ing Court as lamaist nobles. In addition, many abbots or owners of smaller temples were recognized as re-incarnations (*khubilghan*) by the local people, but were not listed in the official file of the Manchu-Ch'ing Court, According to tradition, after their deaths, their new incarnation, the *khubilghan,* inherited the former incarnation's rank, titles, property, and even *shabinar* (lay disciples).[22]

Still more honorable than those mentioned above, were the lamas of the highest religious rank, *khutughtu,* born and re-incarnated in Tibet or other Tibetan-speaking areas, such as Kham or Amdo. This group included the four great Mongolian *khutughtu* : (1) Changyka Khutughtu, (2) Galdan-Shiréetü Khutughtu, (3) Mingyur Khutughtu and (4) Jilung Khutughtu.

"The Eight *Khutughtu* of Peking" included the Dongkhar Khutughtu, Goman Khutughtu, Namkha Khutughtu, Asar Khutughtu. Ragu'a Khuṭughtu, and Ajiā Khutughtu, Gungtang Khutughtu and Togon Khutughtu. In Dolö on-nor there was Shikur-Shiréetü-noyan-Chariji Khutughtu.[23] These nobles were similar to Mongolian lamaist nobles and, especially in Inner Mongolia, enjoyed the same feudalistic privileges as the lay nobility.

During the Manchu-Ch' ing period, those Mongolian lay nobles who held administrative power were called *jasagh,* which means "ruler", and those who had no such power were called "the nobles in leisure". For the ecclesiastical nobles—those who possessed land and people (*shabinar,* the lay disciples) but no land, the Court established a special administrative system outside the jurisdiction of the ordinary league and banner system. Such offices as that of *lama tamagha* and *jasagh lama* were created to deal with the administration of the monasteries, lamas, and lay disciples.[25] This measure, instituted to bring about the fragmentation and subjection of the Mongols, caused a further split in the already divided society.[26] At that time, the Ch'ing Court, atleast ostensibly, was that lamas were not to be involved with lay politics.

Religion sometimes has a more powerful influence on human life than does law. The conversion of a nation to a certain religion means that its people will accept that religion's principles as their basic pattern for life. When the Mongolian-Yüan Khans were converted to Buddhism, the religion was accepted only by the upper class, whose influence was much weaker than in the late sixteenth century, when the whole Mongo-

lian nation received Buddhism as its faith. After the collapse of the Yüan Dynasty, the Mongols had suffered extensively from both foreign invasion and internal tribal wars. As a result, the people felt that life was vain and sorrowful. Following the second conversion of the Mongolian nobles, they began to regain hope for peace and gained a deep faith that provided them comfort. The desire of both nobles and the common people was to follow the Law that would lead them to the realm of the Buddha. They repented of their sins and worked for blessings. This psychological change brought peace and stability to Mongolia, but it also resulted in weakness and decline : The traditional martial spirit was replaced by an realistic vain hope for the next life.

When Altan Khan was converted to Buddhism, the nobles promised to honor and support the four kinds of ecclesiastics,[27] freeing them from serving in campaigns and from to hunt and performing other labors, and exempting them from all tax obligations.[28] At this time, the insulting, scolding and beating of a monk began to be treated as a transgression against the nobles themselves.[29] As a result, a new class of ecclesiastical nobles, with a status higher than that of the common people, arose in Mongolian society. A monk's duty was to read scripture and carry out religious work. He had no corvée obligations or taxes; in other words, he had no obligation to the lay administration. In the early days, this sort of honor had been given only to persons of highest merit. Now however, anyone who became a monk received this special treatment, which obviously encouraged parents to send their children to the monastery. The rapid growth of ecclesiastics unfortunately, greatly damaged the military forces, productive power and rate of population growth in Mongolia.

While the initial conversion to Buddhism of the Mongolian Khans and nobles of the Yüan Dynasty had not interfered with shamanistic beliefs, the second conversion, in the later part of the sixteenth century, was a complete surrender to the Tibetan Yellow-sect religion. The Tibetan religion had strictly forbade its believers from following heathen practices. This, in turn, implied the complete suppression of shamanism. Though the lamas absorbed shamanistic, pantheistic Mongolian deities such as *Tenggeri*, *Loos* and others, into the fold as protectors of the Buddhist Law,[30] they used the political power of the converted nobles to destroy shamanistic idols and to forbid shamanistic practices.[31] In addition, Buddhist rituals replaced those of shamanism, and lamas replaced the shamans in the worship of the deities of mountains and rivers, in divination, in cleansing and even in mystic or magical practices. Buddhism also prohibited the burying of the living with the dead and animal sacrifices, and closed the door-opened earlier by Mongol Khans—to the dissemination of all religions. These new religious measures forced any remaining shamanistic practices underground, branded them as dishonorable, and radically altered the Mongols traditional religious life. From a cultural, historical perspective, this change was a major step forward from a primitive, animistic belief to a region of profound philosophy and discipline.

Translation of Buddhist scripture into Mongolian also had a profound effect on Mongolian culture. The translation of the *Kanjur*, promoted by Ligdan, the last great Khan of Mongolia, was a significant contribution. The spread of these Buddhist scriptures enhanced the development and uniformity of the Mongolian writing system, and Buddhist names (mainly in the Tibetan language) eventually comprised more than sixty percent of all Mongol names. The construction of temples, the sculpting and painting of images, and the making of religious instruments and decorations brought progress to

Mongolian architecture, painting, sculpting, and handicrafts. Tibetan art, strongly influenced by Indian art, had a major influence on Mongol art.

Among the influences of Buddhism, however, the economic factor was the most serious. From ancient times, the Mongols had been limited by geographical conditions and a nomadic way of life and consequently their economy was one of scarcity. Their relationship with the southern agricultural people of China always was determined by economic factors.[32] In peaceful trade, the Mongols exchanged their livestock and pastoral by-products for those items necessary for their livelihood, such as foodstuffs, silk and cloth, and agricultural or manufactured goods. Their reliance on the increase of their flocks and herds was the most critical economic factor for the Mongols. After their thorough conversion to Buddhism, the practices of Buddhist ceremonies, establishment of monasteries and temples and donations to and support of monasteries and lamas accounted for the greatest part of the peoples' expenditures. When Mongolian feudal lords donated to the monasteries in Tibet, they often ordered their people to contribute likewise from their herds.[33] Thus, a great portion of Mongolian wealth and surplus production was sent out of the country; this precluded any possible accumulation of wealth. It led to poverty among the people and limited the Mongolian economy. In addition, the exodus of males from their homes to the monastery separated a tremendous portion of the labor force from production, and the enlargement and excessive number of the monasteries contributed to a further decline of the country's economy.

The number of celibate monks increased rapidly, and in later generations it became common for families to keep only one lay son, in order to continue the patriarchal line, and to send all other sons to the monastery. As a result, in the last three centuries the Mongolian population has decreased rather than increased.[34]

Despite these problems, the monasteries were the center of faith, culture, economy, education and traditional medicine in the nomadic Mongolian society. Their contribution, great and long-lasting, should not be neglected.

When the Manchu began their rise to power, the Inner Mongols on the south of the Gobi Desert were already converted to Buddhism and they surrendered to the Manchu. For a period they were allies of the Manchus, but gradually became their vassals. In 1691, the Khalkhas, on the north of the Gobi, were persuaded by the first Jebtsundamba Khutughtu also to surrender to the Manchu. The Manchu rulers, as experts in the art of politics, did not neglect the potential power of Buddhism, and used it to manipulate the Mongols. Of this, Emperor Ch'ien-lung (r. 1736-1795) wrote openly in his work *La-ma-Shuo* :

> The Yellow Religion of the interior and the outside was generally governed by these two persons, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Erdeni. All the Mongolian tribes whole-heartedly submit themselves. The development of the Yellow Religion is intended to pacify the Mongols. This matter is not insignificant and therefore should be protected, but it is not a policy similar to that of the Yüan Dynasty, which deviously flattered the Tibetan monks.[35]

The measures taken toward Tibetan Buddhism by the Manchu Court were as we see, aimed at strengthening their control over the Mongols. Even at the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty, there still were those who openly praised the success of this Manchu

policy to weaken Mongolia. One such analyst said., "The rule of our dynasty over the Mongols is to establish more feudal units, to divide their power, to honor Buddhism, and to control their birth rate and thus to half the disaster of the Hsiungnu and Uighur. The art is really marvelous.[36]

Manchu-Ch'ing's religious policy and Buddhist influence in Mongolia fed on one other, placing the Mongols in a desperate situation. The unifying influence of the first Jehtsundamba Khutughtu had threatened the Manchu policy of fragmentation and rule; therefore, after the passing of the second Jebtsundamba Khutughtu, the Emperor Ch'ien-lung cleverly established the policy that future re-incarnations be born in Tibet, hoping to prevent the union of Mongolian lay-political and ecclesiastical-religious power.[37] At the same time, however, the Manchu emperors endeavored to establish the Changyka Khutughtu[38] as the Holy One of Inner Mongolia, therefore as an imperial instrument to halt the influence of the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu from expanding south of the Gobi. During the previous three centuries the construction of monasteries had been uninterruptedly carried out in Inner Mongolia. At the earliest Buddhist center of Köke-Khota, there were more than ten large monasteries. Later, at the time of Emperor K'ang-hsi (r. 1662-1722) and Emperor Yung-cheng (r. 1723-1725), the Köke Süme (hui-tsung su) was built, in 1691, and the Shira Süme (Shan-yin ssu) at Doloon-nor, in 1731. Emperor Ch'ien-lung, imitating the architectural style of Tibet, established in 1770 the Potala (pu-to-tsung-Ch'eng ssu) and the Tashilumbu (Hsü-mi-fu-shuo ssu) in Jehol. Consequently, Köke-Khota, Doloon-nor and Jehol became the centers of religious administration in Inner Mongolia. There, the offices of the Lama Tamagha were established to carry out religious administration.

In Peking, Emperor Yung-cheng donated his own princely residence as the Imperial Lamaist Monastery, Yung-ho-kung. There were also in the Capital many other great lamasaries, such as the Yellow Temple (Huang ssu), where the relic of the Sixth Panchen Erdeni[39] was placed, and Sungchu ssu, the residence of the Changyka Khutughtu. Most important there was the Tsandan Juu Temple (Chan-tan ssu),[40] originally built by Khubilai Khan at the time of the Mongolian Empire. Wu-tai-shan mountain monastic center, in Shansi Province, also provided a strong attraction for Mongolian pilgrims.

The great monasteries of Inner Mongolia were famous for various reasons. The Monastery of Badgher (commonly known as Wu-tan-chao or Kuang-chüeh ssu in Chinese) in the Mongnai Mountains (Chs. Ta-ching-shan) of Ulaanchab League, was famous for its strict discipline and profound studies in Buddhology. The Chaghan-dayanchi-yin Süme (Chs. Jui-ying ssu) of Josotu League, was the most populous monastery, once reaching ten thousand. The Shire'etü-Küriye Süme, of the same League, was unique in that it had administrative power over a banner and its people. The Janglung Pandita Gege'en Keid (Chs. Pei-tzu Miao) of Shilinghol League, although not large numerically, also was important.[41]

Because Buddhism was so influential, the great hope of Mongolian monks was to study in Tibet. There, the three great monasteries, especially Jebon (Hbras-spuñs), maintained special dormitories for students from Inner Mongolia. Lamas who could not go to Tibet sought to travel to the famous monasteries of Kumbum and Labrang, in the Tibetan districts of Kökönor and Kansu. At the very least they would go to Badghar in Western Mongolia for further study.

III. Changing Conditions and the Decline of Lamaist Buddhism

At the turn of the twentieth century, rapid changes in the Asian situation posed serious problems to the existence of the Mongols as a nation. By this time, Tibetan Buddhism already had mingled with traditional Mongolian culture and had become an integral part of the Mongolian national character. It also had become one of the main reasons for the decline of the Mongols as a nation. When Outer Mongolia declared its independence from China in 1911, many were concerned about the protection of its religious faith.[42] Still other enlightened Mongolian intellectuals carried out campaigns against Buddhism, advocating strict control over religion for the sake of the survival and development of the Mongolian nation.

Prince Günchügsüreng of the Khorchin Left Front Banner of Jerim League was the first to openly advocate strict controls on Buddhism and its activities. In 1910, one year before the independence movement in Outer Mongolia he presented a memorial to the Manchu-Ch'ing Court, in which he proposed that "in order to abolish superstitious religion [Buddhism], must be put under strict control".[43] Prior to this memorial, in 1903, Prince Gungsangnorbu of Kharachin Right Banner of Josotu League had established several modern schools. Students who attended these schools began to doubt the teachings of the lamas and to recognize Buddhism as a factor in the decline of the Mongols. Soon afterwards, Prince Günsangnorbu sent several students to study in Japan. Following their return to Kharachin, modern thought and an anti-Lamaist Buddhist movement began to spread rapidly.

As has been mentioned, in addition to its political and economic goals, the 1911 independence movement sought the protection of the Yellow Faith. The leader of the movement was the Eighth Jebtsundamba Khutughtu.[44] Because of his incomparable personal influence in religious matters, the movement won enthusiastic support from the Khalkha people. However, soon after independence, various conflicts broke out eventually creating a situation and the conditions for the Communist Revolution of 1921 and its subsequent socialist reforms.

The independence of Outer Mongolia was a great temptation to the Inner Mongols. But because the prestige of the Jebstundamba Khutughtu to the south of the Gobi was not as great as it was among the Khalkha Mongols, the goals of the revolution in Inner Mongolia, as planned by the Outer Mongolian leaders, could not be achieved. By this time, the Peking Government of the Republic of China (successors of the Manchu-Ch'ing Dynasty), in order to halt further expansion of the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu's influence in Inner Mongolia, followed the footsteps of the abdicated Manchu Court and proclaimed its policy of protection and patronage of the Yellow Religion.

During this crisis, the high lamas who had the greatest influence over the Inner Mongolian people were the Changyka Khutughtu and the Kanjurwa Nom-un Khan of the Doloön-nor Monastery. A power struggle over ecclesiastical administration had long existed between these two lamas and their disciples. The Kunjurwa Nom-un Khan was sympathetic to the Outer Mongolian Independence Movement, and because of this was killed in 1913 by so-called "bandits", disguised Chinese soldiers stationed at Doloön-nor.[45] Consequently, the Sixth Changyka Khutughtu, still a young man, was urged by his politically ambitious disciples to intervene in Mongolian politics. He openly showed his support for the newly established Republic of China, which supported his

vested interests. He was subsequently rewarded with the title of *Hung-chi kuang-miṅg ta-kuo-shih* (Great National Master of Spacious Relief and Enlightenment). Henceforth, until his death (1950's) the Sixth Changyka Khutughtu was frequently entangled in Inner Mongolian politics. During the period of the Peking Government (1912-1928) he was a political opponent of Prince Gungsangnorbu, who was then the Director of the Mongolian-Tibetan Ministry and the main promoter of an Inner Mongolian Modernization Movement. The Mongolian-Tibetan Academy founded by Gungsangnorbu in Peking became early an active center of anti-feudalistic and anti-Buddhist activity. In 1924, with the death of the Eighth Jebtsundamba, traditional religious influence greatly diminished, and the Mongolian Peoples' Republic was established. These new events on the north of the Gobi greatly attracted the attention of the students at the Mongolian-Tibetan Academy and encouraged more anti-religious activities in Inner Mongolia.

In the early 1920s, a political conflict broke out between the two great Masters of Tibetan Buddhism, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and the Ninth Panchen Erdeni. Finally, the latter was forced from power and sought refuge in China and Mongolia. During his stay in the "lower land", he created the last "high tide of Buddhism" in Inner Mongolia. The princes, nobles, and common people gave their utmost support to this great Master, and Prince Demchügdüngrub[46] of the Sumid Right Banner, Shilin-ghol League, even proposed building a temple for him. The proposal was warmly received, and in 1932(?) the last great monastery in western Inner Mongolia in Sumid Banner, was dedicated to him.

In 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria, and eastern Inner Mongolia soon fell into the hands of the invaders. The Japanese militarists, in order to strengthen Mongolian local governmental organization, and thus win the support of Mongolian intellectuals, abolished the old quasi-feudalistic system and began the extensive construction of schools. In order to please the conservatives, the militarists also carried out a policy of patronizing Buddhist monasteries, but did not exempt lamas from conscription for military services. The Japanese ostensibly favored Lamaist Buddhism, but subtly abrogated the traditional privileges of the Mongolian ecclesiastical class. This greatly reduced the interest of parents in sending their sons to the monasteries. According to the statistics of 1938, there were in the Mongolian districts of "Manchuria" or *Manchukuo* six hundred and sixty-two lamasaries. Among a Mongolian population of approximately 930,000 there were about 29,000 lamas, comprising about 3 percent of the entire population and 6 percent of the males.[47] This indicates that in eastern Inner Mongolia the number of lamas had sharply declined from the beginning of the century and that the trend was especially pronounced in the 1930s.

Political developments in western Inner Mongolia reached a crisis in 1933, with the Autonomous Movement. This was a cooperative political undertaking of nobles and conservative leaders, under the leadership of Prince Demchugdungrub and supported by liberal intellectuals. However, confronted with heavy pressures from the Chinese warlords of nearby Shansi and Suiyan Provinces and conforming to the influences of long-standing feudalistic regionalism, some princes and nobles began to turn away from the movement. At this time, the Ninth Panchen Erdeni was residing at the monastery of Batu-kha' algha-yin Süme (Chs. Pai-ling-miao), in Darkhan Banner. Ula' an-Chāb League also was a center of the Autonomous Movement. Conservative nobles gathered there continually to visit the Tibetan master for prayers and counsel. Because the Ninth

Panchen Erdeni was himself very sympathetic to Prince Demchugdungrub and his Autonomous Movement, the center being the Ula'an-chab League, the Panchen Lama's answers to doubts regarding the movement were encouraging, leading most of the nobles who lacked confidence to support the movement.[48]

The Sixth Changyka Khutughtu was then at the Buddhist center of Wu-tai-shan in Shansi Province, where he was persuaded by Yen Hsi-shan, leading warlord of the Shansi-suiyuan faction, to express openly his opposition to Mongolian autonomy. Just prior to this, the Changyka Khutughtu had been appointed *Meng-Chianghsüan-hua-shih*, "Culture Propagation Emissary to the Mongolian Banners", by the National Government in Nanking, with the hope that through his "propagation" the problem of the Mongolian Autonomous Movement would be resolved. The Sixth Changyka arrived in Peiping (Peking) whence he planned to travel to Inner Mongolia and carry out his mission of subverting the Autonomous Movement. On his arrival in Peiping, however, the Mongolian students studying there unexpectedly published in the local newspapers a declaration opposing religious interference in Mongolian politics by a Tibetan ecclesiastical politician, *i.e.*, the Changyka Khutughtu. The students threatened bodily harm to the lama and demanded that he should return to Wu-tai-shan immediately.[49] Under this threat of death, the Sixth Changyka quietly returned to Wu-tai-shan.

This was the first overtly anti-Buddhist Movement in Inner Mongolian history. Needless to say, it was criticized by the conservatives; nevertheless, it saved the Autonomous Movement from possible destruction through religious interference. The Ninth Panchen Lama's support of Mongolian autonomy was secret, but the Sixth Changyka's opposition to Mongolian self-rule was an open failure. As a result, most young intellectuals became even more determined to carry out a struggle against the traditional religion, in order to maintain the existence of the nation. In this crisis, many conservative leaders understood the very real problem facing the Mongol nation, but their personal faith prevented them from participating in the movement against Lamaist Buddhism.

In 1937, the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) broke out and western Inner Mongolia came under Japanese occupation. However, because of the struggle for autonomy, Mongolian national consciousness was much stronger in the west than in the Mongolian areas of Manchukuo. Therefore, in order to prevent opposition from the Mongols, the Japanese army interfered less in the internal affairs and administration in western Mongolia than they had in eastern Inner Mongolia. Nevertheless, the Japanese military prepared various "lama policies". One objective was to "Japanize" the Tibetan Buddhism of Inner Mongolia, in order to gain further psychological control over the Mongols.[50] The Koyasan Monastary near Osaka, headquarters of the Shingon Sect of esoteric Japanese Buddhism, became a re-education center for Mongol lamas, the hope being that this Japanese center would become the "holy land", replacing the Tibetan monasteries, This kind of religious infiltration or manipulation caused Mongolian devotees great concern, for it faced them with what they saw as a sort of religious imperialism.

This period was a major turning point in modern Inner Mongolian history. The Mongols had to struggle for their national existence against threats from the outside, and internally they had to quicken the modernization process and improve their livelihood. Among the many critical-political demands, they saw that high priority had to be given to the task of breaking the deadlock posed by the traditional religion. Though

conservative leaders recognized the necessity of changing their religious institutions, they dared not to advocate changes, for fear of jeopardizing their religious faith or future life.[51] Younger radical leaders felt, however, that the salvation of the Mongolian nation lay in the eradication or serious modification of Lamaist Buddhism. Differences over political policy between the two schools of thought created considerable difficulties.

According to statistical data gathered by the author during his term as an official in the Shilin-ghol League government in 1943, there were 10,930 lamas in a total population of 52,706 (21 percent of the total population).[52] These statistics need no further comment as to their harmful effects upon population growth, the economy and very existence of the nation itself. This internal crisis and the infiltration of Japanese Buddhism from the outside eventually forced leaders of the two western Inner Mongolian camps to forge a mutually-acceptable policy. Though much of this policy was a reformation, the term "purification" was generally preferred because of the sensitivities of believers, who composed the vast majority of the population. The main points of the new policy were :

1. The Buddhist doctrine of the Yellow Religion is correct, holy, and should be respected. But it must be purified to re-develop the pure truth of its original holy teachings. Impure elements from outside should not be allowed. This was meant to hinder the introduction of Japanese influences.
2. The monastery and temple system, because of defects present, should be regulated anew according to the *bainin yosun*, or rule of discipline.
3. Lamas should be experts in Buddhist scripture, and their competence be demonstrated by examination. All lamas from 18 to 50 years of age must take the examination. Those who fail will return to secular life. This examination should be given each year to all lamas who turn eighteen. The examination should be regulated by banner and league officials in cooperation with the ecclesiastical officials of the monastery.
4. Lamas who are the only male family member or the only son must return to lay life in order to maintain the family line.
5. Henceforth, if there are three sons, one may become a monk. If there are more sons, not more than half may become monks.
6. The competence of the lamas must be heightened : they must learn both Mongolian and Tibetan. Mongolian language is an important item on the examination[53].
7. Lamas sould participate in productive activities and in each monastery a training quarter and a small factory should be set up. Lamas under 18 years must be involved in the training.[54]

In Shilin-ghol League from 1942 to 1944 more than 1,500 lamas, 14 percent of the total, were returned to a secular life. This moderate reformation policy, though not as effective, in reducing the number of lamas as the general conscription law carried out in the Mongolian district of *Manchukuo*, was the only Buddhist reformation in Inner Mongolian history that was internally motivated and formulated without outside interference. It is clear that the dominating power of Buddhism within Mongol society had already been weakened, for otherwise the reforms would not have been possible.

Staff officers of the Japanese occupying forces felt that this religious reformation would anger the Mongolian people and somehow weaken Japanese control. Therefore, the Japanese contacted religious leaders individually and attempted to implement a "Lama Policy" of their own. In opposition to this scheme, conservative Mongolian leaders under Demchügdungrub decided to establish, in accordance with the old Manchu-Ch'ing regulations, a *Lama Tamagha* (Lamaist Affairs Office) to bring together Lamaist leaders, including pro-Japanese lamas, and organize them into a single unit under the supervision of Prince Demchügdungrub himself. This resulted in a behind-the-scenes struggle against Japanese measures, which was carried out under the pretext of restoring traditional Tibetan Buddhist doctrines and discipline on the precedent of the old regulations of the Manchu-Ch'ing Dynasty. Though the Japanese military authorities in Inner Mongolia were displeased, they could find no pretext to stop the Mongols from reforming their own religion, since it was in the name of restoration and purification.

IV. Post-script

With the end of the Second World War in 1945, the Soviet Red Army and the Mongolian Revolutionary Army entered Inner Mongolia. This occupation ended the long era of Tibetan Buddhism in Mongolia. Soon the whole of Inner Mongolia came under the control of the Chinese Communists and all religious activities were abolished or fundamentally altered. At first, the Chinese Communists organized a religious unit to manipulate all lamas and believers. But after the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, all lamas disappeared and the monasteries were either closed or used for other purposes. Religious music, activities, prayers and ceremonies, that had long been a part of the people's lives became no more than a matter of history.

On the other side of the Gobi, in the Mongolian Peoples' Republic, after undergoing drastic changes for several decades, religious activities began again on a very small scale in the 1940s. The famous monastery of old Urga, (Ulan Bator) Gandan Kheid, the old center of Buddhist faith in Mongolia, was opened to the people for worship and a few lamas were allowed to perform religious ceremonies. Even a college of Buddhism has now been opened in Ulan Bator. Buddhism there, unlike Buddhism in Inner Mongolia, today enjoys relative freedom from harassment.

FOOTNOTES

1. Sechin Jagchid, "Why the Mongolian Khans Adopted Tibetan Buddhism as Their Faith," *Proceedings of the Third East Asian Altaistic Conference*. Taipei, 1969, pp. 108-128.
2. Sechin Jagchid, "Ta-Yuan ti-shih Pa-ssu-pa la-ma shih Itsen-yang-ti I-ko-jen" (Phags-pa Lama, Imperial Tutor of the Yüan Dynasty), *Chung-hua Wen-hua fu-hsing yüeh-k'an*, No. 4, Vol. IV, Apr. 1971, pp. 12-19.
3. Sechin Jagchid, "Buddhism in Mongolia after the Collapse of the Yüan Dynasty," Irēne Melikoff, ed. *Traditions religieuses des peuples, Altaigues*, Paris, 1972, pp. 49-58.
4. Altan is known as An-ta in the *Ming-shih* and other Chinese materials. He was not the Great Khan, but received a *khan* title from the Great Khan. Beause of his contribution to the development of Buddhism in Mongolia, he also was entitled Sayin Gege'en Altan Khan (the word *gege'en* means "enlightened"). See also Sei Wada, *Toashi kenkyu-Mokohen* (Studies on the History of Far East—Mongolia), Tokyo, 1959, pp. 753-812.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 690-716.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 716-738.
7. Panchen Erdeni or the Tashi Lama was known as the re-incarnation of the second great disciple of Tsongkha-pa, the founder of the Yellow Sect.
8. Tümen Khan (r. 1558-1592) is also known as Jasaghtu Tümen Khan in Mongolian materials and T'u-man in the *Ming-shih* and other Chinese materials. During his time the Khan only had control over the Left Wing forces, while the Right Wing forces were under the domination of Altan.
9. The records on the meeting date and place of Abadai Taiji and the Third Dalai Lama are not all identical. Some suggest, it took place in Tibet and others suggest it was at Köke-Khota. The latter seems more dependable.
10. The father of the Fourth Dalai Lama, Sümer-mergen-khong-taiji was the grandson of Altan Khan.
11. Strictly speaking, the "Red Sect" is identified only with the Nyingma-pa sect, though a general view, somewhat mistaken, is that the so-called "Red Sect" includes all sects except the Gelug-pa, the Yellow Sect.
12. In 1631 (the 4th year of Tien-ts'-ung) the monument of the Great Chin (Manchu) Lama, "*Ta-Chin la-ma fa-shih pao-ta-chi pei*" was established in memory of the Tibetan Lama Ülüg-darkhan-nangsu.
13. The First Jebtsundamba Khutughtu, Chanabochar (1635-1723) was the son of Gombodorji, Tüshiyetü Khan of the Khalkha Mongols. See C.R. Bawden, *The Jebtsundamba Khutukhtus of Urga*, 1961, Wiesbaden, pp. 8-20, 46-67.
14. The Mongolian translation of the Kanjur was done during the rule of Ligdan Khan (r. 1604-1634), but it was not possible to publish because of the defeat of the Khan by the Manchu. Later it was published in Peking at the time of K'ang-shi (1662-1721). The Mongolian translation of the Tanjur was accomplished at the time of Yung-cheng (1723-1735).
15. Ligdan Khan, after his defeat by the Manchu, retreated to Western Inner Mongolia, where he allied with Choghtu Taiji of Khalkha to carry out an invasion of Tibet. Their purpose was to assist the so-called "Red Sect" to restore its power over the Yellow Sect of the Dalai Lama. Törölbaikhu, the leader of the Khoshod tribe of the Oirad Mongols, led his forces to help the Yellow Religion. By this time Ligdan Khan had died and Choghtu's forces were entirely destroyed

by Törölbaikhu, and the "Red Sect" was also subdued by him. Therefore, in fact, Törölbaikhu was the one who assisted the Fifth Dalai Lama to establish his theocratic rule over Tibet.

16. Galdan accepted from the Fifth Dalai Lama the title "Boshoghtu Khan," which means "the Khan of the mandate of heaven". This greatly encouraged the ambition of Galdan to unify all Mongolia, and eventually caused the breakout of the Manchu-Jungharian War that lasted seven decades.

17. In the very early period of Mongolian history, there were some clan leaders or *noyan* who had the title of *begi* or *beki*, they were shamans. However, none of them were real ecclesiastical monks.

18. These lay disciples, *shabinar*, were originally the underlings or *khariyatu* of the nobles who offered them to high lamas that they honored. These *shabinars* were only obliged to serve there religious overlords and their temples, but were released from their old obligations towards their old feudal lords. See Sechin Jagchid, "Mongolism Lamaist Quasi-Feudalism. During the Period of Manchu Domination," *Mongolian Studies*, Vol. 1, 1974, Bloomington, pp. 27-54.

19. *Ibid.*

20. In 1624, the Khorchin tribe of Inner Mongolia allied with the Manchu. Later, in 1636, all Mongolian nobles on the south of the Gobi presented the title of *Boghda Sechen Khan* to the Emperor T'ai-tsung of the Manchu, and officially recognized him as the sovereign of Mongolia. the surrender of the Khalkha Mongols took place in 1691, and the Manchu military occupation of the Junghar realm began in 1757.

21. See *Ta-Ching hui-tien*, Vol. 974, p. 8b. Both the Chakhar and the Hulunbuir areas are not listed in this section.

22. *Ibid.*, Vol. 67, p. 6ab. Many important *khubilghan*, such as the Kanjurwa, Nomun Khan and others are not listed here.

23. In Outer Mongolia the ecclesiastical official under the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu dealing with the lay administration was the *Shangsadba*. His office was the *Shangsadba Yamen*.

24. Sechin Jagchid, *Ibid.*

25. Those high-merited persons were called *darkhan* in the *Secret History of the Mongols*. This title remained very honorable even after the period of the Mongolian empire.

26. See note 18.

27. Sagang Sechen, *Erdeni-yin-Tobchi*. Ulan-Bator 1960 edition, pp. 252-254.

28. *Ibid.*, see also note 25.

29. *Ibid*., pp. 242-243.

30. Radnabadara, "*Zaya* Pandita-*yin Namtar* (the biography of Zaya Pandita), Damdinsürüng ed., *Mongghol uran jokiyal-un degeji jaghun bilig orushibai*, 1959, Ulan-Bator, pp. 320-326.

31. Sagang Sechen, p. 252.

32. Sechin Jagchid, "Trade, Peace and War Between the Nomadic Altaics and the Agricultural Chinese", *Bulletin of the Institute of China Border Area Studies*, No. 1, 1970, Taipei, pp. 35-80.

33. Radnabadara.

34. According to the author's personal experience, the pure pastoral area of Shilin-ghol League, at the beginning of Ching dynasty was divided into ten banners which contained 108 *somun*. Each *somun* was a unit of 150 men in an army reserve and at the same time it was also a civilian administration unit of about 150 families. If each family contained five persons, the total number of the families would be about 16,200 and the whole population would be atleast 81,000. However, the 1942 statistic of this league records 11,872 families and 52,706 persons.

35. Ho-ning (revised), *Wei-Tsang t'ūng-chih*, 1965, reprinted in Taipei, pp. 27b-28a.

36. See the preface by Chen Chan-jan for *Ch'ou-Meng chū-i* (A rustic opinion on Mongolian policy) by Yao Hsi-kuang, Peking, 1908, reprinted in Taipei, 1966.

37. The Second of Jebtsundamba Khutukhtus was also born in the family of Tüshiyetü Khan. He was unhappy because of the long involvement of the Khalkha Mongols in the Manchu-Jungharian War. Therefore, after his death (1757), the Ch'ing Court influenced the Mongolian ecclesiastical and lay authorities to restrict the reincarnation of this high lama to be found in the "Holy Land" of Tibet. However, at the present time, the documentary material on this top secret policy is not yet available for study.

38. The First Changyka Khutughtu was a follower of the emissary of the Fifth Dalai Lama to the Ch'ing Court. The Second was a great master of profound knowledge in Buddhism and received the title of *Ta kuo-shih* (the great tutor of the kingdom). Also, from the second to the late eighth incarnation the same title was perpetuated by the Court as an instrument to solve Mongolian problems.

39. The Sixth Panchen Lama (1738-1780) came to Jehol to visit the Emperor Chien-t'ung. He was received with great honor. The great Monastery of Tashilumbo or Hsü-mi-fu-shuo-ssu at Jehol was established in his honor. In 1780, he died in Peking. The Emperor established a Pagoda for him at the Yellow Temple (Huang-ssu) outside the wall of Peking.

40. This Monastery was destroyed by the Allied forces after the defeat of the Boxer's resistance, 1900.

41. The Pandita Gege'en Keid original contained only a few more than fifty officially authorized lamas but in the late 19th and early 20th century, the number of the lamas reached more than one thousand.

42. Chen Ch'ung-tsu. *Wai-Meng chin-shih shih* (the history of modern Outer Mongolia) Peking, 1921, 1965 reprinted in Taipei, p. 10.

43. The entry for the *keng-yin* day of the 12th month of the second year of Hsuan-t'ung (1910), "Hsuan-t'ung chen-chi" of the *chīng-shih-lu*.

44. The Eighth Jebtsundamba Khutughtu was reincarnated in Tibet, 1874. He was brought to Urga, Mongolia, and was installed there the same year. At the time of Outer Mongolian independence in 1911, he was enthroned and was given the title of *Boghda Khan* (the Holy Emperor). In 1915, Outer Mongolia changed its position from independence to automnoy and the President of the Republic of China gave him the title of *Khutughtu Khan*, In 1920, the Urga Government abolished its autonomy under pressure from the Chinese warlord Hsü Shu-cheng. In 1921, the Outer Mongols declared its independence again, and the Eighth Jebtsundamba recovered the old title of *Boghda Khan*. In the same year, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party took power. Because the influence of Buddhism was still great, the Eighth Jebtsundamba-although he lost his political power was still recognized as the nominal head of the state. In 1924, he died, and the Party announced the formal name of Outer Mongolia to be the Mongolian People's Republic. At the same time, it announced that no incarnation of the Jebtsundamba would ever be reinstalled.

45. The author was personally informed about this matter by the present Kanjurwa Khutughtu and some old lamas at Dolo-ōn-nor.

46. Prince Demchugdungrub (1902-1970?) was also known in Chinese as Te

Wang (Prince De).

47. Zenrin kyokai, *Moko taikan*, Tokyo, 1938, p. 264.

48. Information from the author's personal contact with Prince Demchugdungrub.

49. At this time the author was studying at Peking University, was one of the members of the Mongolian Students' Association in Peiping, and attended the anti-Changyka movement.

50. For instance, the learned Japanese monk, Hashimoto Kōhō who studied in many Mongolian monastaries also was an active spy of the Japanese army. Major Yukei, the head of Japanese military intelligence office (*tokumu kikan*) at Jabsar (te-hua) was a monk, who especially focused on religious matters in Mongolia. As for earlier Japanese concern with Mongolian religion, see Kokuryukai, *Toa Senkaku shishi kiden*, Tokyo, 1966, Vol. II, pp. 266-267.

51. All Mongolian nobles took at least several high lamas as teachers to whom they gave their oath of obedience, and they would never do anything contradictory to their oath. Consequently, they refused to criticize the religion, religious affairs, and especially their personal teachers, such as, the Sixth Changyka Khutughtu.

52. According to the 1942 statistics of the Shilin-ghol League Government.

53. The lamas mostly recited only the Tibetan scriptures, and neglected the Mongolian edition. Therefore, the young lamas were forced to learn Mongolian.

54. The author as an official of the Shilin-ghol League Government was personally involved with religious reform work for three years.

*Shingon Mikkyo Buddhism : Its Concept of Tathata and Problematics Concerning Dharmakaya Mahavairocana**

MINORU KIYOTA

THE term Shingon is derived from *mantra*, meaning, in the context of this paper, the "true words of the Buddha". Mikkyō is a term employed in contradistinction to Kengyō. Mikkyō means the secret, hidden, or unrevealed teaching of the Buddha. Kengyō means the revealed teaching. Shingon Mikkyō means the "ture words of the secret teaching". It is the Japanese version of Buddhist Tantrism, systematized by Kūkai in the ninth century. Shingon Mikkyō attempts to reveal the contents of *tathatā*, which is identified as Dharmakāya Mahāvairocana, through the employment of symbols. This paper attempts to describe the contents of the Shingon concept of *tathatā*, its forms of meditation designed to actualize *tathatā*, and the problematics involved in the understanding of Dharmakāya Mahāvairocana, the personified Dharma, which is the *tathatā*.

I. Tathatā

The *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith*, a text attributed to Aśvaghoṣa but in all probability a Chinese composition, and one of the major canonical sources on which Shingon is based, says, "There is a Dharma which can arouse the roots of faith in Mahāyāna".[1] This text then goes on to identify the Dharma as *tathatā*, analyzing it in terms of its body, marks and function. Shingon follows the tradition of the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith* in its analysis of *tathatā*, but it describes the three attributes of

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tathatā symbolically in terms of : 1). the six elements, 2). the four maṇḍalas, and 3). the three secrets.

(*1*) *The Six Elements : The Substance of Tathatā*

The Shingon theory of the six elements analyzes the universe in terms of specific elements. Such an attempt is not original on Kūkai's part. For example, Empedocles conceived four elements, the Pythagoreans and Aristotle five, and the Upaniṣad, Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika philosophers also five. However, these philosophers proposed elements as matters with distinct physical properties. According to Buddhism, such elements were, of course, subject to the law of origination and extinction. Kūkai conceived the six elements as symbolic representation of *tathatā*. The explanation of *tathatā* with reference to the six elements therefore is Kūkai's creation, though ideas germane to this theory can be found, for example, in the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra*.[2] The six elements are described below :[3]

(a) Earth : Symbolically represented by the syllable 'A', for *anutpāda* (non-origination), it, means that *tathatā* is neither created nor destroyed. Thus, as the earth is the mother of all things, so is *tathatā* the source of all things.

(b) Water : Symbolically represented by the syllable VA, for *vāc* (voice or sound), it actually means that the voice of *tathatā* is beyond verbal description. Thus, as water flows freely without being contained in any way, so is *tathatā* beyond conceptual categories.

(c) Fire : Symbolically represented by the syllable RA, for *rajas* (passion), it means that *tathatā* destroys errors. Thus, as fire burns all things, so does *tathatā* burn up *kleśa*.

(d) Wind : Symbolically represented by the syllable HA, for *hara* (action), it means that *tathatā* is freedom of action. Thus, like wind moving about freely, so is *tathatā* endowed with complete freedom.

(e) Space : Symbolically represented by the syllable KHA, (space), it means that *tathatā* is without limits. It is universal, all pervasive, and omnipresent.

(f) Mind : Symbolically represented by the syllable HUM, perfect enlightenment, it means that the five attributes of *tathatā* described above are reflected upon the enlightened mind.

The first five are the material elements, the sixth is the mind. Thus, the six elements are reduced to mind (*citta*) and form (*rūpa*). Shingon claims that there is no mind apart from matter and no matter apart from mind, the perceiver and the perceived being interrelated. The two are the inseparable entities of *tathatā*, the Shingon concept of ultimate reality.

The six-element theory is not only an analytic description of *tathatā*. It forms the basis of Shingon meditation, because Shingon claims that insight into the six elements provides the key to understanding the existential nature of man. This insight is referred to as the harmony (*i.e.*, the interfusion) of the six elements (rokudai-enyū). Again, the theory of the harmony of elements is not an invention of Kūkai. The Chinese Ti-lun school postulated the theory of the harmony of the six 'marks'; Hua-yen, the harmony

of the inexhaustible interfusion of elements; and T'ien-t'ai, the three thousand worlds implicit in one instant thought. Shingon follows the tradition of the concept of harmony developed in Chinese Buddhism. Though Taoist influence is apparent, this concept is not a diversion from Mahāyāna. Underlying the concept of harmony is the principle of co-arising, the principle of the interdependence of all elements. Emptiness enables co-arising. It is within the domain of emptiness that all forms of conceptual discrimination are dissolved and a new dimension (co-arising) unfolds itself; it is through this type of insight that a Shingon practitioner recognizes the parts, each lacking an essence, interfusing with one another and contributing to create a dynamic cosmic harmony. *Tathatā* refers to this cosmic harmony. But Shingon is specific. It speaks of *tathatā* in terms of the six elements and maintains that the nature of the six elements—which intermingle in complete harmony with one another—constitutes the world itself, the first five representing the 'known' and the sixth the 'knower'. The merging of the 'known' and the 'knower' is Mahāvairocana, the personified *tathatā*. Man is a microcosm of the world of Mahāvairocana. He is endowed with the seeds of the cosmic Buddha.

(2) The Four Maṇḍalas : The Marks of Tathatā

Maṇḍala in Edgerton's term is a "circle, piece of ground specifically prepared in honor of a Buddha or saint (for him to sit on)".[4] Sometimes it is referred to as *maṇḍa*, meaning "cream, best part, highest point, and the essence of things, "while-*la* is a suffix meaning 'possessed, support, and complete,' according to Toganoo".[5] A maṇḍala specifically refers to the state of enlightenment illustrated by a graphic representation. The four maṇḍalas are means to phenomenally observe the six elements—the cosmic reality—in their four different attributes.[6]

(a) Mahā-maṇḍala. *Mahā* here refers to the universe or the whole. It encompasses all six elements representing *tathatā*. Thus, the Mahā-maṇḍala represents all states of existence within the world of Dharmakāya Mahāvairocana. These states of existence are described iconographically : the Buddha is surrounded by his companions (representing his attributes), the arrangement of whom represents the contents of Dharmakāya. The following three maṇḍalas represent the three attributes :

(b) Samaya-maṇḍala. *Samaya* means "assembly, congregation, concourse."[7] Toganoo analyzes the term into *sam*, meaning "universal, collective, whole" and *aya*, meaning "to go".[8] In Shingon, *Samaya* has a two-fold meaning. From the viewpoint of the non-enlightened one, it means "to go to the realm of universal enlightenment", which is the realm of Mahāvairocana. From the viewpoint of the enlightened one, *samaya* means "to go to the realm of the collective sufferings of mankind". Involvement in the non-enlightened realm requires not only the insight into enlightenment but also the wisdom to improvise skill-in-means to communicate that insight. This is a vow-maṇḍala.

(c) Dharma-maṇḍala. This maṇḍala is the embodiment of truth (Dharma). It is designed to reveal the Dharma through the vehicle of letters and syllables, supposedly representing the voice of *tathatā*. This does not mean that all Dharma-maṇḍalas represent a letter-maṇḍela. Sometimes letters and syllables are replaced

by buddhas and bodhisattvas. This maṇḍala is also referred to as a *bīja-maṇḍala*, a maṇḍala showing the seeds that produce all things. This is a truth-maṇḍala.

(d) Karma-maṇḍala. Karma refers to the work of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas. It describes their efforts through the medium of sculpture. In Shingon, however, Karma-maṇḍala is more often expressed as graphic representations, rather than by sculpture. This is a work-maṇḍala.

(3) *The Three Secrets : The Function of Tathatā*

The term 'three secrets' is derived from the Sanskrit *tri-guhya*. Specifically, the term refers to the three secret teachings of the Buddha, revealed through the function of the body (*kāya*), voice (*vāc*) and mind (*manas*) of Dharmakāya Mahāvairocana[9]. A description of the three secrets requires some preparatory remarks.

Because Shingon is based upon the Ekayāna premise of universal Buddhahood, it holds that man, just as he is, is the Buddha. Hence, ideally, there is no difference between the function of the Buddha (one who has realized *tathatā*) and man (one with inherent Buddha-nature) ; actually, however, man's Buddha-nature is covered by *kleśa*. This condition necessitates practice. So, from the standpoint of man, his aspiration to realize Buddhahood is described in terms of *tri-karma*, the three practices of man ; from the standpoint of the Buddha, his desire to reveal *tathatā* to man is described in terms of *tri-guhya*, the three secret practices of the Buddha. The practices of man and of the Buddha are of three kinds : those performed by body, voice and mind. The merging of *tri-karma* and *tri-guhya* is realized through *adhiṣṭhāna*, which in the Shingon lexicon is referred to as *kaji*,[10] the instrument of integration between man and the Buddha. Shingon enlightenment therefore constitutes the merging of *tri-karma* and *tri-guhya* through *kaji*, that is the power (compassion) of (Mahāvairocana) Buddha converging with the aspiration of man.

Kcji, or *cdhiṣṭhāna*, is of three kinds : *mudrā*, the finger signs ; *dhāraṇī*, secret verses ; and *yoga*. *Mudrā* is the instrument to realize the union of bodies (*kāya-karma* and *kāya-guhya*) ; *dhāranī* is the instrument to realize the union of voices (*vāk-karma* and *vāg-gyhya*) ; and *uoga* is the instrument to realize the union of minds (*manah-karma* and *mano-guhya*). Kūkai therefore says, "*Kaji* is the [union of the] Buddha's great compassion and the faith of all beings".[11]

Summary : *Tathatā* was examined in terms of the six elements, which constitute the body of Mahāvairocana ; the four maṇḍalas, which constitute the marks of Mahāvairocana; and the three secrets, which constitute the function of Mahāvairocana. *Kaji*, which includes the practice of *mudrā*, *dhāranī* and *yoga*, is the instrument to bring about the integration of man and Dharmakaya Mahāvairocana. Shingon, however, conceives of another means to realize this integration—A–ji meditation—which we shall now examine.

II. A-Ji Meditation

A-ji, derived from the Sanskrit *ādi* meaning 'primordial' is a Japanese compound made up of 'A', the basic vowel, and *ji* meaning syllable. A-ji means the syllable 'A'. A-ji is one of the objects of Shingon meditation.[12] It is treated in detail in the

Mahāvatrocana Śūtra and in the *Bodhicitta Sāstra*.

The *Mahāvairocana Sūtra* says, "What is the Mantra Dharma? It is the teaching of the syllable 'A'".[13] A-ji symbolizes the *bīja* of Dharmakāya Mahāvairocana. 'A' has two meanings : it is a sign of negation, symbolizing emptiness; it is a sign of all-pervasiveness, symbolizing the source of all things. It is the embodiment of emptiness and co-arising. In 'A' is contained the essence of the middle path. But meditation on a given syllable is not an invention of Shingon, for it also can be found in non-Shingon literature. For example, the *Gaṇḍavyūha*[14] and *Prajña-pāranüta Sūtra*[15] make reference to the forty-two syllable *dhāranī*, beginning from 'A', the *Ta chih-tu lun*[16] says that the forty-two syllables are the basis of all words; and San-lun and T'ien-t'ai describe the forty-two stages of bodhisattva practices based upon the forty-two syllables. 'A', symbolizing emptiness, is conceived as the source of all things in much of Mahāyāna literature.

In Shingon, 'A' is the symbol for Dharmakāya Mahāvairocana. It is defined as the source of all things, emptiness, and non-origination. It is the source of all things because 'A' represents the fundamental nature of co-arising; it is emptiness because the nature contributing to co-arising is empty; it is non-origination because *tathatā* is the 'middle', that is, the absence of the two extremes, being and non-being. These three definitions represent the attributes of emptiness : the first describes its positive attribute, the second its negative, and the third the synthesis of the first two.

A-ji meditation is designed to produce three kinds of insights : a) that all dharmas arise due to conditions, and as such they are conventional designations; b) that because they are conventional designations they are not true reality but empty of true reality; and c) that true reality is the embodiment of being (revealed conventionally) and non-being (empty of an essence). In other words, A-ji meditation is designed to enable its practitioner to realize that reality is a flux, not to be conceived in any fixed conceptual categories. The 'middle' is the cognitive dimension from which the being (co-arising) and its essential nature (emptiness) are realized as inseparable entities of total existence. The 'middle' unfreezes all forms of categorical concepts, negates extreme views (being and non-being), and enables the realization of ultimate reality, which is *tathatā*. Hence Shingon claims that all things are distilled in 'A' and from 'A' emerge all things. But among the three definitions, the most fundamental is the third, 'non-origination' (*akāra-ādyanutpāda* or *anutpāda)*. *Anutpāda* precludes the notion of the first principle or the first cause.

Because *anutpāda* is one of the fundamental concepts in Shingon, many commentaries have been written on it. The most representative of these are perhaps the writings of Kakuban (also known as Kōkyō Daishi, 1095-1143), the founder of neo-Shingon. He dealt with the subject in considerable detail in his works, such as the *A-ji hishaku* (The Secret Inter-pretation of A-ji), the *A ji kan* (A-ji Meditation), and others.[17] Kakuban's basic premise is that dharmas are due to the law of co-arising; as such they are essentially empty of an essence but are nonetheless conventionally real. The 'middle', which is the synthesis doctrine prominent in much of Mahāyāna literature, is Kakuban's rational basis for describing *anutpāda*. He says that *anutpāda* is synonymous with :

(*a*) The mind (*citta*, *i.e.* the container of impressions and experiences) : the

embodiment of the cause of enlightement, the roots of compassion, and the instrument to realize enlightenment.

(*b*) Dharmakāya : the embodiment of *sambhogakāya* (one who as gained insight into emptiness) and *nirmāṇakāya* (one who reveals the nature of emptiness through skill-in-means).

(*c*) The secret body (kāya-guhya) : the embodiment of *vag*-and *mano-guhya*, that is, the marks and the function of *tathatā*.

Kakuban attempted to portray the world of the union of all forms of diversity as conceived by the human consciousness rationally. That is, because the union of diversity is based on the middle path doctrine, union itself is a world beyond conceptual thought as of being and non-being : it is non-beingness conceived through insight into the nature of emptiness. Kakuban affirmed phenomenal reality but recognized the emptiness of the dharmas that contribute to this type of reality-description. Kakuban also attempted to portray the world of the union soteriologically. In this context, *anutpāda* is a realm of the non-creatable and the non-destructible, it is also the eternal realm, because eternity is the non-creatable and the non-destructible ; Hence A-ji is the source of all things and all things develop from it. Regardless of approaches to describing A-ji, 'A' is the Shingon symbol for *tathatā*. It is Dharmakāya, and Dharmakāya does not exist apart from man, for it is a world reflected upon the mind of man.

Inasmuch as A-ji meditation adequately describes *tathatā*—the idea germane to it being already discussed in Mahāyāna literature—why then did Kūkai consider it necessary to formulate the six-element theory in addition to A-ji meditation? Historically, *anutpāda* is identified as a verbal symbol for marklessness (*alakṣaṇa*), no essence (*asvabhāva*) and emptiness (*śūnyatā*), terms that characterize Mādhyamika. Kakuban's A-ji interpretation is in fact a projection of Śubhākarasiṃha's thought, which follows the Mādhyamika dialectic pattern. To contend with the more positive world-description presented by the major schools of Chinese Ekayāna—T'ient'al and Hau-yen, for example—Kūkai evidently felt it necessary to articulate a more positive interpretation of the middle path doctrine. Hence, in addition to the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra*, which is Mādhyamika-oriented, he incorporated the *Tattvasamgraha Sūtra*, which is Yogācāra-oriented. From the latter, he derived the doctrinal basis for the six-element theory the integration of the 'knower' and the 'known'. But the six-element theory does not contradict the Mādhyamika thesis, just as Yogācāra does not contradict Mādhyamika thesis: integration is possible because of co-arising, the central theme of Mādhyamika, because the mind itself is essentially markless, lacking an essence and empty.

Actually, the two basic sūtra-sources of Shingon are the *Mahāvairocana* and the *Tattvasamgraha*. The former represents the Mādhyamika and the latter the Yogācāra doctrinal bases of Shingon. But following the model of the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith*, Kūkai incorporated the two major systems of Mahāyāna philosophy, interpreted them symbolically and conceived the six-element theory. Doctrinally, there is no difference whatsoever between the six-element theory and the contents of A-ji meditation.

III. The Honji-Kaji Controversy: What is Mahāvairocana?

We have established that the six-element theroy, following the Mādhyamika line of thought, and A-ji meditation, following the Yogācāra line of thought, are designed to realize *tathatā*. *Tathatā*, in the Shingon context, is personified as Mahāvairocana, and Mahāvairocana in turn is identified as Dharmakāya. We are now prepared to deal with the most crucial issue facing Shingon. Shingon is a doctrine that reveals the realm of Dharmakāya Mahāvairocana; it is also the teaching by Dharmakāya Mahāvairocana. The first needs no further explanation, as it has already been dealt with in terms of the six elements and A-ji meditation. The second does. Because Shingon Mikkyō conceives *saṃbhogakāya*, *nirmāṇakāya* and *niṣyandakāya* as attributes of Dharmakāya Māhavairocana, Dharmakāya Mahavairocana is described variously as *svabhāva-Dharmakāya* (Dharmakāya *per se*), *sambhoga-Dharmakāya*, *nirmāna-Dharmakāya* and *niṣyanda-Dharmakāya*. The specific question we now face is, which form of Dharmakāya reveals the secret doctrine? This question requires an examination of the terms *honji* and *kaji*.

Honji is a compound of *hon* and *ji*. *Hon* means 'fundamental'. *Ji* (not to be confused with *ji* in A-ji) literally means 'earth', symbolically conceived as the source of all things. *Honji* therefore means the 'fundamental nature' of all things. It signifies the ground on which all things are dependent for their existence. *Honji* is frequently followed by another term, *suijaku*. *Suijaku* means 'trace', the phenomenal manifestation of the fundamental nature. *Kaji* is the Shingon version of *suijaku*. It is man's instrument to realize union.

As a system of Japanese Buddhist thought, Chapter Sixteen of the *Lotus Sūtra* (in the Chinese translation) forms the basis for the development of the *honji-suijaku* theory. It speaks of the Eternal Buddha, who is conceived as *honji*, and the historical Buddha, who is conceived as *suijaku*, the emanation of the Eternal Buddha. In the course of Buddhism's contact with Shinto deities, whom the masses worshipped, Japanese folk religion conceived Buddhas and bodhisattvas as appearing in this world, in the form of Shinto deities, to save all beings. The Buddhas and bodhisattvas were conveniently referred to as *honji* bodies and Shinto deities as the emanation of the *honji* bodies, that is *suijaku*, as for example in the case of Hachiman, a Shinto deity. Thus, in the context of the history of Japanese religion, the *honji-suijaku* theory contributed to develop Buddhist Shinto syncretism and it provided the ground for the assimilation of Buddhist thought on a folklore level.

Historically, the term *honji-suijaku* is found in the *Iwashimizu-monsho* (The Iwashimizu Letters), dated, 937. But Murayama Shūichi refers to a passage, dated 698, in the *Zoku nihongi* (The latter Chronicles of Japan) in which he sees a semblance of a *honji-suijaku* phenomenon.[18] He warns, rightly, that it is necessary to investigate still earlier documents or religious phenomena to see the beginnings of Buddhist-Shinto syncretism. The fact remains that Prince Shōtoku (d. 622) employs the term *honji-suijaku* in his alleged composition, the *Shōman gyō gishō* (A Commentary on the Śrīmālādevī-siṃhanāda-sūtra),[19] though, as can be expected, the term in the context of this Buddhist text is not associated with religious syncretism at all. It refers to the bodhisattvas, who represent the embodiment of the True Dharma and the emanation of the Eternal Buddha.

In Shingon, the *honji* body refers to the essential nature of Dharmakāya, that is *svabhāva-Dharmakāya*, while the *kaji* body refers to the manifested body, that is the practitioner whose purpose is to realize the essential nature of Dharmakāya. Thus we can see that the *honji-kaji* controversy, in the case of Shingon, stems from the interpretation of Mahāvairocana, the central issue on which the Shingon schism took place.

Śubhākarasiṃha's *Commentary on the Mahāvairocana Sūtra* says, "The Bhagavān is the Mahāvairocana, the essential nature of Dharmakāya".[20] It also says, "At this time the Bhagavān, because of his past compassion-vow, becomes mindful of this : 'If I were to dwell only in this [*honji*] realm, in the self-abiding, super-power of *adhisthāna-samādhi*".[21] The first passage identifies Mahāvairocana as *honji*, the latter as *kaji*. Orthodox Shingon claims that Dharmakāya Mahāvairocana is *honji* (whose essential nature is *svabhāva-Dharmakāyc*) and that his attributes (*sambhoga-Dharmakāya, nirmānar-Dharmakāya* and *niṣyanda-Dharmakāya*) represent his *kaji* bodies. *Honji* is identified as the six elements, and *kaji* bodies as the marks (the four maṇḍalas) and function (the three secrets) of Dharmākya Mahavairocana. But neo-Shingon claims that Dharmakāya Mahavairocana *per se* is the embodiment of both *honji* and *kaji* : it presupposes that svabhāva-Dharmakāya is empty of body, marks and function, and that only through its attributes can the body, marks and function be revealed.

Many Shingon masters have taken part in the *honji-kaji* debate. Hōju's (1722-1800) *Himitsu innen kangen söjö-gi* (The Meaning of the Secret Doctrine) is among the most interesting because it presents a synthesis of the two views.[22] He derives the basis for synthesis from the Kegon (Hua-yen) theory of 'all-in-one and one-in-all', which is one of Kegon descriptions of Dharmadhātu. This theory sees the essence of Dharmadhātu ('one', *i.e.*, the universal one) in the diversity ('all' *i.e.*, the parts of the universal one) of forms, and the essence of the diversity (all') in the all-encompassing Dharmadhātu ('one'). 'One' refers to emptiness, 'all' refers to co-arising. Though this theory contradicts the basis of Western philosophy (*e.g.* theories of dualism as presented by Anaxagoras, Plato and Aristotle), it bears distinct similarity to Spinoza's notion of *deus sive nature*. 'One-in-all' sees the essence of emptiness pervading all forms, and 'all-in-one' sees all forms integrated within the organic content of emptiness. At any rate, in the Shingon context, the 'one-in-all' is the basis of meditation to realize *prajñā*, while 'all in-one' is the basis for the practice of compassion, the improvising of skill-in-means to communicate the 'one' essence to 'all'. The two are not distinct and apart. They are inter-dependent and non-dual. The six-element theory is the Shingon's 'all-in-one' interpretation of the organic world of Dharmakāya Mahāvairocana.

Doctrinally, therefore, Hōju identified the *Mahāvairoccna Sūtra* as the basis for the 'one-in-all' theory and the *Tattvasaṃgraha Sūtra* as the basis for the 'all in-one' theory. Technically, the former is a description of the unconditioned world (*asaṃskṛta-dharma*) while the latter is a description of the conditioned world (*saṃskṛta-dharma*). The 'one-in-all' is the doctrinal basis for the *honji* theory while the 'all-in-one' is the doctrinal basis for the *kaji* theory.

But the object of the *honji-kaji* controversy is a question of whether *svabhāva-Dharmakāya* is the *honji* body (enlightenment *per se*) or the embodiment of *honji* and *kaji*. We now return to the initial question : who is the communicator of the secret doctrine—the *honji* body as orthodox Shingon maintains, or the *kaji* body as

neo-Shingon maintains?

The *kaji* body theory destroys the basis of Shingon doctrine, since Shingon identifies the body of Mahāvairocana with the six elements, his marks with the four maṇḍalas, and his function with the three secrets, which, according to orthodox Shingon, are the manifested attributes of Mahāvairocana. Orthodox Shingon claims that *svabhāva-Dharmakāya* itself, not its attributes, possesses the capability of communication. Nevertheless, the communicator (*svabhāva-Dharmakāya*) and the object to which the Dharma is communicated (sentient beings) are two different entities. Even with the assumption that the Dharma (Dharmakāya Mahāvairocana) is the communicator, the Dharma is the embodiement of enlightenment. The Dharma is beyond the reach of sentient beings. Dharma reaches the realm of sentient beings only through *saṃbhogakāya* and *nirmāṇakāya* (and in the case of the four body theory, *niṣyandakāya*). But this is the Kengyō position as held, for example, by T'ient-t'ai. Neo-Shingon therefore recognizes that together with *honji*, *kāji* is also inherent in the Dharma. As is now apparent, the intensity with which the *honji-kāji* controversy was debated essentially led Shingon doctrinal masters away from Kūkai's major thesis—the integration of man and Dharmakāya mahāvairocana. The controversy centering on *honji* and *kaji*, the major issues which led to the orthodox neo-Shingon schism, is based on a methodological premise that is contrary to the basic Shingon tenet. Let us now investigate this matter.

First, though the *honji-suijaku* represents a Buddhist theory of assimilation, as Alicia Matsunaga claims,[23] it is so only to the extent that this theory can be employed to interpret the sophisticated philosophical contents of Buddhism on a folklore level. It cannot be employed to interpret the actual philosophical contents of Buddhism, such as the notions of emptiness and co-arising, which preclude the conceptual categories of either dualism or monism. Second, in Buddhism, *honji-suijaku* is a means to describe the attributes of the bodhisattvas. As such, *kāji*, the instrument of integrating man and Mahāvairocana, is radically different in its contents, philosophically as well as in the implementation of that philosophical thought in terms of practice, from what the *haji-suijaku* theory conceived on a folklore level attempts to do—an attempt to interpret Buddhism on a folklore level. Hence, the arbitrary categories of *honji* and *kaji*, as these terms are understood in the context of folk religion cannot be employed to describe the nature of Mahāvairocana, because, as said before, Mahāvairocana transcends all notions of dualism. The schism between orthodox and neo-Shingon is based upon this misconception. However, granting that Mahāvairocana transcends all notions of dualism, still is it possible for the Dharmakāya *per se* to reveal the Dharma? More specifically, is a personified Dharma, as is Mahāvairocana, a logical possibility in the context of Buddhist thought? Shingon Mikkyō responds in the affirmative, based upon its supposition that Dharmakāya—the body of Dharmadhātu—is a living organism with distinct form, sound and mind, in the same context that man, the microcosm of Dharmakāya Mahāvairocana, is a living organic entity. Kengyō, however, disclaims the Shingon Mikkyō theory of the personified Dharma. The Kengyō-Mikkyō controversy concerning Dharmakāya Mahāvairocana, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.[24]

FOOTNOTES

1. *Taishō shinshū daizō-kyō* (hereafter abbreviated as *T.*) 32.1666, p. 575b..
2. *T.* 18.1848, p. 9b. Also see pp. 13, 19, 31, 38, etc.
3. Kūkai describes the six-element theory in his *Sokushin jōbutsu-gi*, *T.* 77.2428, pp. 381c-382c.
4. Franklin Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit*, Vol. II (Dictionary), Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1953, p. 416.
5. Toganoo Shōun, *Mandara no kenkyū*, Naigai Press, Kyoto, 1927, pp. 1-2.
6. Ideas germane to the theory of the four maṇḍalas are found in texts Kūkai makes reference to, as for example: *Mahāvairocana Sūtra*, *T.* 18.848, p. 44a; *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*, *T.* 19.1004, p. 610. The four maṇḍalas are treated in details in Kūkai's *Sokushin jōbutsu-gi*, pp. 382c-383c; *Hizō-hōyaku*, *T.* 77. 2426, pp. 363a-b, 373a; etc.
7. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit* (Dictionary), p. 565.
8. Toganoo, *Mandara no kenkyū*, p. 263.
9. The three secrets are treated in detail in *Sokushin Jōbutsu-gi*, pp. 373c-374a. Also see *Mahāvairocana Sūtra*, p. 30, for the basis of the three secret theory.
10. For details on *kaji* (*adhisthāna*), see *Dainichi-kyō kaidai* in *Kōbō Daishi Zenshū* (Collection), Vol. IV, comp., Center of Mikkyo Cultural Studies of Kōya-san University, Naigai shuppan, Kyoto, 1965, p. 686.
11. *Sokushin jōbutsu-gi*, p. 383c.
12. A-ji meditation is treated in many Shingon texts. For a comprehensive bibliography on the subject, see *Mikkyō dai-jiten*. Vol. I, comp. and ed., Matsunaga Shōdō, Naigai Press, Kyoto, 1931, pp. 17c-20a.
13. *Mahāvairocana Sūtra*, p. 10.
14. *Gaṇḍavyūha Sūtra*, *T.* 9,278, p. 765.
15. *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*, *T.* 8.223, p. 256.
16. *Ta chi-tu lun*, *T.* 25.1509, p. 408.
17. For an interpretive account of Kakuban's A-ji meditation in modern Japanese, see Kusuda Ryōko, *Shingon Mikkyō seiritsu katei no kenkyū*, Sankibo, Tokyo, 1969, pp. 201 ff. For Kakuban's reform movement, see Matsunaga Yūkei, *Mikkyō no rekishi*, Heiraku-ji shoten, Kyoto, 1969, pp. 224-228.
18. *Nihon bunka jiten*, comp. and ed., Kawasaki Yasuyuki, Morisue Yoshiaki, *et. al.*, Asakura shoten, 1964. See "honji-suijaku," pp. 666-667.
19. *Shōmangyō-gishō*, Hōryūji edition, 1940, pp. 1a, 5b, etc.
20. *Commentary on the Mahāvairocana Sūtra*, *T.* 39. 1796, p. 580.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 598.
22. A summary of Hōju's ideas on *honji-kaji* issue is presented by Takagami Kakushō *Mikkyō gairon*, Dai-ich shōbō, Tokyo, 1942, pp. 158-161.
23. Alicia Matsunaga, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Assimilation*, Sophia University and Charles E. Tuttle, Co., Vermont and Tokyo, 1969, pp. 1-3.
24. Those interested to see how modern Japanese Buddhologists treat this controversial issue are invited to examine, for example, Ui Hakuju, *Bukkyo hanron*, Iwanami shoten, Tokyo, 1947, Vol. I (First Edition), pp. 90-91, in which this eminent Buddhologist challenges the Shingon theory of the personified Dharma. Nasu Seiryū, an eminent Shingon scholar, responds to Ui (and others) and defends the Shingon position, in "Dainichi-kyō no kyōshi ni tsuite", see *Chizan Gakuhō*, No. 66, Feb., 1954, pp. 2-23.

9

The Writing of Buddhist History in the Sherpa Area of Nepal

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HOW DOES ONE, how should one write the history of Buddhism of a particular area, at a given moment in time? These questions seem relevant in a symposium devoted to a cross-cultural study of the History of Buddhism. So, I hope you will pardon me if I talk to you of my own experience when promoting the composition of a History of Buddhism in the Sherpa area of Nepal between 1969 and 1971 A.D. As you doubtless know, the geographical area in question lies at the foot of Mount Everest and covers some pretty rugged terrains. The present population is around 30,000, half of whom are non-Sherpa groups such as Magar, Rai, Tamang, Chetri, Kami, Newar, etc. . . . The Sherpa population is, apparently, composed of four main elements :

1. Descendants of four clans that crossed the border southwards from Tibet across the Snang-pa la around 1533 A.D., but whose original ancestors came from Khams, some 1300 miles away to the East.

2. Descendants of sub-clans that split off, in the course of time, from the four initial clans.

3. Descendants of individuals from Nepalese caste-groups who moved in from the West from around 1850 A.D. onwards, married into Sherpa families and settled principally in Pharak, which lies between Khumbu and Solu.

4. About 1200 so-called Khumbus who came over the border from the North during the past four or five generations : these include many elements from Sding-ri, some from Mustang and Manang and very few from Khams itself. Until twenty years ago, the local Sherpa educational system was entirely monastic and no statistics concerning literacy in Tibetan are available.

In 1971, a Sherpa lama, Sangs-rgyas bstan-'dzin, and I published a volume that came out in Europe under the French title *Documents pour l'étude de la religion et de l'organisation sociale des Sherpa.*[1] This volume contained the photographic

*See in Footnotes, on page 131.

reproduction of three Tibetan manuscripts that we had composed conjointly. These are :

1. a *rnam-thar*, that is an "autobiography", of Sangs-rgyas bstan-'dzin.
2. a *chos-'byung*, that is to say a "history of Buddhism", with particular reference to the Sherpa area.
3. a *mes-rabs*, a title which, for practical purposes, I shall translate as "the succession of the ancestors".[2] Before we compiled this volume, there existed no History of Sherpa Buddhism in the Tibetan language, a dialect of which is the lingua-franca of Solu-Khumbu. In his book *The Sherpas of Nepal, Buddhist Highlanders*, published in London in 1964,[3] Ch. von Fürer-Haimendorf had used practically no written Sherpa documents and seemingly had discovered little legendary material. However, the first volume to come from the German Khumbu Himal project marked a great step forward in knowledge, for it brought to light important new written materials. Five documents in Nepali concerning Sherpa relations with the Nepalese Govt. between 1791 and 1853 A.D. along with fourteen Sherpa documents in Tibetan were translated into German and analysed in Michael Oppitz's *Geschichte und Sozialordnung der Sherpa*, which was published in Munich in 1968.[4] Unfortunately, this book contained none of the original Tibetan texts, not even in transliteration; so the originals could not be examined by Tibetologists or Tibetans. Moreover, as the book was written in German, its contents remained a dead letter to practically every Sherpa when Sangs-rgyas bstan-'dzin and I started to work together in August, 1969.

Although the 100 bound copies of our work published at Nanterre in 1971 do contain a very short preface in French about how the volume was written, the 200 un-bound copies sent to Sherpa country do not contain any such account. So I shall tell you something of our motives, something about how we collected our sources, what these were, and how we used them. In conclusion, I shall make a few remarks about the difficulties one has to face in this kind of history-writing, and the kind of problems of communication it raises.

First, a word about our motives and what might be called our qualifications. Sangs-rgyas bstan-'dzin is today 51, a year younger than I. He was born in Solu at Brag-mtho sbug in 1924, was educated locally and then went to Tibet. He spent eight years in Khams, in particular at Rdzogs-chen and Zhe-chen monasteries[5] where he studied deeply under various Rnying-ma pa masters. At the age of 33 he returned to Solu and founded what was to become the present Bshad-sgrub zung-'brel gling monastery at Ser-log, near Junbesi. I think one might describe him as a very learned scholar in the tradition of Mi-pham and Padma rnam-rgyal. He knows Nepali from birth but knows no English and refuses to learn it, maintaining that if one knows English one wastes much time reading things that have nothing to do with religion. He has had problems all his life because of his modest social origin, his consequent lack of riches and the fact that he is not a reincarnation (*sprul sku*). He tends to be treated as a village lama, a country cousin if not a bumpkin, by the great men from Lhasa. Being both interested by, and involved in, the spread of Buddhism among the Sherpas, to compose or even to copy a work of Buddhist history was meritorious in his eyes. So he had little hesitation when I suggested we work together.

For my own part, I had gone to Nepal in 1969 somewhat dissatisfied both with my previous experience as an anthropologist (where the role of outside observer seemingly

transformed the researcher into some sort of "voyeur" troubled by methodological obsessions to be shared with a few colleagues in distant parts of the globe)[6] and as a philologist (to edit a Tibetan text and to translate it correctly into a European language seemed an activity that had little bearings on the lives of today's Tibetans).[7] What I wanted to do in 1969 was to use my training to write a book not so much about Tibetans as for them. Instead of taking something from their culture, in order to build myself an academic reputation—whether good or bad—elsewhere, I wanted to contribute something to their culture with the tools of my trade. Perhaps naïvely, I wanted to try to establish a communication link, not so much between one western research worker and his chosen field, as between reputable aspects of my own culture (the study of History and the study of Anthropology, for example) and similar features in Tibetan culture (the study of Religion and the study of History).

However this may be, when we set to work to collect documents for writing on the Sherpa area, we started more or less from scratch. Hunting out local documents occupied most of my own time, but I was helped considerably by a Sherpa pupil of Sangs-rgyas bstan-'dzin. Much cunning was necessary. Generally, because of jealousy between lamas or suspicion of my motives, it was unwise to try to explain what we were doing and we were careful never to say publicly that we were working together. Sherpas are used to climbers, to doctors, to trekkers and to hippies, and are quick to divide westerners by reference to known categories : I soon became known locally as the "lama saheb". Sometimes, I copied documents in romanization, sometimes I lent them and could show them (be unknown to their owner) to Sangs-rgyas bstan-'dzin who, during this period, never moved out of the *dgon-pa*. I did not buy outright any documents.

What were the documents collected? Apart from the printed biographies of the Rdza rong phu and Khumbu lamas, which are easy to come by[8], we collected *mi-rabs* (family genealogies) and *mes-rabs* (clan or sub-clan genealogies); *lung-yig* (short and very difficult texts describing particular areas and concerned primarily with points of litigation over land-ownership, and irrigation and grazing rights); *dkar chag(s)* of monasteries (besides information about books, these sometimes include a colophon that gives details of foundation and repair dates, as well as information about individual lamas). Further information was obtained from *slong-yig*; these "letters of request" often provide a very interesting list of subscribers to monastery works. We also consulted numerous *thob-yig*; these contain lists of disciplines, precepts, and consecrations obtained by an individual, and state from whom exactly these were taken. Another source were *gnas-yig* "descriptions of places" : for instance I was able to copy two *gnas-yig* of Mkhan-pa lung, a somewhat mysterious *sbas-yul*, a "hidden country" to the south-east of Everest,[9] and collect references to Rol-ba gling, a very real Sherpa valley which lies to the west of Thang-smad.[10] I also obtained a romanized copy of the *Rus-yig*, "the book of bones" of which much use had been made by the German team. Sangs-rgyas bstan-'dzin had never seen the manuscript of the *Rus-yig* and was delighted when I read it back to him from my notebook : up till that moment he had never really believed in the virtues of the Western system of transliterating Tibetan. We also consulted a certain number of external Tibetan texts, general histories of Buddhism, biographies of Rnying-ma pa lamas and figures of the church such as Thang-ston rgyal-po. All this, as you can imagine, formed a jumble

of material of differing values, which had to be read critically and reduced to a literary form.

Among the literary forms of expression open to us, we opted without much discussion for the genres of *chos-'byung* and *mes-rabs*; but it was only most reluctantly that Sangs-rgyas bstan-'dzin consented to write his own *rnam-thar*. He said he was too young, had done too little and that anyway everyone knew him locally. It seemed to me necessary, however, that foreign readers should know something of his life, his travels, his training in Tibet, so as to be in a better position to evaluate his work.

The *chos-'byung*, which covers folios 15 to 123 of the volume, was itself divided into three sections. The first section (fol. 18-47) is based on oral tradition (*lo-rgyus khar brgyud*) and this is clearly emphasized in the text on fol. 18. This seemed the only honest way of presenting the material in view of the almost complete lack of events that can be dated with certainty locally prior to 1900 A.D. Sangs-rgyas bstan-'dzin had the same difficulty. I had separating out "stories" and "histories" and never suggested that the legends we collected about the founding lamas formed some superior form of truth. He felt, as I did, that these legends do account in a very credible manner for the state of affairs that existed prior to 1924. The legends concerning the successors of Gsang-ba rdo-rje, the first great Buddhist figure in Khumbu, and in particular the protracted struggle between the lama Ser-pa and the lama Dgon-pa, show clearly that it was by displays of magical powers that the Rnying-ma-pa lamas established and confirmed their authority over the minds of the local people. These stories recall the contest between Mi-la ras-pa and the Bon-po on Mount Kailash as well as the magical disputes between rival *jhākris* in present-day Nepal.[11] They are very much the kind of tales, full of earthy humour and rapid changes of style and pace, that Sherpas love to tell when explaining the "traces" (*phyag-rjes* on some natural rock formation)—of the passage of Padmasambhava. Exactly as in the proto-exploits of Padmasambhava, the Sherpa founding lamas vanquished the local spirits and transformed their dwellings into strongholds of the Buddhist order. The very countryside became Buddhist, its geography re-named when sanctified by their victories.

The second section (fol. 47-97) of the *chos-'byung* is based on the *thob-yig*. The section begins by recalling the origins of the Rnying-ma-pa, the only sect that has taken real root in Sherpa country. For the general history of the Rnying-ma-pa, one can of course consult innumerable volumes in Tibetan, but two of the most useful recent publications which we had at hand were Bdud 'jom rin-po-che's accounts of the history and doctrine of the Rnying-ma-pas, printed at Kalimpong in 1967 A.D.[12] Simple lists of transmissions of religious teachings constitute by themselves fairly arduous reading for a Tibetan as for a Westerner, so to enliven this section we introduced biographical details on lamas whenever we were sure of them. The second section ends with a few pages (fol. 89-97), included at my request, concerning Sherpa religious customs, that is to say the ceremonies enacted at birth, marriage and death, and in cases of sickness; and we included a few lines on annual and periodical festivals. Western readers have since told me that they found these pages too short, they wanted more details. Sherpa have told me that they were of no interest, as they dealt with things that are of common place. My own view is that ethnography, that is to say, the context in which we were writing, was already pretty well-known to the West through the works of Haimendorf, Oppitz, Funke, Schmidt-Thomé and T.T. Thingo,[13] and that there was

little reason for us to write at greater length on these topics.[14]

The third section of the *chos-'byung* (fol. 97-123) is based on Sangs-rgyas bstan-'dzin's experience in his own lifetime. It gives an account of the foundation of several monasteries from 1936 onwards. In each case we gave information about dates of foundations, details concerning the founding lamas, the patrons (*sbyin-bdag*), the lamas who consecrated the buildings, some notes on the bronze and wooden statues, the stūpas (*mchod-rten*), and the contents of the library. It is useful to everyone from East or West to know where there is, or atleast was, a *Rin-chen gter-mdzod* or a *Rnying-ma'i rgyud-'bum*. For the situation bookwise has changed very considerably since David Snellgrove first visited the area and described the rituals at Spyi-dbang dgon-pa;[15] there are in fact few books left today in many Sherpa *dgon-pas*. Most have very regrettably been moved to Western libraries.

I shall pause here to describe an example of how critical we were about our materials. I have already spoken of the *Rus yig*, parts of which my friend Michael Oppitz thinks are 400 years old. I beg to doubt this. My copy, made from the manuscript which Ngag-dbang tshe-brtan holds in his hands in the photo on page 35 of Oppitz's book, includes the sentence which states that the manuscript was written by a certain Karma Gzung. Both Sangs-rgyas bstan-'dzin and I were fascinated by the entire manuscript and spent hours discussing it. We did not find confirmation of the role in the Sherpa past which the manuscript attributes to Thang-stong rgyal-po; and Sangs-rgyas bstan-'dzin knew that Karma Gzung was a sarcastic, practical joker who lived 30 or so years ago in Solu. So the manuscript called *Rus-yig* may in fact be a splendid modern example of a *gter-ma*, a hidden treasure destined to be discovered by future generations and interpreted according to their wont. However this may be, we mentioned this manuscript and its contents in our book (fol. 25), while pointing out that it does not tally with other Sherpa document that describe the same sequence of events.

The last part of the *Documents I*, that is to say the *mes-rabs*, starts with a classic Buddhist description of the formation of the universe. It begins by a cosmogony; it explains how the universe took shape, the origin of different forms of life, of men, of the stars. It goes on to describe what certain anthropologists would call the passage from Nature to Culture. It tells of the first king, then moves on to the origin of the Tibetans (fol. 141-148) and of the Khams-pas (fol. 149-155). It tells of the emigration from Khams of those who were to become the Sherpas, migration provoked, it is said, by the incessant military campaigns, in the lands of Hor and Sog, of Gesar of Gling. The text describes the arrival in Khumbu, which was then an empty land, *lung stong mi med-pa*. An explanation of various etymologies of the word "Sher-pa" is followed by details of the founding members of the Sherpa clans and their descendants : Thim-mi, Ser-pa, Lcag-pa, Mi-nyag-pa. Details also are given of the sub-clans, which are called in Sherpa speech *rus-chung* or *rus-lag*, and which split off from the four main clans, and go by the names of Za-la-sga, Khams-pa-can, Sgo-bar-ma, etc...The final part of the *mes-rabs* describes the origin and development of Sherpa material culture; the birds and the beasts met with, the introduction of houses, furniture and clothing; eating habits and sleeping habits, agriculture, stock-raising and the Sherpa move towards the South, which was eventually blocked by Nepalese military domination.

I should add that the work we did together included the making of a large map that indicates all the religious foundations mentioned in the text. Unfortunately this

map—a rather grand name for a cross between a sketch and a plan—could not be published along with the Tibetan texts. I hope to publish it along with the annotated French translation of the entire first volume, which I am at present preparing. When this second volume appears, it will certainly be easier for Westerners to take a more balanced over-all view of our work.

Some time after the publication of the first volume of the *Documents*, my Norwegian colleague, Per Kvaerne, drew my attention to an article in which Wilfred Cantwell Smith had written that "it is the business of comparative religion to construct statements about religion that are intelligible within atleast two traditions simultaneously".[16] It was indeed a statement of this type that Sangs-rgyas bstan-'dzin and I, who were, at the time, both ignorant of Smith's article, had tried to make. Whatever our failings and shortcomings, I think that we atleast succeeded in being instructive within two traditions simultaneously. Sherpa readers, who will not be troubled by the *form* in which our texts are written, will, I think, recognise themselves in Sangs-rgyas bstan-'dzin's prose and learn a lot of things about themselves and their past that they did not know. They may dispute what is written about the relative roles of certain lamas; they may point out gaps and underline mistakes; and they will undoubtedly say that the text gives too optimistic a picture of the present state of Buddhism in the Sherpa area, where men today, and women too, are more preoccupied with material than spiritual problems. The Western reader, on the other hand, will be troubled by the form in which we chose to express ourselves ; and to be intelligible to Westerners, I shall have to add many explanatory notes—on book titles, on names and sites of monasteries, on Buddhist technical terms—which Sangs-rgyas bstan-'dzin could dispense with when addressing a Tibetan-educated, Buddhist public. Yet, however badly I succeed in my translation, the Westerner who already knows something of Lamaism and Sherpa culture may still learn something from it about the Rnying-ma-pa movement in Solu-Khumbu. For, by and large, apart from G. Tucci's admirable pages on doctrine in the German "Religions of Humanity" volume concerned with Tibet and Mongolia[17], the only coherent account in a European language of the intellectual evolution of the Rnying-ma-pa movement is, to my knowledge, that *gter-ston chen-po* Gene Smith's English preface to *The Autobiographical Reminiscences of Ngag dbang Dpal bzang, late Abbot of Kaḥ-thog monastery*, published at Gangtok, Sikkim, in 1969. And I doubt whether that book is in many Western libraries or book-stores.

I also believe that our contribution was positive for Westerners inasmuch as we provided more solid background material than existed previously for cultural comparisons with other southern pockets of Tibetan culture such as Dolpo, Mustang, etc. Up to a point, we seem also to have gotten over the hurdle of satisfying "all the most rigorous demands of scholarship", which was another obstacle set in the path of the historian of religions by Cantwell Smith in the article already quoted.[18] No complaints have as yet been received from pupils at Ser-log dgon-pa, where the book is used for teaching purposes; and our texts have also been used for the teaching of Tibetan at the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations orientales in Paris, a development that I certainly never foresaw when I was in the field.

Certain criticisms have naturally been voiced by readers from both cultures. "Why"—said the Steng-po-che lama—"waste your time writing about these dolts of Sherpas? There are only very few of them and they have never made any important

contribution to Buddhist thought. You were in position to write on Tibet itself, which is a big country with a great Buddhist tradition and you would have been better employed studying that." From western University teachers, I have heard complaints that the book should have contained my autobiography also and that it reveals little of the contents of Sangs-rgyas bstan-'dzin's personal library.

It is very difficult to satisfy the intellectual elites of one culture, let alone two as different as those to be found in France and in Sherpa-land. The communication gap between the two is truly enormous and there is, in more than a literal sense, no common language. For instance, I spent a considerable time trying to explain R.A. Stein's views on Gesar, the hero of the Tibetan epic, to Sangs-rgyas bstan-'dzin.[19] The latter was genuinely astonished that anyone could question the historical reality of Gesar : "But I have seen his statue," he said, "and there are all those manuscripts which you yourself collect, and all the stories sung about Gesar. Whatever your, Stein says, here we all believe that Gesar lived. Could you provide me, in your sense, with the proof that Padmasambhava really lived? And, if not, would this mean that the Snga-'gyur rnying-ma movement was founded on legend"?

Here I feel we should not dodge the difficulty of determining to what extent concepts of history are founded in faith as well as reason. Michael Oppitz may be right that "the concept a society has of history in general determines its own history" and that "the historian is rarely more than the official spokesman of that particular concept."[20] But is it possible to define the Sherpa "concept of history," either in Sherpa terms or by external terms of reference? As an outsider, I would suggest that the past is present for the Sherpa common man in ritual, in the memories of the lamas and their learning, in certain features of the landscape, in a few important man-made buildings (the monasteries and a few great houses); but above all it is present in what is said, what is recounted, from generation to generation, about these activities, places, people and their doings. Looking back, it seems to me no accident that the kind of history we compiled was largely anecdotal and essentially Buddhist. Today, this seems to me not so much the kind of history we should have written, as the only kind that could be written in the context. For instance, it would, I think, be very difficult, if not impossible, to write, say, Sherpa social history from the standpoint of a family or a village. In this respect, one should not let oneself be led astra'y by the example of the *mi-rabs* and the *mes-rabs*. To us, these manuscripts can furnish indications about the past provided we count the number of generations detailed therein and combine the result with present-day demographic statistics, as Oppitz did, very intelligently, in his book. But in Sherpa society these manuscripts are not used in this way; they are consulted locally not as history but as handy manuals for the social, contemporary control of exogamy and the prevention of incest.

From today's standpoint, I view the *Documents I*, as a fairly comprehensive Sherpa narrative, constructed in a small society, which has lived to-date on the margin of the great currents of Buddhist and Hindu expansion. Like any narrative compiled in a society, where orally-transmitted information is the primary source of knowledge and where much knowledge is founded on faith, it gives what can only be a partial view of the past.[21] As such it represents the viewpoint of a highly intelligent lama who is our contemporary. It is not, in the Western sense, a Sherpa history. It is not pitched

on an even, didactic key. It does not contain analysis of those exactly dated, objectively interlocked sequences of events that are, seemingly, so important for the Western mind. But in the West too, where history is no longer oral but printed, the *guru* who does his job does not content himself with telling his pupils to read books. And it is the oral commentary in the East as in the West that breathes new life into the texts at each generation and furnishes the impulsion to their contemporary understanding. Moreover, for a Sherpa, as for a Westerner, certain statements—but not all—require verification. The Sherpa does not question seriously what a lama says about the structure of the universe any more than I question what an atomic physicist tells me about the same subject. For both of us, certain matters are a question of faith, others are not. For instance, both the Sherpa and I would tend to verify a statement about the price of rice very carefully, even if it was made by a lama.

I will end with two remarks of a general nature. Let me say, first, that I do not believe that the kind of collaboration, I achieved with my co-author, would have been possible had I been working in an illiterate tribal society. The anthropologist is seldom a success as a cultural catalyst; and I do not pretend to have invented a *passe partout* method for filling in documentary gaps in local cultures. But what seems worthy of note is, that Sangs-rgyas bstan-'dzin and I could and did collaborate, not only because we spoke the same language, but because we shared a certain literary background of Tibetan texts. Not only did each know what the other was saying; each knew also, to some extent, what the other was talking about. The second point I wish to make derives from the first. In a Tibetan cultural context, if a book survives, it does so not entirely on its own merits, however great these may be, but because somewhere, somehow, it is related to oral tradition and the living heritage. The reasons for its survival are to be sought not only in its content but in the complex paraphernalia of oral traditions that surround it and maintain its meaning, its contemporary cultural relevance. To me it is a sobering thought that the future of our book will depend on what is said about it.

FOOTNOTES

1. Laboratoire d'Ethnologie et de Sociologie comparative, Université de Paris X, Nanterre.

2. For the word *rabs*, see recently R.A. Stein, "*rabs* et composita "récit" et "genre", being Appendice 2 of his article "Du récit au rituel dans les manuscrits tibétains de Touen-houang" in *Etudes Tibétaines dédiées a la mémoire de Marcelle Lalou*, Paris, 1971, pp. 537-545.

3. By John Murray. On p. 18, for instance, one reads : "Traditions and Myths relating to the Sherpas' migration to the regions of Khumbu and Solu and the establishment of the present villages are almost completely lacking". This is the kind of statement an ethnographer who does not know a language is always liable to make.

4. More exactly at Innsbrück-München at Universitätsverlag Wagner Ges. M.B.H., being teil I of the Beiträge zur Sherpa-Forschung.

5. Ru-dam Rdzogs-chen O-rgyan bsamgtan chos-gling was founded in 1685 by a contemporary of the Fifth Dalai lama, Padma rig-'dzin. *Zhe-chen* was founded in 1734 by 'Gyur-med kun-bzang rnam-rgyal. My copy of the *Zhe-chen chos-'byung* was published at Leh in 1971 by T.Y. Tashingangpa under the title *A Concise Historical Account of the Techniques of Esoteric Realisation of the Nyingmapa and other Buddhist Traditions of Tibet*, being the text of *Snga-'gyur rdo-rje theg-pa gtso-bor gyur-pa'i sgrub-brgyud shing-rta brgyad kyi byung-ba brjod-pa'i gtam mdor-bsdus legs bshad padma dkar-po rdzing-bu*. This text was composed by Zhe-chen rgyal-tshab Padma rnam rgyal in 1910. Included along with the *chos-'byung* in the same volume is the *dkar chag* of the collected works in thirteen volumes of Padma rnam rgyal. I have also in my library a manuscript copy of the same author's *gtam tshogs* but have not yet found a publisher for it.

6. Here is what I wrote in the avant-propos to the *Documents* in 1971 : "Sans s'arrêter sur la constatation facile que les idées scientifiques occidentales ne remuent pas beaucoup l' esprit du paysan de Solu-Khumbu (il n'y a pas de commun language), admettons d'emblée que les missions occidentales au Népal se suivent et se ressemblent. Porteuses à l'arrivée d'argent et de médicaments (qui sont, certes, les bienvenus), elles emportent, quelques mois plus tard, vers l'occident, des documents et des idées : connaissances acquises d'une part, perte d'un fragment du patrimoine culturel de l'autre. Par la suite, chacun des participants continuera à s'intéresser à soi-même. Avouons que c'est la une assez méchante forme de troc. Peut-on faire autre chose que d'y participer à son tour? Ce sont, je crois, les écrits de Gene Smith qui m'ont donné le courage de persévérer dans une forme de discours dont on percevra peut-être les premiers balbutiements dans un article paru dans *l'Homme*, janvier-mars 1966, et intitulé "Les Tamang vus par l'un d'eux". Car nul mieux que Gene Smith n'a su cerner les idées préconcues et opposées avec lesquelles le Tibétain et le Tibétologue abordent encore la lectures d'un même texte. Pour ma part, de plus en plus insatisfait d'une ethnologie des orientaux qui ne s'adresse en fin de compte qu'à quelques lecteurs occidentaux hautement spécialisés, j'ai tenté ici un effort réel pour entamer le dialogue avec les Sherpa, c'est á dire fournir un moyen de communication directe entre l'ethnologue et ceux qu'il étudie. Il s'agissait de se plier aux exigences d'une science qui

requiert l'exactitude philologique et le classement ordonné des matériaux et en même temps de fournir, dans un cadre conventionnel, une lecture instructive et pas trop rébarbative aux gens des pays Sherpa. En deux mots, afin d'éviter le voyeurisme distingué, triste héritage de l'esprit colonialiste, qui est la marque de tant de travaux anthropologiques occidentaux, J'ai cherché á provoquer une situation ou les gens, les presmiers intéressés de l'enquête, se racontent dans le contexte de leur vie quotidienne".

7. For instance my *Matériaux pour l'étude de la littérature populaire tibétaine*, Paris, vol. 1, Presses Universitaires de France, 1967 and vol. 2, Klincksieck, 1971. Since the publication of these two volumes, further materials on the *ro-sgrung* have been made available by Dieter Schuh in *Tibetische Handschriften und Blockdrucke Sowie Tonbandaufnahmen tibetischer Erzählungen*, Teil 5, (Verzeichnis der Orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland, Bd. XI, 5), Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1973.

8. *Dus mthar chos smra-ba'i btsun-pa ngag-dbang bstan-'dzin nor-bu'i rnam-thar' chi-med bdud-rtsi'i rol-mtsho.* For information on Ngag dbang bstan-'dzin norbu, see, for instance, *Kailash* vol. I, n°3, Kathmandu 1973 pp. 226-227. The other biography I refer to is entitled *Kho-bo bya-btang chos-dar ram ngag-dbang norbu bzang-por' bod-pas rang snang' khrul-pa chul-bzhin brjod-pa mukti-ka'i phreng-ba.* This latter blockprint contains an interesting account of a pilgrimage to Dolpo. See p. 28a and 28b.

9. See *Kailash*, loc. cit. pp. 232-233, note 28. In Tibetan tradition, if not on our maps, the locations of Mkhan-pa lung are multiple. In my present opinion, the cult of this *sbas-yul* is perhaps of Bhutanese origin, being linked with the name of Padma gling-pa.

10. Mkhan-pa lung is also mentioned on fol. 2a of the print *Shar khum-bu rol-ba gling gi 'dab' brel gsang-sngags theg-mchog chos-gling gi bca'-yig kun-gsal me-long.* Rol-ba gling has been described recently by Janice M. Sacherer, Sherpas of the Rolwaling valley in *Objets et Mondes*, t. XIV, fasc 4. Paris, 1974, pp. 317-324.

11. Many examples of this type of conflict are to be found in John T. Hitchcock and Rex L. Jones (editors), *Spirit Possession in Nepal Himalaya*, Aris & Phillips, Warminster 1976, *passim.* See also A. Höfer, Urgyen Pema und Tusur Bon "Eine Padmasambhava-Legende der Tamang, Nepal," in H. Berger (ed.) *Mündliche Uberlieferungen in Südasien*, Fünf Beiträge, Schriftenreihe des Südasien-Institutes der Universität Heidelberg 17, Wiesbadn, F. Steiner, 1973.

12. *Gangs-ljongs rgyal bstan yongs rdzogs kyi phyi mo snga-'gyur rdo-rje theg-pa'i bstan-pa rin-po-che ji-ltar byung-ba'i tshul dag cing gsal-bar brjod-pa lha dbang g-yul las rgyal-ba'i rnga-bo che'i sgra dbyangs* and *Gsang-sngags snga-'gyur rnying-ma-ba'i bstan-pa'i rnam gzhag mdo tsam brjod-pa legs bshad snang-ba'i dga'-ston.*

13. F.W. Funke, *Religioses Leben der Sherpa*, teil II of the Beiträge zur Sherpa Forschung, was published by Universitätsverlag Wagner Ges. M.B.H., Innsbrück-München, in 1969 ; and M. Schmidt-Thomé and T.T. Thingo, *Materielle Kulter und Kunst der Sherpa*, as t. iii. of the same series is 1976.

14. I do not wish to deny in any way the value of a local man's description of village rites and festivals. Good recent examples of inside descriptions are Thubten Sangay's *Tibetan Birth Ceremonies* and *Tibetan Ceremonies of the Dead*, published at Dharmsala in 1975.

15. See David L. Snellgrove, *Buddhist Himālaya, Travels and studies in quest of the origins and nature of Tibetan Religion*,

Bruno Cassirer, Oxford 1957, Chapter VI.

16. See *Ethnologische Zeitschrift* 1973, II, Zurich, pp. 145-146.

17. See Giuseppe Tucci in *Die Religionen Tibets und der Mongolei*, Verlag W. Kolhammer, Stuttgart 1970, pp. 94-105 in particular.

18. "Comparative Religion : Whither and Why?" in *The History of Religions, Essays in Methodology*, edited by Mircea Eliade and J. Kitagawa, Chicago 1966, pp. 31-58. The quotation comes from pp. 52. See also the interesting debate between P. Kvaerne "A reply to Wilfred Cantwell Smith" and Wilfred Cantwell Smith, "The finger that points to the moon" in *Temenos*, vol. 9, Helsinki 1973, pp. 161-172.

19. See in particular R.A. Stein, *Recherches sur l'épopée et le barde au Tibet*, Paris, 1959, and my review of this great study in *L'Homme*, 1, 3, September-December, 1961, pp. 136-140.

20. "Myths and facts : reconsidering some data concerning the clan history of the Sherpas" in *Kailash*, vol. II, n°1 & 2, Kathmandu 1974, p. 128.

21. Stephen Crites has recently argued that individual human experience is itself essentially narrative ("The Narrative Quality of Experience" in *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, vol. 39, n°3, September 1971, pp. 291-311). I thank Prof. Bardwell Smith for drawing my attention to this article.

*Since writing these lines I find that what is apparently this copy has been edited in Tibetan at Dolanji in 1976 under the general title of *Rare Tibetan Texts from Nepal, A Collection of Guides to Holy Places, Lives of Religious Masters, and Khrid-yig by the famed Rja' roṅ-phu Blama* reproduced by Tashi Dorji, pp. 61-80. It will be useful to be able to compare the two copies where the text is obscure. The same volume also contains in Tibetan a Guide to the Holy Places of Rca-ri by the 8th Rgyal-dbaṅ 'Brug-pa Kun-gzigs chos kyi snaṅ-ba (pp. 1-59) and a Guide to Svayambhunāth in Nepal by a certain Suna śri'i bha-tra (pp. 81-90). Tashi Dorji has also reproduced Ye-ses rgyal-mchans *Gaṅs ri mcho gsum gyi dkar-čhag* as well as Bstan-'jin rin-chen's *'Jam-gliṅ gaṅs rgyal ti-se'i dkar-čhang chaṅs dbyaṅs yid-'phrog* in a volume entitled *Snaṅ srid mjod-phug gi rca-ba daṅ 'spyi don gyi gsuṅ-pod*, published at Ochghat in 1973.

10

Tradition and Innovation in Contemporary Indian Buddhism

JOANNA ROGERS MACY
AND
ELEANOR ZELLIOT

I. BELIEFS AND VIEWS

OCTOBER 14, 1956, in an open field in Nagpur, B.R. Ambedkar and some three hundred thousand of his followers embraced the Buddhist faith. The *dīksha* (initiation) sparked a series of mass conversions, creating more thousands, then millions of Indian Buddhists. The event was not unexpected. Ambedkar, born of the Untouchable Mahar Community, a lawyer, political leader and architect of the Indian Constitution, had publicly despaired of progress for the Untouchables so long as they remained within the Hindu fold. He had been drawn to Buddhist teachings since his days as a student; further reflection and voracious reading fueled his conviction that the path to social equality and psychological liberation lay in the Buddha Dhamma. With his conversion and that of his followers, the Buddhist religion became once again a mass movement in the land of its birth.

This movement, still largely limited to ex-Untouchables, with the Mahar community constituting a large majority, holds distinctive views of Buddhist history and doctrine. No established organization, foreign or indigenous, was present to mediate more traditional teachings, so the movement, very much on its own, started out with its own version of the Buddha Dhamma. This was evolved largely by Ambedkar himself. His perspectives on the faith which he transmitted molded to a large extent the converts' understanding of the Buddhist past and Buddhist teachings. It is with the particularity of these perspectives that this essay is concerned.

Setting and Sources

Buddhism was an option for Ambedkar, because its revival in India had long

since begun. The roots of this revival trace back to archaeological discovriees of British civil servants, to the recovery and translation of texts by nineteenth century European scholars, and Anagarika Dharmapala's foundation of the Maha Bodhi Society, dedicated to the rehabilitation of ancient shrines and the renaissance of the faith on its native soil. By the early decades of this century the beginnings of a revived Indian Buddhism were evident—in limited but influential conversions at both extremes of Indian society. These included Tamil-speaking *pariahs* in the South and the emergence out of caste-Hindu society in the North of a trio of Buddhist scholars, Mahapandita Rahula Sanskrityayan, Ven. Anand Kausalyayan and Ven. Jagdish Kashyap. The writings of the Tamil Buddhists, especially of P.L. Narasu,[1] made a strong impact upon Ambedkar, while the leading and enduring role played by the latter three is continued today by Ven. Anand Kausalyayan in his training center for bhikkhus in Nagpur.

The numbers now represented by Indian Buddhists are difficult to estimate. The Government Census of 1971 sets the total of Buddhists at 3,812,325, which represents a growth of over three and a half million since the Nagpur *dīksha*. But some members of the movement itself believe their numbers are higher, arguing that converts are often reluctant to identify themselves officially as Buddhists and thereby forfeit, in all States but Maharashtra, benefits to which they are entitled as members of the Scheduled Castes. Estimates by leading bhikkhus range up to fourteen and even twenty million.[2] Whether or not, these higher figures are accurate, the movement represents an historic return of Buddhists' presence in India.

The converts' background, as Untouchables in a caste society, colors their views of the faith they espouse—casting into bold relief the social teachings of the Dhamma and those interpretations of the Buddhist past that speak to their need for self-respect. These perspectives were afforded them by "Babasaheb" Ambedkar, whose authority is unquestioned by most converts. A few even refer to him as a "Second Buddha" and the Nagpur *dīksha* has been described as a new Turning of the Wheel of the Law. This new Turning gives the Law a distinctive flavor. As a scholar of political theory and champion of the downtroddens, Ambedkar projected upon the Dhamma his own faith in rationalism and his over-riding concern for social reform. The chief vehicle for transmitting and interpreting the new faith is his book *The Buddha and His Dhamma*, written in English at the end of his life, published posthumously and subsequently translated into Hindi and Marathi. His aim was to produce a "Bible", and so it has served and continues to serve in modern Buddhist India, where it is held in reverence and gratitude. For many of the literates it is the sole Buddhist text they own or have read. For the illiterates it is the one they hear, read aloud to them in villages and city slums, bearing in their eyes the authority of sacred scripture.

Judged by academic standards, *The Buddha and His Dhamma* is not intended to be scholarly. The Buddha's life and teachings are narrated free-style, with great independence exercised in selection, amplification and interpretation. The volume is unencumbered by textual references; no effort is made to distinguish Ambedkar's commentary from scriptural material, and the liberties taken with the Pali Canon have excited the criticism of many scholars and traditional Buddhists.

In his Hindi translation of the volume, Bhadant Anand Kausalyayan has identified the original texts from which Ambedkar drew. Queried about departures from canonical

scripture, Bhadant Anand, a Pali scholar, commented that *The Buddha and His Dhamma* represents a "new orientation, but not a distortion" and that all central doctrines are present. Ambedkar himself offers a rationale by which differences can be explained. He points out that oral transmission of the teachings gave scope for error even during the Buddha's lifetime. Identifying five such cases in the Suttas, he notes that mistaken views appear "common with regard to karma and rebirth", and are likely to have continued, especially, since they represent Brahmanical reinterpretations. "One has, therefore, to be very careful", Ambedkar concludes, "in accepting what is said in Buddhist canonical literature as being the word of the Buddha".[3] Ambedkar sets forth the criteria by which he determines authenticity :

> There is one test which is available. If there is anything which could be said with confidence, it is : He was nothing if not rational, if not logical. Anything, therefore, which is rational and logical, other things being equal, may be taken to be the word of the Buddha. The second thing is that the Buddha never cared to enter into a discussion which was not profitable for man's welfare. Therefore, anything attributed to the Buddha which did not relate to man's welfare cannot be accepted to be the word of the Buddha (IV.V.12-4).[4]

The religious implications of taking reason and logic as ultimate authorities, and the implications for historical scholarship of taking them as criteria for accuracy, did not appear to concern Ambedkar. His emphasis upon rationalism reflects in part the situation in which converts find themselves *vis-a-vis* the dominant Hindu culture. To lend authority to their rejection of Hindu belief structures, they have no God or divine revelation to point to, nor an ecclesiastical institution whose age and grandeur could serve to validate belief. Deification of the Buddha would simplify this problem of ultimate authority, but was out of the question, for it would lend credibility to the Hindu belief that he was an *avatāra* of Vishṇu. In battling the ideas of God, soul and re-incarnation upon which they see the institution of caste ultimately resting, Ambedkar and his followers appeal, in the last analysis, to no other authority than that which resides in human reason itself.

History

Ambedkar's chief departure from the traditional view of the historical origins of the Dhamma lies in his account of the circumstances prompting the Going Forth of Gautama and the ethnic character of the mass, of his followers. Both these points of divergence lay emphasis on the nature of the Dhamma as rationalistic social gospel and both dramatize the role of non-Aryan elements in its birth and dissemination.

The cause for Gautama's renunciation of his princely life is no longer taken to be the traditional Four Passing Sights, which confronted the young Śākya with the fact of human sufferings. Ambedkar found it an affront to commonsense to suppose that a man of 29 would not have been exposed earlier to the presence of sickness and death.

> These are common events occurring by the hundreds and the Buddha could not have failed to come across them earlier. It is impossible to accept the traditional

> explanation that this was the first time he saw them. The explanation is not plausible and does not appeal to reason.[5]

The judgment is a literal one, betraying no recognition that this story could have a symbolic truth or that the Four Passing Sights could be interpreted as metaphors for human transience and pain. Nor did Ambedkar question the appropriateness of applying "reason" and plausibility to mythic material. Instead, he offers as the circumstance for the Going Forth Gautama's refusal to support a Śākya military action against the Koliya tribe in a feud over water rights. Determined not to participate in war, Gautama went into voluntary exile as a *parivrājaka*, a wandering religious mendicant. His moral stand lent courage to those Śākyas opposed to the use of force and the feuding parties were reconciled. When alerted of this outcome and invited to return home, Gautama reflected and refused; this decision constituted his great renunciation.

> He had left home because he was opposed to war. "Now that the war is over is there any problem left for me? Does my problem end because the war has ended"? On deep reflection he thought not. "The problem of war is essentially a problem of conflict. It is only a part of a larger problem. This conflict is going on not only between kings and nations but between nobles and Brahmins, between householders,...The conflict between nations is occasional. But the conflict between classes is constant and perpetual. It is this which is the root of all sorrow and suffering in the world...I have to find a solution for this problem of social conflict" (I.II.6. 4-9).

Ambedkar's references to "class conflict" and "class struggle", it should incidentally be noted, do not betray the influence of Marxist ideology so much as an effort to compete with it. Although, as he said near the end of his life in an address on the "Buddha and Karl Marx", he saw their goals as similar, Marxism and Buddhism violently differed in their perception of means. To reform the world, he said, the mind of man must be reformed and the Buddhist way, while tedious, was the safest, soundest and most democratic for this to happen.[6]

Ambedkar may have derived the idea behind his version of the Going Forth from the writing of Dharmanand Kosambi, a Brahmin from Goa, who had become a Buddhist monk and the first modern Indian scholar of Pali. In his *Bhagvān Buddh*, published originally in 1940, Kosambi criticized the credibility of the story of the Four Passing Sights.[7] To help explain Gautama's renunciation he turned to the Rohini water dispute that is described in the *Kunāla Jātaka*, in which the Buddha intercedes and recites the *Attadaṇḍasutta* decrying conflict and the use of force. Kosambi suggests that the original event occurred before the Buddha's enlightenment and that, while revulsion for the world and hope for *nibbāna* played a part in Gautama's motives for going forth, the Sākya-Koliya river dispute probably constituted the main reason.

In previous scholarship, inquiring into the roots of Untouchability, Ambedkar had concluded that India's aboriginal stock had common ethnic roots, which he identified as Nāga. Subjugated by the Aryans, the Nāgas, according to this view, became Buddhist in large numbers. They were progressively excluded from the mainstream of society and eventually caste out as "broken men", the ancestors of the Untouchables.[8] Before their extreme degradation, still bearing the dignity of their past and rich in culture,

these people were patrons and disseminators of the Buddha Dhamma. In his conversion speech Ambedkar pointed to the Nāgas as chief propagators who "spread the teachings of Bhagvān Buddha all over India". The Koliyas, to whom Gautama was related on his mother's side, belonged to this ethnic stock. So the Nāgas were connected to the Dhamma's origins through blood (Gautama's mother) and water (Rohini) and were instrumental in its spread.

The paucity of historical evidence to document this view does not diminish its impact on many converts, and they see a symbolic significance in the choice of Nagpur, city of the Nāgas, for the event that heralded the return of Buddhism to Indian soil. It is a part of a new mythic identity and history. As attested in both ceremony and conversation, this vision of their past affords roots and dignity, a historical role in which they find continuity and pride in being the "true Buddhists". The early Buddhist sanctuaries, and especially the cave temples and *vihāras* of Maharashtra, which are close to many Mahar Buddhists, speak to them of their ancient relationship with the Dhamma. There, carved on wall and pillar, cobra-crowned Nāgas hold the stem of the lotus-throne supporting the seated Buddha. Those snake-kings are for the converts a reminder and proof of their past role, in a faith to which they now return.

This vision is receiving support from contemporary scholarship. Anthropological, linguistic and archaeological researches combine to reveal additional evidence that non-Aryan elements played a key role in the rise of Buddhism. Even on the popular level of mainstream Indian culture, such a view is becoming acceptable, as is exemplified by a recent magazine article entitled "Was the Buddha an Aryan"? Giving an overview of some of the relevant evidences, it avers that "Buddhism has always been a religion of the non-Aryan indigenous people of India" and concludes : "It may be discovered (be future scholarship) that many of our national heroes, besides the Buddha, belong to the hitherto despised aboriginal strata".[9]

Ambedkar's perspective on Buddhist history is also one which plays down and occasionally criticizes the distinctiveness and importance of the Sangha. To correct an impression that the Buddha addressed himself primarily to the bhikkhus, Ambedkar argues that "the Buddha clearly had the laity in mind when he preached". He judges by their content that the Five Precepts and the Eight-fold Path (which he assumes to date back to the Buddha) are addressed to householders. The Dhamma, therefore, was preached "principally for the laity" (V. IV. 3. 8-10).

To rationalize the existence of the Sangha, Ambedkar offers the view that it was instituted by the Buddha to serve as a model and show that the ideals he preached were practicable. The monk has a role to play in social uplift and example.

> Is the Bhikkhu to devote himself to self-culture or is he to serve the people and guide them? He must discharge both functions. Without self-culture he is not fit to guide...A Bhikkhu leaves his home. But he does not retire from the world. He leaves his home so that he may have the freedom and the opportunity to serve those who are attached to their homes, but whose life is full of sorrow, misery and unhappiness and who cannot help themselves...A bhikkhu who is indifferent to the woes of mankind, however perfect in self-culture, is not at all a bhikkhu. He may be something else, but he is not a Bhikkhu (V. II. 4. 17-22).

Ambedkar emphasizes that the differences between monks and *upāsakas*, lay followers, were essentially formal—homelessness, property, celibacy, initiation, ceremony and accountability for vows. "Except on (these) points there is no difference between the life of the bhikkhu and the Upāsaka" (II. I. 3.4). In describing their reciprocal rights and responsibilities, he stresses that the laity could bring complaint of any monastic mischief or misconduct. He draws no explicit comparison with the status of the Brahmin priest, but does claim that lay complaints occasioned amendments to monastic rules and that 'the Vinaya Pitaaka is nothing but redress of complaints of the laity" (V. IV. 2).

The difference between *upāsakas* and bhikkhus as to initiation of *dīksha* turned out to be a grievous one, in Ambedkar's view.

> Sangha-Dīksha included both initiation into the Sangha as well as into the Dhamma. But there was no separate Dhamma-Dīksha for those who wanted to be initiated into the Dhamma, but did not wish to become members of the Sangha,... This was a grave omission. It was one of the causes which ultimately led to the downfall of Buddhism in India (V. IV. 1. 10-12).

It was this "grave omission" that Ambedkar amended, when he invented the Dhamma-Dīksha ceremony.

The Sangha, in Ambedkar's view, although instituted to teach, demonstrate and serve, had become often derelict in these duties. He publicly expressed the opinion that the majority of modern bhikkhus had "neither learning nor service in them",[10] and urged monks to follow the example of Christian missionaries in outreach to the masses. Shortly before his death he held a closed meeting at Sarnath with monastic leaders ; according to former colleagues who were present, he took the occasion to criticize the modern Sangha for its apparent espousal of the *arahant* ideal.

Ambedkar's historical view of the Sangha, whether accurate or not, has some relevance for a period when many Indian Buddhists have little or no contact with a monk. Bhikkhus, especially native-speaking ones, are still rare, and Ambedkar's emphasis on the dignity and role of the laity helps foster an attitude of religious self-reliance. Although the need to train more monks is expressed, there also is talk of the need to develop an *upāsaka* or lay Sangha and of its appropriateness now in a time and community that lack the economic base for a full-time Order. One can construe the activity of young college students, teaching the Dhamma in the villages, as such an *upāsaka* Sangha in embryonic form. In the Ambedkar and Milind Colleges in Aurangabad, for example, a sizeable number of students undertake voluntary eight-week courses in the Dhamma, which equip them to teach in the villages during their vacations. This commitment of time, which is called *grīshma-śīla*, or summer vows, is devoted to holding meetings, teaching Buddhist songs, reading from *The Buddha and His Dhamma* and organizing, upon occasion, the construction of a small *vihāra*.

In sum, this revisioning of the Buddhist past relates to the life situation of the converts. The Dhamma's origins in social concern, its non-Aryan character and the ambiguous role of the Sangha, are departures from traditional view that appear integral to the relevance the converts find in it. One may wonder whether the divergences from scripture will cause eventual problems in the development of a strong tradition, or

whether the relative independence felt by the laity will impede the growth of a traditional Sangha. But, within this period atleast, it is clear that the historical perspective Ambedkar afforded is meaningful and useful to his followers.

Doctrine

Two characteristics of the Buddha's teachings were perceived, prized and proclaimed by Ambedkar above all others; their rationality on one hand, and their social message on the other. He exalted them to the virtual exclusion of a supra-empirical dimension. "Buddhism is nothing if not rationalism", he writes and describes the Buddha as :

> a reformer, full of the most earnest moral purpose and trained in all the intellectual culture of his time, who had the originality and the courage to put forth deliberately and with a knowledge of opposing views, the doctrine of a salvation to be found here, in this life, in inward change of heart to be brought about by the practice of self-culture and self-control (II. II. 7.7).

The (alleged) rationalism of the Buddha serves chiefly, in Ambedkar's Bible, to deny the existence of God and soul. Where the Buddha of the Pali Canon appears to maintain an agnostic silence, Ambedkar's Buddha is certain and explicit. His teachings are assembled and interpreted, alongwith other philosophic arguments to demonstrate conclusively that neither God nor soul exists. "He began by saying that his Dhamma had nothing to do with God and soul. His Dhamma had nothing to do with life after death", wrote Ambedkar of the Buddha's first sermon (II. II. 2.14). And so do present-day Indian Buddhists begin, for in their eyes the greatest danger of the belief in God and soul is the basis it provides for belief in caste. In their teaching activities, this appears to be Lesson One. There is no God who created from his body the four *varṇas*, no God who ordained as part of his sacred order this cruel division of society. There is no soul to transmigrate and visit the sins of one life upon the next, no inherent blame is being born without privilege. This doctrine brings to the convert a psychological release, altering his self-image, even where society continues to regard him as Untouchable. Hence its "atheism" is seen as a key element of the Buddha Dhamma, asmuch a hallmark as its rationality and egalitarianism. Within a Hindu context, such an interpretation of the *anatta* concept is understandable and perhaps even necessary, given the movement's aims. But within the context of traditional Buddhist doctrine, problems arise when the Buddha's ultimate silence on this question is overlooked.

Ambedkar's interpretation of "soul" entails for him rejection of "belief in Saṃsara or wandering together, *i.e.*, transmigration of the soul", "belief in Moksha or Salvation of the Soul, *i.e.*, its ceasing to be born again", "belief in Karma (as) the determination of man's position in present life by deeds done by him in his past life" (I. VII. 1.1). The Buddha "denied the fatalistic view of karma. He replaced (it) by a much more scientific view of karma. He put new wine in old bottle" (I. VII. 2.3). According to this "scientific" view, rebirth as a concept applies only to the natural components of a being. When the body dies, the four elements disperse and live on and the body's energy is freed and never lost. While any psychological or spriitual dimension to the

concept of rebirth is denied karma as moral law is acknowledged. It is operative only within one's present life and "the general moral order".

> Our deeds produce results both good and evil. The whole world is under the law of causation...Let us surrender self and all selfishness, and as all things are fixed by causation, let us practice good, so that good may result from our actions (II. III. 5.10-12).

This watered-down and Westernized vision of moral law conveys, in contrast to traditional Buddhist thought, categorical distinction between doer and deed. The self, that Ambedkar interpreted and denied as a "soul", re-emerges here implicitly as a free agent, separable from its action. For Ambedkar and his followers, however, it frees man from the weight of an imaginary past, unlike the Hindu karma which was devised to "sap the spirit of revolt" (I.V.3.40), and "so the state can escape responsibility for the poor and the lowly" (IV. II. 3.20).

"Once it is realized that Buddhism is a social gospel, its revival would be an everlasting event," said Ambedkar and, understandably, accords in his 'Bible' great weight to the egalitarian aspect of the Buddha's life and message. The scriptural stories of the Buddha's acceptance of and regard for the low and outcaste followers, such as the sweeper Sumita, the barber Upali, the Untouchables Sopaka and Suppiya and others, were featured in Ambedkar's Bible. Known by heart, recounted at gatherings with drama and relish, these accounts form an important part of the converts' Dhamma. Although he stressed the Buddha's attack on caste and the Untouchables' historical connection with Buddhism, it should be noted that Ambedkar did not, however, identify the Buddha's message and movement solely in terms of a revolt against the caste system; as evident in the story of the Going Forth, the social concerns were wider.

If the Buddha's gospel is seen as essentially social, than so is *dukkha*, the central Buddhist notion of suffering or sorrow. "The recognition of suffering (is) the real basis of religion", writes Ambedkar in his version of the Buddha's first sermon. But this suffering is the condition of "misery and poverty", wrought by social and economic injustice. "Man's misery is the result of man's inequity to man" (III. V. 2.16). It is what we do to each others rather than what we do to ourselves; no reference is made to that inner dimension in which we enslave ourselves through our own misperceptions and misidentifications.

While what is perhaps the central insight of the traditional Buddhist vision is omitted from this view, the social perception of *dukkha* has meaning for the conversion movement. It acknowledges the dimension of the pain it has known and makes the Buddha appear more relevant. Daya Pawar, a Mahar poet, provides an example of this. He writes of a turning point in his life, when a friend had told him that Marxist and Buddhist philosophies could "in a certain sense" be accepted together. "His opinion was different from that of the doctrinaire Marxist, it gave me a new vision. Everything fell into place in my mind. (I had just) read earlier the article, *Buddha and Marx*, by Dr. Ambedkar. The sorrow that is envisioned by the Buddha is not the sorrow of soul, of re-birth, of the law of karma, but the sorrow of the present injustices performed by the established class...I cannot look at the Buddha in a traditional way. I wrote about the Buddha:

I never see you
In Jetawana's garden
Sitting with closed eyes
In meditation, in the lotus position
Or
In the caves of Ajanta and Elura
With stony lips sewn shut
Taking the last sleep of your life.
I see you
Walking, talking,
Breathing softly, healingly,
On the sorrow of the poor, the weak,
Going from hut to hut
In the life-destroying darkness
Torch in hand,
Giving the sorrow that drains the blood
Like a contagious disease
A new meaning.[11]

This vision of suffering as primarily social entails a substantial amount of surgery on the Four Noble Truths. For, if one's suffering is inflicted from without, then its cause and alleviation do not relate directly to one's desire or craving. Ambedkar omitted them because he found them pessimistic. "The Four Aryan Truths deny hope to man...Do they form part of the original gospel or are they a later accretion by the monks?[12] In his version of the Buddha's first sermon, "the recognition of human suffering" and "the removal of this misery" are taught and can be viewed as functional equivalents to the first and fourth Noble Truths. But as the second and third Noble Truths, this sermon presents no analogous teachings, for no attention is given to the cause of this sorrow nor any mention made of craving or desire. Elsewhere in the volume, however, craving does appear as source of sorrow, but again its interpretation is social.

> "Why is this craving or greed to be condemned? Because of this", said the Buddha to Ananda, "many a bad and wicked state of things arises—blows and wounds, strife, contradiction and retorts; quarrelling, slander and lies". That this is the correct analysis of class struggle there can be no doubt. That is why the Buddha insisted upon the control of greed and craving (III.III.4.12-14).

Such being the perception of the human predicament, it is no surprise that the salvation to which the Buddha points is seen as a "kingdom of righteousness on earth", (V.II.4.10) or that even the enlightenment itself is presented in a purely pragmatic perspective.

> On the night of the last day of the fourth week, light dawned upon him. He realized that there were two problems. The first problem was that there was suffering in the world and the second problem was how to remove this suffering

and make mankind happy (I.IV.2.9).

The jolt to a traditional Buddhist of reading such a description of the enlightenment, with its absence of a sense of radical transformation or transcending insight into the nature of reality, epitomizes the problems inherent in Ambedkar's "Turning of the Law."

Given the drive for equality that motivated Ambedkar to lead his people into Buddhism, it is clear why he interprets the Dhamma in social terms. That this social emphasis led to exclude or distort some teaching, fundamental to traditional and canonical Buddhism is understandable, yet it raises substantial problems. His perception of the nature and cause of human suffering, while meaningful to his followers, forfeits a major insight which the Buddha represented. His perception of liberation, although invigorating as a call to ethical action, lacks the transcendent dimension of freedom which the Buddha also represented. These problems can raise questions about the durability of contemporary Indian Buddhism as a religious movement. Such questions, however, must also take into account the vitality of the religious activities and observances, such as Eleanor Zelliot describes in the following section, as well as the growth in Pali Studies. Since influential figures among the converts are enjoying increasing contact, both with the canonical scriptures and foreign-trained Buddhists, it is possible to suppose that the divergences of Ambedkar's Dhamma belong to transitional era. Certainly they belong to our time, as parallels with religious developments elsewhere in the world demonstrate.

The innovations evident in contemporary Indian Buddhism are not isolated phenomena. In the crucible of economic dislocation and ideological struggle, fresh views of the Buddhist social ethic have been expressed in the countries of South and Southeast Asia, from Śri Lanka to Vietnam. Perhaps only the Marxist Buddhists in these countries are comparable to Ambedkar in the degree of divergence from traditional doctrine, but non-Marxists also are reinterpreting basic Buddhist concepts in terms calling for social action and responsibility. This doctrinal ferment and the new emphasis on the role of the laity, persuade us that Ambedkar and his views can be seen to be a part of a larger phenomenon.

This phenomenon is not limited to the Buddhist world. When we look at some of the strongest and most innovative currents in the religious consciousness of our time, we can see that Ambedkar's work and the faith of modern Indian Buddhism fit in the context of liberation theology. As in other forms of liberation theology, the revisioning of history and doctrine can help renew the religion's relevance to human need. From this perspective, such innovations can testify to the continuity and power of a tradition.

II. ACTIVITIES AND OBSERVANCES

The contemporary Buddhist conversion movement in India arose neither from a missionary enterprise that carried its own organizational structure and leadership nor from the Buddha-ization of a highly-developed existent religious structure; unlike any other mass conversion in history, this new religious movement was almost completely on its own. The massive conversion that began in 1956 largely affected low castes, particularly, the Mahars of Maharashtra, who had been involved for decades in a battle

for political, social and religious rights. Buddhism was chosen as the religion of conversion because of its qualities of rationality, equality and intellectual creativity—because it offered a way out of the psychological imprisonment of the Hindu caste system. Buddhism as an organized religion, however, was almost non-existent in India at that time, and the ex-Untouchables who chose to convert had to create leadership, structure, religious observances and activities from very indirect models. Furthermore, what they created had to be a religion that would fit their own needs.

The leader of this conversion movement, B.R. Ambedkar, had been interested in Buddhism for most of his adult life. He had read the books on Buddhism that had become a minor part of India's discovery of her own past in the 20th century; he had met some of the men who had, as solitary individuals, become interested in Buddhism; he had travelled to Ceylon and Burma to see living Buddhism in Buddhist countries; he had written *The Buddha and His Dhamma*, a rationalized life of the Buddha and a selection of texts, chiefly from Pali sources. He had prepared his followers psychologically for a conversion from Hinduism from 1935 on, beginning with his own statement that he "would not die a Hindu". But the conversion was held suddenly, dramatically and without much organizational preparation on October 14, 1956 and within two months Ambedkar was dead. He had died a Buddhist, and he had set in motion a movement that soon involved over three million people. But although the inspiration of Ambedkar's own example and his invitation to others to follow him were powerful directives, the organization of the new religion was at a bare minimum.

The structural and leadership elements developed during the long struggle for social and political rights and for educational opportunities were pressed into service to provide the thrust and direction of the religious movement. Without the living example of a Buddhist society before them, the "new Buddhists"[13] had to create a meaningful religious life from the sources available to them : Ambedkar's precepts, traditional Buddhism as they understood it from the texts, and non-Indian Buddhists with whom they came in contact. Most importantly, they had to build that Buddhist society in the light of the needs of the Buddhist converts, most of them from formerly Untouchable castes, in the context of a dominant Hindu society.

Now, twenty years after the conversion, the movement has slowed in garnering numbers.[14] There were 180,823 Buddhists in India in 1951, before the conversion; 3,250,227 Buddhists in 1961, and 3,812,325 Buddhists in 1971, according to the Indian Census. The great bulk of the Buddhists are in Maharashtra, 3,264,000 Buddhists, but there are sizable numbers in urban centers outside that State : 10,000 in Andhra Pradesh, 81,800 in Madhya Pradesh, 14,100 in Karnataka, 8,700 in the city of Delhi, 8,400 in Orissa, 1,300 in the Punjab, 3,600 in Rajasthan, 1,100 in Tamilnadu, 42,200 in Uttar Pradesh and 39,600 in West Bengal.[15] There is no single leader, there is no over-all organization, but there is a flourishing, creative, controversial Buddhist society, which has evolved patterns of Buddhism both innovative and traditional.

My purpose in this paper is to look at some of the visible elements of contemporary Buddhist society in India, *i.e.* the place of Ambedkar in activities and observances; the buildings that house Buddhist activities; the leadership that teaches, preaches and conducts rituals; the sorts of public holidays and festivals that are observed. The Buddhist tradition, the Mahar tradition and the surrounding Indian tradition all have affected the practices of the Buddhist converts. Much that seems innovative to the

Buddhist tradition will be found to be a necessary carry-over from the convert's past or an almost unconscious response to the prevailing Indian (largely Hindu) present. My observations were made in three separate year-long visits to India, 1964-5, 1971 and 1975-6. My perspective is limited to Maharashtra, although much of what I observed would also be found among Buddhist groups in a number of cities outside that State.

1. The Role of Babasaheb Ambedkar

The presence of the picture of Ambedkar in all Buddhist *vihāras* and at all Buddhist functions seems to set Indian Buddhists today apart from the main Buddhist tradition. The inclusion of "Babasaheb" Ambedkar as an object of reverence is the most visible innovation in the practice of contemporary Buddhists in India. The Buddha and Babasaheb in plaster, stone, poster-art and painting, in song and drama and story, the two seemingly of near-equal importance, rarely one without the other, are continual evidence that contemporary Indian Buddhism proudly combines its own tradition with that of the main Buddhist tradition. Ambedkar is neither worshipped nor prayed to, nor of course is the Buddha. No *pūjā* is performed, no *navas* (vows) are made to either figure, so their functions are not those of a Hindu god. But at every occasion, both figures are garlanded, the Buddha first; incense is lit; and Bhagwant Gautam Buddha and Parampujaya Babasaheb Ambedkar are addressed before the speaker acknowledges the Chairman of the function and the "Brothers and Sisters".

Efforts have been made to place Ambedkar in the traditional Buddhist framework. Some Buddhists acknowledge Ambedkar as a Bodhisattva in recognition of his role in bringing modern Indian converts into Buddhism, *i.e.*, as savior. This use has been justified by atleast one traditionally-trained Theravāda Buddhist bhikkhu. Other Buddhists reject the Bodhisattva concept as Māhayāna Buddhism, which they see as inferior to the rational, non-supernatural, humanity-centered religion they believe the Buddha taught. Another broadly-accepted way of honoring Ambedkar is to add the diminutive of his first name, Bhimrao, to the list of refuges, *i.e. Bhimam śaraṇam gacchami*, so that the "Three Jewels" become four :

I go for refuge to the Buddha;
I go for refuge to the Dhamma (doctrine);
I go for refuge to the Sangha (order of monks);
I go for refuge to Ambedkar.

These efforts to honor Ambedkar within the framework of the Buddhist tradition are an affront to some outside the conversion movement. Those who understand the importance of Ambedkar in the earlier struggle for political, social and religious rights are more charitable in accepting the continuing homage paid to him. That homage can best be understood by reference to the Indian tradition of the *guru* (teacher or master), a concept most explicit in Hinduism, but also found in heterodox sects and in secular life. The use of the term "Bodhisattva" and the inclusion of Ambedkar as a refuge are an attempt to use Buddhist concepts for the basic Indian idea of the need for a teacher to show the way to religious insight and personal freedom. The old

practice of *guru-śiṣya* (master-pupil) is often expanded in modern India to a generalized acceptance of the importance of one special person—parent, teacher, ideal, hero—as a chief inspiration in life. The key is that the guru figure is the one who brings his disciple into self-realization and freedom, *i.e.* the man who "saves" him.

Ambedkar himself claimed that he had three gurus: The Buddha, the 15th century iconoclastic saint-poet Kabir, and the 19th-century radical social reformer, Mahatma Jotiba Phule. In turn, his followers feel that he has been responsible for almost all the educational, social and political progress in their lives and that he has shown them the way to a religion that is both honorable and honored, a religion that negates the religious concepts that classified them as Untouchables. Many feel that Ambedkar has quite literally saved them, and highly-educated Buddhists often feel more strongly about Ambedkar as guru than do those who have not benefited so much from the movement. Ambedkar is by no means a guru in the way that Maharishi Mahesh Yogi or Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh or any of the other many contemporary cult figures are gurus. He is a guru in a less specific but totally Indian way. One's guru does not need to be saintly in character or religious in profession; he needs only to be the one who points toward enlightenment. The picture of Ambedkar, usually clad in a blue business suit, a book in his hand, a fountain pen in his pocket, placed beside the picture of the yellow-robed Buddha, makes clear the very human sort of guru he was.

One of the many contemporary songs sung by Buddhist singing groups to folk tunes or film music illustrates the combination of social and religious enlightenment Ambedkar represents :

> He gave us the conversion at Nagpur;
> He threw his light in the darkness;
> He never was the slave of anyone;
> He showed us the way of Buddha;
> He gave us salvation.[16]

The importance of this concept also is expressed in a more sophisticated way by Namdeo Dhasal, a political radical and a poet of the new Dalit school of literature, which is chiefly composed of educated Buddhists. In this excerpt from one of Dhasal's poems, "they" refer to the forefathers of today's ex-Untouchables; "fakir" is used in Marathi for a Muslim saint, and Dhasal has used it here probably to avoid a reference to Hinduism :

> Turning their backs to the Sun, they journeyed through centuries;
> Now, *now*, we must refuse to be pilgrims of darkness;
> After a thousand years we were blessed with a sunflower-giving fakir;
> Now, *now*, we must like sunflowers turn our face to the sun.[17]

Whether he is called Bodhisattva, a Refuge, a guru or a fakir, Ambedkar is honored as the one who in his lifetime showed the way and who continues after his death to be seen as the wisest and most inspiring of men.

2. The Vihara—meeting-place for Buddhists

The new buildings dedicated to the Buddhist religion in Maharashtra, as well as the old buildings converted to Buddhists' use, are called *vihāras*, the technical term for the residence of the Buddhist monks. The words for temple in Marathi, *deūl* and *maṇdir*, are studiously avoided, and the only term for a gathering place in the old Buddhist tradition seemed to be *vihāra*. The need of today's Buddhists, however, is not so much living quarters for bhikkhus as a meeting place for the laity, a place where the image of the Buddha can be kept, the community can gather for lectures on Buddhism or for *waṇdana*[18] and children can be instructed. As in the case of other lay elements in Buddhist structure, there was in India no living model for the place of gathering of the Buddhist community, so the multi-purpose *vihāra* came into being.

The *vihāra* most often is a plain rectangular structure, embellished where possible, with architectural detail from the most accessible models of Buddhist structures : the caves of Ajanta and the stupa of Sanchi. These buildings are newly built whenever the Buddhists of some locality have the money and the cooperative spirit to create a symbol of their newly accepted faith. In many villages, the *cāuḍi* (community hall) of the old *Mahārwāḍā* (the quarters of the Mahar, somewhat removed from the village proper), does double service as community meeting room and center for Buddhist activities. I have seen few Hindu temples converted to Buddhist use, probably because few were completely in the hands of those Mahars who converted.

No one has undertaken the immense amount of travelling over the face of Maharashtra or to cities of the Buddhist conversion elsewhere to record the presence of *vihāras*, nor is there any organizational record, since the building of a Buddhist center is an entirely local matter. The ones I have seen range from a small community shrine, large enough only to acommodate a statue of the Buddha, in the slums of Delhi, to a large building with an elaborate stupa on top in Pulgaon, Maharashtra, where Buddhists constitute a large, economically-secure, factory-workers' community. Most *vihāras* serve the Buddhist community in several ways. Daily or weekly *waṇdana*, memorial services and meetings for religious observances are held in the *vihāras*, although few are large enough to accommodate all Buddhists in the locality, and great occasions require that a pavilion be erected near the *vihāra*. Many *vihāras* are used for educational and social as well as religious purposes. In some, there are quarters for a travelling or resident bhikkhu. Others combine a room for the image of the Buddha with a room for a pre-school or kindergarten. Such a *vihāra* was dedicated in Wardha in May, 1976. Residents of the area, many of them casual laborers on the railway, collected money for some twenty years and then built a small building. The lower room is a *bālwādi* (children's school) dedicated to Mahatma Phule; above, underneath a Sanchi-like dome, is a small room dominated by a Buddha image brought from Thailand and a photograph of Ambedkar, with quotations from the Pali scriptures and Ambedkar painted on the walls.

The *vihāra* of Buddhists today is not an imitation of a Hindu temple. There is no *pujāri* or ritual priest, there is no stream of individual worshippers paying homage to the image. The *vihāra* serves chiefly as a symbol of the community's faith and as a center for the community to gather as Buddhists. And since knowledge is seen as a Buddhist virtue both Buddhist and secular education can easily be combined with its

religious functions.

3. The Leadership of the Buddhists

At the time of the conversion of 1956, there were few Buddhist bhikkhus in India, and none who spoke Marathi as their native tongue. The oldest Buddhist Bhikkhu then in India, Mahasthaveer Chandramani of Burma, came to Nagpur for the initial conversion ceremony and gave Ambedkar *dikṣha*. From that pointon, any one who had committed himself to Buddhism during the mass meetings at Nagpur could convert others, and the stress was placed on the individual's commitment in a public ceremony. Another huge ceremony was held in Bombay ten days after the death of Ambedkar in December, 1956, at which Bhikkhu Anand Kausalyayan, a Hindi-speaking monk, initiated thousands into the new religion through the use of the Three Jewels (or three refuges) and oaths of declaration of acceptance of Buddhism. There were few trained bhikkhus available for *dīksha* and teaching, however, and the great burden of leadership in the early days of the movement fell upon the political leadership of Ambedkar's Republican Party. Religious conversion at the hands of political leaders may have seemed strange to outsiders, but for those in the movement, these were the men who knew them, who had worked with Ambedkar, who had long ago given up Hinduism as a religion of inequality and superstitions.

Another group of leaders soon rose on the local level. These were the students —young men and a few women—trained in the colleges that Ambedkar had founded. Some had studied Pali, all had sought out some knowledge of Buddhism in the intense and joyful early days of the conversion. They conducted marriages and memorial services in a simple ritual devised by Ambedkar, they founded classes for children and study groups for adults, they joined in Young Men's Buddhist Associations and women's service groups. They published pamphlets on Buddhism in Marathi, wrote songs to be sung in community meetings, and, whenever they could, found a travelling Buddhist bhikkhu or a highly-educated sympathetic Hindu to speak on Buddhist ideology at public meetings.

The organization of the Buddhists, over-all in India, was less effective than that at the local level. The Buddhist Society of India, centered in Bombay and led by Ambedkar's son, Yeshwant Ambedkar, was established by Ambedkar in 1955. Theoretically the center of Buddhist activities, the Buddhist Society of India has given little direction to the movement and the ties between the center and its local branches are very loose. The center was dominated by political leaders, and as fractions began to appear in Ambedkar's party, they affected the religious organization also.[19] The non-political leadership that arose on the local level could not affect a strong central leadership, but neither could the lack of a center affect the vitality of the new movement. The Buddhist Society of India has now completed the Ambedkar Memorial Shrine, a multi-purpose *vihāra* on the seashore in Shivaji Park in Bombay, the site of Ambedkar's cremation. The *vihāras* in the towns and villages of Maharashtra, however, reflect local commitment and local leadership.

Now, after twenty years, it seems clear that Buddhism in India will continue its strong emphasis on the laity and lay leadership. It is still the lay leadership that does most of the teaching and preaching, writes most of the religious material that continues

to flow from the movement, collects the money and plans the *vihāra*. But there are increasing numbers of Marathi-speaking bhikkhus appearing, it seems not so much from the need of the community as from their own individual commitments to Buddhism. Some go to Bodh Gaya or some other Buddhist center in North India for training, a few to Thailand, a few to Ceylon. One young man is now in Japan with the Nichiren sect. Most of the Marathi-speaking bhikkhus are young and highly-educated; many are working on Ph.D.'s in Pali, archaeology or some other field related to the Buddhist past. The only Maharashtrian center for the training of bhikkhus is that at Nagpur, under the care of Bhandant Anand Kausalyayan, a former Punjabi Hindu who became a Bhikkhu in Ceylon in 1930. The Ven. Kausalyayan moved to Nagpur in 1970, has built a home and training center on the grounds where the 1956 conversion took place, and has educated dozens of young men, about fifteen of whom have been ordained as bhikkhus.

The function of the bhikkhus in Buddhist Society in Maharashtra seems primarily to be teaching, although it seems also true that the very presence of a bhikkhu is an important symbol of the identity of a Buddhist group. I have met many sorts of bhikkhus during my visits to India. In the 1960s the Ven. Sangarakshita of England and Kalimpong devoted half of each year to teaching in Maharashtra and Gujarat. He preached many sermons, his English being translated into Marathi by one of the young Buddhist students, and he also conducted *samnera*, a period of ten days or so in which Buddhist laity lived as monks. A Thai bhikkhu, Vivekananda, also travelled widely in Maharashtra, giving simple lectures on Buddhist morality. A number of Thai bhikkhus study at Poona University or Deccan College in Poona, and some of them establish working relationships with Maharashtrian Buddhists, particularly in Buddhist Sunday schools for children, but none is in India permanently. Some Tibetan monks have moved through Maharashtra, but those I met knew no English, Marathi or Hindi, and so served the community by making clay images of the Buddha and reciting texts in hastily-learned Pali. In 1975, a Tamil-speaking bhikkhu was teaching meditation and performing medical service both in Bombay and in the railroad porters' colony in Poona. Singhalese, Burmese and Japanese bhikkhus have been of service to the community at various times, their effectiveness dependent upon their ability to communicate and their attitude toward the still generally economically and socially depressed community.

The appearance of Marathi-speaking bhikkhus, with roots in the community itself, may create a situation in which religious leaders become more essential to the community. To be effective, they will have to be highly-educated, able to preach and teach, totally ethical, willing to completely identify with the community and free from any political ambition. Such a *sangha* is now emerging, but there are by no means enough bhikkhus to serve each Buddhist community. Along with the appearance of Marathi-speaking bhikkhus, the creative lay leadership continues to function. Three examples will serve to indicate its direction : two dedicated professors teach Pali to over 2000 students at the complex of colleges established by Ambedkar in Aurangabad, and are deeply involved in plans for a Buddhist center—with a resident bhikkhu– that will reach far beyond the student body. Another striking example is that of a young woman in Poona who combines work as a clerk in a government office with study for a law degree. She performed so well in a class taught by Thai bhikkhus in her community that she was sent to

a Buddhist Conference in Thailand. Since her return, she has participated in numerous weddings, funerals and other ritual occasions, leading the Pali *waṇdana* and giving talks on Buddhism. A third example of lay leadership is the most ambitious of all. Waman Godbole, one of the planners of the Nagpur Conversion in 1956, called an All-India Buddhist Dharma Conference in Nagpur in December, 1975. Eighty bhikkhus from many traditions and hundreds of lay leaders participated in the conference, with tens of thousands coming to the public sessions and taking part in processions. Godbole hopes for a structured organization that will unify all Buddhists in India. He recognizes that it took twenty years to plan such a conference, however, and is content to work slowly and patiently to build a functioning umbrella Buddhist organization. Godbole is a well-educated Buddhist layman who continues his railway job to support himself and who has not married in order to devote his life to the movement.

Leadership among Buddhists in Maharashtra has emerged during the last twenty years out of a vacuum. The Buddhists leaders are not related to the old Mahar religious leadership, which in any case lost its importance when Ambedkar's movement became committed to leaving Hinduism in the 1930s. The new Buddhist leader, whether a member of the *sañgha* or a lay person, is effective only if he or she can share a knowledge of Buddhism and if he or she is committed to the service of the community.

4. The Holy Days of the Maharashtrian Buddhists

The four great observances of contemporary Buddhists in India—Dhamma Dikṣa Day, Buddha Jayanti, Ambedkar's Death Memorial Day, and Ambedkar Jayanti—reveal their determination to preserve the hard-won glory of their past and to state their commitment to Buddhism. The anniversary of the day of the conversion, October 14, is celebrated as Dhamma Dikṣa Day by those who can return for a great ceremony to the field in Nagpur where the 1956 conversion was held; others hold local observances of varying sorts. In Aurangabad, the Buddhist caves just outside the city are the focus of a procession, Pali *waṇdana* and later games for the children, while speeches and song services are held in the colleges. Buddha Jayanti, the day of observance of the Buddha's birth, has been observed since 1950, when Ambedkar arranged for the celebration as a public occasion in Delhi. The Jayanti is a time for speeches, music, drama on Buddhist themes and occasionally a solemn procession.

Ambedkar's death day, December 6, is a time for quiet and sorrowful gatherings, and talks or music by one of the many singers or singing groups in the community predominate. Ambedkar's birth date, April 14 on the other hand, is a noisy and joyful occasion. Here the borrowings from the processions found in Hinduism, Islam and Jainism are clear. As in the Muslim Moharram or the Hindu Ganapati festival, local groups form committees, which plan their contribution to the city-wide procession. In Poona, the central point is the statue of Ambedkar near the railway station, and groups of dancing, shouting youngsters and older men march from their scattered localities to Ambedkar Square. The Maharashtrian dance game *legim* often is played by the marchers, as in the Ganapati festival, although the Buddhists have atleast one girls' group, which the Hindus do not. One group rented the city zoo's elephant in 1976 to carry Ambedkar's photograph in the procession, but generally the marchers try

to out-do each other in spirit rather than in constructing elaborate floats.

A Jayanti held at the Aundh Road Buddhist locality near Poona illustrates the mood of this day. Dozens of boys and a few elder men drummed and danced their way the twenty miles to the Ambedkar statue and back. A meeting began about 9 o'clock that night, presided over by one of the exhausted participants. Speeches were made by a young Marathi-speaking bhikkhu from another slum locality in Poona, by a Maratha caste convert to Buddhism who had just attended a Buddhist Conference in Thailand, and by this American scholar, who was considered an authority on Ambedkar's life. The speeches were followed by a local drama group. In an effort to unite the community every social group, male or female, and every political faction in the locality was invited to participate, and no outside political leaders were asked to attend. In one or another phase, the events of the day reached the children, the young people and the adults of the community. The procession was a sheer fun, the speeches of the bhikkhus and the Buddhist converts contained heavy doses of ethics and morality and the drama provided both entertainment and a glimpse of the Buddhist past.

While these observances bear some resemblance to Hindu or other Indian holy days or festivals, particularly in the idea of the public processions and the exhibiting of the photographs of the "gurus", the Buddha and Ambedkar, they are unlike Hindu occasions in their emphasis on teaching and in their rationality. There is no one astrologically-timed sacred moment, no one hallowed sacred space. There is no need for a religious figure to give an auspicious presence, blessing or rite. There is no spirit-possession, no religious ecstasy. These four observances are times for community spirit, for education, and for remembrance.

The innovations of the contemporary Buddhist movement in India represent those elements in the past of the Buddhists that are important to their present progress : the work of Ambedkar, their social unity in the face of continued prejudice and occasional violence, and their rejection of Hinduism as a religion of inequality, irrationality and superstitions. Nevertheless, there also is some retention of Hindu or Indian elements among the modern Buddhists—the *guru* idea, the public processions, the days honoring the birth or death of great men. It must be remembered that the Buddhists of India are a minority in a dominant Hindu society, and that, as in the case of other minorities, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and Jains, Buddhists' celebrations have been colored by the ways of showing identity, loyalty and group spirit that are a part of Indian culture.

The outward symbols of traditional Buddhism, that are most stressed, are those that carry the inner meaning of the conversion : honor, equality, rationality, humanism. The image of the Buddha used is a simple one; he is the enligntened one, not a god. The study of Pali is important, not only because it is the language of the Theravāda texts but as a symbol of commitment to the Buddhist world. Pali ritual phrases are used in group performance of *waṇdana*, partly to produce a moment of group unity and partly to show that this is the holy language of Buddhism, as Sanskrit is the holy language of Hinduism. The Buddhist art and holy places of the past are honored by contemporary Buddhists as proof of past greatness and as part of their own heritage. The decorated caves of Ajanta, Elora, Aurangabad, Nasik and Junnar are visited with reverence and awe and many make pilgrimages to Sanchi, Sarnath or Bodh Gaya.

Along with their amalgam of traditional Buddhism, the Mahar past and the socio-religious practices of Hindu society in general, the Buddhists of India seem to have

created some new and interesting developments on their own. The multi-purpose *vihāras* and the initiative and responsibility of the lay leaders are the most striking of these. Wherever it has gone, Buddhism has adapted itself to the needs of surrounding culture. The contemporary Buddhists of India are not an exact copy of Sinhalese, Burmese, Thai, Cambodian or Japanese Buddhists. As in those societies, Buddhism has retained some of its ancient lineaments while allowing those who claim commitment to it to change it in accordance with their own needs.[20]

FOOTNOTES

1. P. Lakshmi Narasu's book, *The Essence of Buddhism*, originally published in 1907 (Madras : Srinivasa Varadachari & Co.), was republished in 1948 (Bombay : Thacker & Co.) by Ambedkar who in his own preface hailed it as "the best book on Buddhism that has appeared so far... complete in its treatment and lucid in its exposition".

2. These estimates were given by Ven. Nyanajagat, head of the All India Bhikkhu Sangha, and Ven. Anand Kausalyayan respectively. Research on this topic was done in the field from January through April, 1976 and can be assumed to be the source of information not otherwise documented.

3. B.R. Ambedkar, *The Buddha and His Dhamma*, 2nd Edition (Bombay : Siddharth Publication, 1974), p. 254. Ambedkar numbered the volume's books, parts, sections and sentences or paragraphs, to facilitate reference and perhaps also to give a scriptural flavor. Since pagination differs between editions, these "verse" references will be given in parentheses after each citation.

4. Narasu (cf. footnote 1) had written much to the same effect : "The dictum accepted in all schools of Buddhism as the sole regulative principle is that nothing can be the teaching of the Master, which is not *in strict accord with reason*". (*op. cit.*, p. vii, 1907 edition, emphasis added).

5. Ambedkar, Introduction to 1st Edition of *The Buddha and His Dhamma*, 1957, p. ix, cited by Richard Taylor in "The Ambedkarite Buddhists", T.S. Wilkinson, ed., *Ambedkar and The Neo-Buddhist Movement* (Bangalore : Christian Institute for the Study of Religion and Society, 1972), p. 31.

6. Dhananjay Keer, *Dr. Ambedkar, His Life and Mission*, 2nd Edition (Bombay : Popular Prakashan, 1962), p. 505.

7. Dharmanand Kosambi, *Bhagvān Buddh* (Poona : Suvicar Prakashan Mandal, 1957) (originally published in 1940), pp. 102-107.

8. B.R. Ambedkar, *The Untouchables*, 2nd Edition (Shravasti, Balrampur : Jetavan Mahavihara, 1969), pp. 69, 98 and Chapter VII. The view that Untouchables were originally Buddhists was also held by leaders among Tamil *pariah* Buddhists, such as C. Iyodhi Doss (W.R. Vijayakumar, "A Historical Survey of Buddhism in India, a Neo-Buddhist Interpretation" in Wilkinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 20 ff). It should also be noted that it was in speeches and other writings, but not in *The Buddha and His Dhamma*, that Ambedkar dealt with the role of Nāgas in Buddhism and their relation to modern Untouchables. Confer also D.D. Kosambi (son of Dharmanand), *Ancient India, A History of Its Culture and Civilization* (New York : Random House, 1965), p. 109 : "The Koliyas were counted among the aboriginals with the generic label Nāgas." Here, as in Ambedkar and some other contemporary writings (see footnote 9) the term "aboriginal", as applied to India, is broader than the anthropological designation of certain "tribals" and appears to be synonymous with "non-Aryan".

9. V.S. Paramar, "Was the Buddha an Aryan?," *The Illustrated Weekly of India*, May 16, 1976, pp. 28ff.

10. Keer, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

11. Daya Pawar, *Kondwada* (Pune : Magova Prakashan, 1974) translated by Eleanor Zelliot, with Vidyut Bhagwat and Jayant Karve, from the Introduction, pp. 10-11.

12. Ambedkar, *The Buddha and His Dhamma*, Ist Edition, Introduction, p. x.,

cited by Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

13. The Indian press and many Westerners use the term "Neo-Buddhist" for the converts to Buddhism in the Ambedkar movement. The Buddhists themselves point out that the words "Neo-Muslim" or "Neo-Christian" are not used, and they find "Neo-Buddhist" a patronizing and unacceptable term.

14. Growth among Buddhists in the last decade has shown a 17% increase in contrast to a 24% increase for Hindus, 31% for Muslims, 32% for Sikhs and 33% for Christians. Buddhists claim that many outside Maharashtra would convert but for the fact that they lose their privileges as Scheduled Castes (scholarships, reserved Government jobs and other benefits) upon conversion, except in the State of Maharashtra.

15. These figures, which have been rounded to the nearest hundred, are from the *Census of India, 1971*, Series 1, Paper 2 of 1972 : Religion. I have omitted those areas where numbers of Tibetans obviously account for Buddhist figures, but some refugees and some carry-over Buddhist groups in Bengal and Orissa may account for several thousands in these figures.

16. From "Majha Bhimraya" (My Bhima, the King), a song collected by Russ Geyer for an under-graduate research paper on the songs of the Buddhists, Poona, 1969.

17. From "Atta" in *Golpitha* by Namdeo Dhasal. Poona : Nilkanth Prakashan, 1975 reprint.

18. *Waṇdana* is defined in Molesworth's dictionary as "adoring, worshipping, rendering reverence of homage", and is used in place of the words describing Hindu prayer or ritual, *prārthana* or *puja*. *Waṇdana* generally consists of the *trisharana* and other Pali Buddhist textual material.

19. Some political leaders have done yeoman work in the promotion of Buddhism : Dadasaheb Gaikwad has built a complex of schools and a *vihāra* in Nasik and D.T. Rupavate in Ahmadnagar; B.C. Kamble and his followers have been active in Buddhist teachings; R.D. Bhandare has kept his interest in Buddhism even after leaving the Republican Party for Congress, and I am told that he is responsible for the translation of the *Tripiṭika* into Hindi by the Government of Bihar. Nevertheless the factions among the political leadership have resulted in factions among local Buddhists, and there now is an attempt to place Buddhist activities and organizations in a totally non-political context.

20. For further reading, see Adele Fiske, "Scheduled Caste Buddhist Organizations" in J. Michael Mahar, ed. *The Untouchables in Contemporary India* (Tucson : University of Arizona Press, 1972); the work of D.C. Ahir, the major writer of the movement in English, particularly, *India's Debt to Buddhism* (New Delhi : Maha Bodhi Society of India, 1964), and *Buddhism in Modern India* (Nagpur : Bhikkhu Niwas Prakashan, 1972); and two of my articles, "Buddhism and Politics in Maharashtra" in Donald E. Smith, ed. *South Asian Politics and Religion* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1966) and "The Psychological Dimension of the Buddhist Movement in India" in G.A. Oddie, ed. *Religious Conversion and Revival Movements in South Asia in Medieval and Modern Times* (Delhi : Manohar, 1977.)

11

Views of Women's Roles in Buddhist Tibet

BEATRICE D. MILLER

TRADITIONAL TIBET, with its secular as well as religious authority vested in its ecclesiastic hierarchs, has occupied a unique position in the world history of Buddhism or, for that matter, in the world at large. The interweaving of secular and religious rule far exceeded that displayed in the Vatican, or in the Holy Roman Empire. Thus, it is fascinating to examine the position of women in that society which has been so largely predicated on Buddhist doctrine.

One can explore the role of Tibetan women in the propagation of the Dharma, or of women as canonical scholars or as members of the Sangha. Such examination would include the role of Ma-gcig (Mother) Lab Drönma (Lab-kyi sgron-ma) to whom R.A. Stein attributes prime responsibility for the dissemination of the doctrines and practices associated with *good* in the 12th century's religious and philosophical renaissance.[1] One could probe into the female incarnation, Dorje Phagmo (rdo-rje phag mo, the Thunderbolt [Diamond] Sow), who presided over a coeducational monastery and whose sanctity and reverence ranked just below that of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas and the Sakya Hierarchs. Various scholars are translating and tracing the biographies and religious lineages of Tibetan women religious leaders.

From the standpoint of anthropology, this article will deal with Tibetan women—regardless of their lay or ecclesiastic status. It seems advisable first, however, to make some preliminary comments, since this piece is concerned with *traditional* Tibet, prior to the introduction of Marxist-Leninist or Maoist influences or ideology. Therefore, the context assumes major importance.

(*a*) Tibet was surrounded by both Moslem and Hindu nations, such as present-day India, including Kashmir, Pakistan and Nepal, and by the Confucian Imperial and Republican China. Within these powerful and influential

neighbors women were often—at best—legal nonentities.

(*b*) A similar statement about being in a legal limbo could be made for women in the United States prior to the 1920s. Moreover, until 1976, American women have had to overcome sex-based barriers to establish credit, or to set up a business, or otherwise engage in self-initiated economic enterprises.

(*c*) Until the past five years, Italian women had no recourse to a divorce, or to protection from desertion.

(*d*) Only within the past fifteen years have French women acquired the legal right to control their own incomes, and it is not much longer ago that English and American husbands also had sole control over the dowries that their wives brought to them.

It is well to keep the above in mind in order to evaluate the position of women in Tibet, relative to that position in other parts of the Asian continent and elsewhere, regardless of the religious or philosophical rationales for such positions. It is within these contexts that myths have been born.

In the minds of its neighbors and of more distant peoples, Tibet frequently has stood as synonym for the "unreal", the "otherworldly" or the "unearthly." If one wished to postulate some remote or extremely unlikely situation, fraught with mystery and extraordinary powers, Tibet has been there to provide the locale. For example, the Jesuit monk-scholar, Ippolito Desideri, who spent many years in Tibet (1713-21), discovered that Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism might really have been the Devil's creation as the mirror image of the Vatican and the True Faith.[2] Long before his discovery the Chinese had stories about the "Kingdom(s) of Women" located, naturally, on the Tibetan Plateau. Again, a mirror image of the correct social order was to be found there. According to Stein[3], both Indian and Chinese accounts deal with :

> "...Suvarṅagotra (the Golden Race) or the western land of Women (Strīrājya). These are the countries referred to in *our* old legends about the ants' gold and the Amazons whom Alexander was unable to conquer. The abundance of gold and the political power of women caused a certain amount of confusion between these places and the eastern Land of Women, which had the same characteristics...it may well have been that real connections existed between the two separate regions." (my italics).

It is easy to understand why Hindu and Confucian alike would attribute so alien and "unnatural" a concept as "dominant women" to their neighboring cloud land. From the Chinese standpoint, what could be more "barbarian"? From the Hindu, what could be more remote from the image of Sita in the Ramayana, especially if the final touch of promiscuity were added to that of female authority?

How much truth did, in fact, lie behind these "Kingdom of Women" concepts or can they just be dismissed as part of the general Tibetan mystique? Some of the answers will follow, but first some caveats are in order. If there is "a truth" about Tibet, it is that there are "many truths". Generalizations are common but—even more commonly—they are misleading. The most accurate, if facetious, statement that can be made is that : if there is any possible permutation on any theme, Tibet is likely to

have it. Even if the permutation does not seem possible, Tibet still may have it. What "realities" follow are, therefore, very specific in terms of particular locales, particular times and particular individuals.

One "truth" : *Tibet's legendary history*

After the insemination of a female earth demon-deity (a manifestation of *sgrol-ma* or Tara) by a monkey (a manifestation of Chenrezig [*spyan-ras-gzigs*] or Avalokiteśvara), there were seven Heavenly Kings. Stein says :

> "...It is a peculiarity of these kings that their names are derived from those of their *mothers*..."[4] to whom they returned when they ascended to the sky at death, leaving no corpses. Misfortune befell, the last of this line remained on earth, and the kings began to have bodies to be entombed. However, two further kingly lines, the Legs with six and the Lde with eight—while themselves earthbound—had deities as queens so that each was also a "divine son".[5]

Tibet's more recent History

> "...it often came about that daughters inherited a throne and reigned (Golok, Derge, Ganje, Ngem, Lhatse, Poyul, etc.)..."[6]

This might occur because the previous occupant of the throne had had no sons or because he (or she) judged a daughter to be more fit.[7] Whether the woman actually reigned as queen-ruler, or was a puppet behind whom male ministers pulled the strings is not nearly as significant a distinction between male and female rulers as it might appear. Frequently, kings too were puppets behind whom ministers pulled strings. Sometimes these string-pullers were relatives of the king's wife or mother. The latter also pulled strings, even to the point of eliminating the nominal ruler or supplanting him with a more pliable successor.[8]

The actual frequency—or the numbers and importance—of such female rulers has been obscured by the unfortunate fact that the observers who came from non-Tibetan traditions, referred to the various states as "kingdoms". They implicity assumed that male rulers were the rightful ones as, of course, they would have been in most European, as well as east and south Asian traditions. The fact that these observers were male also possibly played a part in their assumptions. The Tibetan designations are not sex-oriented, but refer to geographic locations or membership.

Tibetan Religious Hierarchs

British authors, perhaps because they were familiar with reigning queens as well as kings, usually mention Dorje Phagmo and her exalted position. Many others have concentrated exclusively on male incarnation lines and male Sangha constituents. Where they have given some slight acknowledgement to the existence of "nuns", they have consistently dismissed them from the major theological scene, just as the Roman Catholic convent orders have been. Only recently, in such work as Azis'[9] and others,

has there been serious attention to female incarnation lines, teaching lines and Sangha constituents. While Dorje Phagmo is the most revered and famous, she is by no means the *only* female incarnation. There is presently living in the United States a young female incarnation of a very distinguished Nyingmapa lineage. New research should shed light on this whole, too long neglected, area.

Another "truth" : *Tibetan literature and history*

Western literature about Tibet frequently proclaims that Tibetans were only interested in, and recorded, religion and religious history. It might be somewhat more accurate to recognize that these were the kinds of literature that most Westerners and others sought to bring out from Tibet. In reality, many Tibetans kept very comprehensive records for family, hamlet, village and governmental purposes[10]. This type of literature pertains to everyday life : who contributed what to whose or which festive occasions, so that it can be matched appropriately when that contributor's festive occasion is celebrated; what disposition shall be made of which properties at death? what obligations are due in return for land or other gifts or property? Who is responsible for what types of tax or rent to be paid to whom at which intervals? What kind of marriage shall be entered into, and what shall transpire should the participants wish separation or divorce? These are just some examples of actual Tibetan concerns far removed from religion and international politics. These also are some of the areas that cast light on the position of women in this Buddhist state. It is misleading and impossible to content ourselves with incarnations and queens. Their very presence is both a reflection of—and a contribution to—the place of the "ordinary" Tibetan woman. Again it seems useful to examine the perceptions of their neighbors in light of the "realities" experienced on the plateau.

Some other truths : *Modern Chinese views*

When the Peoples' Liberation Army of the Chinese Peoples' Republic marched into Lhasa, it proclaimed the Peoples' Republic's intent to liberate Tibetan women—to give them independence from their subservience to father, husband or other male. The women in Lhasa sang "welcoming" songs to their "liberators." As Miller and Snyder[11] pointed out, these welcoming songs were prime examples of the fine art of "tsik-gyak" or "Tibetan double-talk" which has been honed to a sharp edge by years of practice at matching wits with, and mocking, those who thought themselves superior. To these Lhasan women, the P.L.A.'s promise of "women's liberation" was as attractive as a deluge at harvest time would be to a farmer. Why?

During the 1940's, the Chinese anthropologist, Li An-che, who served as cultural adviser on Tibet and Tibetans for the Kuomintang and later for the Peoples' Republic, had been doing research for years in Tibetan areas that had long been under Chinese control. His field observations led him to advise his government that China might well emulate the Tibetans regarding such concerns as : the independence of women from male subservience; the ability of women to inherit and maintain households, lands and economic enterprises without male guardianship; the freedom of women to enter into, and to sever marriage bonds, etc. In short, he recommended that China's women be

"liberated" along the lines of the traditional Tibetan practices.[12]

Modern Indian Views

Rather than contemplating emulation, many Indians have viewed Tibetan womanhood with sheer horror. In the early 1950s there still was relatively free trade access beetween Tibet and India's Darjeeling District. Furthermore, the Parsi, Indian, Kashmiri and European residents of the district were still reminiscent about the events of World War II. During that period, prospects for trade and profit brought Tibetans—both men and women—down to India. To the residents, these women were obviously "loose" because they fraternized with men very freely. The obvious conclusion was that one of their major items for trade and profit must have been sexual favors. Even more disconcerting was the fact that these Tibetan women welcomed the attentions of not just one, but of several, males. They seemed willing to "flit" from one to another, rather than "having the decency" to form a quasi-permanent bond with a particular soldier or officer sent to the hills for rest and rehabilitation. In short, if they were not practicing prostitutes, they were appallingly promiscuous. In any event, they comported themselves in a fashion that shocked the Indians, as well as the more staid Europeans. (A Swiss Augustinian monk was still in shock from the sight of Tibetan males tending children and washing dishes along the route. Obviously both sexes were confusing).

One of the greatest discomforts for the District's gossipers was the fact that even women of high social position were indulgent. To many it would have been understandable if "lower class" Tibetan women behaved in this fashion, but it was too much when a woman who had to be invited to prestigious social functions might come accompanied by the "wrong" male companion. This gossip continued long after the war's end. It may well have been pervasive even before the war, since there has been relatively constant coming and going across the passes since early in the 20th century.

The truth is that Tibetan women—and many other "hill women" including Nepalis—have never practiced purdah. In fact, even Tibetan Moslem women had never practiced purdah. In childhood and youth there has been no sex-based separation or segregation. Children of both sexes play the same games together. In a Thematic Apperception Test for psychological anthropology, Tibetan informants consistently corrected a photograph showing just a group of boys playing, because it lacked females.[13] From adolescence on, in Tibet, there frequently were song competitions and challenges between unmarried males and females. Individual males and females might pair off—and might or might not have sexual relations. If the woman did become pregnant, she could become the butt of scurrilous gossip and be shamed—not because she was "immoral", but because she was "stupid". No stigma attached to the offspring.[14]

Other Neighbors' Views

While "the Tibetan woman" may have been viewed as an ideal by Li, and as a Jezebel by many Indians, she was regarded in still another way by her Sikkimese and Bhutanese cousins. Like a Parisienne to many westerners, the Lhasan woman in particular epitomized haute couture and ultra-sophistication. A popular folksong,

common to the Sikkimese and Bhutanese, is one entitled "Tsung ba lassie lo." Both men and women sing it. When the men sing, they usually mock both the style and the sentiments of the women. The lyrics deal with a Lhasan girl's visit to a local village, where she quickly turns the heads of all the males. The local women cannot attract any men. Therefore they employ all sorts of strategems to convince the Lhasan that—much as the villagers cherish her presence—she is urgently required back home.

Yet, despite her charms, "the Tibetan woman" threatened these males as well. This may be especially true in the Darjeeling District and its bordering areas. There the men had been exposed to the Hindu concept that the wife's "god" was her husband, whose care and service were her preordained duty. To such men, the prospect of marrying a Tibetan woman was practically equivalent to the prospect of castration. Some resorted to various evasive maneuvers to escape such an impending fate. Even some Sikkimese and Bhutanese males who had Tibetan wives—frequently as marriages of state or for added prestige—regarded their Tibetan wives with considerable ambivalence.

Some Tibetan Views

The following are characteristics attributed to the sexes by Tibetan respondents to the Thematic Apperception Tests referred to above.[15]

Female characteristics	*Male characteristics*
The nature of women is cool, delicate, temperate, patient, wise and forebearing. The female Tibetans are descendants of the She-Ogress, hence the impetuous, violent, witch-like nature of women.	The nature of men is short-tempered, rude, impatient, open to violent means. The males are descended from Chen-re-zig in the form of the monkey ancestor, hence the calm, judicious, rational nature of men.
Females are more apt to failure Women are as capable as men, if not better, at running a business or a household.	Men are more able to succeed.
Women are as cunning as foxes, hiding vile tempers, and mean spirits behind calm and attractive features.	Men are as cunning as foxes, hiding vile characters and weak spirits behind calm and attractive features.

Perhaps the prime current exemplars of the formidable nature of the Tibetan women are the steely-minded, effective—and ravishingly beautiful-Tsarong family women. Among them we find the widow of the late Prime Minister of Bhutan. Her continuing political influence in Bhutan has reflected her personal qualities as a Tsarong woman, independent of the fortunes of her late husband's kinsmen. There is also the exceedingly capable Rin-chen Dol-ma Taring, who has fashioned—and been the real moving force behind—the Tibetan Homes Foundation. Her skills at negotiating and implementing the acquisition of properties for the Foundation left indelible impressions on European and Indian observers alike. These qualities are not exclusively Tsarong traits. There are innumerable Tibetan women-aristocrats and craftspeople, traders,

nuns, teachers and farmers, who exhibit the same capacities with the same unconcern and naturalness. In the early 1950s our first Tibetan acquaintance was a young woman trader who supplied Tibetan objects to a major shop in Calcutta. She made annual trips by mule and train.

The foregoing has dealt mainly with observers' impressions, and some of the "truths" behind these impressions. What are some of the factors that contributed both to the realities and to the impressions? It is unsafe to generalize, so what will be presented are illustrations of some of the potentials and capacities within the Tibetan framework, which make such "truths" possible. It should be recognized that there are also examples and situations that are diametrically opposed to those being noted. This is especially true if one includes the border areas, such as Sikkim and Bhutan, or portions of southeast or northeast Tibet. In such areas, the position of Tibetan women may more closely resemble that of women in India and China. However, even in these areas the Tibetan patterns have mitigated against real female subservience.

Marriage Patterns :

We have already noted the widespread practice of maintaining registers and records for various purposes. Perhaps one of the most pervasive purposes is that of the marriage contract. These may be drawn up formally and may exactly stipulate the obligations of the prospective spouses, of their respective families to each other and to the "couple" jointly and to each member of the marriage.[16] Such obligations may include the payment to the bride's family for their loss of a daughter *if* that is entailed, and what endowments the groom and his family and the bride's family will bestow on her for her own purposes. Payment to the bride's family may include a guaranteed period during which the groom will serve his parents-in-law.

Except for its formality, the above may seem quite straightforward and familiar. However, the contract and various of these terms will be modified according to the nature of the marriage that is contemplated. There are situations in which the groom marries *into* his wife's family as a *mag-pa*. In such a case he may bring some endowment from his own family, but will have no further say in their affairs. Neither will he have authority in his wife's affairs. There are also the more familiar arrangments in which the bride marries into the groom's family as a *na-ma*. The contract further may stipulate that there will be multiple husbands, most usually some or all brothers, or that there will be multiple wives, most usually sisters. Such terms will be recorded, including which, if any, of the multiple spouses will be to able contract another arrangement. According to the Tibetan respondents[17], the most common arrangement is "sa-sum", which involves a union of three spouses, regardless of whether the arrangement involves two women and one man or the more common two men and one woman. In the 1950s there was a trading family, one husband of which spent much of his time travelling between the Darjeeling District and Tibet. The other husband remained in Lhasa and produced some of the items for sale. Their wife managed the stall in Lhasa and kept the books. In this case the husbands were not brothers.[18] In at least one Tibetan Moslem family, the husband was a *mag-pa*, as had been his father before him. The business, a tailoring enterprise, had been passed down from grandmother to daughter to granddaughter.

Most commonly, the literature deals with na-ma who marry a set of brothers in an agricultural situation. This practice presumably mitigated against the division of holdings into uneconomic units.[19] However, it is also reported that the fields were divided among the brothers and a separate portion was reserved for their wife.[20] Whatever the actual case, the particular arrangement is usually specified in the contract.

Contractual arrangements deal not only with the definition of the type of marriage and the properties that will be reserved for the respective spouses. They also stipulate the ascribed paternity of any issue, the conduct that will be expected between the spouses, and what will be regarded as serious transgressions. They may include what punishments or fines will befall the husband who mistreats or abandons his wife, or squanders the household's financial base. Should the terms of the contract be violated, the respective families and friends of the marriage partners may act as intermediaries. If there is the possibility or the desire for reconciliation, an amended contract may be drawn up with the guarantee that the offender(s) will abstain from improper behavior.

Divorce Patterns :

Rather than an amended marriage contract the injured party may desire a divorce contract. Apparently, most frequently the woman will obtain the divorce.[21] Grounds can include too much gambling or drinking, or too-expensive extramarital affairs. Divorce may also occur by mutual agreement as, for example, when one spouse in a sa-sum union wants to set up a separate or monogamous household. Divorce contracts will be as detailed as marriage contracts, including the disposition of the children, compensation to the woman for having borne children, visitation rights, and financial settlements.

However, neither a woman nor a man will necessarily marry or, having married, remain in that condition. It is possible for a woman, as well as a man, to undertake a life of celibacy or to abandon the householder path even after marriage and parenthood.[22] Or, one may decide upon a temporary absence from domesticity to go on pilgrimage to some of the more distant sacred sites with a group of one's "religious friends"[23], minus one's spouse(s). On pilgrimage, all vows—and presumably contract terms—may be suspended.

Householder Patterns :

A household—and the householder(s)—may be strictly female. " ..This type of family is peculiar to the Tibetans, where mothers, daughters, grandmothers and sisters may form a family, with the husband of any of the females being unknown or dead. It is not uncommon to find three generations—grandmother, mother and daughters—living together . . . Being bilateral in descent, (either matrilineal or patrilineal), the Tibetans are not particular whether the male or the female inherits the family line . . . when babies are born they belong to the mother and are taken as such by the society..."[24], unless proper compensation has been paid, as mentioned earlier.

In fact, Li found that in Derge there were more strictly female households than there were strictly male, or mixed sex (sans spouses) households. He stated :

> "...It is of course unusual for single males to live independently ..There are more single males (3.06%) in agricultural than in nomadic communities (1.55%)...settled life makes it easier for single males to get along than does the nomadic..."[25] Apparently the females could manage better than the males, regardless of the nature of the economic activity !

Whether dealing with western, eastern or central Tibet, Carrasco found that women were either "side-dwellers" (dependents or tenants) or "khral-pa" (taxpayers) with relatively small holdings. However, there also are instances where a woman has inherited a major estate and taken a mag-pa to fulfill the official governmental responsibilities associated with it. In Sikkim, women cannot either inherit or control land. In Tibet, the disposition of all property, both real and movable, may be stipulated by written will to include or exclude various potential heirs, regardless of sex.

Economic Entrepreneurship :

Whether a woman acquires land from her own family ,from a spouse, from other sources or has no land at all, she still is not excluded from commercial enterprises. Women managed most of the trade at the markets, and in the stalls and shops in Lhasa —and in Mussoorie, Darjeeling, Delhi and Calcutta where Tibetans now do business. Women run restaurants, tea and ch'ang shops and hotels, regardless of their husbands' social position or even existence. Many have become wealthy through such activities.

In fact, women customarily control the purse-strings even within the strictly domestic scene. According to informants, accounting and bookkeeping instruction were standard parts of the program for young girls who attended some family, monastic or other school, prior to the events of the 1950s.[26] Even more to the point, husband(s) have no right to the wife's wealth. She may dispose of it in life as she desires, or she can will it to daughters, to all issue, to spouse(s), siblings—or to religious institutions.

Political Activity :

With the exception of those cases in which a woman inherits a throne or forms a point in an incarnation continuum, there were no women "officials". Yet, although they lacked the titles and the full responsibility associated with them, Das[27], Ekvall[28], Harrer[29], Rinchen Dolma[30], and others all attest to the enormous political influence of women in Tibet. Rinchen Dolma, discussing the events of the days preceeding and immediately following March 13, 1959 says :

> "...The Lhasa women had made many anti-Chinese posters and when I joined them they were lined up...shouting slogans...Our women were more fierce than our men...All the shops were shut and no one was on the streets except the shouting

women..."[31] who spurred the uprising against Chinese control. These days, among the Tibetans in exile, there are many women in positions of high responsibility. Each March 10th observance includes reports and future programs from women, as well as men, representatives.

Relevance to Buddhism :

How account for the sort of picture presented above? What relevance, if any, does it have to Buddhism, or Buddhism to it? Often, one reads authors who suggest that a reason for the Tibetan permutations is the existence of a disproportionately large sangha. Sooner or later, the author suggests that the presence of so large aproportion of male celibates results in an oversupply of women, and in the need for women to undertake all sorts of essential occupations and responsibilities that "normally" pertain to men. Then an author, such as Li, states that :

> "...this situation makes a normal, healthy life impossible..."because it"...is certainly the cause of unhealthy sex relations."[32] Using these standards of "normality", there are other problems.

(*a*) The sex ratio of the total population is biologically normal, with almost equal numbers of males and females. Thus, the imputed withdrawal of such a large proportion of males should result in an excessive supply of females. This should presumably encourage a very high rate of polygyny, with every non-celibate male having a number of females available or—in order to "normalize" the ratios—there should be a high incidence of female infanticide.

(*b*) However, men *do not* have their pick of women whose families must offer additional inducements to assure that their daughters will find spouses. Moreover, one woman may more usually have multiple husbands than the reverse. There are no barriers to unmarried women coping with the exigencies of life on their own. Whatever infanticide did occur was not on the basis of the sex of the offspring, but on such offspring's potential for embarrassment.

Furthermore, it is unrealistic to equate the number of male members of the sangha with celibacy over the long term. It is better to accept the fact that—even within the Dge lugs pa setting—there may be "flow-through" just as there is in the other sects. That is, celibacy may be an interlude, rather than life-long, for men as well as women. Regardless of sect or of sex, the majority of the inhabitants of any monastery consists of individuals who have *not* taken the highest vows. At least, that seems to be the consensus of most accounts. (With this in mind. statements to the effect that women do not usually take the highest vows do not reflect that broad a gap between male and female sangha members). Without any derogatory intent, Li's disproportionately high ratio of all-female households may, in fact, represent a situation where the male members of the household—if any—were occupying the ranks of the monastic population during the period of his survey.

The nature of the total setting — in terms of economy, sociopolitical aspects,

population size and distribution, terrain, climate, etc., contribute to prolonged absences or separations on the one hand and, on the other, to the encouragement of self-reliance on the part of the stay-at-homes. It also predicates the need to retain a viable "home-base" and to fully exploit all the potential contributions of the limited population. In fact, even the majority of the monastic membership took part in productive activities in addition to their more strictly religious or spiritual contributions.

Buddhism has played a very significant part in this Tibetan phenomenon. First, there is the fact that in Tibet the doors to both lay and clerical spheres have been open to both sexes since Buddhism's inception. Secondly, as one experiences the cycle of rebirth, a person born a male in this particular life may well have been a female in another—the sex is fixed only for the current life. This implication showed up to a startling extent in the thematic apperception responses, where many of the stories told gave no clue to the sex of the respondent. So extraordinary a degree of cross-sex empathy can best be explained by some informants' own expressions of belief that their previous incarnation had been of the opposite sex.

Finally, the religious belief plays an even more significant role where the Karmic doctrine has been reinforced by visible incarnation lineages dedicated to the goal that "All Shall Become Buddha", without specifying male/female distinctions. Thus, in Tibet the socio-ecological setting and the Buddhist doctrine have worked together like "Wisdom" and "Method" to fashion a scene unlike the dreary phenomena of unremitting female subjugation.

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12

Tracking Levy-Strauss along the Eight-fold Path : The Message of the Mahavamsa

ROBERT J. MILLER

ABSTRACT

THE MAHAVAMSA is a skillfully constructed "history", transmitting messages both overtly and subtly, in example and at various levels of consciousness. The key messages, derived by application of *an approach* identified with the name of Claude Levy-Strauss (*i.e.* structural analysis), are shown to be the following :

(*a*) Northern Ceylon and the Anuradha Center of Buddhism are "flawed", historically. Though they are to become the Political-Religious Center, it is only through fusion with the "pure" South.

(*b*) The South is the area of 'true Dhamma', and it is the area which finally brings into being a complete transformation of Lanka into *the* Center of Buddhism, with the instrument of Dutthagamani.

(*c*) The basic opposition in the Mahavamsa is between Universal Power and Limited Power. The Buddha demonstrates Universal Power in his visits to the Island. All who follow, until Dutthagamani, demonstrate only Limited Power. Dutthagamani himself can "complete" the power fusion in the Island with his death.

(*d*) The Mahavamsa is itself a 'fusion' of three themes :

(*i*) The development of the 3 visits of the Buddha;

(*ii*) the development of the spread of Dhamma to Ceylon;

(*iii*) the development of the "true carriers" of the Dhamma—the Mahavihara monks, the Southern Lanka centers, and the indigenous "good" non-humans.



(After Geiger)

In pursuing these themes, it is shown that the traditional location of Nagadipa is inconsistent with the structural characteristics of the rest of the Mahavamsa, and Nagadipa is re-located to the South. The Northwest is shown to be a place in which only evil events happen, though these are events which prepare the way for the triumph of the Dhamma.

I. The Basic Story

The 'Old' Mahavamsa (of Geiger) is two 'books', two 'stories'. On the one hand it is relating of the establishment and vicissitudes of Buddhism in Sri Lanka from the traditional 'earliest times' through the reign of King Mahasena (325-352, Geiger p. xxxviii). On the other, it is a 'secular' history, chronicling the establishing and development of the Sinhalese State, complete with struggles between regions, relatives, natives and foreigners for control of the island. The weaving of these two stories together is done by an author residing in Anuradhapura, in the North of the island, sometime during the 6th Century A.D. Geiger considers the author to have intentionally rearranged the earlier Chronicle (the Dipavamsa), which in turn was based upon older materials. (ix, x, xii). Internal evidence suggests further that the Author was a supporter of the Mahavihara doctrinal position (anti-Vaitulyavadin) against the monks of the Abhayagirivihara. The chronicle ends (or rather, the Geiger 'Old Mahavamsa' ends) when the quarrels (to continue for some centuries afterward) have temporarily been settled. But the Order is clearly in disarray, the King Mahasena is not satisfied, (his 'evil Thera' adviser attempts to destroy the boundaries of the Mahavihara) and it is only the intercession of his minister and one of the king's wives which protects the Mahavihara and its monks. The Mahavihara supportive minister is Meghavannabhaya, later to assume the throne; he has previously gone to Malaya (see map) and to Rohana/Ruhuna in the far south to raise a rebellion. It is in this context of relationships (South/North; King/Order; Minister-adviser/King; wife/Minister); and the establishment of *boundaries* that we begin to examine structural features of the 'Old' Mahavamsa.

Basic structure of the Mahavamsa itself:

By far the most interesting structural characteristics are found in the content of the work's chapters. However, it is useful to draw back briefly to examine the overall pattern of the work. Are there any 'clues' to the meaning of the whole, the overt/covert implications of the parallel stories contained in the organization of the chapters? Or does the author arrange the material simply as a 'stylistic device'? I do not believe so; the contents of the work are demonstrably precise as to locales, personages, etc. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that the ordering of chapters is possibly significant.

But what are we to look for? If there is 'structure', it is not enough to simply count chapters, or to accept each at face value as equivalent to the other. We must group the chapters by focus, emphasis, significance (hopefully into what the author might consider significant) and search for intended balances—such balances as a reader sharing the structural world of the author might automatically perceive.

Geiger himself gives us a starting point :

> "The chronicle must originally have come down only to the arrival of Mahinda in Ceylon. But it was continued later, and indeed, to all appearance, down to the reign of Mahasena (beginning of the 4th century A.D.), with which reign the Dipavamsa as well as the Mahavamsa comes to an end" (Geiger, p. x).

Examining the original arrangement of chapters, we find that if we accept Geiger literally, we have to do with *13* Chapters; if by "the arrival of Mahinda in Ceylon" is meant arrival *and* implanting of the Doctrine and Order, then we are dealing with *20* chapters.

Recall, however, that we are dealing with a construction which, in the author's words..."compiled by the ancient (sages) was here too long drawn out and there too closely knit; and contained many repetitions." (Geiger, Ch. 1,2). Thus the whole 37 Chapters must be taken into account, with the first 20, perhaps indicating a basic earlier structural form, and the next 17 reflecting the author's attempt to continue the inherent message while contending with the reality of his time. That reality, as noted, was one in which the "true Dhamma" was threatened, the Right Relation of King and Order was askew, and the future of the Mahavihara, bearing the 'true Dhamma' and the 'true' line of descent from the Buddha, was clouded. In short, the King had lost his bearings and was looking in the wrong direction for advice. Where should the King look? Overtly, to the Mahavihara and his predecessors who best exemplified the periods of Right Relation of King and Order, and to learn from those who were misdirected. Subtly, the King should look to Lanka, to the Center of Lanka and the heartland of the Doctrine in Lanka—*i.e.*, to the South. Only with the Southern Center and the Northern Center, Doctrine and Secular Rule linked in Anuradhapura, would the glory of Lanka survive.

Where does this "fantasy" come from? It is derived first from the focus of the Chapters as noted on Tables 1 and 2. You will see that Chapters 1-5 establish the fundamental themes alluded to above. More detailed argumentation will be provided later. Chapter 1 itself elaborates the Southern base of the Doctrine in Lanka; Chapters 6-10 introduce men into the Island, to provide a mechanism for the Dhamma to work through, and to establish the Northern Center. Chapters 11-19 bring to fruition the past events, and establish the passage of 'legitimacy' as *the* Center of Buddhism to Lanka. But there is still a flaw; the Northern Center is imaging India; and glorious as Devanampiyatissa is, how supportive of the Order he is, he is *not* 'of the Island'. His strength comes from the Secular line, from his deference to the Order, and his connexion with Asoka. Mahinda too, is connected to Asoka, as is his 'sister' Sanghamitta. But Devanampiyatissa, together with Mahinda, is a focus for the firm establishment of the Order, the symbols of the Buddha, and the *complete* conversion of Men in Lanka. There remains yet to bring the Buddha back to the Island, and to re-establish the link of Northern Center with Southern Center (heartland).

Chapter 21 begins again, but now the emphasis is to shift, in the next 12 chapters (13 in all) to the compression of all that has happened before, and to culminate in the "imaging of Lanka" as the Center of the Buddha, the Dharma, the Sangha and the Chakravartin. This is the story of Dutthagamani, a true child of the soil, *the*

Bodhisattva of Lanka.

Finally, Chapters 33-36 presage the weakening of the tie between 'true Dhamma' and 'true King'; between the N. and S. Centers, and once more the now evil influence of the Indian connection. It is the story of the decline of the Mahavihara, the disregard of tradition, and the repeated attempts to restore the condition of Right Relation of King and Order.

In what direction should the King look for guidance ? As indicated in Table 1, to the Mahavihara; to Lanka; to the Buddha, who is rooted in both South and North, and in his delegation of power to other gods and beings on the Island, and to *Dutthagamani*, who lurks with Maitreya in the Tushita Heavens.

II. Derivation of Structural Features

In proposing the 'structure' and message I have presented in Table I and II specialists may note that I have taken some liberties with scholarly tradition. I have argued that the Buddha's 3 visits to Sri Lanka establish the "spiritual source" in the Southern part of the Island. I have suggested that Dutthagamani is *the* focal personage, rather than his sharing that spot with Mahinda and Devanampiyatissa. I have suggested that the Doctrine was not fully, completely and formally entrenched in the Island until Dutthagamani "imaged Lanka" as the Centre of the Buddhist world. Yet would I return without comment to the beginning and attempt to re-affirm *my* 'structure'. Questions raised in Tables I and II will only be clarified by examination in more detail of specific chapters and the structure, particularly, inherent in Chapter I and Chapters VI and VII.

Chapter I and the problem of Naga Dipa :

Crucial to my argument (that this is, above all a Lanka 'nationalist Buddhist' composition), is the interplay between the Buddha's Conquests in Lanka before there were 'Men', and the Conquests of Vijaya. It is these Conquests which prepare the way for the ultimate Conquest of Dutthagamani, and the consolidation of the 'true Dhamma' in Lanka. In the process of comparison, some of the structural features suggested earlier will emerge in their proper places. Necessary to this discussion is a close following of Map I and the associated names and triangulations. We turn then to the Map and Table 3 (Conquests of the Buddha and Vijaya compared).

1. Follow first the Conquests of the Buddha. The first conquest is that one resulting in a humane relocation—but no conversion of Yakshas. The locale is that of the future *Mahiyangana* Stupa, traditionally considered to be located at Old Bintenne (presumably present Alutnuwara) on the edge of the descent to the Eastern Plains. It is also roughly on the edge of the Wet-Dry Zones of S. Ceylon. Here the Buddha accepts the offering of the Island, in return for *release* of the Yakshas from terrors he has created for them.

"We all, O Lord, give you even the whole of our island,
Give us release from our fear,"...

TABLE I

Focal Direction (1)	*Chapter & Title* (2)	*Chapter Emphasis* (3)
South	I. The Visit of the Thathagata.	3 visits of the Buddha establish spiritual and secular domination over Lanka. Key points in South Center, South, West, East & N. Center.
Extra-Lanka 'Directionless'	II. The Race of Mahasammata	Establishes the Buddha's kingly line of descent. Legitimates combined secular-spiritual rule.
(Extra-Lanka)	III, IV, V. The First Council; the Second Council; The Third Council.	Establishes the legitimacy of the Mahavihara & its traditional right to represent the 'true Dhamma'.
North (extra-Lanka) NW Lanka	VI. The Coming of Vijaya.	Establishes Northern *Human* base; places Men on Lanka. Linka. Links Men with Yaksha inhabitants.
N. Center	VII. The Consecration of Vijaya.	Establishes secular Human *rule* & legitimacy. Establishes connection with S. India. Import of men & women. Sends Yakshi Queen & children of Vijaya to S. Lanka (Sumanakuta Mt.)
North Center South	VIII, IX, X. The Consecrating of Pandu Vasudeva; Consecrating of Abhaya; Consecrating of Pandukabhaya.	Continues Lanka-S. India connection, strengthening secular rule of N. & extending to S. Lanka.
(extra-Lanka North Lanka North Center	XI. Consecrating of Devanampiya-tissa.	Fruition of past events, embodied in Devanamp. Begins passing of "legitimacy", both secular and spiritual from India to Lanka. Transfer of Order still needed to 'complete' fruition.

1	2	3
North Extra-Lanka	XII. The Converting of different countries.	Establishes legitimacy of Mahinda in Ceylon. Establishes link of Kingly acts, Order-Secular Kinship ties, Asoka model.
North Center	XIII. The Coming of Mahinda.	Establishes *Juncture* of Sangha & Secular power to begin 'Age of Lanka' as Buddhist base.
North Center	XIV. The Entry into the Capital.	
	XV. The Acceptance of the Mahavihara.	Establishes the Order & its visible 'permanence'.
	XVI. The Acceptance of the Cetiya-pabbata Vihara.	
	XVII. The Arrival of the Relics.	
(Extra-Lanka) North	XVIII. The Receiving of the Great Bodhi Tree.	Re-establishes the 'presence' of the Buddha through Symbols. Transformation of Lanka into "India". Juncture of past events, (B's visits, Vijaya's conquests; councils) Relinquishing to Lanka the "Center Symbol". Establishment of Nuns-conversion of Women.
N. Center; North	XIX. The Coming of the Bodhi Tree.	Final rooting of Buddhism in the N. Base. End of the Northern phase & "imaging India".
North Center	XX. The Nibbana of the Thera.	Dispersal of key figures; Mahinda, monks, Sanghamitta, Devanampiyatissa.

TABLE II

(1)	*Focal Direction* (2)	*Chapter & Title* (3)	*Chapter Emphasis* (4)
	Extra-Lanka (S. India) North Center	XXI. The Five Kings.	Breakdown of Right Relation of King & Order. Tamil invasion. Benign but not Buddhist Kings;
	Transition to S. Lanka South	XXII. The Birth of Prince Gamani.	His father ruler of *Rohana.* Mother a daughter of *Kalyani* king. Gamani the rebirth of a Samanera residing near Katagamuwa (Kataragama) in Cittala-pabbata Vihara.
	Southeast	XXIII. The Levying of the Warriors.	Rallying of the S. & S.—Center to Gamani.
	South Center	XXIV. The War of the Two Brothers.	Struggle of Tissa & Gamani; G in Malaya. Tissa in Dighavapi, Gamani emphasises Right.
	South, S. Center, North Center, Northwest	XXV. The Victory of Dutthagamani.	Relation to Order, Affirmation of S. Base for legitimacy. March to Anuradhapura; Stop at *Mhivangana;* proceeds NE along river. Defeats 32 Tamil kings; Attacked by 33rd, Bhalluka—defeats Bh. who approaches from *NW* (Mahatittha). "Cleansing of the Island" Triumph of the Budda's heritage.
S/N	Union of S. & N.	XXVI. Consecrating of the Maricavatti Vihara.	Linking of the "Powers" of the Island.

1	2	3	4
		XXVII. Consecrating of the Lohopasada	The "imaging of Lanka" as the Center of Buddhism.
	Throughout Lanka (All Directions *except* NW)	XXVIII. The Obtaining of the Wherewithal to build the Great Thupa.	
Centers/ peripheries	Extra Lanka ('tribute')	XXX. The Making of the Relic Chamber.	Gathering of the Order internal & External *to* Lanka.
Sea/Land Lower Worlds		XXXI. The Enshrining of the Relics.	*Retrieval of Relics* of the Buddha from the *Nagas* (uncle & nephew). (Reprise of the Buddha's 2nd visit). Relics assume Buddha- form—The "Return of the Buddha" to Lanka.
Upper Worlds	Lanka linked with Future Buddha	XXXII. The Entrance into the Tushita Heaven.	Ascendance of the Order reaffirmed. Dutthagamani a 'brother' of Maitreya; to be 1st disciple of Maitreya.
	Extra-Lanka	XXXIII. The Ten Kings.	Breakdown of Right Relations; dissention in Order.
	N-S 'Oscillations'	XXXVII. The Eleven Kings The Thirteen Kings King Mahasena.	Weakening of N. Center & return of "Lanka" to South for renewal. Restorations of Right Relations from South. Continued breakdowns (Ascendance of Abhayagiri due to 'extra-lanka' traditions brought in by a Chola monk.



Map 1 : Relocation of NagaDipa according to Structural considerations.
NagaDipa 1 = Location according to Miller argumentation;
NagaDipa 2 = Location from time of Devanampiyatissa (traditional)
NagaDipa = Geiger Location.

As may be seen in Table 3, the Buddha (in the text, the "Conqueror", the "Vanquisher") complies, but in the process the Yakshas "Daunted by the burning heat (of the Buddha's 'rug' which is burning at the edges)...and terrified (they) stood around *at the border*." (my italics). The Buddha then resettles the Yakshas, transporting them out of that place, to "Giridipa". I have located them suitably on the map (and without direct evidence, for there is none) in order to make them available for the Vijaya connection. In their place, the *Devas* assemble and are converted. Present among the Devas is a prince, Mahasumana of Sumanakuta Mt. (alt : Samanola, Samanatakuta), *i.e.* Sri Pada or Adam's Peak. Leaving hairs for worship which form the core of the Mahiyangana Stupa, the Buddha leaves for Uruvela. He has come alone, he departs alone leaving the *South Centre* in being and *free of Yakshas*. This has all occured in the 9th/10th month post enlightenment.

A. 1.2 – *The second Conquest :*

In the 5 year of Enlightenment, the Buddha returns to Lanka—to prevent a war between Nagas—an uncle and a nephew. He goes to the elusive territory of Nagadipa. Map I shows Nagadipa in three places; The location given by Geiger, the location (Nagadipa[1]) I will propose along the South and SE coast of Lanka, and a Nagadipa[2] identified from the time of Devanampiyatissa, and associated with the coming of Samghamitta and the Bodhi Tree. The story itself is short and simple—wherever Nagadipa is, a Deva attendant who accompanies the Buddha "had been in his latest birth, a man in Nagadipa." Once again, the Buddha delivers beings from Darkness, spreading light. The throne over which the war was to be fought is given to the Buddha. The Buddha then ".. established in the (three refuges and in the moral precepts eighty kotis of snake-spirits, dwellers *in the ocean* and *on the mainland*." (my italics) (p. 7) Having left the tree brought by his attendant, and the throne given him, as objects of worship, the Buddha returns to Jetavana.

What prompts the placement of Nagadipa[1] in the South? What not accept the Geiger placement—and the apparent agreement of scholars and contemporary belief ? Let me elaborate the indirect evidence for my Southern location of *this* Nagadipa[1], which is more logical in terms of the structure of the tale, in terms of the situs of actions, and in terms of later emphasis on the Southern heartland for the 'true Dhamma'.

(*a*) The war of the Naga kings :

1. King Mahodara is ruler of a "naga kingdom in the ocean, that covered half a thousand yojanas'. His younger sister had been given (in marriage) to the naga king on the Kannavaddhamana-*mountain*; her son was
2. Culodara. His mother's father (the Mt. Naga-king) had given to his mother a splendid throne of jewels, then had died and therefore this war of nephew with uncle was threatening; and also the *nagas of the mountains* were armed with miraculous power" (Geiger, p. 6; 48-51).

Note that the Buddha's first Conquest is associated with a mountainous region, a



Map 2 : Triangulations of the Buddha's "Conquests"



Map 3 : Composite Triangulation of Key Points of the Buddha's 3 Visits/Conquests, Linking Southern locales.

region which can also be seen as a key point between *mountain and plain, Wet and Dry Zones.* Note here we have association of *Mountain and Ocean.* Now proper mountains, in Ceylon, are *not* found in the Northwest, and a look at the map will show where the Buddha goes next to Conquer. He goes to Kalyani, at the behest of a Naga-king of Kalyani. "...Maniakkhika...*mothers brother* to the naga *Mahodara* (the Ocean Naga-King)" who had "*come thither* to take part in the battle and who, *aforetime, at the Buddha's first coming* (to Mahiyangana, in the Mts.)... had become established in the refuges and in the moral duties" (Geiger, 7 : 63-64). There are *extensive* Ocean areas suggested—but "a former dweller in Nagadipa" was a Deva (named Samiddhi *sumana*).

I realize that Nagas are not as limited as humans in their ease of movement ; I submit, however that a projection (the triangle) on Map 2 from the Mahiyangana apex places us in the position of readiness for the 3rd Conquest of the Buddha in logical order, *i.e.*, 1.3 from Kalyani to Sumanakuta/Divaguha and thence to Dighavapi and finally to the N. Centre, Anuradhapura. It is tidier and more logical that the Buddha should "wrap up" the S. Centre. S. East-Coast, and S.W. Coast areas. Or, if we center on Bintenne/Mahiyangana, the Buddha moves from the Centre, to the South, to West, to East, and back to North center point. And note that in this way, the future *two primary areas of Buddhist 'power'*, as well as the areas of significant prehistoric habitation *prior to the coming of Vijaya* are 'conquered'. In this way, also, the Northwest is left 'open' for the action of Vijaya and the Yakshas.

Locating Nagadip in the South gives us further a logical reason for continuing popularity among Sinhalese Buddhists, of the area around the Tissamaharama, Mahagama, and at the shrine of Kataragama (Skanda associated with warfare, Veddas, having authority over the South East—East area. (Obeyesekere, G., pp. 21-23; Wijesekera pp. 155). In the Mahagama, which is Southern location associated with the tale of Gamani, there is a Mahanaga—Dagoba or Nagamahavihara. It is ostensibly named after the 2nd brother of King Devanampiyatissa, who became ruler of Rohana in Mahagama. It is, perhaps, coincidence—I do not think so. Once more, a glance at the map will show that the triangle Bintenne/Mahiyangana—Kataragama/Mahagama/Tissamaharama—Kalyani incorporates the mountain theme, the Sea-Mountain Nagas theme, the origin-point for the birthplace and starting point of the 'Bodhisattva' Dutthagamani (who also united all the 'powers' of Lanka), and *encloses* the key point, Sumanakuta Mountain (Adam's Peak). It also encloses 8 1/2 of the 16 most popular places of Worship; of the remaining 8, 7 are at Anuradhapura, and the remaining one is Dighavapi, the point from which the Buddha departed from the South for Anuradhapura during his last 'Conquest'.

If one concedes the possibility of Nagadipa in the South-Southeast, the only site which seems aberrant is Dighavapi. Why should the Buddha, who is establishing the future significant sites of 'power' move to Dighavapi in the East (aside from the inclusion of a cardinal point ?). Perhaps we can explain this also in terms of the emphasis on the South in the Mahavamsa, and of contemporary realities. First note that Dighavapi is on the edge of the *Vedda* country, and that the Veddas are closely associated with worship of *Saman* and *Kataragama.* (Obeyesekere, p. 19-20). They take prominent part in the Mahiyangana yearly rituals acknowledging the formal supremacy of the Buddha as a superior deity. The primary seats of Saman are at Ratnapura and Mahiyangana, and of course he is associated with Sumanakuta

mountain. Kataragama "presides over Uva, Saman over Sri Pada environs, Vishnu along the coastal area from Tissa to Columbo..." Wijesekera, p. 155). If we accept Geiger's location of Dighavapi as shown (ca. 35 mi. SSW from Batticaloa), then a triangulation from Ratnapura to Dighavapi to Kataragama encloses certain significant parts of Uva. These parts are associated (in Mhv.) with a critical *war, i.e.*, the war of *Dutthagamani* and his brother Tissa (residing at *Dighavapi* to protect the Mahagama area from Tamil), prior to Gamani's war on the Tamil Elara; and thus are associated with what I have called the 'imaging of Lanka as Centre of the 'true Dhamma'. For Dighavapi, then, we have :

1. Linking of Dighavapi with Sumanakuta/Samanala (the Buddha's visit);
2. Linking (even indirectly) with War and Dutthagamani;
3. Linking of Dighavapi with Vedda country, and the Veddas with Saman and Kataragama;
4. Linking of Kataragama with *War* (=Skanda as a major guard-point for the S.,) with the *Veddas*, and with the dominion over *Uva*;
5. Placing Dighavapi at the edge/corner? of Kataragama's dominions;
6. Completion of a geographical series to 3 cardinal points, established by the Buddha's 3 visits (Centre, South, West, East) and a 'take off' point to the final N. point.

Admittedly, there are a series of associations one must take on faith as interrelated. But there is a logic in it which rests upon the problems Buddhist missionaries and chroniclers have faced wherever they have encountered strongly entrenched beliefs in gods, demons, etc. in a newly converted area. They have re-'sanctified' old sites, equated Buddhist deities with existing deities, and have alloted local power from the Buddha to the locals. In Tibet, Padmasambhava deliberately placed *temples* to suppress the powerful female demon after defeating her in a contest of powers. In short, the placing of the site of Dighavapi by the Buddha is hardly an accident or a vagary of our author. The significance of Dighavapi may, of course, derive from the time of Saddhatissa, brother and successor of Dutthagamani, who built there a vihara and a magnificent cetiya, (Mhv., XXXIII, 10 : p. 229 Geiger). This is the only other mention of the Dighavapi site in the Mahavamsa, not accociated directly with the Buddha or Dutthagamani.

B. *The Conquests of Vijaya :*

We turn to the last of the 'structural' elements to be discussed in detail. Refer once again to Table III, Column II. Recall that I have had the Buddha displace the Yakshas from Mahiyangana via the "Giridipa mountain" as vehicle to the interior. With the Buddha, we are at the South Center point. But we are able to preview all that will happen, and this visit is one of the events necessary to allow the peopling of the island with 'humans' who will become the nucleus for the work of the Dhamma. It is also necessary, from a future Sinhalese viewpoint to legitimate the humans' claims to rulership of the island. The Buddha has complete dominion over the Yakshas and *from* them the Island. He will re-affirm total dominion by conversion of the Nagas

and Devas. Where shall he send the Yakshas in order to forward the good work in the future? Though Yakshas abound, they have *all* gathered here. The Centre is cleared, and the Yakshas do not appear prominently again until we hear of their association with Vijaya's coming, and with their aid to the descendant of Vijaya, Pandukabhaya. Both encounters take place in the North Center. We have a choice of locale: from Mahiyangana, the 'interior' may be West, NW, or North—in keeping with the emphasis on mountains, it cannot be in flatland, and since we also have to contend with Mountain Nagas. it should not be an area where strife is likely to arise. Vijaya is to arrive from the Northwest; he and his men are to encounter Yakshas in that area. The area North—Northwest of Mahiyangana is both interior, mountainous, and "pleasant"—a region well suited to be the "...pleasant Giridipa..." which the Buddha moevs. There will be time, before Vijaya arrives, and before Pandukabhaya encounters *his* yakshi, for the Yakshas to expand around the perimeter north and west. I have located Giridipa on the map 1, then, so that we may bring together Yakshas and Men appropriately.

Who is Vijaya?

Vijaya's ancestry marks him out as unusual; he is the eldest of 16 twin sons of a father who is himself the son of a princess and a lion. His mother's father is a King, his father founds a kingship. (Later we find that his brother has become king in 'Lala', and married a daughter of the Madras King. Vijaya's nephew (brother's youngest son) becomes V's successor, Panduvasudeva, since Vijaya has no 'human' offspring to inherit from him). Vijaya is "...of evil conduct and his followers were even (like himself), and many intolerable deeds of violence were done by them." (VI. 39; p. 53). Because of his nature, his father drives Vijaya and his followers (700 men) out of the kingdom, sending all to sea. But wives and children are sent separately from the men, and only Vijaya and his men, after landing at Supparaka (ident=Sopara) land in Lanka on the day of the Buddha's death. The Buddha charges Sakra to protect Vijaya and Lanka; in turn, Sakra gives over *to Vishnu*, who hastens to Lanka to give a protecting charm to all, guarding them from demons. It is at this point that a Yakshi appears, in disguise, with the results shown in Table III, 2.

Vijaya's first "Conquest" is achieved through the *magical* aid of his Yakshi-consort; He *releases* his men from the *pit* (in which Kuvanna has confined them) through a *bargain*. Like the Buddha, he encounters the Yakshas *gathered together* for a wedding, but since they are *invisible to him*, Kuvanna/Kuveni must move among them and give out cries, toward which his weapons will be guided by Kuvanna. *Unlike* the Buddha, Vijaya does not displace the Yakshas; he *slaughters* them. He has taken the island by force and trickery. Vijaya spends some time in the spot, and then moves to "Tambapanni". Their location throughout, from landing to struggle, is obscure, but the "2nd Conquest of Vijaya", the establishment of a kingdom, follows close upon and gives us some clues. Reference to the map I will show that we are concerned with an area from the mouth of the Kalu-Oya river on the West, to Vijitapura South of Anuradhapura, to Upatissagama, North of Anuradhapura, and with Anuradhapura as itself the 'center'. If we place the encounter of Vijaya and his men with the Yakshas somewhere in this area, they must have come into the island from NW, N. or NE. Tradition has entry from the

NW, perhaps because of the assumption that the ship had departed from Sopara.

The "2nd Conquest" is not identified as such—but note that Vijaya has not yet established a Humanly legitimated Kingdom. He and his men have been cohabiting with Yakshis. A stable, human kingdom requires wives, human offspring, and a ceremonial recognition (consecration). It is this 'act' that I term Vijaya's *second* conquest. The founding of the cities, the importation of a wife from the King of Madurai (?) and wives for his ministers, and "...craftsmen and a thousand families of the eighteen guilds..." (VII, 57) fully people the conquered area. All these come into Ceylon through Mahatittha ("the great landing place") across from Mannar island, in the Northwest. On arrival of the human Princess, Vijaya ends his bargain with the Yakshi-consort, and dispatches her, with an offering and her children, from the now thoroughly Human area. Like the Buddha, he shows some compassion—he initially urges Kuveni to leave the children, but she does not. It is not hard to see here the parallel to the Buddha's displacement of the Yakshas. The way is now clear for the marriage of Vijaya, consecration as King, and forsaking "...his former evil way of life" (VII. 74 ; p. 61).

Vijaya's 2nd conquest is complete. He returns to his city (Tambapanni, *not* Anuradhapura), and so too does Kuveni with her children. But she is killed by the Yakshas, and the children, through the intersession of her mother's brother, are spirited away to Sumanakuta mountain. Brother marries sister and produce the offspring who ultimately produce "Pulinda", identified by some as Veddas. These offspring, "dwelt, with the king's leave, there in *Malaya*. Note that this province is that which borders Mahiyangana, the *original home of the Yakshas*. It is also the province to which Dutthagamani flees when he is angry with his father for refusing to attack the Tamils.

TABLE III

The Mahavamsa

Visit of the Buddha and Vijaya's Conquests compared :

"Sacred" Contact	*Secular Contact*
9th/10th Lunar month post Enlightenment (528 BC ?)	ca. 483 BC ?
1. The Buddha comes from Himalayas to "purify/cleanse" Lanka of Yakkhas. Flies over. Lands in S. Center.	1. Vijaya and followers come from Vanga viâ Sopara/Gujarat. On water, land in N.W.
2. B. to gathering of Yakkhas at Mahiyangana (future site), on right bank of Mahawaeliganga R. Site is the Mahanaga *garden*.	2. V's men are collected by a Yaksha princess (Kuvanna/Kuveni) in a *pit*. Presumed location near "Tambapanni", NW coast of Ceylon. Vijaya seeks men.
3. Makes rain, darkness, storm to terrify Y's. They ask for *release*. B. asks for a	3. Vijaya meets Kuvanna, *seated* under tree. *Threatens* her with 5 weapons. She

seating place.

4. Y's offer Island. B. spreads his "rug of skin" (hide ?) on which to sit, causes it to *spread and burn* at edges.

5. B brings Giridipa to Mahiyangana/ Mahanaga. *Settles Y's on it* and *transports* it back *into interior* with them. G. is a "*pleasant*" land.

6. Y's now relocated, B. brings Devas (?) to assembly, preaches and converts. All become Upasikas/Upasakas. No Bikkhus, *Implants Doctrine* in Island.

7. Mahasumana of *Sumanakuta Mountain* (Adams Peak), *prince* of Devas, becomes sotapanna. *Requests relic* for worship. Buddha gives handful of hairs. Maha receives in golden urn, places on top of jewels, covers with stupa of "sapphire". (one Maniakkikha, king of Kalyani, Naga-land, is present and converted.)

8. The Buddha returns to Uruvela (India)

5th Yr. of Buddhahood

From Jetavanna to Nagadipa (NW Ceylon ?) to prevent a war between Mahodara (uncle) and Culodara (Nephew) over a jewelthrone.

Mahodara=Naga king in ocean
Culodara=son of M's younger sister married to Naga king on Kannavaddhamana Mt.

9. B. comes with Deva attendant (one formerly born in Nagadipa). B. is shaded by Rajayatana tree from Jetavana.

10. B. hovers over battlefield. Brings *darkness. Releases* them. Nagas receive *requests* mercy. Vijaya asks for guarantee of safety. K. *releases* men.

4. K. offers *Kingdom* and *herself* as wife. Gives food. Guides Vijaya to Yakka city where Y's gathered for wedding. Vijaya told to *destroy* all Yakshas. K. aids in destruction thru *magic* (Y's *invisible* to V.).

5. V. *founds city* of Tambapanni.

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6. V's ministers found villages about area of present Anuradhapura. 5 villages Anuradhagama (center), Upatissagama (N) Ujjeni (?), Uruvela (W), Vijita (S or E).

7. *Ask Vijava* to *become king* of *Men.* V. wants human queen. Ministers send to Mdura (Madras) for princess. *Princess* and other women, plus craftsmen and families come. Land at Mahatittha (Mantota, on N.W. Coast across from Mannar Island).

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8. Vijaya sends Kuvanna/Kuveni and his son and daughter by her back to Yakshas. K. is killed. Children are protected by K's mother's brother who sends them to *Sumanakuta Mt.* There they produce offspring in due time.

[end vijaya theme]

preaching, give Throne to the Buddha. After offerings, converts the *Nagas*, both land and sea.

11. Maniakkha. King of Kalyani, *mother's brother* of Mahodara, asks B. to make return visit. (M. was present at first visit). The Buddha promises. Establishes tree for worship, together with throne.

Return of B. to Jetavana.

8th Year after Enlightenment

12. Maniakkha goes to Jetavana; requests visit.

13. The Buddha comes with 500 Bikkhus to Kalyani country—at place where Kalyani Cetiya (stupa) to be built.

14. Thence to Sumanakuta (leaves foot-print)

15. Thence to Dighavapi (30 mi. SSW of Batticaloa); Cetiya there later.

16. Thence to Mahameghavanarama (S. of Anuradhapure) where Bo tree to be.

Thence to Great Stupa (Ruwanwaeli Dagoba)

Thence to Tuparama locale (Anuradhapura)

Thence to Silacetiya locale. (also (Anuradhapura)

17. Leader of the Assembly (of Bhikkhus and Devas gathered) gives discourse to Devas.

18. The Buddha returns to Jetavana with *500* (p. 109)

III. The Structure

Where in all I have presented is the structural, 'subtle' meaning which I suggested inheres in the Mhv.? I believe I can sum up *some* of the key elements :

1. *The North and North West of Lanka is the Centre for Men and Yakshas.* (Pandukabhaya is aided by a Yakshi who, in the form of a horse, tells him "I will conquer the kingdom and give it to thee...") With her aid, he formally takes over and establishes Anuradhapura as capital and as ritual centre, thus completing the 'prefiguring' of that city forming the B's Centre in the Buddha's 3rd visit.
2. The Northwest is the *Human entry-point*; Vijaya and his men enter here for their conquests; Dutthagamani defeats the 33rd Tamil general, Bhalluka at Mantota/ Mahatittha. The *Doctrine* does *not* enter here—(Devanampiyatissa's envoys to and from Asoka *do not* depart from here; Samghamitta, her nuns and the Bodhi tree *do not* enter here (Jambukhola for both aboves). *This is an evil place.*
3. Tlanaga (a good king), is removed, when he is about to be slain by rebels, from Ceylon surreptitiously via Mahatittha—he returns via *Rohana*, (the South) to retake the throne.
   The message seems to be clear ; the Northwest is not an area favored by the Buddha, by the Dhamma, nor by 'good' (*i.e.*, Buddhist) men. It is hardly the area which would have been visited by the Buddha on his second visit to "Nagadipa".
4. *The South, Southeast and Southwest are most auspicious*; They are the area of consistent support for the Dharma; they supply the personage who is to

complete the rooting of the Dharma in Lanka, and the total fulfilment of the Buddha's prefiguring conquests.

5. *The Dharma is more effective in its scope and power than any other ideology.* Vijaya and his descendants are dependent upon the Yakshas initially (Magic); Pandukabhaya, receives aid from the Yakshi, welcomes various religieux in his capital, is given connection with the Buddha through his wife (presumably a descendant of the Sakyas). But he is no Buddhist, and he does not have the Dhamma. It is only with the king Devanampiyatissa and his friendship with Asoka that the wheel begins to turn in Anuradhapura and the North of Ceylon. But note that the Buddha has long ago *thrice* taken the Island, from South to North.

   5*a*. The Dharma (through the mechanism of the Sangha and Kings) ismore persistent than worldly power; in fact worldly power is effective only so long as it is in consonance with and sustained by Dharma. The Buddha's three visits accomplish what it takes 4 major humans to bring to conclusion. [*viz* : Vijaya, Pandukabhaya. Devanampiyatissa, Dutthaghamani]

6. The Dharma can work only through men—even evil men—and it can only work most effectively through the tradition which is 'true Dhamma', *i.e.*, that which is in the Mahavihara and the South.

Conclusion :

When I began this paper, I paid obeisance to the *method* of Claude Levy-Strauss. Others have done more precisely "Levy-Straussian" analysis [*e.g.* Michael Ames, Hans Dieter-Evers, Edmund Leach, Nur Yalman, G. Obeyesekere, all cited in the Bibliography]. As Ames points out, each including himself, emerges with a somewhat different "structure"; Leach and Yalman with basic "binary oppositions", Ames with apparently opposed transactions which become complementary. I suggest only *one basic* opposition in the Mahavamsa : the "opposition" of 'flawed North' to 'pure South'—this is the Buddhist structure. These two become 'fused' in the process of making Lanka fully Buddhist, *i.e.* in absorbing Buddhism into itself, and transferring the Center of Buddhism to Lanka. This 'opposition' is expanded in terms of "power", the power of the Buddha's visits contrasted with the meagre power of Human Kings, even when aided by Yakshas. Note also that the Buddha's 3 visits are paralleled by 3 Human Kings : Vijaya, Devanampiyatissa, and Dutthagamani. It is finally Dutthagamani who 'fuses' the South and the North, Buddhism and the 'powers' (in his 16 superhuman companions) of the Island, and the future of Lanka (through his own relationship to Maitreya). In short, the structural Message of the Mahavamsa gives historic credence to the structures which seem to permeate the analyses of Contemporary Ceylonese Buddhism.

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Maps :

1. Base map for all modifications is redrawn from Geiger, op. cit.
2. Various maps of Ceylon were consulted for more precise locational data.

13

The Architectural Tradition in Buddhist Monasticism

GADJIN NAGAO

'A BUILDING IN which Buddhist icons are lodged, and in which monks and nuns are housed.' Such is the definition, in the Reverend S. Mochizuki's *Buddhist Encyclopaedia* (Vol. 2, p. 1710), of the word *tera*[a] (usually, but not very accurately, rendered in English with 'temple'). In a learned paper, O. Takata identifies the Buddhist monastery in terms of the same two features: 'halls or *stūpas* (reliquaries) containing objects of worship... and monks' quarters'.[1] The latter paper is full of information and scholarly findings, but the description just cited is, at the least, misleading insofar as Buddhist monastic architecture in early India is concerned. Our knowledge of Buddhist monastic institutions is derived, for the most part, from the Vinaya, the Buddhist monastic code, which, however, took its present textual form only about the beginning of the Christian era. Thus, these texts, though they refer to many incidents contemporaneous with the Buddha Himself, reflect the thinking of a much later time, the time of their own redaction. The definitions given above apply, albeit only partially, to this period.

In this paper I intend to sketch briefly the history of Buddhist monastic institutions, my focus being that of monastic architecture. Buddhist monastic dwellings have several Indian names, such as *ārāma* (pleasure garden), *saṃghārāma* (pleasure garden donated to the monastic community), the two most frequent ones, or *vana* (forest, grove), which may be used alongside, or instead, of the above words. The words came to be associated with the name of the place in which the monastery was located, *e.g.*, Jetavanārāma (Jetavanānāthapiṇḍakārāma), Veḷuvanārāma, Ghoṣitārāma, Jīvakārāma (also called 'Jīvakāmravana', *i.e.*, 'Jīvaka's mango grove'). Referring more to the monastic mode of life than to the physical surroundings are such names as *vihāra* and *guhā*. The former word, derived from a verb meaning 'to pass time', denotes, in its Buddhist usage, a wide range of structures, anything from a modest hut to a huge

building or monastic compound. The latter word, literally 'cave', came to denote a Buddhist monastery, particularly in the south. I will use the word 'monastery', without distinction, as the English equivalent of all these Indian words.

I

In its earliest stages, the monastic institution had room neither for worship of icons nor for the quartering of monks. In fact, the 'monastery', in the strict sense of the word, did not yet exist. Initially, the notion of *saṃgha* was an abstract, universal notion; to borrow a word from the vocabulary of later times, it referred to the 'fellowship of all four quarters' (*cātuddisasamgha*).[2]

The Buddha appears to have led a homeless—quite literally homeless—life throughout His preaching career, having neither a fixed dwelling nor any possessions, acquiring His food by begging and spending His nights under trees or by roadsides with a stone for a pillow. His disciples, who grew in number with the passage of time, lived a life modelled on His. As *śramaṇas* (ascetics), as *parivrājakas* ('wanderers') they too were quite literally homeless.

The wandering, however, was not without interruption. Every fortnight there was a convocation, called *uposatha*, a meeting at which the monastic rules, going back to the Buddha Himself, were recited, thus furnishing the monks with an occasion for reflection on their conduct and on their own lives. Apart from this, since wandering was impossible during the rainy season, which lasted three or four months, there was an annual retreat from the rains, during which they were obliged to remain in a single place. These two circumstances occasioned first the choice of a convenient meeting place, then the erection of small huts, each to house a single monk during the rains and to be dismentled by him when the rains had ended. The retreat from the rains was common to all Indian ascetic communities of the time, but the Buddhists were unique in respecting the strict rules by which the place of retreat was selected. The key word here is *sīman*, lit., 'boundary line'.[3]

The 'bamboo grove' near Rājagṛha, called Veḷuvana in Pāli and Veṇuvana in Sanskrit, is said by tradition to be the first such place to be donated to the Buddha and His fellowship for these purposes, the donor being King Bimbisāra.[4] In the king's own day there was probably no building at all on the site, but in later times a monastery, bearing the same name, was built there. There is some doubt, in fact, as to what was meant by 'donation'. Did it mean that the land became literally the property of the monastic community, to be registered as such in law, or simply that the monks had free access to it, to use as they saw fit? The Buddha and His disciples usually spent their nights in forests or by things such as *caityas* (shrines of common worship, at times consisting of nothing more than old tree stumps), in either case not far from places of human habitation. In Vaiśālī, for instance, the Buddha stayed in the Ambapālīvana, a grove belonging to the courtesan Ambapālī, before she donated the grove to the Order. The Veḷuvana itself was probably donated for the same purpose, for it is a fact that monks used to erect simple huts there for the duration of the rainy season only to dismantle them when the rains had ended.

The next stage of development saw the donation not only of land, but of huts or even of solid buildings. It is recorded, for example, that a certain rich man

had sixty such huts erected and donated to the monastic community in a single day.[5] Other examples of this are the above mentioned Jetavanānāthapiṇḍadārāma in Śrāvastī and the Jīvakāmravana in the outskirts of Rājagṛha. Very well known is the account of Anāthapiṇḍada, the rich merchant who bought from Prince Jeta a grove on which he erected many buildings as a gift to the Buddha and His Order. Excavations of the site, while they reveal work going back to the Gupta period, or even a bit earlier, have brought to light nothing that dates to the Buddha's own time.

The excavation of the Jīvakāmravana site,[6] on the other hand, carried out under the auspices of the Archaeological Survey of India in the years 1953-9, shows some unique features. The name of the grove, as already suggested, goes back to the traditionally alleged donor, Jīvaka, a physician contemporaneous with the Buddha. According to the excavation report,[7] there remain at least three or four foundations (cf. fig. 1), consisting of a pebble base on which buildings. probably of wood, were constructed. There is also a ground plan of a long, spacious hall with an apsidal end on either side, a plan that reminds one of the *caitya* hall of later times. There are no demarcations of any sort in the hall, and, although there do seem to have been such things as kitchens and granaries, there is no evidence of shrines for worship or of monastic cells. In the light of contemporary findings, one may surmise, these finds to date the time of the Buddha, or not long after. If the surmisal is accurate, then this is the site of the oldest surviving Buddhist establishment.



Fig. 1
Jivakāmravaṇa, Rājagṛha

This is probably the site referred to in the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta* (*Dīghanikāya 2*). The scene is one in which, under a full moon, King Ajātaśatru visits the Buddha and His disciples in the Jīvakāmravana. Jīvaka, one of the king's ministers, escorting the King to that spot, says to him 'The Buddha is in that round edifice.' The 'round edifice' (*maṇḍalamāla*) is probably a reference to the apsidal portion of the building that has since been excavated. The King, upon entering, sees the spacious hall, in which the Buddha is seated facing a congregation of monks. The King is frightened by the spectacle of a large hall so full of people, yet so calm and quiet.[8]

Thus, the Jīvakāmravana, with all of the buildings standing on it, was donated to the Order. There is no shrine for worship, but this is not surprising, since the Buddhist Order did not worship any god. The Buddha—who, was later deified and worshipped—was, at this time, constantly within the reach of His disciples, ready to answer their questions and to resolve their doubts. The reverence of the disciples for their Master is not to be confused with worship. Here in the Jīvakāmravana, the *uposatha*, the most important of all the events, may have been held either inside the hall or outside. The hall may, on the other hand, have been a monastery; the absence of demarcations may possibly indicate a common dwelling in contrast to

the later practice, in which each monk occupied a cell by himself.

Thus, the first donations of land to the Order had a limited purpose, that of an assembly ground on which makeshift huts could be erected. In addition to the name *vihāra*, the huts were given the names *āvāsa* ('residence') or, more specifically, *vassāvāsa* (dwelling in, *i.e.* retreat from, the rains). Permanent buildings seem not to have been donated; if any in fact were, it was probably to accommodate the *uposatha*, the most important function of the monastic community as a community. Thus, the assembly hall (*upaṭṭhānasālā* in Pāli, *upasthānaśālā* in Sanskrit) may well have been the first building in what was later to be a monastery complex. It is still too early, however, to speak of 'monasteries', at least in the sense in which the word is to be used below.

II

One now encounters a turning point in the monastic way of life, a change reflected in the architecture as well. The monk changes from anchorite to cenobite, from wanderer to dweller. It became the practice for the monks to return to the same place at the beginning of every rainy season, a practice that thus converted the retreat into a reunion of old friends rather than what it had been until then a chance gathering of monks. Moreover, the makeshift structures used during the retreat gave way, in the course of time, to more durable buildings, in which the monks could remain, if they wished, when the rains were over. Thus, the wanderers settled down and became dwellers.

It is said that a *gandhakuṭī* ('hall of fragrance') was constructed in the Jetavana and donated to the Buddha as his own private room.[9] It is also said in a canonical source that the Buddha spent a whole year—rainy season, winter and summer—at Rājagṛha.[10] These statements should not, however, be understood in terms of the settled Order of later times. For the Buddha was, from first to last, a wandering mendicant. The *Mahāparinibbāna-suttanta*, for instance, tells of the Buddha's final journey to Kusinārā from Rājagaha, but no mention is made of any particular residence or even of a particular place of rest, such as the house of friend, patron or lay disciple. No, the octogenerian mendicant takes His rest by the side of the road, where He has Ānanda bring him some water. Finally, the Buddha achieves Nirvāṇa in the open air, between two śāla trees.

As long as the Buddha was in the world, as long as His disciples were still imbued with His spirit, it is very unlikely that the settled way of life became an institution among them. Nonetheless, the habit seems to have been acquired quite early, possibly—at least in the view of Dr. Tomomatsu[11]—as early as twenty or thirty years after the Buddha's passing, though this surely does not mean that the change of habit came upon all monks at once.

The new habit did, however, gain in strength, to the point that the monastic order began to show a new face. That is to say, a systematically regulated cenobium was created in India for the first time. The monastery, or the *vihāra*, reaches full maturity as a cenobium.

Of necessity, the new settled life brings to the Buddhist Order such fixed property as lands and buildings, or simpler things donated by poor villagers. For the first time, also, a limit has to be set on the size of the Order, since the monks have now to be

housed. Likewise, the fixed monastery has to have officials, such as a dean and his subordinates, in order to control and distribute the property and to attend to other such administrative duties.

The *uposatha* and the retreat from the rains go on as before. In fact, study and sermon, originally confined to the latter, are now extended over a whole year, thus reinforcing the cenobitic character of monastic life. A system of training now comes into effect. An initiate, for instance, must now submit to probation for a time. Doctrinal study and disputation became the order of the day for some, and the Abhidharma is owed to the latter.

The settlement also requires the monastery to become geographically confined and, at the same time, independent. What was to be the 'Saṃgha of the Four Quarters' (*cātuddisasaṅgha*) is now a congeries of self-contained, virtually independent monastic units. Thus the monks, living now in a fixed abode, might be on very close terms with the local laity, giving them religious instruction and getting things from them in return, not only donations but popular religious notions as well. This independence may well have been one of the causes of the many schisms. Be that as it may, this was the new face of the Buddhist monastery throughout India.

At the time in question, the principal part of the monastery was the assembly hall, followed by quarters for the monks. No less necessary were storehouses, kitchens, wells, baths, *caṅkramaṇa* places, etc. No one seems, however, to have thought of a place for worship.

III

As integral to Buddhism as the monastery was the *stūpa*. The latter, sanctuary though it be, belongs to the realm of the pious laity, not to that of the monastic order.

Buddhists though all are, there is a fundamental difference between the way in which the monk views the Buddha's personality and His teachings and the way in which the layman sees them. The Buddha taught that the world is full of woe, that all things are impermanent and substanceless, etc., etc. In keeping with these precepts, the monks disciplined themselves in *yoga*, *dhyāna* (contemplation), *dhuta* (rigorous religious practices), etc., in the true manner of ascetics. To lay folk, however, the Buddha prescribed service to one's fellows and other virtuous conduct, the goal being happiness in this life and rebirth, ultimately, as a god. Such widespread beliefs as those in *samsāra* and *karman* remained intact, and these sermons affected lay folk with faith (*śraddhā*, *bhakti*), which was all that was expected of a layman. He was not expected, for instance, to give up any of his other beliefs. For the layman the Buddha was an object of devout faith, in effect a Saviour. For the monk, on the other hand, the Buddha was simply the forerunner, the leader,[12] not a superhuman being, even less a god.

There was a similar difference in attitudes toward the *stūpa*. The first *stūpas*, eight in number, are reported by tradition to have been erected by eight kings after they had divided the Buddha's relics among them. King Aśoka, himself a worshipper of *stūpas*, is said by tradition to have increased their number to 84,000. These were acts of faith, performed by persons of power, to be sure, but by laymen nonetheless. Monks, on the other hand, were rather indifferent, even cold, toward this monument to lay devotion. In the *Mahāparinibbāna-suttanta*, the Buddha tells Ānanda that it is

pointless to exert oneself for the veneration of the Buddha's relics.[13] This may well have governed the thinking of all the monks.

What may have been going on among the laity is scarcely a matter of record, since the records were kept principally by learned monks, who, with their preoccupation with doctrine and monastic rule, regarded the movements of secular thought as beyond their concern. While the learned monks were busy writing their learned books, pious lay folk were creating objects of art that bore witness to their faith. It is they who dug the caves, embellishing them with those well-known, soul-gladdening paintings and bas-reliefs, to be presented to the Order as pious donations. The same thing can be said of *stūpas*. Scarcely hidden behind all this pompous embellishment are the worldly aspirations and faith of the laity. Desiring rich and happy lives, or desiring to have beautiful wives and children, the pious laity would adorn the gates and railings of a *stūpa* with demons (*yakṣa*) and demonesses (*yakṣī*) or with images of the goddess of good fortune (Lakṣmī). The fashioners of the ornaments seem to have been well acquainted with the legends connected with the life of the Buddha and with the tales of His previous incarnations (*Jātaka*), etc., but the ornaments seem to have almost nothing to do with monastic doctrine. For the laity regarded the *stūpa* as the Buddha Himself, worshipping it as they would a *yakṣa*. For the monk, on the other hand, the *stūpa* was simply a monument to a great man, in which, in their view, no excess of zeal should be invested.

It is worthy of note, however, that Buddhism was, in fact, evolving in the direction of a popular religion, whose principal motive force was the laity, and that *stūpa*-worship is but one bit of evidence pointing to that fact. One might speak of an evolution from the negativism of the monastic order, a body of Hīnayānistic recluses, to the affirmativeness of the Mahāyānistic laity. In the long run, even the monk could not shut his eyes to the importance and to the intense devotion of this secular *stūpa*-worship. Eventually, the *stūpa*, under the name *caitya*, gets incorporated into the monastery.



Fig. 2
Caitya Cave
Ajantā Cave No. 10
1st Cent. B.C.

The oldest cave temples, dating to about the first century B.C., are evidence that the *caitya* was already part of the monastery complex. A *caitya*-cave, *i.e.*, a cave containing a *caitya*, is a long spacious hall with high ceilings, divided by pillars into a nave and an aisle on both sides (cf. fig 2). The end of the hall, usually apsidal, has a *caitya*, surrounded by enough free space for circumambulation. Without much doubt, this was an assembly hall. The *caitya* must have been worshipped by the cave dwellers also. If the *caitya* may be taken to be the Buddha Himself, this means that the monks must have held the *uposatha* and other convocations in the Buddha's presence.

The *vihāra*-cave (cf. fig. 3), a sort of monastery-cave existing alongside the *caitya*-cave, is, as the name implies, a monastic dwelling, being not infrequently equipped with such things as cisterns. At the time in question, it was very different from the *caitya*-cave which later always included a sanctuary.

It is difficult to reconstruct the pattern of the monastery of the time in Northern India, so total are the ruins to which they have been reduced. The general features can, however, be surmised with the aid of the cave temples. The Nāgārjunakoṇḍa sites, to be discussed presently, will also be of some help in this direction.



Fig. 3
Vihāra Cave Ajantā Cave No. 2
7th Cent. A.D.

Thus, the *stūpa* was not merely approved and accepted by the monastic community but actually adopted by it, integrated into cenobitic life as one of its most important elements. Now, for the first time, the monastery included an object of worship; it was part 'shrine'. The definition of 'monastery' which we gave earlier on is applicable only at this point. A serious shortcoming, in this regard, is that so little attention was paid by the above mentioned persons to the assemby hall (*upaṭṭhānasālā*) in spite of its obvious importance.

IV

An epoch-making innovation in the history of Buddhist institutions is the Buddha-image. The consensus is that the Buddha image first appears in the first century in Gandhāra, then, almost immediatly thereafter, in Mathurā.[14] Before that, the Buddha was not concretely depicted. He was merely symbolized, the symbol being a Bodhi-tree, a *stūpa*, a footprint, etc. The first appearance of the Buddha image is as an illustration accompanying such stories as that of the Buddha's life, the figure being virtually the same in height as those that surround it. Eventually, when the Buddha image becomes an object of worship, it becomes larger in size. Initially, the attitude may have been that it is sacrilege to depict the Buddha in human form at all. However, once it became the vogue, the new image was probably welcomed by the laity in the spirit of sincere devotion. The evolution of the Buddha-image is analogous to that of the *stūpa*. First averse to the innovation, once the monks became aware of its significance as an object of worship, they introduced it even into the cenobium. Later, in the Tantric period the task of religious sculpture and painting devolved upon the learned monks, because only they had the knowledge of iconography and iconometry necessary for that sort of work.

It is at Nāgārjunakoṇḍa that the evolution from the aniconic to the iconic can be traced with precision.[15] The site, situated in Andhrapradeśa, dates to the third century. To the religious edifice already familar to us, we see a new type added. It consists of two parts, *mahāstūpa* and *vihāra*, the latter being the monks' quarters, a group of cells. One can see a correspondence to the *caitya*-cave and the *vihāra*-cave, but to

the *vihāra* two new elements are added, *viz.*, *maṇḍapa* and *caityagṛha* (cf. fig. 4).

The *mahāstūpa*, or great *stūpa*, is a bit removed from the *vihāra*, so that lay folk as well as monks may circumambulate it in worship. The worship of *stūpa* and *caitya* is clearly widespread at the time and place in question; a new school, the Caityaka, dates to this period. The place in which the monks usually gathered for their convocations may, however, not have been the *mahāstūpa*, but rather the *maṇḍapa* (pillared hall) attached to the monks' quarters. In the inner courtyard, which is surrounded by monkish cells, there are traces of pillars for the *maṇḍapa*, a new feature. Another novel feature is that an edifice called *caityagṛha* is added to the *vihāra* at a place inside, or just outside, the *vihāra* area. The plan is quite similar to that of *caitya*-halls or *caitya*-caves, having an apsidal end to accommodate a *caitya*. There is, however, no pillar on the inside, and the scale is so much smaller than that of *caitya*-hall or *caitya*-cave as to admit only one or two circumambulators. The addition indicates the monks' desire to have a shrine inside their own area because of their apparent dissatisfaction at having to share the *mahāstūpa* with the laity. The entrance to the *vihāra* is narrow, probably as an indication of unwillingness to admit lay folk in general.



Fig. 4
Nāgārjunakondo Site No. 3 (left) and Site No. 4 (right)
a Stupa; b-Caitya-grha; c-Maṇḍapa; d-Cells.

Neither at Amarāvatī nor at Nāgārjunakoṇḍa, in the early period, were there any Buddha-images. As time went on, however, and certainly from early in the third century, the image appeared even here, though this does not mean an immediate end to the representation of the Buddha by symbols rather than by icons. The *caityagṛha*, mentioned above, came to include Buddha-images. These edifices are frequently in pairs, each facing the other. In some cases, however, one sees a *caitya* facing a Buddha-image. The object of worship was clearly changing from *caitya* to image.

The archaeological and epigraphic evidence leads to the following conclusions about the change in the object of worship in the various schools and sects at Nāgārjunakoṇḍa.[16] The Mahāsāṃghikas, *caitya*-worshippers for the most part, later split in two, one group worshipping images, the other refusing to do so. The southern Sthaviravādins, at first opposed to the *caitya* as a sanctuary, were not only brought round to worship the *caitya* but, in the event, prevailed upon to introduce images into the sanctuaries. The Mahīśāsakas, of the same Sthavira lineage, to the very end worshipped *caityas* but not images. I call your attention to the fact that all of the schools mentioned thus far belong to the Hīnayāna tradition. It should not be concluded from this that the image-worshippers were all Mahāyānists, nor that all Buddhists worshipped images once they had come into vogue.

In later times, the icon was introduced not only into the *caitya*-cave but into the *vihāra*-cave as well. In the former case, there are examples of where Buddha-images were carved on *caitya* surfaces (*e.g.*, the later caves at Ajaṇṭā and Ellora). In those instances, the objects of worship are multiplied and intertwined on the same spot, a contrived (or, if you will, a degenerate) device stemming from the wish to satisfy simultaneously the desire of both *stūpa* worshippers and image worshippers. In the case of the *vihāra*-cave, the central cell against the back wall was transformed into a shrine, where the image of the Buddha (and other divinities—for the Buddha was now a god in the popular imagination) was installed, and the pillars and the walls surrounding the shrine and the spacious hall in front of it were embellished with sculptures and paintings (as at Ajaṇṭā). According to S. Dutt, this hall became, after the Gupta period, a *maṇḍapa*, *i.e.* a place of assembly for the monks.[17] If true, the cave monastery at this stage of development was able to provide two assembly halls, one in the *caitya*-cave, the other in the *vihāra*-cave.

Caves excavated even later show a tendency to increase chambers and niches for the installation of icons and to reduce in number the monkish cells. Examples of this are in Ellora, cave no. 2 in particular, Aurangabad (the later caves), etc. Such caves may well be called 'shrine-caves'. This will reach its limit in the 'pure shrine-cave', one to which no monastic cells are attached at all. One will not find this in India itself, though outside of India it can be found everywhere from Afghanistan to China, becoming more frequent the farther east one goes. Most of the caves in Tun-huang, Yün-kang and Lung-men, not to mention other sites in China, are 'pure shrine-temples'. The Chinese caves have *stūpas* or *caityas* and images side by side. At any rate, the production of the shrine-cave itself, as well as the transformation of the cenobitic cave into a shrine-cave, may be taken to symbolize a change of faith in both lay and clerical circles.

V

One now observes a new type of monastery in Nālandā, which was a center of Buddhist activity from the Gupta period until about the year 1200. The Nālandā complex is called *mahāvihāra*, 'great monastery', because it consisted of several smaller *vihāras*. In other words, it was a great university or research institute consisting of several colleges; as such, it was, in its time, the academic centre of all India. It was followed by Vallabhī in the west at the end of the Gupta period, by Odāntapura, Vikramaśilā, Jagaddhala and others in the Pāla period. The monks, frequently of different schools, gathered at these institutions to study, to lecture and to conduct disputations. Research was conducted not only in the area of Buddhist thought but in fields of secular study as well, fields such as grammar, logic, medicine, pharmacology, astronomy, astrology, etc.

As to the architecture of these *mahāvihāras*, a clear idea can be had from the excavated Nālandā site. The buildings are of two kinds, *vihāras* and shrines. The *vihāra*, consisting of monks' quarters, has a frontage of from 50 to 60 m., enclosed by solid bricks walls of from 2 to 3 m. in thickness. A corridor (or veranda) with pillars runs around all four sides of the inner yard; around the corridor stand rows of cells. In the courtyard there is no *maṇḍapa* like those seen in Nāgārjunakoṇḍa. Instead, there are wells in some cases, while in others there are ovens, rostrums for preaching, a

subsidiary shrine or other miscellaneous facilities. The inner courtyard appears, thus to have been used as a kitchen in some cases, as a lecture hall or place of assembly in others. The main shrine or sanctuary invariably occupies the central cell in the back row. This shrine may be regarded as a substitute for the *caityagṛha* of Nāgārjunakoṇḍa, and corresponds to the shrine in the *vihāra*-caves of later times. The *vihāras* stand facing west in a straight line running from north to south.

To the west of these *vihāras* is a row of big shrines facing east, *i.e.*, facing the *vihāras* themselves. They are not quite face to face, however, since the number of shrines is less than the number of *vihāras*. It is not really possible to surmise the original shape of these shrines. In all likelihood they are not so much *stūpa*-like as similar to the shrine in the so-called Great Temple of Bodhgayā, *i.e.*, enshrining Buddha-images. If this is so, then Nālandā, unlike Nāgārjunakoṇḍa, had neither *caitya-gṛha* nor *mahāstūpa*, nor did it have a *caitya* hall, which latter was present in the cave-temples. It had only these big shrines—university chapels, as it were.

What is stated above is a brief history of monasteries and monastic buildings in India. These buildings, subject to variation in keeping with historical developments, can nevertheless be said to fall into several principal types, in the earlier period *upaṭṭhānasālā* (assembly hall) *vihāra* (monks' quarters) to be joined later by *stūpa* and *caitya*, finally by a Buddha shrine, though the first two never ceased to exist.

VI

The institutions of the Indian monastery were gradually transmitted to China through Central Asia, then further to Korea and Japan on the one hand, to Tibet and thence to Mongolia on the other. In the following I will confine myself to certain features of the Buddhist monastery in Japan and Mongolia.

Buddhism was first introduced into Japan from the Korean kingdoms of Paekche and Silla and, somewhat later, directly from China. Thus the earliest Buddhist monasteries in Japan, during the Hakuhō, Asuka and Nara periods (6th to 8th centuries), reflect the systematic architecture of those countries. The monastic buildings just mentioned were built on flat land, not on hillsides nor in the mountains. The buildings were built symmetrically along a line extending from north to south, fenced in by a rectangular fence, likewise running from north to south.

There is a traditional Japanese term, *shichidō garan*[b], lit., a 'seven-halled *samghārāma*', indicating a monastery complex consisted of seven buildings. There is, however, neither agreement nor certainty as to what these seven buildings were, for the different literary sources describe them variously, in addition to variations depending upon sectarian and chronological differences. In the *Taishi-den Kokin-mokuroku-shō*[c] the seven are given as (1) pagoda (*tō*[d]), (2) golden hall *(kondō*[e]*)*, (3) lecture hall *(kōdō*[f]*)*, (4) bell tower (*shōrō*[g]*)*, (5) scriptural library (*kyōzō*[h]), (6) monks' quarters *(sōbō*[i]*)*, and (7) refectory (*jikidō*[j]*)*. This description, though not fitting every monastery site, may be regarded as an ideal standard for the seven necessary buildings.

Of these seven buildings, the four most important are : (1), (2), (3) and (6). The first, the pagoda, was in three, five or seven storeys, a distant descendant of the Indian *stūpa*, but so distant that not even the form was the same, to say nothing of the materials. The golden hall (2) was a building in the centre of which images of the

Buddha and other figures were worshipped; it corresponds to the Indian Buddha-shrine. The lecture hall (3) was an innovation, but functionally it may be said to correspond to the *upaṭṭhānasālā*, the *caitya*-hall or the *maṇḍapa* of the Indian monastery. Monks' quarters are found in the Indian monastery under the designation *vihāra*. Thus the most essential elements of the Indian monastery were inherited and preserved in the four Japanese buildings just named.

Other terms, such as Buddha-hall (*butsuden*[k]) and dharma-hall (*hattō*[l]), appear, but these two appear to be synonymous respectively with the golden hall (2) and lecture hall (3) mentioned above. Very often a gate is mentioned as a component of the seven buildings. In some cases one sees mention of a drum tower (*korō*[m]) in connection with the bell tower; in others, bathrooms (*yokudō*[n]), privies (*tōsu*[o], *seichin*[p]), etc., are included among the seven buildings as replacements for some of the others listed above.

The arrangement of the integral buildings may be seen in various ground plans (cf. Figs. 5—10).[19] There is a rectangular corridor, within which are a pagoda (1) and a golden hall (2). This style, in which the greatest importance is attached to the pagoda and the golden hall, is felt to be the oldest in Japanese Buddhist architecture. In what is now Osaka, on the site of the Shitennō-ji[q] (Fig. 5), which dates to ca. 587, the south gate, central, gate pagoda, golden hall and lecture hall are arranged on a north-south axis, while the two central buildings, *viz.*, the pagoda and the golden hall, are flanked by a corridor. In the Hōryū-ji[r] (Fig. 6), which dates to 607, and in other monastery



Fig. 5
Shiteno-ji



Fig. 6
Horyu-ji

complexes, the two central buildings are on an east-west axis. In the Kawaharadera[s] (fig. 7) there is a second golden hall. The outstanding case is the Asuka-ji[t] (fig. 8), dating to 596, whose plan was revealed for the first time in a recent(1 956-8)

excavation. Here, there is a pagoda in the centre with three golden halls standing about it. This is unique in Japan, while there are only two such in Korea.

In the examples cited, the lecture hall, the principal element in the early Indian Buddhist monastery, is usually outside the corridor, *i.e.*, beyond the most venerated part of the monastic complex, while beyond it stand the monks' cells. In Buddhism,



Fig. 7
Kawahara-dera



Fig. 8
Asuka-ji

by the time it reached Japan, the worship of the Buddha was very important. This explains why the pagoda (1) and the golden hall (2), which in India were later features, in Japan were placed in the very center. The two were regarded as equally important; in the case of the Asuka-ji in fact, which is the oldest such site in Japan, it may be surmised that the pagoda (1) was, if anything, more imortant than the golden hall (2). The Indians had a clear understanding of the *stūpa's* significance. The Japanese élite, for that matter, were also aware of its importance, knowing as they did that the pagoda was always a repository for the Buddha's relics. Nevertheless, the weight of importance seems to have shifted eventually from relics to image. This parallels a development in India itself, one in which the *stūpa* or *caitya* was eventually replaced by a Buddha-image. In other words, a figure visible to all becomes more important to everyone than relics kept in concealment.

When the Yakushi-ji[11] (fig. 9) was built in 680, the golden hall occupied the precise centre of an area flanked by a corridor with two pagodas, one in each corner, as if the

latter were in attendance. When, at the next stage of development, the Todai-ji[v] (fig. 10) was built (ca. 740), the golden hall became the one and only central piece, the two pagodas being expelled, so to speak, to beyond the corridor. In other words, the pagoda, being no longer an object of reverence, became a mere embellishment to glorify the scenario. As time went on, the tendency to regard the pagoda as a sort of minor accessory became more pronounced.



Fig. 9
Yakushi-ji

Up to this point, a lineage of sorts can still be traced from the Indian originals to their Japanese descendants. In the Heian period (8th-12th centuries), however, the most significant monasteries were constructed on mountains such as Hiei and Kōya, where a symmetrical plan was impracticable. Certain features of these Japanese buildings can be explained in terms of the faith and habits of the time. Also, in and around the city, the present Kyoto, many mansions of the aristocracy were converted into monasteries. Japanese Buddhism, by this time, was largely a religion of invocatory worship, far removed from the original Indian asceticism. Thus, the religious edifices became more and more Japanese, to the point that a connecting line between them and their Indian prototypes was scarcely to be drawn.

In Kamakura times (13th century), a new form of Buddhism was imported from China, to be known in Japan as *Zen*. In keeping with it, there came into existence a new set of seven buildings, entirely different from their forerunners, a pattern in which the pagoda no longer occupied a place. On the other hand, there arose, also in Japan, a devotional Buddhism, typified by the Pure Land movements. In the course of time, two new big halls came into being, one to house the Amita Buddha, the other to house the founder of the school, halls designed to accommodate the thousands of believers who were to gather there to hear sermons. The monk is no longer a practising ascetic, he is now a priest preaching to the laity. This resulted in the disappearance not only of the pagoda but also of the lecture hall (which goes back to the *upaṭṭhānasālā*) and the monks' cells (going back to the time when the monk was a practising ascetic). The result is something purely Japanese, something whose prototype cannot be found in India, not even in China or in Korea.

VII

Tibet received Buddhism from both India and China, but more from the former than from the latter. The natural result is that many elements of Tibetan Buddhism are obviously Indian. The lama colleges, for instance, are cenobitic in



Fig. 10
Todai-ji (original plan)

character down to this day, and their scholastic curriculum seems also to be modelled, more or less, on that of India.

The Tibetan word *mchod rten* is used to represent both *stūpa* and *caitya*, but the structure itself is a variant on the former. There are innumerable *mchod rtens* everywhere in Tibet, scattered through valleys, mountaintops, plains and roadsides, not to speak of monastery compounds, whether inside or outside them. In Tibet itself, great *mchod rtens* were constructed at such places as Gyantse (Rgyal tse) and Samye (Bsam yas); even outside of Tibet, e.g. in Peking, there are great white pagodas. But the *mchod rtens* are in every case shrines for worship by people whose attitude to them is similar to that of the Indians to the *caityas* of old. They are, in other words, independent shrines, not components of cenobitic monasteries. Here I will confine myself to a description of some architectural features of certain lama colleges in Inner Mongolia,[20] all of them belonging to the Dge lugs pa school.

The *vihāra* (monks' quarters) is not a single building but many small houses surrounding the main monastery buildings in the centre so as to look quite like a small town. Apart from the *vihāra* there remain two elements, essential to the monastery since India, the Buddha-shrine and the assembly hall.

The main building, called '*du khaṅ* (Tib., 'house of assembly'), is usually very big and tall. In a monastery of the Tibetan type, this main building is divided into two parts, front and back (cf. fig. 11, 12). In the back is the shrine that houses the Buddha-images.



Fig. 11

Wu-tang-chao, Tshogs chen du khan

It is very tall, sometimes reaching the height of a three-or four-storeyed building. Its depth, however, is so slight that only a few can worship in front of the colossal Buddha-images lodged within it. At times the entire Tibetan Buddhist canon (both *bka 'gyur* and *bstan 'gyur*) will be found heaped up in this one room.

In front, on the other hand, is a large and spacious square hall, within it 64 (8 x 8) massive pillars, sometimes even more, a hall that can accommodate several hundreds of monks. This, the main hall of the monastery, is called *'du khaṅ*, lit., 'assembly hall' (see above), corresponding to the *upaṭṭhānasālā*. Every department, or division, of a monastic college must have a *'du khaṅ*. Many *thaṅ ka* (painted scrolls) and wall paintings adorn the hall on all sides, but there are scarcely any Buddha-figures as objects of worship. In fact, the hall, having only one or two narrow doors leading to the Buddha-shrine behind it, is thus almost totally cut off from the latter. Thus, the spacious hall is meant for monkish assemblies and for nothing else. At some assemblies, the monks sit on rows of long benches facing one another, not facing a Buddha-image or indeed any other object of worship. There are, to be sure, various other rituals, such as recitation of Scripture and mystic invocations, but these rituals are performed not before a Buddha or even in invoking one, but rather in private supplication.

Architecturally speaking, three types of *'du khaṅ* or main building can be clearly discerned, the first being Tibetan, the second being Chinese, the third being intermediate or a combination of, two. (1) The purely Tibetan *'du khaṅ* (figs. 11, 12), to which most of the above description has been devoted, is made of stone, having usually two storeys in front, three or four in back. The wall is very thick, sometimes measuring 2 m. at



Fig. 12
Wu-tang-chao (Batuγar Süme), Dus 'khor 'du khaṅ

its base, and has a few small windows. The light streams in through a big skylight adapted in the center of the ceiling of the hall. The roof is flat. Two examples (figs. 11, 12) are both from Wu-tang-chao[w] (alias Batuγar Süme), located in a mountain range to the north of Köke-qota. (2) In the Chinese type (fig. 13), on the other hand, the roof, slanting on both sides in the usual Chinese fashion, covers the whole structure. The building has a single spacious hall, corresponding to the front part of the *'du khaṅ* with no rear attachment. A few Buddha images stand against the back wall, while, in some cases, a Buddha-shrine will be found in the rear courtyard at some distance from the hall. The front face of the main hall is a two-storey structure, something unknown in Chinese architecture but in perfect accord with the Tibetan architectural style, which serves the ritual needs of Tibetan Buddhism. Typical examples that may be cited are at Pei-tzu-miao[x] and Dolonnor (Doloγan Naγur). (3) The third type (fig. 14), which we have called 'intermediate' or 'mixed', is confined to a rather small geographic area, that of Köke-qota and its environs. We call it 'intermediate' or 'mixed' because it has a threefold Chinese roof but the floor plan is quite Tibetan. The division is twofold, as in the case of the *'du khaṅ*, but the Buddha-shrine in back is somewhat more spacious than one would find in strictly Tibetan architecture. This part of the building is covered by a big roof in the Chinese style. In front is the assembly hall, a bit wider than the rear. There is a skylight, consisting of a square hole, in the center of the ceiling, and another roof, in the Chinese style, above that; the rest of the building is flat-roofed. Only the front face is in two storeys, again in accord with Tibetan practice and in response to Tibetan ceremonial requirements; it is covered by a third Chinese roof, the smallest. Thus the three roofs, arranged in decreasing size from back to front, achieve an effect of balanced beauty. From the distance one would have the impression of three buidings, standing one behind the other, but, in



Fig. 13
Pei-tzu-miao,
Ch'ung-shan-ssu[y] (Tshong chen 'du khaṅ)

point of fact, the three roofs cover a single building with two rooms. It is likely that this architectural style is unique to this one place, probably because Mongolian Buddhism represents the confluence of two cultural strains, the Chinese and the Tibetan.

The original Indian notion of the cenobitic monastery is very much alive in these lama colleges, but from the architectural point of view the only common feature is the *'du khaṅ*, which bears certain resemblances to the *vihāra*-cave of later times. Still, the *'du khaṅ* has none of the monastic cells that surrounded the Buddha-shrine and place of assembly in the vihāra-caves.



Fig. 14
Koke Quta, Hsiao chaoz

FOOTNOTES

1. Osamu Takata, "Monasteries and Buddhist Stūpas", *Bukkyō Geijutsu (Ars Buddhica)* No. 69, Mainichi Press, 1968; *also* in his *Bukkyō Bijutsushi Ronkō* (Miscellanies on the History of Buddhist Art), Tokyo: Chūōkōron-Bijutsu-Shuppan, 1969, p. 64.
2. *Vinayapiṭaka*, I, p. 305 (*Mahāvagga, Civarakkhandhaka*), II, p. 147 (*Cullavagga, Senāsanakkkhandhaka*); *Dīgha Nikāya*, I, p. 145 (Kūṭadanta-s., 24), etc. Cf. Akira Hirakawa, *Genshi-Bukkyo no Kenkyū* (Study on the Primitive Buddhism), Tokyo : Shunjūsha, 1964, p. 313.
3. *Vinaya*, I, p. 106 (*Uposathakkhandhaka* S. Dutt, *Buddhist Monks and Monasteries of India*, London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1962, pp. 54, 57.
4. *Vinaya*, I, p. 39 (*Mahākhandhaka*). Cf. Keishō Tsukamoto, *Shoki Bukkyō Kyōdanshi no Kenkyū* (A History of the Early Buddhist order), Tokyo : Sankibō Busshorin, 1966, p. 313.
5. *Vinaya*, II, p. 146 f (*Cullavagga Senāsanakkhandhaka*).
6. Tsukamoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 313, 319.
7. *Indian Archaeology, 1953-54, A Review; id. 1954-55; id. 1957-68: id. 1958-59.* New Delhi : Dept. of Archaeology, Government of India, 1954-59.
8. *Dīgha Nikāya*, I, p. 50.
9. *Jātaka*, I, p. 92 (*Nidānakathā*).
10. *Vinaya*, I, p. 79 (*Mahākhandhaka*).
11. Entai Tomomatsu, *Bukkyō ni okeru Bunpai no Riron to Jissai* (Theory and Practice of Distribution in Buddhism), I, Tokyo : Shunjūsha, 1965, p. 67.
12. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I, p. 16 (*Bhayabherava-sutta*): "For them (the disciples), Gotama, you are the forerunner, the protector, and the supportor..."
13. *Dīgha Nikāya*, p. 142.
14. E.g., Osamu Takata, *Butsu-zō no Kigen* (The Origin of the Buddha Image), Tokyo : Iwanami-shoten, 1967, pp. 209 ff, 343 ff, 415.
15. H. Sarkar, *Studies in Early Buddhist Architecture of India*, Delhi : Munshiram Manoharlal, 1966. (Also his "Some Aspects of the Buddhist Monuments at Nāgārjunakoṇḍa," *Ancient India*, No. 16, 1960.)
16. Ibid., *Studies*, p. 78 f.
17. Dutt, *op.cit.*, p. 151.
18. *Dai-Nippon Bukkyō-Zensho* (rep. ed.), Vol. 71, Tokyo : Suzuki Research Foundation, 1972.
19. Legends in figs. 5 to 10 : a=gate; b=corridor; c=pagoda; d=golden hall; e=lecture hall .
20. Cf. my *Mōko Gakumon-ji* (Monastic Colleges of Lamaism in Inner Mongolia), Kyoto : Zenkoku Shobō, 1947, Chap. II, "Architectural style of Lamasery."

a. 寺
b. 七堂伽藍
c. 太子傳古今目錄抄
d. 塔
e. 金堂
f. 講堂
g. 鐘樓
h. 經藏
i. 僧坊
j. 食堂
k. 佛殿
l. 法堂
m. 鼓樓
n. 浴堂
o. 東司
p. 西淨
q. 四天王寺
r. 法隆寺
s. 河原寺
t. 飛鳥寺
u. 藥師寺
v. 東大寺
w. 五當召
x. 貝子廟
y. 崇善寺
z. 小召

14

Portraits of the Feminine : Buddhist and Confucian Historical Perspectives

DIANA PAUL

INTRODUCTORY ASSUMPTIONS

INTERACTION between Confucian and Buddhist values in China has been the subject of many studies focusing on the conflict between a family-oriented society which had developed a cult of filial piety and a basically monastic, ascetic society advocated by Buddhist sūtra literature.[1] To my knowledge no comparative studies have been undertaken concerning the views of sexuality within the two value systems. Indian Buddhism had acquired a new and significant function in its attempt to transmit Buddhist values : to demonstrate that Buddhism, especially monastic Buddhism with its severing of social ties, rejection of the household life and observancy of strict celibacy, was the highest form of filial piety.[2] This was a necessary accommodation to and reconciliation with Confucian ideals by the Buddhists.

In order to understand the underlying structure of some of the differences between Indian Buddhist and Confucian values, it is important to investigate the notions of the feminine as part of their value systems or world-views. The feminine, as portrayed in textual materials, may provide some indications of differences in values and beliefs. Literary portraits of the feminine pose some serious problems of interpretation, however. For example, do the literary portraits describe existing social practices of the period or do they advocate change in social practice? The principal purpose of this paper is not to present sociological implications concerning images of the feminine or to attempt to reconstruct the social context within which these portraits were composed. Rather, the purpose is to describe and interpret the images of the feminine as an integral part of two religious systems : Confucianism and Buddhism. The portraits described below represent a series of cultural phenomena involving a certain cosmological dimension of an ordered, contained world which was seen as an integral part of the religion. In the

present paper the cosmological dimension of a sample of portraits concerning the feminine will be investigated. The following discussion assumes that : 1) an image of the feminine is necessary to a given world-view, *i.e.*, is an essential factor in the cosmology of any religion; 2) that a given value system will remain intact only if all necessary cosmological dimensions remain intact; otherwise, the value system must change.

The portraits of the feminine are not, atleast totally, representative of the social realities of the time, particularly since the texts to be discussed tend to be the predominant world-view of the upper classes in society.[3] There was an inextricable relationship between cosmology and social institutions in traditional Chinese society since the Confucian law was based on norms (*li*) which perpetuated the order of the cosmos.[4] The concern in this paper is primarily with the cosmology from which *li* or the values and norms of society were developed.

Images of the feminine in a sample of Buddhist texts will be compared with those in Confucian texts. Confucianism was based on the family as the exemplary model for society and Buddhism had to deal with that model in order to successfully transmit Buddhism to a Chinese audience. The portraits of the feminine will be explored with relation to the cosmological functions embodied in Confucianism and Buddhism. By Confucianism I mean not only the views of Confucius and Mencius but the Legalist-Confucian-Taoist amalgam of ideas which were current during the disintegration of the Han dynasty :

> The Confucians did not constitute a group separate from the general current of religious life of traditional Chinese society. They shared with the rest of the population a basic system of religious belief in Heaven, fate, and other supernatural concepts...The Confucians, therefore, cannot be regarded as a distinctly different group on religious grounds, but must be regarded as part of the general pattern of Chinese religious life with only relative differences due to their social and economic position.[5]

Information on group and individual beliefs and attitudes prevailing at any given time in traditional Chinese classics is fragmentary. Texts themselves, especially the Buddhist sūtras, provide little or no information concerning authorship, of date composition, or location. Pronouncements and expositions in the texts may have had little real impact on either individual or social behavior. In no way is the following comparison meant to be an exhaustive study of the image of the feminine in Confucian and Buddhist texts, but rather, a tentative typology of certain characteristics in harmony or tension within two different cosmological views.

Confucian Attitudes toward the Feminine

The "philosophy of organism", through which the Chinese view of cosmic harmony may best be described, has been discussed extensively by others.[6] The cosmological theories based on the *yin* and *yang* principles which are of concern in this paper became exceedingly important in the Confucian ideology during the Han. Among the classical texts which deal with the *yin* or feminine force and its interplay and complimentarity with the *yang* or masculine force, the *Li Chi*, *Hsün Tzu*, and the *Nü Chieh*

have been selected for their portraits of the feminine.

Yin may be summarized as being subordinate, docile, and soft, while *yang* is authoritative, strong and hard :

> On sophisticated levels of philosophical thinking, the *yin* and *yang* were regarded as equally necessary for the functioning of the cosmos and therefore as mutually complimentary, even though the *yin*, like a wife to her husband, was recognized as subordinate to the dominant *yang*. Popular thinking, however, tended to look at the two principles in more absolute and manichean terms : the *yang* as desirable and good, the *yin* as undesirable and evil.[7]

In the structure of the family upon which Confucianism based its conception of society, relationships between members were ordered by the *yin* and *yang* cosmological principles. Since the relationships within the family structure were believed to be the most fundamental and sacred, the interrelationships were construed as the reciprocity between the *yin* and *yang* forces. The father was the agent and ruler who ordered the cosmos through his responsibility to teach the norms of behavior (*li*) to the household.[8] The image of the father was the embodiment of *yang*. *Li* was a mechanism for maintaining social, age, and sexual distinctions. The mother was subordinate to the father and served him as ordained by *li*. The image of the mother was the embodiment of *yin*.

To ensure that the distinctions between *yin* and *yang* were learned at an early age, the *Nü Chieh* repeats the dictum from the *Shih Ching* : When a boy is born he sleeps on a bed, wears fine robes, and plays with a sceptre as indicative of his future status as lord of the household. When a girl is born, on the other hand, she sleeps on the ground, wears coarse woolen robes, and plays with spools to remind her of the fact that she is the worker of the household and inferior to her lord.[9] If boys and girls were raised according to these precepts, an ordered and harmonious society was assured.

This is also seen in *Hsün Tzu*. According to that text, Hsün Tzu mourns the dissolution of sexual distinctions by men as well as women of his time, maintaining that human nature and its ordering in society depend on sexual, age, and status distinctions :

> Hence man is not truly man more particularly in that he has two feet and no feathers but in that he makes distinctions. The birds and beasts have fathers and sons, but not the affection between father and son; they are female and male, but they do not have the proper separation between males and females.[10]

In snmmary, the primary distinctions which were maintained were both sexual and generational, *i.e.*, vertical relationships between the sexes and between differing age groups. The masculine, as the image of authority, and the feminine, as the image of submission and nurturance, were the prominent motifs in the Confucian classics. *Yang* as Heaven was the spiritual teacher; *Yin* as Earth was the material :

> A father can beget a child but cannot feed it;
> A mother can feed it but cannot instruct it.[11]

The subordination of the feminine in the cosmology is most evident in the *Nü Chieh* :

> Yin and yang are different in nature;
> Men and women are different in behavior;
> *Yang* is powerful ["virtuous"] because he is hard ["firm"]:
> *Yin* is functional because she is soft;
> Men are worthy because they are strong;
> Women are beautiful because they are weak.[12]

The difference in nature described above is elaborated in the following passage :

> Women have four behavioral patterns :
> First, in ("wifely") virtue or power; second in speech;
> Third, in appearance; fourth, in achievement;
> It is said that woman's virtue is in never being exceptional in intelligence;
> Woman's speech should never be clever or eloquent;
> Woman's appearance should never be [noticeably] beautiful in face and form;
> Woman's achievement is in never being more capable than men.[13]

Besides being the negative counterpart to the portrait of manhood, the portrait of womanhood is to bend and follow : "Therefore the *Nü Hsien* states : 'If a woman is like a shadow or echo [of a man and his parents]', she cannot but be appreciated".[14] Sexual distinctions in theory were ineradicable as necessary for harmony and order in the cosmos.[15] The feminine would always be subjected to three states of dependency under the guardianship of : 1) her father when she is a young girl, 2) her husband when she is an adult, and 3) her son when she is an old woman.[16]

Theoretically, the maternal image was one in agreement with the cosmological principle of *yin* as servant and worker for the lord of the household. The children were expected to care for both parents by being filial at all times. The relationship between mother and son seemed to be less important in terms of social organization than the relationship between father and son.[17] The former symbolized the emotional bond between mother and child regardless of achievement or failure. The latter symbolized a contractual relationship between father and child similar to a business contract :

> Here now is the affection of a father for his sons;—he loves the worthy among them, and places on a lower level those who do not show ability; but that of a mother for them is such, that while she loves the worthy, she pities those who do not show ability;—the mother deals with them on the ground of affection and not of showing them honor; the father, on the ground of showing them honor and not of affection.[18]

"The ceremony of marriage was intended to be a bond of love",[19] which ensured the continuity of ancestral worship through ritual performances and procreation and maintained sexual distinctions between husband and wife.[20] The relationship was

considered the most important of human relationships.[21] In the role of a wife, the woman's deference signaled internal harmony within the family and more broadly, within the cosmos as the way of heaven and earth :[22]

> Although the *yin* has its beauties, it keeps them under restraint in its service of the king and does not claim success for itself. This is the way of Earth, of a wife, of a subject. The way of Earth is not to claim the merit of achievement, but on another's behalf to bring things to their proper issue.[23]

The *ying-yang* cosmology dictated a hierarchical dualism in which harmony was based upon social distinctions. *Yang* was the preferred principle.[24] Nonetheless the advocation that female education was futile since girls were uneducable did not necessarily hold. For example, Pan Chao, in the *Nü Chieh*, claims that if *li* is to be perpetuated young girls must be educated in order to maintain the cosmic harmony and perform their duties correctly. While she assumed the superiority of men over women, she interpreted *li* to its literal advocacy of the differentiation of functions in two entirely distinct spheres of life. The woman was essential to that differentiation and maintenance of *li*.

> Let's look at the men ("gentlemen") of today. They know that wives are to be supervised and their correct deportment is to be regulated. Because they teach their sons to read the classics and records they really do not know at all that husbands must be served [by women] and the meaning of *li* must be retained. They only teach boys and do not teach girls but isn't this obscuring the [destined] affinity between them ?[25]

To refuse education to girls, in Pan Chao's opinion, was to ignore the position of the feminine principle in cosmic harmony. Not advocating the reading of the classics by girls, implicity meant a belief that girls as *yin* were not really necessary for harmony and social order, a belief which is suggested in the Analects :

> Only women and the commoners are difficult to handle. If you're close to them, they will not be deferent ("like a grandchild"); if you're distant, they will be hateful.[26]

In summary, the traditional Confucian value system was based on a model of the family which, in turn, was based on the norms of behavior or *li*. *Li* was used as a method to reinforce and maintain sexual and generational distinctions within the family and, by derivation, within social organizations in general. As a set of norms *li* was constructed upon a cosmology which entailed a world in harmony and balance between the principles *yin* and *yang*. The cosmos and all organizations within the world system demanded distinctions between sexes and generations, based upon *yin* and *yang*.

The image of the masculine symbolized authority, rationality, grantor of awards for achievement, and performer of sacred ritual while the feminine symbolized

obedience, affection, sympathy for others regardless or achievement or failure, and procreator. As *yin* the feminine can support man but cannot rule over him.[27] The relationship of husband to wife was that of guardian to child, master to servant.[28] The wife, therefore, was theoretically a child who should behave towards her husband as if he were her father.[29] In terms of participation in the sacred, however, the father supervised the ancestral rites and ruled over them but the mother assisted in ancestral worship by her procreation of sons to continue the rites.

Buddhist Attitudes toward the Feminine

The Buddhist portraits of the feminine will be confined to those of the cosmogonic theory in the *Agañña suttanta*[30] as retold in the *Mahāvastū*[31] and the image of the feminine as temptress and seductress. According to the general myth of the devolution found in the *Agañña-suttanta*, the Golden Age was one in which epicene or asexual, self-illuminated, and noncorporeal beings[32] dwelled blissfully in the heavens until one being fell to earth. Other beings soon followed. Earth gradually appeared as a substance like pure honey and ghee. One day someone tasted the earth with one finger and others followed. As a result, these beings were no longer luminous and the Sun, Moon, and stars appeared. With continual feeding these beings became corporeal and heavier in form. Those who ate little were beautiful while those who were gluttonous were ugly. Pride in one's beauty made the cosmos devolve even more. Greed and more eating continued and their bodies became grosser in form and divergence in beauty became greater. The sexes then appeared and with them, passion and sexual intercourse. Sexuality was immoral and a violation of another. Gradually, it became sanctioned. With continual devolution, property resulted and crimes were committed until the best one of the human race, a male, was elected king.

What is illustrated in this cosmogonic myth is a belief in beings who, in a Golden Age, were asexual and noncorporeal, beyond notions of morality, good and evil. Physical devolution is concomitant with moral degeneration. There were no sexual or social distinctions in the perfected state of beings and no tendency for passion (*i.e.* food and sexual intercourse). As soon as the perfect beings of the Golden Age fell from heaven, their nature was linked with desire and craving. The earth, the object of their craving, is a feminine symbol. The association between devolution and feminine earth may or may not be causal. Although no cause for the degeneracy of the age is offered, pride and sexuality emerge immediately after the increase in eating, the gross degeneracy of the human form, and the appearance of male and female characteristics. Sexual intercourse is the first act which violates others and is the object of repulsion.

The crimes which follow sexual intercourse involve property and require a system of punishments and the establishment of a sovereign. By implication, the designation of a male as sovereign associated the good and powerful with masculinity. A subtle transformation developed concerning sexual identities. In the early Buddhist texts sexual intercourse involved both sexes violating each other, but neither sex was given the responsibility for initiating the violation. In many later Budddhist accounts, however, reproduction and sexuality are invariably associated with the feminine who are insatiable in their lust :

> Monks, I know of no other single form, sound, scent, savour and touch by which a woman's heart is so enslaved as it is by the form, sound, scent, savour and touch of a man. Monks, a woman's heart is obsessed by these things.[33]

Even though denigration of the feminine was a trend in a portion of Buddhist literature, both sectarian and *Mahāyānist*, the belief that the soteriological paths were open and accessible to both sexes was upheld. In the case of Theravādin Buddhism, there were female Arhats among the religious community members. There are several outstanding examples of *nuns* as Arhats recorded in the *Therīgāthā*.[34]

Not only was the soteriological path of the Arhat open to women, but also the Bodhisattva path was accessible in theory. In the Mahāyāna Buddhist literature, the path of the Boddhisattva was one in which all discriminations and distinctions were to be avoided. The cosmogonic account of the Golden Age also indicated that the ideal state was asexual and transcended all distinctions among beings. Devolution brought the onslaught of greed, sexual distinctions, and immorality. The Golden Age was one of no conflict between the sexes—there were none. In Mahāyāna the advanced Bodhisattvas and Buddhas theoretically were empted of sexual categorizations. The most famous example in Mahāyāna Buddhist sūtra literature with regard to the untenable nature of believing in sexual categories is the episode of the goddess in the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa*. Śāriputra, in true monkish form, asks the goddess to change her female form if she is really eloquent and gifted in teaching the Dharma. The goddess responds, after reversing forms with Śāriputra so that he appears as a goddess :

> Śāriputra, if you can change into a female form then all women can also change. Just as you are not really a woman but appears to be female in form, all women also appear to be female in form but are not really women. Therefore, the Buddha said all phenomena are not really male nor female.[35]

The *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* is not the only text to conclude that there are no sexual categories. This can be seen in the *Ta-chih tu lun*. The discriminative characteristics of male and female are analogous to the ignorant individual's perception of water in a mirage. Because phenomena are empty of innate characteristics, there is neither male nor female. However, in practice this theory was difficult to follow. For example, for purposes of iconographic representation, distinctions in gender were necessary between Buddhist deities. Kuan-yin or Kuan-shih-yin is a prime example. Kuan-yin exemplified mercy and compassion and was initially represented as a masculine figure. By the end of the T'ang dynasty-Kuan-yin was represented as a feminine figure. More than any other celestial Bodhisattva, Kuan-yin was represented as sexually ambiguous, *i.e.*, assuming various masculine and feminine forms to suit the needs of her or his devotees.[36] Theoretically, Kuan-yin, as were all advanced Bodhisattvas or Buddhas, was epicene and technically in a formless realm, *i.e.*, in a realm of mind-made bodies not dissimilar from those ideal passionless beings of the Golden Age in early Buddhist cosmology.

Comparison between Confucian and Buddhist Portraits of the Feminine

The comparison between Confucianism and Buddhism is based upon the cosmological theories associated with the two systems—the *yin-yang* duality in Confucianism and the Golden Age cosmogony of early Buddhism. While dualistic systems such as that entailed in the *yin-yang* cosmology attempt to unify the dualism by the participation of both forces, the ideal religious state in Buddhism was to remove the apparent dualism between the masculine and feminine forces by the elimination of both.

The interplay of cosmological principles *yin* and *yang* represented a harmony in which hierarchical distinctions of the masculine over the feminine were necessary for continued order in both the universe and society. Early Buddhist cosmogony, on the other hand, believed in the notion of a Golden Age in which stratification and contractual obligations were unknown.

Comparisons of portraits of the feminine stem from social organizations in China, on one hand, and from the characterization of the feminine in India on the other : The cosmological extremes described above did not totally find their way into portraits of the feminine described below. The subtle transformation in early Buddhist cosmogony from mutual responsibility for devolution to feminine responsibility for devolution complemented the Confucian tendencies to portray the feminine as a negative force.

With regard to the feminine as sensual, passionate, and problematic, the Buddhists were to find a sympathetic audience among the Confucians. The hierarchical structure imposed on interpersonal relationships in Confucian literature influenced the description of male-female relationships in Buddhist texts. While Indian Buddhist texts had depicted the perfect life as one in which distinctions were to be eradicated, early Chinese translations of Buddhist texts were adapted to Confucian values by maintaining the social hierarchical patterns inherent in *yin-yang* cosmology. For example, the Pali original of the *Siṅgalovāda-suttanta* states that : "The husband *supports* his wife". The Chinese translation reads : "The husband *controls* his wife".[37] Adaptations such as these were common during the Later Han through the Eastern Chin dynasties when texts stressing filial piety were being disseminated. The adaptation to the patterns of interpersonal relationships found as essential to the maintenance of cosmic order in Chinese cosmology was undertaken by the Buddhists during the period of introduction and transmission of their culture and religion into China. The Buddhists accomodated Confucian theories of social organizations by adapting their texts. They also associated their notion of the feminine as a powerful source of evil with the Confucian notion of the feminine as a latent threat to the social order maintained by *li* and filial piety :

> Because your parents wished for happiness and prosperity for their children, they would perform whatever practices were difficult, have patience in facing all difficulties, and withstand all kinds of evil . . . Having married, however, they [their children] become addicted to other women. Because of their addiction, they are confused. Seeing their parents gradually of old age, they turn against them and insult them. They would use their [parents'] wealth without shame and drive their parents from their home. Because of desire there is such perversion. Your majesty, you should know that these are the causes for rejecting one's obligation

to one's parents. To value and flatter other women, providing them with various things without satisfaction, is the foundation of hell.[38]

In addition to associating their notion of the feminine as a threat to morality with the Confucian latent tendency to associate women with undermining social order, the Buddhists also integrated their portraits of feminine limitations with Confucian beliefs. As mentioned above, the Confucian texts claimed that women were dependant in three ways, resulting in their peripheral position in society. These three states of dependency or guardianship were assimilated with the five impediments women experinced in Buddhism, *viz.*, the impossibility of being: (1) the status of Indra, (2) the status of Brahmā, (3) a king, (4) an emperor, or (5) an irreversible Bodhisattva. The epicene or asexual nature of advanced Bodhisattvas and Buddhas remained implicit in the majority of Buddhist texts.

In summary, the Buddhist and Confucian notions of the feminine may be compared in terms of the cosmological accounts related in their literary traditions. Early Buddhist cosmogony assumed a Golden Age in which all social and sexual distinctions between beings were non-existent. In sharp contrast, Confucian cosmology presupposed a harmony in which two cosmic principles were not of equ al force but were constituents in a vertical relationship between a powerful and a weaker principle. Since the Buddhist Golden Age had, as its foundation, a system which was the anti-thesis of the Confucian notion of cosmic harmony, the common ground between the two cosmologies cannot be found with regard to the idyllic or harmonious state of the universe. It is with regard to dissolution or devolution of the perfected state of beings, that the notion of the feminine as a descriptive force becomes attractive to both a Confucian and Buddhist audience. The feminine as seductress and sexual power which threatens the moral precepts of Buddhist monasticism is synthesized with the feminine as a latent threat to Confucian notions of societal regulation. Buddhist sūtras reflect the association of the feminine with disruption of the moral order, *i.e.*, destruction of filial piety. In contrast to the weaker power of *yin*, Buddhist portraits of the feminine often construct the image of a potent evil force.

In addition to construing the feminine as an ominous power in the cosmos, women were also accorded a higher degree of autonomy and self-determination in interpersonal interactions. To accomodate the Confucian norms, Buddhist texts were changed to reflect the subordinate position of women in traditional Chinese society. Juxtaposition of the "three dependent states" in Confucian texts with the "five impediments" in Buddhist texts set the tone of the portraits of the feminine in which women are in a peripheral position in society but are a potentially formidable force disruptive of universal harmony.

Concluding Remarks

There are two cosmological structures of the feminine in Confucian and Buddhist portraits. They began with different assumptions of what constitutes the feminine in the universe. In the Legalist-Confucian-Taoist amalgam of beliefs which emerged at the end of the Han, *yin-yang* cosmology represented one important facet of the belief systems. The *Li Chi* and *Nü Chieh* portrayed the feminine as complementary to the

masculine but as secondary and supportive. Distinctions of status and sex were part of the cosmic order and were to be regulated by *li*. Humanity was distinctive because of its capacity to impose hierarchical structures on social organizations and to maintain harmony in society. The organizational structures were to be governed by men who were rational and powerful and served by women who were emotional and obedient. Preference was given theoretically and legally to the men in society while women were ideally dependent at all times upon some male member of the family.

Buddhist structures of—the feminine and masculine—were more ambiguous. Cosmogonic accounts of the devolution of the universe from an idyllic and "golden" age presented the emergence of the human race concomitant with the emergence of desire and sexuality. Distinctions, both sexual and social, were representative of the "fall of man" and organized society was necessary only when distinctions had occurred. Sexuality was part of the devolution but neither male nor female was given the blame for the passion which resulted. Sexual intercourse, from the outset, was immoral although later was to be sanctioned by society. Although the female was not considered more passionate in the cosmogonic myth, a transformation occurred in later Buddhist literature. The female became responsible for the disruption of the moral order of the cosmos.

Societal distinctions were necessary for moral and cosmic order in Confucianism but endemic to cosmic disorder or devolution in Buddhism. In early translations of Buddhist texts into Chinese there is an apparent accommodation to the hierarchical social structure of Confucianism in which the feminine is subservient to and controlled by the masculine while, somewhat contradictorily, more powerful than the masculine sexually as a destroyer of spiritual perfection and cosmic order. The ideal of the Bodhisattva Kuan-yin as a sexually ambiguous Bodhisattva is the most striking example of an iconographic accommodation to the asexual or epicene state of beings in the Golden Age.

Portraits of the feminine, in summary, are more complex and ambiguous in Buddhist Chinese literature than in Confucian literature. The notion of a weak but important feminine principle of worker and assistant is overlaid with the Buddhist notion of the potent feminine principle as a sexual power. Maternal emphasis of the feminine was in accord with notions of filial piety dear to the Confucian. However, the focus in Buddhism upon the destructive feminine in Chinese Buddhist literary portraits was, atleast partially, intended to instill fear in the heart of Confucians as well as Buddhists.

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, Arthur F. Wright, *Buddhism in Chinese History* (Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 21-41; Erich Zür cher, *The Buddhist Conquest of China* (Leiden : E. J. Brill, 1959), pp. 281-285; Kenneth Ch'en, "Filial Piety in Chinese Buddhism, "HJAS, Vol. 28, pp. 81-97.
2. Hui-yüan (344-416) in the *Hung-ming chi* (弘明集)

(T. 2102), emphasized the fact that the rules of ordination which required the permission of one's parents before ordination was proof that monks were filial. cf. I. B. Horner, *The Book of the Discipline* (London : Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1938-52), IV, p. 104.
3. Derk Bodde, *Festivals in Classical China* (Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 2.
4. *Hsiao Ching* ("Classic of Filial Piety") : "Yes, filial piety is the constant (method) of Heaven, the righteousness of Earth, and the practical duty of Man, "tr. by James Legge *Sacred Books of the East* (Oxford : 1879), III, p. 473.
5. C. K. Yang, *Religion in Chinese Society* (University of California Press, 1970), pp. 276-77.
6. Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China* (Cambridge University Press, 1954-1976), II, pp. 543-550.
7. Bodde, *Festivals in Classical China*, p. 37.
8. Arthur F. Wright, "Values, Roles, and Personalities" in *Confucian Personalities*, ed. by Arthur, F. Wright and Denis Twitchett (Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 6; Robert N. Bellah, *Beyond Belief* (New York : Harper and Row Publishers, 1970), pp. 76-99.
9. *Ts'ao Ta-chia Nü Chieh* (曹大家女誡)

(hereafter cited as *Nü Chieh*) by Pan Chao (班昭)

of Later Han, chapter I, in *Shuo fu* (說郛),

100 *chüan*, compiled by T'ao Tsung-i. (陶宗儀)

Ch'ing edition, 1647.
For an account of Pan Chao's life, see Nancy Lee Swann, *Pan Chao : Foremost Woman Scholar of China* (N. Y. : The Century Co., 1932).
10. *The Works of Hsuntze*, tr. by Homer H. Dubs (London : Arthur Probsthain, 1928), pp. 71-72.
11. The Works of Hsuntze, p. 242.
12. Nü Chieh, chapter three, p. 2b9-3a1.

陰陽殊性，男女異行。陽以剛為德，陰以柔為用。男以強為貴，女以弱為美。

13. *Nü-Chieh*, chapter six, p. 3b5-7 :

女有四行。一曰婦德，二曰婦言，三曰婦容，四曰婦功。夫云婦德不必才明絕異也。婦言不必辯口利辭也。婦容不必顏色美麗也。婦功不必功巧過人也。

14. *Nü-Chieh*, chapter six, p. 5a4-5:

故女憲曰婦如影響焉不可責。

15. Morahashi Tetsuji, *Shina no kazokusei.* (支那の家族制)

(Tokyo : 1940), pp. 59-66, explains the differences in addressing one's wife as indicative of social status. The lower the

social class, the less distance was acknowledged between husband and wife. Differences in mourning garments for husband and wife signified that just as heavan does not have two suns, the finest mourning garments may only be worn as tribute to one's lord, *i.e.*, the male head of the household.

16. Morahashi, *Shina no kazokusei*, p. 16.
17. Ch'u T'ung-tsu, *Law and Society in Traditional China* (Paris: Mouton and Co., 1965), p. 104; "Legally, a wife's authority was controlled and limited by her husband. To be sure, she had the right to discipline and arrange for their marriages, but she could not go counter to her husband's will."
18. *Li-Chi*: *Book of Rites*, tr. by James Legge (New York : University Books), II, p. 341.
19. *Li Chi*, II, p. 428.
20. *Li Chi*, II, p, 430.
21. Mencius, V, 1, 2 : 1 :

男女居室，人之大論。

cf. *The Four Books*, tr. by James Legge (New York : Paragon, 1866), p. 777; *Mencius*, tr. by D. C. Lau (Middlesex, England : Penguin Books, 1970), p. 139.

22. *Li Chi*, v. II, pp. 431-434.
23. Derk Bodde, "Harmony and Conflict in Chinese Philosophy," in *Studies in Chinese Thought*, ed. by Arthur F. Wright (Chicago : 1953), p. 61.
24. Bodde, 'Harmony," p. 54-62.
25. *Nü Chieh*, chapter two, p. 2b3-6:

察今之君子從知妻婦之不可不御威儀之不可不整。故訓其男檢以書傳。殊不知夫主之不可不事禮義之不可不在也。但教男而不教女亦敝於彼此之數乎。

Shu (數)

denotes a sacred relationship defined by cosmic order. Literally, the character means "number" and was a generic term for the designated numbers used in divination.

26. *Analects*, XVII, 25:

唯女子與小人，為難養也。近之則不孫，遠之則怨。

27. *The Works of Hsuntze*, p. 235.
28. *The Works of Hsuntze*, p. 155.
29. Ch'u ,*Law and Society in Traditional China*, p. 103-105.
30. *Dīgha Nikāya*, III, 27. cf. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, tr. by T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids (London : Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1965), Pali Text Society, Part III, pp. 77-94.
31. *The Mahāvastū*, tr. by J. J. Jones (London: Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1949) I, pp. 285-301.
32. There are two Chinese accounts of the cosmogonic myth (T. v. 1, no. 1, pp. 37b28-39a20; pp. 145a6-149c23). Only the latter recension explicitly mentions the asexual nature of the beings (p. 145a27). The former recension describes the polluting nature of the womb (p. 38a9-10) not found in the other Chinese translation, the *Dīghā Nikāya*, nor the *Mahāvastū*.
33. *Anguttara Nikāya* I, i, 1. cf. *The Book of Gradual Sayings*, tr. by E.M. Hare (London: Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1952), I, pp. 1-2. The passage immediately prior to the quoted citation discusses the equivalent obsession which men have for women. In general, however, non-Buddhist Indian texts believed a woman's sexual drives were much stronger than a man's. Buddhist literature incorporated this belief in some of their more misogynist literature.

34. Uracchadā, Khemā, Uppalavaṅṅā, Paṭācārā, Bhaddā, Kuṇḍalakesā, Kisāgotamī, and Dhammadinnā were nuns and eventually Arhats. cf. G.P. Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pali Proper Names* (London: Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1960), I and II, for textual references.

35. T. v. 14, n. 475, p. 548b2-5 (tr. by Kumārajīva) :

若能轉此女身則一切女人亦當能轉。如舍利弗非女而現女身，一切女人亦復如是。雖現女身而非女也。是故佛說一切諸法非男非女。

The problem of interpreting the sexual transformations of Bodhisattvas is not within the scope of this paper.

36. In Kumārajīva's translation of the *Lotus Sūtra* there are thirty-three forms, among which are nine females (T. v. 9. n. 262, p. 57a23-b19); Dharmarakṣa (Chü Fa-hu) lists seventeen male forms (T. v. 9, 263, p, 129b28-c6).

37. T. v. 1, n. 16, p. 251b14 :

西向拜者謂婦事夫。

For other examples, see Nakamura Hajime, "The Influence of Confucian Ethics on the Chinese Translations of Buddhist Sutras," in Liebenthal Festschrift, *Sino-Indian Studies*, V, parts 3 and 4, pp. 158-166.

38. *Yu-t'o-yen wang* (優陀延王), "The Tale of King Udayana," twenty-ninth assembly in the Ratnakūṭa, T. v. 11, n. 310, p. 544b24-c6 (tr. by Bodhiruci):

夫父母者皆願利樂所生子故難作能作，能忍一切難忍之事。假令種種不淨穢惡皆能忍之。....既婚娶已於他女人愛戀耽著。由耽著故惛醉纏心。或見父母漸將衰老違逆輒欺。所有資財無慚費用。或令父母不住於家。如是皆由欲所迷倒。大王，當知以此因緣於己父母棄背恩養。於他女尊重承事種種供給無疲厭心即是成就地獄之本。

15

Vinaya and Pratimoksa : The Foundation of Buddhist Ethics

CHARLES S. PREBISH

AN ANALYSIS OF THE VINAYA

PROPERLY SPEAKING, the Vinaya Piṭaka, or that portion of the Buddhist canon regulating the monastic life of the monks and nuns, is composed of three parts: Sūtravibhaṅga, Skandhaka, and Appendices. However, a consideration of Buddhist monastic discipline must be taken in broad spectrum, focussing not just on that portion of the monastic law which was canonized, but on Vinaya literature in general, thus affording us an opportunity to view the developmental process going on within the early Buddhist community in the first few centuries following Buddha's death. Consequently, we can include the Prātimokṣa and the Karmavācanās, although not considered to be canonical in the strictest sense, under the heading of Paracanonical Vinaya Literature,[1] and the commentaries and miscellaneous texts under the heading of Non-Canonical Vinaya Literature. Thus, we arrive at the following scheme :

I. Paracanonical Vinaya Literature
   A. Prātimokṣa
   B. Karmavācanā
II. Canonical Vinaya Literature
   A. Sūtravibhaṅga
   B. Skandhaka
   C. Appendices
III. Non-Canonical Vinaya Literature
   A. Commentaries
   B. Miscellaneous Texts

We can now proceed to an examination of these categories.

I. Paracanonical Vinaya Literature

A. *Prātimokṣa*

The Prātimokṣa is an inventory of offenses, being primarily, "a collection of liturgical formularies governing the conduct of the Bhikṣus and Bhikṣuṇis".[2] Many scholars have attempted to explicate the etymological meaning of the term Prātimokṣa, but these pursuits remain, for the most part, speculative.[3] The Prātimokṣa was recited by the monks at each Poṣadha day, and regarding its function, Miss Horner candidly states,

> This recitation served the double purpose of keeping the rules fresh in the minds of the monks and nuns, and of giving each member of the monastic community the opportunity, while the rules were being repeated or recited, to avow any offences that he or she had committed.[4]

For each breach of the rules, appropriate punitive measures are indicated. Since the Prātimokṣa concerns both monks and nuns, it is twofold [Bhikṣu Prātimokṣa and Bhikṣuṇī Prātimokṣa]. The monks' Prātimokṣa contains eight categories of offenses, classified, "according to the degree of gravity".[5] These eight categories of offenses shall now be listed and explained.

1. *Pārājika Dharmas*

These four offenses are the most serious which can be committed by the Bhikṣu. They include : [1] sexual intercourse, [2] theft, [3] deprivation of life [of a human], and [4] false proclamation of superhuman faculties.[6] Mention of these four offenses is not distinct to the Prātimokṣa or Sūtravibhaṅga, as we find them, for example, elsewhere in the Pāli Vinaya.[7] Violation of any one of the pārājika dharmas results in permanent expulsion from the saṃgha. It should be noted that the term pārājika remains a puzzle. Miss Horner renders it "defeat," following Ryhs Davids and Oldenberg.[8] E.J. Thomas notes that, "Buddhaghoṣa interprets pārājika as 'suffering defeat' and the Mūla-sarvāstivādins appear to do the same . . ."[9] Recently, however, Gustav Roth has thrown some new light on the subject by interestingly re-examining Sylvain Lèvi's suggestion of an earlier form of the term : pārācika.[10]

2. *Saṃghāvaśeṣa Dharmas*

These thirteen offenses represent, following the pārājika dharmas, the most severe breach of monastic discipline. Five offenses deal with sexual transgressions, two with dwelling places, two with false accusation, two with schisms, one with a monk who is difficult to speak to,[11] and one with monks who corrupt families. The first nine of these become offenses at once, while the final four do not become offenses until the third admonition of the monk involved.[12] The section of saṃghāvaśeṣa dharmas is unique in that it represents the only class of Prātimokṣa offenses which contains provisions for disciplinary action. When a monk is culpable of a saṃghāvaśeṣa offense, he is subjected to a probationary period [parivāsa] for as many days as the offense was

concealed. If the offense was confessed at once, the parivāsa period is reduced to nil. When the parivāsa is completed, a further period called mānatva[13] must also be spent. It is interesting to note that an entire vastu [*i.e.* chapter] in the Skandhaka portion of the Vinaya, the Pārivāsikvastu, is devoted to these issues. The term saṃghāvaśeṣa, like pārājika, is problematic. No etymological rendering of the term seems to make much sense. However, a careful discussion of the term, stressing the plausibility of the variant saṃghātiśeṣa [as found in the Sanskrit version of the Mahāsāṃghika text], is presented by Gustav Roth [in "Terminologisches aud dem Vinaya der Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin"][14] and also Sylvain Lévi [in "Sur une langue précanonique du Bouddhisme"].[15] Regarding this class of offenses Miss Horner perceptively notes,

> It is not impossible that originally the various Saṅghas, which were really subdivisions of the whole Saṅgha, exercised their jurisdiction over each individual member only in the case of the Saṅghādisesa offences, only coming later to exercise such jurisdiction in the case of all classes of offence. If this is so, we do well I think, to underline the formalities which the Saṅghādisesa offences entailed, and were very likely alone in so doing at first. For by this means some early feature of the Order's history may be kept in mind.[16]

3. *Aniyata Dharmas*

These two offenses include cases whereby a monk may be accused by a trustworthy female lay follower, and dealt with according to her dictate. If a monk should sit together with a woman in a secret place which is convenient for sexual intercourse, he may be charged with either a pārājika, saṃghāvaśeṣa or pāyantika [discussed below] offense according to what actually transpired [case 1]. If a monk should sit together with a woman in a place unfit for indulging in sexual intercourse, but suitable for speaking to her in lewd words, he may be charged with a saṃghāvaśeṣa or pāyantika offense, the pārājika offense of unchastity having been ruled out [case 2]. Due to the variable manner in which the monk may be charged, expressing the variety of monastic offenses open to him, this category of offenses is referred to as "undetermined offenses". The two offenses in this category reflect an outstanding and somewhat surprising degree of trust in the female lay follower, and more shall be said on this point later in the text.

4. *Niḥsargika-Pāyantika Dharmas*

There are thirty offenses in this class, violation of which requires expiation and forfeiture, as can be seen from the class title. Miss Horner notes, "From internal evidence, pācittiya [Skt. pāyantika] is a (minor) offence to be confessed, āpatti desetabbā [Skt. āpatti deśayitavyā], a state common to all the Nissaggiyas [Skt. Niḥsargika]."[17] The niḥsargika-pāyantika dharmas are arranged in three vargas, or sections, of ten rules each. Using the description of E.J. Thomas :

1. Ten rules concerning robes.
   These refer to the length of time during which an extra robe might be kept,

to repair and exchange of robes, and to receiving them as alms. He might not ask a lay person for a robe unless he had lost his own, nor might he suggest the kind he was to receive.

2. Ten rules for rugs and the use of money.
   The material of which the rug was made was prescribed, and it had to be used for six years. The monk might accept the material for it under certain conditions. Gold and silver must not be accepted or used in transactions, and buying selling were forbidden.
3. Ten rules concerning bowl, medicine, and robes.
   A monk might not keep an extra bowl beyond ten days, nor exchange his bowl if it was broken in less than five places. Medicine (ghee, butter, oil, honey, raw sugar) must not be stored more than seven days. There are special rules for robes in the rainy season and for having them woven. Nothing intended to be given to the order was to be applied by the monk to his own use.[18]

If we tabulate the offenses, we discover that sixteen refer to robes, five to rugs, four to money and appropriating saṃgha property, two to sheep's wool, two to bowls and one to medicines. This is the first class of offenses in the Prātimokṣa in which the numbering system employed by the various schools becomes widely divergent.[19] In commenting on the nature of the forfeiture and confession, and on the general value of this form of punishment, Miss Horner, again furnishing us with a valuable insight, remarks,

> As a general rule, the Padabhājaniya [Old Commentary] states that forfeiture and confession were to be made to an Order, that is to any part of the whole Order, five monks or more, living within a boundary, sīmā, or within one residence, āvāsa; or to a group, gaṇa, of monks, that is to a group of from two to four monks; or to an individual monk. When the article has been forfeited and the offence confessed, the offence was to be acknowledged, in the first two instances, by "an experienced, competent monk;" in the third by the monk to whom the forfeiture and confession had been made. The forfeited article was then to be given back to the monk who, having acquired it wrongfully, had forfeited it.
>
> The value of the nissaggiya pācttiya [Skt. niḥsargika-pāyantika] type of penalty was, I think, in the eyes of the framer or framers of the Pātimokkha [Skt. Prātimokṣa] rules, its deterrent effect on the commission of further similar offences, and its redemptive power for each particular offender. It was apparently held that an offence whose penalty was of this nature was annulled by confessing it and having it acknowledged, combined with this hardly more than symbolic act of forfeiting the article wrongfully acquired. This involved some formality, but evidentally the offence was not considered bad enough to warrant the offender's permanent loss of the goods he had obtained improperly.[20]

Regarding the terms niḥsargika and pāyantika, several of the alternate readings should be pointed out. For niḥsargika, we find [for the most part] : nissargika, naissargika, naisargika, and naiḥsargika. For pāyantika, we also find : pāyattikāḥ, papattikā,

pāpantikā, pācittiyakā, pātayantikā, prāyaścittikā, pācittiya, payti, pāyacchitika, pācchita, and pācattika.[21]

5. *Pāyantika Dharmas*

There are ninety offenses in this category,[22] violation of which require expiation. Although the numbering pattern in this class of rules is extremely divergent in the various schools, an examination of the contents of the rules yields surprising results. The vast majority of rules [74] may be grouped under five major headings :[23]

(*a*) Moral rules [lying, etc.]—23 rules;
(*b*) Conduct with women—14 rules;
(*c*) Food and drink—16 rules;
(*d*) Dharma, Vinaya, and their application—11 rules;
(*e*) Use of requisites—10 rules.

The remaining rules [16] may be grouped under three further rubrics, each containing a lesser number of items :

(*a*) Behavior in the vihāra—6 rules;
(*b*) Travel—5 rules;
(*c*) Various types of destruction—5 rules.

The placement of the rules into these categories is somewhat arbitrary, and several of the rules are actually co-terminous. The various Prātimokṣa texts generally group the rules numerically in divisions of ten [rules]. Some texts supply uddānas or summaries at the end of each section of ten rules, presumably as a memory aid for the monk, and one text [the Mahāsāṃghika] even provides a summary of the vargas at the end of the entire section. E.J. Thomas, primarily because of the use of the term vihāra and the denotation of furniture common to the saṃgha, is of the opinion that,

> Several rules in this section show a more developed communal life than that implied in the Sanghādisesa rules, and the whole section has probably been collected or put into shape at a later period than the previous rules.[24]

6. *Pratideśanīya Dharmas*

The pratideśanīya section contains four straightforward offenses which are to be confessed. They include : [1] partaking of food obtained through the intervention of a nun, [2] not reproving a nun for giving orders [pertaining to the meal] while a meal is being served, [3] accepting food from a family which is undergoing training, and [4] obtaining food while living in a dangerous setting, without having announced it being so beforehand [unless the monk is ill].

7. *Śaikṣa Dharmas*

This group of rules is the most disparate in the entire Prātimokṣa. The number of śaikṣa dharmas varies in number from 66 in the Chinese Mahāsāṃghika version to 113 in the Chinese Sarvāstivādin version.[25] Pachow describes the śaikṣa dharmas in the following manner :

> The nature of these rules is essentially concerned with the daily conduct and decorum of the Bhikṣus such as : walking, moving to and fro, looking, dressing, contracting, and stretching and so forth. They do not come under any penal section inasmuch as there will not be any sanction or punishment for their breaches or violations. The violation of any of them by a Bhikṣu is not considered to be a criminal act but simply bad manners.[26]

This section of the Prātimokṣa will be dealt with in some detail later in the text.

8. *Adhikaraṇa-Śamatha Dharmas*

These seven rules represent a system by which offenses may be resolved. The first, saṃmukhavinaya, literally means : in the presence of. The Samathakkhandhaka of the Pāli Vinaya explains this by presence of the individual, the Saṃgha, the Dharma, and the Vinaya.[27] The second, smṛtivinaya, literally means : verdict based on recollection. However, the Samathakkhandhaka makes it clear that it is a verdict of innocence and outlines five requirements for such a decision : [1] that the monk is pure and faultless, [2] that he is accused, [3] that he asks for dismissal of the charge, [4] that the saṃgha gives the smṛtivinaya decision, and [5] that the saṃgha is complete.[28] The third, amūḍhavinaya, literally means : verdict of past insanity. The Samathakkhandhaka notes three criteria for granting such a verdict : [1] the offense was not remembered, [2] the offense was remembered and confessed, and [3] the monk remains insane.[29] The fourth, yadbhūyaṣikīya, literally means : decision of the majority. The Samathakkhandhaka however, states that when a decision of the majority is not reached, monks at another āvāsa may be consulted.[30] Miss Horner suspects that this method was not contemplated, referring to a passage in which voting by tickets was used to resolve the legal question.[31] The fifth, tatsvabhāvaiṣīya, literally means : special nature [of the accused monk]. The Samathakkhandhaka notes three occasions for carrying out this act against the monk : if he [1] is a maker of fights, [2] is a maker of quarrels, of [3] is a make of disputes.[32] The sixth, tṛṇaprastāraka, literally means : cover [as] with grass. The Samathakkhandhaka explains that when monks are engaged in dispute, many unbecoming things may be said. Monks should gather together under the direction of an experienced monk, confess their collective fault, and unless it is a grave sin [sthūlavadya] or connected with the laity [gṛhapatisaṃyukta], enact this procedure.[33] The seventh, pratijñākāraka, literally means : verdict which effects confession. The Samathakkhandhaka advises that acts must not be carried out against a monk without his acknowledgement.[34] The adhikaraṇaśamatha dharmas are discussed at length in Sukumar Dutt's volume, *Early Buddhist Monachism* [Chapter VI : "The Internal Polity of a Buddhist Sangha", pp. 113-145

(revised edition)]. Strangely enough, we also find an explanation of this class of rules in the Sāmagāma Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya [Sutta No. 104].

These eight classes of rules comprise the monks' Prātimokṣa Sūtra. The texts are preceded by a series of verses praising the disciplined life, and also by a ritual formulary, but a discussion of this formulary shall be delayed until the second portion of this article. A series of verses, often concurring with several verses in the Dhammapada or Udānavarga, also follow the text proper, uniformly mentioning the six Buddhas immediately antecedent to Śākyamuni Gautama and Gautama himself.[35]

The nuns' Prātimokṣa consists of the same classes of rules as the monks' Prātimokṣa, but the aniyata dharmas are omitted. We also find that the number of rules in the nuns' Prātimokṣa is considerably larger than in the monks' version, many rules having been inserted specifically for females.[36]

B. *Karmavācanā*

All transactions appertaining to the communal life of a saṃgha were settled by acts referred to as Saṃghakarmas. Saṃghakarmas could arise in either of two ways :[37]

1. By a general requisition;
2. By a dispute.

B. Jinananda notes :

> A formula, styled karmavācanā (Pāli kammavācā), was resorted to for performing saṃgha karmas. There are two forms of arriving at a resolution (i) a summary decision (Jñaptidvitīyakarma) in which a resolution is arrived at by the first reading and (ii) a decision by the third reading (Jñapticaturthakarma).[38]

Herbert Härtel finds the earliest evidence for Karmavācanā in several portions of the Pāli Canon.[39] He then quotes Hermann Oldenberg :

> 'While, however, in the case of the suttavibhhaṅga the liturgy on which it has been founded (pātimokkha) has been preserved in a separate shape, the formularies in the Khandhakas [Skt. Skandhakas] have not as yet, except in some instances, been found in existence apart from the Khandhakas. The principal exception is the Upasampadā-kammavācā, which recurs in its entirety in the First Khandhaka of the Mahāvagga.'[40]

Since the book that Härtel is quoting from was published in 1881, he is careful to point out several newer examples of independent Karmavācanās, not only in Pāli, but also in Chinese and Sanskrit.[41] Both Härtel and Jinananda cite fourteen Karmavācanās :[42]

1. Admission into the order [pravrajyā];
2. Ordination of monks [upasaṃpadā];
3. Holding the confession ceremony [poṣadha];
4. Holding the ceremony of invitation [pravāraṇā];

5. Residence obligation during the rainy season [varṣopagamana];
6. Use of leather objects [carman];
7. Use and preparation of medicines [bhaiṣajya];
8. Robe-giving ceremony [kaṭhina];
9. Discipline;
10. Daily life of monks;
11. Beds and seats, *i.e.* dwellings [śayanāsana];
12. Schisms in the order [saṃghabheda];
13. Duties of a student and teacher to one another;
14. Rules for nuns.

In commenting on the Karmavācanā, Jinananda observes :

> The importance of this formula for the history of community life of Buddhism is very great. It permits us to have a peep into the Buddhist church organisation which did not have any supreme head. The whole organisation is imbued with a democratic spirit and follows the parliamentary method.[43]

As the Saṃghakarma is so significant to the lawful functioning of the monastic community, it shall be explained more fully with a particular emphasis on its application to the Vinaya. A valid Saṃghakarma consists of the following conditions :[44]

1. The presence of the proper number of competent monks[45];
2. The conveyance of all absentee ballots [chanda];
3. The motion [jñapti] being proposed;
4. The proper proclamation of Karmavācanā.

Sukumar Dutt, in *Early Buddhist Monachism* [pp. 125-142, revised edition], provides an excellent summary of the proceeding of a Saṃghakarma and I am going to summarize it here, replacing the Pāli terms with their Sanskrit counterparts and supplying page references wherever necessary. Dutt treats both disputatious and disciplinary Saṃghakarmas, and we shall examine the former first.

Disputes [adhikaraṇas] are of four classes [pp. 126-127] :

1. Vivādādhikaraṇa—disputes concerning Dharma, Vinaya, matters concerning the Tathāgata, and the nature of monastic offenses.
2. Anuvādādhikaraṇa—disputes concerning a monk's general department;
3. Āpattyadhikaraṇa—disputes concerning pārājika, saṃghāvaśeṣa, pāyantika, pratideśanīya, duṣkṛta, sthūlātyaya, and durbhāṣita offenses of which a monk is accused.[46]
4. Kṛtyādhikaraṇa—disputes concerning Saṃghakarma procedure ' or saṃgha responsibilities.

The following stages are outlined [pp. 125-126] :

1. The dispute [preliminary]
   (*a*) Accusation and denial, or
   (*b*) Confession, or
   (*c*) Difference of opinion
2. The procedure
   (*a*) Proposal of the jñapti
   (*b*) Proclamation of Karmavācanā
   (*c*) Rules of adhikaraṇa-śamatha[47]
3. The saṃgha's decision.

The samgha's decision must be in terms of the original jñapti. If the jñapti was for acquital or discharge, the matter was dismissed. If the jñapti was for conviction, a disciplinary Saṃghakarma was required, and this leads us to an examination of this second type of Saṃghakarma.

When a monk is charged with an offense, six pleas are open to him [pp. 136-138] :

1. Past insanity;
2. Not remembering committing the offense;
3. Refusal to make confession;
4. Confession;
5. Hedging [retraction of a plea, etc.];
6. Confession of a different offense than that with which charged.

If the first plea is taken, and the saṃgha satisfied with it, request for amūḍhavinaya is made by the accused, and transacted according to the Saṃghakarma rules outlined above. If the saṃgha is not satisfied, the monk may be suspended for non-confession of a fault or sentenced to the mānatva and parivāsa penalties. The second plea may be accepted only from one whose memory is trusted, and the process is as above. In the third case the monk may be suspended for non-confession of a fault or sentenced in other appropriate but lawful ways. In no wise is the accused to be discharged or absolved. For the fourth plea the monk must confess his offense and request the mānatva discipline. A jñapti is then set out and the Karmavācanā employed, after which the monk is sentenced. In the fifth plea the monk should ask for punishment suited to his obstinate nature With regard to the sixth plea, the monk's confession cannot be accepted. He can only be tried for the offense with which he is charged. Dutt seems to feel that the most prudent course would be to change to the second plea, remaining open of course, to later accusation for the originally confessed offense.

We now come to the penalties administered for the various offenses [pp. 138-142].

1. *Parivāsa*

The parivāsa is enforced for the violation of a saṃghāvaśeṣa dharma. It involves a probationary period with some of the monk's rights, such as attending the Poṣadha ceremony or living with the saṃgha, suspended. The parivāsa period is determined in one of four ways :

(*a*) Apraticchanna—when the offense is immediately confessed [in which case parivāsa is reduced to nil];
(*b*) Praticchanna—when the offense is concealed, parivāsa is imposed for as many days as the offense was concealed [from the time of sentence];
(*c*) Śuddhāntika—when it is impossible to determine the date on which the offense was committed, the parivāsa period is counted from the date of the monk's ordination to the date of his sentence;
(*d*) Samodahana—when a new offense is committed by a monk while serving parivāsa, a new parivāsa period begins [and the longer period, *i.e.* for the first or second offense, is served].

2. *Mānatva*

The mānatva period is imposed with the parivāsa [for the same offense], and served immediately following the conclusion of parivāsa. The difference between parivāsa and mānatva is that the latter has a fixed period : six days.

3. *Tarjanīyakarma*

This penalty was imposed for any offense excepting a pārājika [which required immediate and permanent expulsion from the saṃgha] or saṃghāvaśeṣa dharma. Disabilities were imposed on the monk, continuing until the monk asked for and was granted reinstatement.

4. *Nigarhaṇīyakarma*

This penalty subjects the monk to careful observation, being imposed on a monk who repeatedly committed saṃghāvaśeṣa offenses [and served the corresponding penalties].

5. *Pravāsanīyakarma*

This penalty, consisting of banishment, was inflicted on a monk creating scandals.

6. *Pratisaṃharaṇīyakarma*

This measure was inflicted on a monk who offended a householder, and required his obtainment of pardon from the offended party. If pardon was not granted, attempts could be made by a companion, the saṃgha, and again by the monk, humbly confessing his guilt in the presence of the householder.

7. *Utkṣepaṇīyakarma*

This penalty was assessed for not confessing a fault, not expiating a fault, or not renouncing an improper doctrine. The penalty involved suspension.

8. *Brahmadaṇḍa*

This penalty resulted in social excommunication.

Thus having recounted the structure of the Prātimokṣa and the Karmavācanā, and having examined how the Vinaya system of monastic discipline is administered, we are ready to consider the structure and contents of Canonical Vinaya Literature.

II. Canonical Vinaya Literature

A. *Sūtravibhaṅga*

The term Sūtravibhaṅga is literally translated as "analysis of a sūtra." Thus, the Sūtravibhaṅga is a detailed analysis concerning the offenses recorded in the Prātimokṣa Sūtra. As we should expect, the Sūtravibhaṅga has the same eight sections as the Prātimokṣa Sūtra : Pārājika, Saṃghāvaśeṣa, Aniyata, Niḥsargika-Pāyantika, Pāyantika, Pratideśanīya, Śaikṣa, and Adhikaraṇa-Śamatha Dharmas. Regarding each of the Prātimokṣa rules, the Sūtravibhaṅga has a fourfold structure :

1. A story [or stories] explaining the circumstances under which the rule was pronounced;
2. The Prātimokṣa rule;
3. A word for word commentary on the rule[48];
4. Stories indicating mitigating circumstances in which exceptions to the rule or deviations in punishment might be made.

In addition to the Prātimokṣa offenses, several new terms are found in the Sūtravibhaṅga: duṣkṛta [light offense], sthūlātyaya [grave offense], and durbhāṣita [offense of improper speech]. Miss Horner describes the nature of these offenses :

> One or other of these offences is said to be incurred if behaviour has approximated to that which a particular pātimokkha rule has been designated to restrain, but which is, so far as can be judged, not so grave in nature as a breach of the rule itself, because of certain differences in its execution, or because of certain extenuating circumstances.[49]

In explaining why these new terms were used, instead of simply including new offenses under the standard headings, Oldenberg declares,

> Now the circle of offences which constitute a Pācittiya [Skt. Pāyantika], etc., appeared in later times as completed; if a punishment was to be inflicted for a transgression not specified in the Pātimokkha, they avoided using the expression Pācittiya, because, in doing this, they would have made an unauthorized addition of new matter to the ordinances of the Pātimokkha as fixed of old, which was considered as inadmissable. Hence an offence of this kind, if it was a slight one, was termed Dukkaṭa [Skt. Duṣkṛta]; if grievous, Thullaccaya [Skt. Sthūlātyaya].[50]

Like the Prātimokṣa, there is both a Bhikṣu Sūtravibhaṅga [sometimes referred to as Mahāvibhaṅga] and a Bhikṣuṇī Sūtravibhaṅga.

B. *Skandhaka*

The Skandhaka contains the regulations pertaining to the organization of the saṃgha. The Skandhaka functions on the basis of the acts and ceremonies dictated by the Karmavācanās. Two statements may thus be made in the way of analogy :[51]

1. The Skandhaka represents to the saṃgha what the Sūtravibhaṅga represents to the individual monk or nun.
2. The Karmavācanās are to the Skandhaka what the Prātimokṣa is to the Sūtravibhaṅga.

There are twenty chapters in the Skandhaka, each referred to as a vastu, which shall now be listed with a brief summary of the main features of each.[52]

1. *Pravrajyāvastu*

This vastu discusses, at length, admission into the order [pravrajyā], ordination to full monkhood [upasaṃpadā], the admission of novices [śramaṇeras], the regulations regarding the behavior of a new monk toward his master [upādhyāya] or teacher [ācārya], and a résumé of the cases disqualifying one from admission into the order.[53]

2. *Poṣadhavastu*

The Poṣadhavastu discusses the monthly confession ceremony from its inception to its final form, and also outlines the rules connected with the Poṣadha ceremony. The Poṣadha ceremony is instituted on King Bimbisāra's suggestion, based on his observance of other sects [non-Buddhist, of course]. At first, the ceremony is held on the eighth, fourteenth, and fifteenth of every fortnight, but later, observance on the eighth is eliminated, and the Buddha declares that the Prātimokṣa Sūtra should be recited at the Poṣadha ceremony. Finally, many rules follow, discussing : how the confession ceremony is to be announced and the monks called together, how the Prātimokṣa recitation should begin, how the Poṣadha is to be kept up, the various kinds of confession ceremony, the procedure, atonement of offenses, how to handle monks arriving while the ceremony is going on, and arrangements for avoiding any interruptions of the ceremony.

3. *Varṣāvastu*

The third vastu sets forth the rules for the observance of the rainy season. The Varṣāvastu begins with an account of the events leading up to the Buddha's decision to have the monks spend the rainy season in fixed residence. The period for rainy season residence is fixed at three months, and a discussion of when to enter the rain residence, acceptable and forbidden dwellings, and room and furniture distribution follows next. Conditions under which the rainy season residence may be abandoned are carefully

explained. Finally, the offenses and non-offenses are outlined in the case of a monk abandoning a rainy season residence [which the monk has promised a layman to inhabit].

4. *Pravāraṇāvastu*

This chapter treats the Pravāraṇā ceremony [invitation] which comes at the end of the rainy season. The ceremony is designed to prevent disharmony in the monastic community, and involves each monk inviting other monks to state whether there is anything for which he should be reproved, being prepared of course, to make the proper preparation. Precise procedural rules for the ceremony are given, defining the preparations for the ceremony, how the ceremony is begun, etc. Provisions are outlined for various kinds of Pravāraṇā ceremonies, and how to carry out an abbreviated ceremony in case of danger. It is noted that unauthorized persons are excluded from the ceremony. The method for making amends is outlined, and it is emphasized that a monk may not participate in the ceremony without having done so. Finally, some exceptional cases, such as postponing the Pravāraṇā ceremony, are discussed.

5. *Carmavastu*

The Carmavastu deals with the usage of leather [and shoes in particular]. The vastu begins with an extensive story concerning Śroṇa Koṭīviṃśa. Following this account, the subject matter of the chapter title is discussed in detail. The chapter concludes with a second legendary story, that of Śroṇa Koṭīkarṇa.[54]

6. *Bhaiṣajyavastu*

This chapter discusses the rules concerning the foods and medicines allowed to the monks. Several stories are utilized to outline a definition of medicinal drugs and an explanation of how and when they are to be used. With regard to food, the rules are severe, stating which alms foods may be accepted, how an invitation should be dealt with, how alms foods are to be prepared, and how the storeroom [kalpikaśālā] is to be used. A relaxation of these rules is allowed in case of hard times. Several legends conclude the vastu.

7. *Cīvaravastu*

The Civaravastu treats the rules regarding monks' clothing. The legend of the physician Jīvaka is recounted, at length, culminating with the Buddha's allowing monks to accept robes from the laity. Rules concerning which robes may and may not be worn, the cutting and sewing of the robes, the disfiguring of the robes, and the number of robes are set forth. Many rules regarding the distribution of clothing are outlined. The distribution of a deceased monk's requisites is also treated at length.

8. *Kaṭhinavastu*

This vastu, seting forth rules concerning the manufacture and distribution of robes for the monks, was initiated because of the poor condition of the clothing of the monks

after the period of rainy season residence [probably due to the bad climate]. The actual procedure is considered, followed, by an explantion of when the kaṭhina procedure is or is not properly conducted. Cases in which a monk's kaṭhina privileges are considered to be suspended are also set forth, with subdivisions of these cases.

9. *Kośāmbakavastu*

The Kośāmbakavastu relates a dispute between two groups of monks in Kauśāmbī, concerning the expulsion of a monk. At first, the Buddha makes a vain attempt to settle the quarrel. Alms offerings by the laymen of Kauśāmbī are withdrawn, whereupon the monks travel to Śrāvastī. Finally, the excluded monk confesses his guilt, is readmitted, and harmony is restored.

10. *Karmavastu*

This chapter discusses acts carried out by the monastic community, emphasizing the various sorts of assemblies in the saṃgha and in which acts they are competent to function. Valid and invalid procedures are also outlined.

11. *Pāṇḍulohitakavastu*

This vastu outlines monastic disciplinary measures. Five cases are mentioned.

1. For their argumentative natures, Pāṇḍuka and Lohitaka are sentenced to the tarjanīyakarma;
2. For continuous offenses, Śreyaka is sentenced to the nigarhaṇīyakarma;
3. For scandalous conduct, Aśvaka and Punarvasuka are sentenced to the pravāsanīyakarma;
4. For offenses to a layman, Uttara is sentenced to the pratisaṃharaṇīyakarma;
5. For not recognizing an offense, and for refusing to make reparation, Chanda is sentenced to the utkṣepaṇīyakarma, as is Ariṣṭa, for not giving up false doctrines.

12. *Pudgalavastu*

The Pudgalavastu discusses the treatment of simple offenses. The parivāsa and mānatva probations are outlined, as well as the reinstatement ceremony [āvarhaṇa].

13. *Pārivāsikavastu*

This vastu outlines the standards of behavior to be observed during the parivāsa and mānatva periods.

14. *Poṣadhasthāpanavastu*

This chapter discusses the prohibiting of a monk from participating in the Poṣadha

ceremony. The chapter commences with the Buddha refusing to recite the Prātimokṣa, despite Ānanda's several requests, because there is an impure monk in the assemblage. When the monk is removed, the Buddha announces that in the future the saṃgha itself [and not the Buddha] must hold Poṣadha and recite the Prātimokṣa. In addition, monks guilty of offenses are excluded from participation in the Poṣadha ceremony.

15. *Śamathavastu*

The Śamathavastu outlines the procedures for the resolution of legal questions [adhikaraṇas]. The seven adhikaraṇa-śamatha dharmas : saṃmukhavinaya, smṛtivinaya, amūḍhavinaya, yadbhūyaṣikīya, tatsvabhāvaiṣīya, tṛṇaprastāraka, and pratijñākāraka are discussed, as well as the four classes of disputes : vivādādhikaraṇa, anuvādādhikaraṇa, āpattyadhikaraṇa, and kṛtyādhikaraṇa.

16. *Saṃghabhedavastu*

This chapter discusses schisms in the saṃgha. The Devadatta legend occupies a large portion of the vastu, emphasizing the following points :

1. Devadatta, after entering the order, obtains great powers, and gains the support of Prince Ajātaśatru;
2. Maudgalyāyana is informed of Devadatta's plans and tells the Buddha;
3. Devadatta enjoins Buddha to leave the saṃgha under his direction [after Buddha's death];
4. After being denied, Devadatta tries to found his own community [which is not recognized by Buddha];
5. Devadatta requests the help of Ajātaśatru to replace Bimbisāra as king and exterminate Buddha;
6. Ajātaśatru complies, setting himself up as king in place of his father Bimbisāra;
7. Devadatta sends men to murder the Buddha, but the Buddha converts them;
8. Devadatta attempts to kill the Buddha with a rock, but only succeeds in wounding his foot;
9. Devadatta sends a mad elephant against the Buddha, but the elephant is tamed by the Buddha;
10. Devadatta poses more stringent rules and lures five hundred monks away from the Buddha, actually founding a new community;
11. Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana lead the five hundred monks back into the Buddha's fold, and when Devadatta learns of this, he spits blood and dies.

Following the Devadatta legend, there is a general discussion of schisms in the saṃgha.

17. *Śayanāsanavastu*

The Śayanāsanavastu concerns the dwellings of the saṃgha. After an introductory

story relating the building of dwellings for the saṃgha by a householder in Rājagṛha, the legend of Anāthapiṇḍada, a wealthy merchant in Śrāvastī who presents Jetavana to the saṃgha, is recounted. Various abuses lead the Buddha to allow a monk to be put in charge of assigning dwellings and furniture to the other monks. Other monks are given administrative roles, such as superintendent of buildings [navakarmika] or distributor of clothes. Provisions are also made to avoid the decay of donated buildings by assigning a monk to dwell in each permanently.

18. *Ācāravastu*

This chapter is a miscellany concerning rules of conduct. Behavior with regard to alms begging, meals among the laity, towards newly arrived monks, and towards forests dwelling monks is outlined.

19. *Kṣudrakavastu*

The Kṣudrakavastu is an inventory of rules which are of minor importance, and by their nature could not be appropriately placed elsewhere. Such topics as toothpicks and bathroom furniture are discussed.

20. *Bhikṣuṇīvastu*

As is obvious from the title, this chapter treats rules designed specifically for nuns. At the beginning of the vastu, the story leading up to the admission of women into the saṃgha is related. The nuns' admission, confession, and invitation ceremonies are discussed, as well as rules for conduct towards the male saṃgha members. Minor regulations conclude the chapter.

In addition to the twenty vastus in the Skandhaka, there is an introductory section discussing the Buddha's genealogy, birth, and life history up to the conversion of Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana, and also a concluding section covering the Buddha's death, the council of Rājagṛha, the history of the patriarchs, and the council of Vaiśālī.

In summary, we may thus outline the following scheme for the structure of the Skandhaka :[55]

1. Introduction : Buddha's Early Life and Career;
2. Buddhist Monastic Institutions [Chapters 1-4];
3. Daily Needs of the Monk [Chapters 5-8];
4. Monastic Law [Chapters 9-10];
5. Disciplinary Proceedings [Chapters 11-13];
6. Miscellaneous [Chapters 14-20];
7. Conclusion : Buddha's Death and Afterwards.

C. *Appendices*

Appendices are attached to several Vinayas as a supplement. They serve two

basic functions :[56]

1. Providing summaries of the rules found in the Sūtravibhaṅga and Skandhaka;
2. Providing interesting bits of monastic history.

III. Non-canonical Vinaya Literature

A. *Commentaries*

Fortunately, a wide variety of Vinaya commentaries have come down to us, and their importance for the student of Vinaya literature need not be stressed here. The most complete commentatorial traditions have been preserved in the Theravādin and Mūlasarvāstivādin schools, written in Pāli and Tibetan, respectively. We also possess Chinese translations for Vinaya commentaries in virtually all of the major Hīnayāna schools, but unfortunately, we are almost totally lacking in Sanskrit Vinaya commentaries.

B. *Miscellaneous Texts*

There are no less than sixty titles in Nanjio's *A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka, the Sacred Canon of the Buddhists in China and Japan* devoted to Hīnayāna Vinaya, and needless to say, a considerable number of these texts are not associated with any schools. There are also over sixty Hīnayāna Vinaya titles in the *Taishō Tripiṭaka*, and we find the same circumstance, of texts not associated with a particular school, here too.

Having examined the structure, contents, and application of the Vinaya, we are now in a position to proceed with our study, focussing on problematics particular to the Prātimokṣa. In conclusing this analysis of the Vinaya, I should like to quote Miss Horner, who provides as discerning a summary of the nature and importance of the Vinaya as I have discovered :

> Yet, as in any others, the Vinaya shows that there were in Gotama's Orders indolent, lax, greedy monks and nuns, those who were lovers of luxury, seekers after pleasure, makers of discord. We should, however, be greatly mistaken if we insisted upon regarding the Order as riddled by scandal, by abuses and by minor forms of wrong-doing. There is no doubt that these existed; but there is no justification, simply because they happen to be recorded, for exaggerating their frequency, or for minimizing the probity and spiritual devotion of many men who, in Gotama's days, were monks. Records of these are to be found in the Nikāyas, in the Theratherī-gāthā; and, too much overlooked, there are in the Vinaya, the virtuous, moderate monks who, vexed and ashamed, complain of the misdemeanours of their fellows.
>
> As historians, we must be grateful to these inevitable backsliders, for theirs is the legacy of the Pātimokkha rules. Had the Order contained merely upright, scrupulous monks and nuns—those who were steadfastly set on the goal of the Brahma-life, and those who had, in the circumstances, to voice their annoyance

with the wrong-doers—in all likelihood the Vinaya, the Discipline, the Pātimokkha rules would have not come into being, and much of the early history of the Order would now be known to us solely through the indirect and fragmentary way of the Sutta-Piṭaka.[57]

The Prātimokṣa : Problematics

While the previous section presented a detailed analysis of the structure and contents of the Vinaya the focus of this section will take on something of a different flavor, namely providing a provisional identification of the problematics inherent in Prātimokṣa study. The Prātimokṣa "Puzzle," as I see it, revolves around three central problems : [1] historical issues—the original meaning of the Prātimokṣa, and its nature, content, and function; [2] development of the Prātimokṣa as a ritual liturgy; and [3] differences in the Hīnayāna Prātimokṣa Sūtras extant. It is my contention that only in the light of the above can we begin to understand the implementation of the Prātimokṣa as an ethical instrument. Consequently, we shall examine the above three points in order. And I refer the reader also to my article on this subject in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society* [94, 2 (April-June, 1974), 168-176], which presents a summary of several of the issues treated below, as well as my book *Buddhist Monastic Discipline* (University Park : The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975), which examines these issues as the apply specifically to the Prātimokṣa texts of the Mahāsāṃghikas and Mūlasarvāstivādins.

Although etymological explanations of the term Prātimokṣa remain speculative, and for the most part, beside the point, some of the leading notions should be reviewed, the reasons for which shall soon become apparent. Rhys Davids and Oldenberg derive Prātimokṣa from √muc, taken in the sense of disburdening or getting free.[58] E.J. Thomas also favors derivation from √muc, but he renders it "that which binds, obligatory."[59] Winternitz associated the word with redemption, based primarily on his reading of the Jātakas.[60] Dr. Pachow notes,

> In the Chinese and Tibetan translations, this is interpreted as : Deliverance, liberation, or emancipation for each and every one and at all occasions, that is, 'prati' stands for 'each, every' and 'mokṣa' for Deliverance,'[60]

and so the derivations from √muc go on and on. Over against this, we find the evidence of the Pāli Mahāvagga, declaring Pātimokka [the Pāli equivalent of Prātimokṣa] to be the face, the head of all good dharmas [mukhaṃ etaṃ, pamukhaṃ etaṃ kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ].[62] With the exception of the Mahāvagga passage, each of our western interpreters seems to commit one huge error in his interpretation of the term : etymological judgement was colored by the preconceived notion that Prātimokṣa, since it was a monastic code, had to be rendered accordingly. What if Prātimokṣa, at the introduction of the word into Buddhist vacabulary, had nothing to do with the outline and confession of offenses? Sukumar Dutt throws considerable light on this suggestion by interpreting Prātimokṣa in quite a defferent sense. He notes,

> Pātimokkha, however, can be equated to Skt. Prātimokṣa, which from its etymo-

logical parts lends itself to interpretation as something serving for a bond, the prefix Prati meaning "against" and the root Mokṣa meaning "scattering" (kṣepaṇe iti kavikalpadrumaḥ), though I have not been able to discover any instance of the use of the word precisely in this sense in Sanskrit. I should prefer to take the etymological interpretation of the word as bond...[63]

In order to determine what led Dutt to such a bold statement, so obviously abandoning the orthodoxy of the time, we are necessarily led to an examination of the Prātimokṣa's original nature, content, and function, as the two problems are thoroughly intertwined.

Dutt assesses the state of the early Buddhist saṃgha :

The Buddhist Sangha existed originally as a sect of the Parivrājaka community of the sixth century B.C., and it rested on the basis of a common Dhamma and had at first no special Vinaya of its own. It is impossible to say at what point of time, but certainly very early in its history, the sect of the Buddha, the Cātuddisa Bhikkhu-sangha [Skt. Cāturdiśa-Bhikṣu-saṃgha], devised an external bond of union : it was called Pātimokkha.[64]

What was the nature and content of this earliest Prātimokṣa? The Mahāpadāna Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya provides a brief glimpse. We may recall that this sutta mentions the six Buddhas immediately proceeding Śākyamuni Gautama, expounding at length a story concerning Vipaśyin, the first of these previous Buddhas. Of utmost importance are three verses in the third chapter of the text [Nos. 26, 27, and 28]. The first two verses relate that at the end of each six year period the monks are enjoined to journey to the town of Bandhumatī to recite the Prātimokṣa. The text of this Prātimokṣa is as follows :

Khantī paramaṃ tapo titikkhā;
Nibbānaṃ paramaṃ vadanti Buddhā;
Na hi pabbajito parūpaghāti;
Samaṇo hoti paraṃ viheṭhayanto;
Sabbapāpassa akaraṇaṃ, kusalassa upasampadā;
Sacittapariyodapanaṃ, etaṃ Buddhāna sāsanaṃ;
Anupavādo anupaghāto pātimokkhe ca saṃvaro;
Mattaññutā ca bhattasmiṃ pantañ ca sayanāsanam;
Adhicitte ca āyogo, etaṃ Buddhāna sāsanan ti.[65]

Its translation :

Enduring patience is the highest austerity;
nirvāṇa is the highest say the Buddhas;
for he who injures others is not a monk;
he who violates others is not a śrāmaṇa;
Not to do any evil, to attain good;
to purify one's own mind; this is the Teaching of the Buddhas.

> Not speaking against others, not harming others,
> and restraint according to the Prātimokṣa,
> moderation in eating, secluded dwelling,
> and the practice of adhicitta; this is the Teaching of the Buddhas.[66]

These verses are not distinct to the Dīgha Nikāya. They also appear as verses 183-185 of the Dhammapada, but even more significantly, are among the verses appended to the Prātimokṣa Sūtras of the various schools [although attributed to others of the six Buddhas].[67] It is not unreasonable to suppose that each verse [of those appended to the Prātimokṣa Sūtras] represented the original Prātimokṣa of a particular Buddha, the likelihood of this hypothesis being heightened by the fact that at least one version of a Prātimokṣa Sūtra [the Sanskrit Mahāsāṃghika text] refers to each verse as a Prātimokṣa.[68] I conjecture that the inclusion of these verses in the fully developed Prātimokṣa Sūtras of the various schools represents an admission of the earlier form of Prātimokṣa, designed to provide the mature texts with added religious and historical authority. Regarding the function of the earliest Prātimokṣa, Dutt remarks,

> The Buddhist Sangha had rested originally on a community of faith and belief, on a Dhamma, but an external bond of union, a Pātimokkha, was afterwards devised serving to convert the Sect into a religious Order, and this Pātimokkha originally consisted in periodical meeting for the purpose of confirming the unity of the Buddha's monk-followers by holding a communal confession of faith in a set form of hymn singing. This custom seems to me to be indicated by the story of Vipassī [Skt. Vipaśyin].[69]

Recently, Dutt's thesises have been accepted by atleast two modern scholars : Bhikshu Sangharakshita in *The Three Jewels. An Introduction to Modern Buddhism* and Peter A. Pardue in *Buddhism*, although neither indicates Dutt as the source of his inspiration.[70]

It is beyond doubt that relatively early in the history of the Buddhist saṃgha the Prātimokṣa evolved into a monastic code, eventually developing into a formalized ritual. The process by which this took place must now be examined. Sukumar Dutt seems to think that the Prātimokṣa as bond or union being transformed into a monastic code took place shortly after Buddha's death, his reasoning being founded on his reading of the account of the council of Rājagṛha, in the Pāli Vinaya, about which he says,

> The canonical account of this "council," as I have already suggested, cannot be relied upon. It is based on a vague tradition of what happened in the long, long past. But we may read it between the lines. In the reported proceedings, the term, Pātimokkha, is nowhere mentioned, but all the heads of misdemeanour on the part of a Bhikkhu are listed except the Sekhiyas [Skt. Śaikṣas] and the procedural rules of Adhikaraṇa-samatha [Skt. Adhikaraṇa-śamatha]. The reason for the studied omission of the word, Pātimokkha, is not far to seek if we assume that at the time when the proceedings were put into shape, the Bhikkus understood by Pātimokkha something quite different from a code of Vinaya rules...The code, whatever its original contents, became after the First Council the bond of association of the

> Buddhist Bhikkhus, and was called Pātimokkha (Bond). Thus the old name for a confession of faith came to be foisted on something new, a code of Prohibitions for a Bhikkhu.[71]

One might object that although Prātimokṣa is not mentioned in the council account, it is mentioned in other parts of the Skandhaka text. However, these references to Prātimokṣa occur almost exclusively in the Poṣadhavastu and Poṣadha-sthāpanavastu sections, which have been shown by Fraüwallner to be both intimately related and late, indicating their formal, ritualistic nature.[72] Unfortunately, Dutt does not state his case strongly enough, or for that matter, make full use of the sources available to him. At the end of the eleventh chapter of the Cullavagga [in the Pāli Vinaya], the proceedings of the council are described as a vinayasaṃgīti, rendered by Miss Horner as "chanting of discipline."[73] Is it not possible that this chanting of Vinaya was of the same nature and function of the earliest Prātimokṣa, outlined above? In addition, when Upāli is questioned in the chapter, the text does not say that this interrogation concerned Prātimokṣa, but rather Vinaya.[74] Upāli's answers, replete with names of categories of offenses, pose no problem. Obviously rules for conduct existed, many probably even propounded by the Buddha, but these had not been as yet codified into a rigid structure. On this point, Pachow notes,

> Gautama Buddha, of course, was a reformer in some respects but as the conception of morality had been so well established before his time, that he had simply to accept their fundamental principles, and cast new rules in order to suit the requirements of his disciples, under unusual circumstances.[75]

After the Buddha's death, and most probably after the alleged first council, the monks set out together those precepts, outlined by Upāli as Vinaya, into a code. We have already seen that Prātimokṣa was to be the title of the code. There is no mistaking the existence of this bare code. Examples of its being regarded so are numerous in the Nikāyas. For example, we repeatedly find terms such as pātimokkha-saṃvara-saṃvuto, "constrained by the restraints of the Pātimokkha," and the like.[76] In addition, the ritual formulary preceding the Prātimokṣa as we have it today is found not in the Sūtravibhaṅga, as we should expect, but in the Poṣadhavastu [a section where it is out of place].[77] Sukumar Dutt goes as far as to say, "The Sutta-Vibhaṅga, in fact, regards the Pātimokkha as a mere code while the Mahāvagga [in the Khandhaka] regards it as a liturgy,"[78] pointing up another vital question : what is the relation between the Prātimokṣa and the Sūtravibhaṅga? To be more specific, Oldenberg succinctly outlines the problem :

> The question is, therefore, whether the ordinances originally appeared with the explanatory notes as in the Vibhaṅga, the Pātimokkha being subsequently extracted from it; or whether the Pātimokkha alone was the older portion, the additional matter of the Vibhaṅga being the work of a subsequent revision.[79]

I do not wish to dwell on this point, as Oldenberg himself conclusively verifies the antiquity of the Prātimokṣa :

> In dealing with this question, it should, in the first place, be observed, that if we read the ordinances of the Pātimokkha without the commentary of the Vibhaṅga, we find that they constitute one uninterrupted whole; and, moreover, it frequently happens that a rule refers to the one immediately preceding it, in a manner that would be altogether unintelligible if the two had been originally separated by the intervening explanations of the Vibhaṅga.
>
> So, too, both the nature and effect of the explanations themselves seem conclusively to point to their later origin. Sometimes they extend the application of the rules, at others limit their operation, while occasionally they give directions for preventing their evasion. In some cases also the explanations substitute an entirely new rule, based upon a development of the law which took place since the framing of the rules.[80]

In addition to the introductory formulary being out of place in the bare Prātimokṣa code, the interrogatory formula, concluding each category of rules, also does not fit. An example of this last point might be taken with regard to the adhikaraṇa-śamatha dharmas. No offenses are actually stated, hence the declaration of purity following these rules is indeed superfluous.[81]

Before we examine the actual process by which the Prātimokṣa developed into a formalized ritual, two further points need emphasis : [1] the flexibility of the Prātimokṣa during its formative period, and [2] the relative date of its finalized root form. That the Prātimokṣa text was flexible during its growth period is unquestionably attested to by the inclusion of a substantial amount of late material in its final form. For example, in the Theravādin, Mahāsāṃghika, and Mūlasarvāstivādin pāyantika dharma section, we find the term akṛtānudharmeṇa ["not performed according to Dharma"]. We cannot find an explanation of this technical term anywhere in the Prātimokṣa. In fact, it is only in the Pāṇḍulohitakavastu that the term is explained.[82] The Sūtravibhaṅga does, however, note that the utkṣepaṇīyakarma is anticipated as penalty for such an offense, but again, this second new term [as well as other, similar, punitive terms] is unknown to the Prātimokṣa, Sukumar Dutt notes,

> Then, again, the classification of offences does not appear to have been made on any initially recognized principle, but is more or less haphazard and promiscuous suggesting, if not actually later additions and alterations, at least the elasticity of the original code which offered opportunities for them.[83]

Also, regarding the flexibility of the emerging Prātimokṣa code, we have some evidence that the earliest form of the code contained a considerably smaller number of rules than the final form. Although Pachow cites the Sammatīya Prātimokṣa to contain only about 200 rules,[84] our most reliable source in the numbers game seems to be the Pāli. In its final form this Pātimokkha contains 227 rules. However, several sources indicate a figure of something more than 150 śikṣāpadas [sādhikaṃ diyaḍḍhasikkhāpadasataṃ].[85] Several scholars have entertained a series of arithmetic gymnastics in explaining the disparity of 77 rules [plus or minus]. B.C. Law for example, suspects that because the adhikaraṇa-śamatha dharmas were unnamed at the

first council, as well as the śaikṣa dharmas, they may have been later additions. In order to a rrive at the proper number, he disposes of the former group somehow and declares the correct figure to be 152 [*i.e.* 227 total rules minus 75 śaikṣa dharmas; if he also substracted the adhikaraṇa-śamatha dharmas, he would end up below 150].[86] Sukumar Dutt comes awfully close to making the same assertion, but adding that these two sections of rules "were considered to be of a somewhat different character from the rest."[87] While Dutt is correct to a degree, Pachow points out the futility of such approaches, noting that some of the śaikṣa material is extremely old.[88] Other ploys to account for the roughly 150 rules, perhaps just as ridiculous, might have been set forth. For example, if one charts the place at which each rule is said to have been promulgated, we discover that an overwhelming majority [roughly 170] were set forth at Śrāvastī. This figure is no more unreasonable than the others suggested [especially in view of the Pāli qualifier sādhikaṃ, "something more than"] and probably could be further supported by emphasizing the many rainy seasons spent there by the Buddha. This hypothesis was most likely not employed [and I assume that I am not the first to consider it, although I have not seen it in print] because scholars generally ascribe very little reliability to place names mentioned in the Pāli Canon.

In view of the materials presented above, we can tentatively propose several conclusions concerning the date of the earliest root Prātimokṣa text. First, the oldest portions of this text, indeed very ancient, may date from 500-450 B.C. Due to the flexibility of the early text, its period of growth to completion must have taken a considerable period of time, perhaps fifty to one hundred years. Thus, it was probably in its final root form by about 400 B.C. Accepting Oldenberg's thesis concerning the relationship between the Prātimokṣa and the Sūtravibhaṅga, we can assume that the latter text was composed a short period after the completion of the Prātimokṣa. However short this period may have been, it was certainly significant, for by the time of the composition of the Sūtravibhaṅga, no new additions to the Prātimokṣa were admitted, thus accounting for the new terms for offenses mentioned in the Sūtravibhaṅga : Sthūlātyaya [grave offense], duṣkṛta [light offense], and durbhāṣita [offense of improper speech]. We might say that the development of the Karmavācanās and the Skandhaka, taken together, parallels that of the Prātimokṣa and the Sūtravibhaṅga, although not being quite so ancient. Clearly, by the time of the completion of the Skandhaka, the root Prātimokṣa text had already developed into a ritual text, regarded as such by the former.

The ritual form of the Prātimokṣa is intimately bound up with the Buddhists' acceptance and observance of the Poṣadha ceremony; thus Poṣadha, or the Buddhist Sanskrit form of upavasatha [fast day], must be examined first. The story, of course, is a familar one, related in the Poṣadhavastus of the various Vinayas. King Śreṇīya Bimbisāra, the well known patron of Buddhism, observed that various groups within the parivrājaka community came together on the eighth, fourteenth, and fifteenth of each fortnight to speak their respective Dharmas. In so doing, they gained adherents and prospered, arousing in Bimbisāra the question as to why Buddha's followers did not observe this practice. Being possessed of the necessary amount of audacity, the king approached Gautama and questioned him on this point, suggesting that the bhikṣu-saṃgha also hold these fortnightly meetings. Recognizing the wisdom of

Bimbisāra's recommendation, the Buddha decided to adopt it, altering it to suit his followers needs. As Gokuldas De points out,

> But, the Buddha's injunction to his disciples regarding the observance of this ceremony of Uposatha [the Pāli form for Poṣadha] was that, instead of discussing the Dharma which was also conceded later on among themselves only, they should recite on this particular day the "Sikkhāpadas" embodying the code of rules for their own guidance, to be henceforward known as the Pātimokkha.[89]

Dutt comments on the change in function of this ceremony :

> But though the Uposatha observance was a widespread popular custom, the Buddhist Bhikkhus adapted it to their own uses and purposes : they made it fit in with their congregational life. Its form was changed : it became a confessional service, an instrument of monastic discipline.[90]

Before coming to the Prātimokṣa itself, it should be noted that two further points regarding the Poṣadha ceremony were changed. First, the three observance days were reduced to two, with the eighth day of the fortnight being excluded. Precautions were taken to avoid excessive observance. Second, extreme care was taken to establish a meeting hall for the Poṣadha ceremony and delineate proper boundaries [sīmā] for each āvāsa, already verifying the fact that various saṃghas existed in several places.

At first, the only business of the Poṣadha ceremony was the Prātimokṣa recital.[91] Accordingly, the bare Prātimokṣa text had to be transmuted into liturgical form. The first thing necessary was to add an introduction [nidāna] to the text. This nidāna is spoken by an elder, competent monk who first calls the saṃgha to order, announces the recitation of the Prātimokṣa to be at hand, calls for the careful attention of the saṃgha, extols the confession of faults, denotes silence as an affirmation of innocence, and emphasizes conscious lying to be a serious impediment to a monk's progress.[92] However, it is essential to note that in addition to the above, the elder monk, before calling for the careful attention of the monks, remarks that the first duty of the saṃgha is to declare complete purity.[93] That declaration of complete purity, pariśuddhi, is a pre-requisite to the Prātimokṣa Sūtra recitation is attested to elsewhere. In the Poṣadhasthāpanavastu, the Buddha refuses to recite the Prātimokṣa because one of the monks present in the assembly is not completely pure.[94] If the Prātimokṣa recitation, in fact, served anything more than a purely ritual function, why must complete purity be declared *before* the ceremony? With pre-announced complete purity, the only offenses subject to confession during the actual recitation would be those which were remembered while the recitation was in progress or those concealed previously but now confessed. Both of these cases were likely to be the exception rather than the rule. At the conclusion of the nidāna we find a statement indicating that there is comfort [phāsu], *i.e.* absolution, for one confessing a previously unconfessed fault, thus adding to our premise of the artificiality and purely ritual function of the ceremony, for the possibility of an offense for which confession would not suffice [such as a pārājika dharma] is not entertained at all. After adding the nidāna to the bare text,

the next requisite was to add interrogatory portions at the end of each class of rules. These statements consisted of a threefold repetition of the question: "Are you completely pure in this matter?" Immediately following the interrogation was the declaration of the elder monk: "Since there is silence, the Venerable Ones are completely pure in this matter. Thus do I understand." Apparently the confession of even one fault was not anticipated by the Prātimokṣa leader, again illustrating the solely ritualistic function of the formulary. I have already pointed out above that the interrogatory text is utterly misplaced after the adhikaraṇa-śamatha portion of the Prātimokṣa, but mention it here only to conjecture that it was incorporated to maintain the symmetry of the ritual. In addition to the nidāna and the interrogatory sections added to the root text, verses before and after the text were included, many of these corresponding to the speculated Prātimokṣa of the previous six Buddhas [as well as that of Śākyamuni Gautama]. Unfortunately, not all of these verses have been traced in the various recensions of the Buddhist canon, and it might prove enlightening to do so. Nevertheless, Schayer's comment on the inclusion of unusual passages in formalized texts is particularly pertinent here:

> There arises a further question: why have those texts not been suppressed in spite of their contradictory non-canonical character? There is only one answer: evidently they have been transmitted by a tradition old enough and considered to be authoritative by the compilers of the canon.[95]

Later, when other functions were added to the Poṣadha ceremony [such as monastic decisions carried out according to the Karmavācanā method], Prātimokṣa recital began to occupy only a lesser position. De remarks,

> Naturally when other items of business were introduced into the Poṣadha's observance, the main one, *i.e.*, the recital of Pātimokkha, failed to attract much attention of the members which it originally did being the only item. Good care therefore must be taken to ensure its recital and uphold the purity of the Saṃgha according to its several provisions.[96]

However,

> As to the effect of the this Uposatha on the members of the Order we may observe that the different Saṃghas which quickly grew up in large numbers all over India, especially in the North, freely transacting their respective business in very different manners had now to mind a particular work which concerned every individual of every Saṃgha in a way common to all.[97]

What does the ritualization of the Prātimokṣa, with its artificiality and lesser role in the Poṣadha ceremony mean in terms of the ethical dimension of Buddhist life? Most assuredly it does not mean that the ethical ideal had been abandoned by the Buddhists in the course of time. Rather, it seems to indicate a shift in the thrust of Buddhist ethics. With the rise of individual saṃghas, it was more apparent than ever that each saṃgha needed an ethical guideline or foundation to preserve its collective

life and maintain its individual integrity. With the maturation of the monastic order in Buddhism, it also became critically apparent that pragmatic considerations had to be reckoned with. By having all offenses [except those cited above : freshly remembered offenses or previously concealed offenses] *confessed and dealt with before* the actual Poṣadha ceremony, more time was freed for the other monastic concerns. Thus, the ritualized recitation of the Prātimokṣa becomes intensely meaningful. It seems to become the *formal embodiment* of a tradition, by this time long in practice, of expecting and demanding the highest cultivation of an ethical life by practitioners of Buddhism. In so doing, the ritualization of the Prātimokṣa reveals not that ethics and morality were overlooked, but rather that they continued as strongly as ever, simply recast into the formalistic mould that Buddhist monastic life had adopted. Considered in this perspective, Prātimokṣa is not just monastic "glue" holding the saṃgha together, but the common ground on which the internally enforced life of śīla is manifested externally in the community.

Having now followed the development of the root Prātimokṣa to its finalized ritual form, we are ready to examine the differences among the versions extant in the various schools, observing the manifold way in which each school altered the precepts of the root text. Sukumar Dutt has noted,

> A comparison of the Pali version of the Pātimokkha with the Chinese and the Tibetan shows differences, both numerical and substantial, in the Pācittiya [Skt. Pāyantika] and Sekhiya [Skt. Śaikṣa] rules, the greater discrepancy being under the latter head.[93]

Although Dutt makes no reference to the Sanskrit texts, which is understandable since the book quoted from was published in 1924 when Sanskrit Vinaya study was still in its infancy, he does set forth the two categories basic to an understanding of the differences in the various Hīnayāna Prātimokṣas. Our endeavor enhanced by the availability of several Sanskrit texts, we can construct the following table, charting the number of rules in the text of each school :[99]

Bhikṣu Prātimokṣa Sūtra

School (*Language*)	*I*	*II*	*III*	*IV*	*V*	*VI*	*VII*	*VIII*	*Total*
MSV (Chinese)	4	13	2	30	90	4	98	7	248
MSV (Tibetan)	4	13	2	30	90	4	108	7	258
MSV (Sanskrit)	4	13	2	30	90	4	108	7	258
MSG (Chinese)	4	13	2	30	92	4	66	7	218
MSG (Sanskrit)	4	13	2	30	92	4	67	7	219
T (Pāli)	4	13	2	30	92	4	75	7	227
S (Chinese)	4	13	2	30	90	4	113	7	263
S (Sanskrit)	4	13	2	30	90	4	113	7	263
D (Chinese)	4	13	2	30	90	4	100	7	250
MHS (Chinese)	4	13	2	30	91	4	100	7	251
K (Chinese)	4	13	2	30	90	4	96	7	246
Mahāvyutpatti	4	13	2	30	90	4	105	7	255

Key

MSV	—Mūlasarvāstivādins	I—Pārājika, Dharmas
MSG	—Mahāsāṃghikas	II—Saṃghāvaśeṣa Dharmas
T	—Theravādins	III—Aniyata Dharmas
S	—Sarvāstivādins	IV—Niḥsargika-Pāyantika Dharmas
D	—Dharmaguptakas	V—Pāyantika Dharmas
MHS	—Mahīśāsakas	VI—Pratideśanīya Dharmas
K	—Kāśyapīyas	VII—Śaikṣa Dharmas
		VIII—Adhikaraṇa-Śamatha Dharmas

The most striking factor in examining the number of rules in the various Hīnayāna Bhikṣu Prātimokṣa Sūtras is the astounding consistency in six divisions of rules : pārājika, saṃghāvaśeṣa, aniyata, niḥsargika-pāyantika, pratideśanīya, and adhikaraṇa-śamatha dharmas. Thus, two categories are suspect : the pāyantika and śaikṣa dharmas. Taking the former first, we find that the Theravādin and Mahāsāṃghikas texts preserve 92 rules instead of the 90 found in the other versions. In the Theravādin text, pāyantikas 23 and 82 are added. The first rule [23] relates to admonishing nuns, while the second [82] concerns confiscating saṃgha property for individual use.[100] In attempting to resolve the problem, Pachow remarks,

> Our answer to this would be that some of the schools did not adopt the Pali (Sthavira) V. 23 and 82, probably on the ground that the Pali V. 21, 22, and 81 are similar to them in nature, it was therefore, thought advisable to leave them out.[101]

The rules Pachow mentions are indeed similar to the two rules under discussion, and he has provided a thoroughly reasonable explanation of their omission in the other texts. However, he goes on to say, "And probably a round number like 90 would be easier to remember and better to calculate."[102] This last point is of negligible value, since when other categories of rules carry such unrounded numbers as 4, 13, 2, and 7, there would have been little concern for the distinction between 90 and 92; and monks simply recited the rules rather than calculating them. Coming now to the extra two Mahāsāṃghika rules, we find that they correspond exactly to the Theravādin additions (Mahāsāṃghika 23 to Theravādin 23 and Mahāsāṃghika 91 to Theravādin 82). The same explanation for their exclusion holds : rule 23 is similar to rules 21 and 22, while rule 91 is covered by rule 9. Regarding the Mahīśāsaka text, we find that no rule 91 seems to have existed, and perhaps Pachow has made an error.[103]

The śaikṣa dharma section is where the schematic numbering variance becomes acute. We find the smallest number of items in the Chinese Mahāsāṃghika text [66] and the largest in the Chinese Sarvāstivādin version [113]. In trying to resolve the problem of such widespread variance, both in numbering pattern (and content) and implications for the development of Buddhism, scholars have resorted to diverse techniques. For example, Pachow supplies the following explanation, to be equally applied to the pāyantika section :

> This shows : *i*) That when the schools used to be located at different places : the

> Sarvāstivādins at Kashmir, the Mahāsāṅghikas at Pāṭaliputra, the Sthaviras as Rājagṛha and so forth, it seemed inevitable for them to follow the order of rules rather loosely, because they had probably lacked the necessary writing material and had solely to depend on a powerful memory. *ii*) That as there is no specific number of the Śaikṣa dharmas, the schools were at liberty to add to them according to their wish. This brought about the discrepancy between the texts of the various schools. *iii*) That the schools claiming a very old origin show great discrepancy in regard to the number of rules. For instance, the Mahāsg. schools in general, agree with the Pāli text so far as the order of rules is concerned. But it suddenly jumps in striking manner from 51 to 61, 5 to 63, 8 to 80 ! Nobody would be inclined to believe that it is older because of such peculiarities.[104]

There is much validity in the first two of Pachow's arguments. While his writing materials thesis is weak, as we are still dealing with an oral tradition, the diversity of saṃgha sites could indeed foster local distinctions, bred by possible lack of communication among the schools. In addition, his second notion, the adding of rules to the śaikṣa section [and perhaps the likelihood of subtracting rules should also have been mentioned], coincides well with the flexibility hypothesis outlined earlier in this paper. Pachow, however, elects to dwell at some length on the third point in his statement. And it is here that I am obligated to disagree with his methods and some of his conclusions, especially in view of the final sentence of the passage cited above (which he himself violates in his presentation of the details). I suggest that the supposedly most ancient Buddhist schools only appear to exhibit such a discrepancy in the number and ordering of rules because they are measured against the root text in Pachow's admirable study : the Chinese Sarvāstivādin version. If the Mahāsāṃghika or Theravādin text was adopted as the root text, the converse conclusion would have resulted (and Buddhology would necessarily hold that conclusion untenable). The remainder of Pachow's argument is lengthy, accompanied by several charts and tables, so I simply refer the reader to the appropriate pages of *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa*[105] for a complete presentation. Now it is not to be disputed that on this third point both Pachow and I would like to arrive at some definitive conclusions regarding the age of the various Buddhist sects, based on information presented in the Śaikṣa section of the various Prātimokṣas. Nevertheless, one cannot be misled by the *suspicion* that the Mahāsāṃghikas and Theravādins are extremely ancient. Later research, in fact, indicates that while the Mahāsāṃghikas are very likely ancient, the Theravādins are not (once we understand that the Theravādins are not to be confused with the Sthaviravādins of the Great Schism, in spite of the fact that Theravāda is the Pāli equivalent of Sthaviravāda).[106] In summing up his section on the śaikṣa dharmas, Pachow provides us with the following table :[107]

	In Agreement	*In Disagreement*	*Total*
Sanskrit [Sarvāstivādin]	103	10	113
Pāli	61	14	75

	In Agreement	*In Disagreement*	*Total*
Dharmaguptaka	59	41	100
Mahīśāsaka	84	16	100
Kāśyapīya	60	36	96
Mahāsāṃghika	57	9	66
Upāliparipṛcchā	57	15	62
Mūlasarvāstivādin	62	36	98
Tibetan [Mūlasarvāstivādin]	52	56	108
Mahāvyutpatti	63	42	105

Setting aside the faulty arithmetic (57 plus 15 equals 72, not 62 as listed for the Upāliparipṛcchā), Pachow's conclusion does indeed have a ring of truth to it: "This gives us a very distinct idea of the relatively closer relation between the schools".[108] Nevertheless, we still find in the table many rules in disagreement, and it is these that may hold the key to the solution of the developmental puzzle.

Perhaps a more sensible approach would be the developmental, concentrating more on the contents of the various rules than their numbers. In considering the texts with which I have worked most closely, namely the Sanskrit Mahāsāṃghika, Mūlasarvāstivādin and Sarvāstivādin versions and the Theravādin [preserved in Pāli], this technique proves quite instructive. These texts contain 67, 108, 113, and 75 rules, respectively, but we find on comparison that there are only four areas in which the texts with a large number of rules [Mūlasarvāstivādin and Sarvāstivādin] differ from those with a small number of rules [Mahāsāṃghika and Theravādin]:

1. The robe section;
2. The section on village visiting;
3. The section on Dharma instruction;
4. The section on eating.

Before embarking on an examination of these sections, however, it should be noted that in the Sanskrit Sarvāstivādin text, 16 rules are entirely missing and several more have been reconstructed [by Finot, the editor of the text].[109] Lest one object that I have based my assumptions on faulty evidence, I can only note once again that remarks pertaining to the Sarvāstivādin text can be but provisionally accepted. Consequently, I have excluded it from any generalizations and conclusions. In the Mahāsāṃghikas and Theravādin robe sections, we find only two rules: one stating that the inner robe [nivāsana] should be worn wrapped around, and the other issuing the same advice for the outer robe [cīvara]. The Mūlasarvāstivādin and Sarvāstivādin versions elaborate greatly here, providing intricate details as to how the robe should not be worn. For the first two mentioned schools, a simple positive affirmation concerning the robes sufficed. The expansion of these rules in the second two schools seems to indicate that they were either more concerned about monastic dress from the outset, or developed a more thorough series of prohibitions at a later time because the earlier, simple regulations did not suffice and were abused. In the second

category the same growth can be observed. While the Mahāsāṃghika and Theravādin versions have 21 and 24 rules, respectively, dealing with behavior in the village, the Mūlasarvāstivādins have 29 and the Sarvāstivādins 39. The major difference in the more extended versions seems to center on the various unbecoming postures which the monk might assume. Either the last two schools were originally more concerned than the first two with general conduct of the monks in a village, or they observed, over a period of time, an alienation of the laity, precipitated by the unsatisfactory manners of the monks. A thorough and definitive understanding of this second division would insist on a better demarcation of the monastic-lay relationship in ancient India than we now possess. In the section on Dharma instruction we find that the Mahāsāṃghika text contains 16 rules, the Theravādin 16, the Sarvāstivādin 21, and the Mūlasarvāstivādin 26. The Mūlasarvāstivādin and Sarvāstivādin texts seem simply to list more conditions under which Dharma instruction was inappropriate. Perhaps the Mahāsāṃghikas and Theravādins, in their zeal to promote Dharma [as would seem to apply to the earliest Buddhist schools], were more indiscriminate regarding the conditions under which Dharma was preached, or perhaps the Sarvāstivādins and Mūlasarvāstivādins observed that it was just impractical to, for example, preach Dharma to someone who was on horseback [unless the rider was ill and could only receive Dharma instruction in this way]. However, it is also possible that difficulties arose from random Dharma preaching, and the Mūlasarvāstivādins and Sarvāstivādins sought to eliminate these by refining the circumstances under which teaching could *respectfully* occur. Further, if the Mūlasarvāstivādin and Sarvāstivādin schools represent newer factions in the Buddhist saṃgha, a likely suggestion, it is quite possible that Dharma preaching had developed, in the course of time, into a more fully matured enterprise, replete with added restrictions for its undertaking. A similar argument could be set forth with regard to the section on eating : Mūlasarvāstivādin 39 rules, Sarvāstivādin 21, Mahāsāṃghika 25, Theravādin 30. Without playing the numbers game, we see that of the 41 rules which vary between the Mahāsāṃghika and Mūlasarvāstivādin schools, no less than 40 rules may be speculated to be developmental advancements, indicating a lapse of some unknown time span between the finalizations of these two texts. I might add that these two texts were selected for comparison in the above statement because the Mahāsāṃghika text has the fewest number of rules and the Mūlasarvāstivādin text the greatest [if we remember that there are severe problems surrounding the Sarvāstivādin text, which in my opinion, make it an uwise choice for generalization]. What obviously needs to be undertaken is a careful study of the deviant rules in this section of the various Hīnayāna Prātimokṣa Sūtras, combining the evidence obtained with other bits of monastic history preserved in various other sources. To date, I know of only one study attempting even a portion of this task : André Bareau's "La Construction et le Culte des Stūpa d'après les Vinayapiṭaka", in *Bulletin De l'Ecole Francaise D'Extréme-Orient* [L, 2 (1962), pp. 229-274]. In spite of its restricted scope, the results are remarkable. We can see from the table of the number of rules in the Bhikṣu Prātimokṣa Sūtras of the various schools that the Dharmaguptakas have 100 rules in the śaikṣa dharma section, at first glance appearing to be not especially noteworthy. However, of the 100 rules, 26 discuss the conduct which must be observed at a stūpa, a subject which is uniformly neglected by the other Hīnayānists. Of course Pachow mentions this, but it was left to Bareau to develop. Without listing the 26 rules, which would be tedious, it is sufficient to furnish

a portion of Bareau's conclusion, providing a brilliant new insight into Prātimokṣa study :

> Comme il est invraisemblable que les Dharmaguptaka aient abandonné 26 règles antérieurement admises pour les remplacer par celles qui concernent le stūpa, on peut penser que celles-ci furent consignées dans leurs Prātimokṣa à l'époque ou les autres sectes du Nord complètèrent aussi leurs listes des śikṣākāraṇīya, quoique de façon différente, pour que chacune de celles-ci renferme environ cent articles. La liste Dharmaguptaka est la seule qui contienne exactement ce nombre, les autres dépassant généralement de quelques unités. La présence de la règle 18, qui concerne l'image du Buddha, permet de dater du début de notre ère la fixation à cent du nombre des śikṣākāraṇīya chez les Dharmaguptaka et vraisemblablement, comme nous venons de le voir, dans les autres sectes du Nord de l'Inde également.[110]

Further, if we consider Bareau's other findings concerning the strictness and severity of the Dharmaguptaka's stūpa regulations in the light of the structure and contents of Dharmaguptaka Vinaya literature, we find an interesting conjectural supposition emerging. As preserved in Chinese translation, the Dharmaguptaka school possesses no less than six Karmavācanā or ritual function texts, a considerably larger number than have been preserved in the other Hīnayāna schools [see Nanjio's Catalogue Nos. 116, 1120, 1128, 1129, 1146, and 1163; the last three of these texts appear also as Taishō 1434, 1433, and 1432, respectively]. On the one hand, we observe a weighty emphasis on Karmavācanā texts, indicating a keen interest in the careful ritual transaction of monastic business; on the other hand, we witness a stern reverence for the stūpa and its worship. Preliminary speculation seems to favour marking the Dharmaguptakas as professional ritualists. Additional research, of course, will be necessary before we can alleuiate this suspicion above the bare, provisional level. It is also noteworthy that Bareau, in making an exhaustive study of the sources, which is so typical of all his work, comes to the conclusion that :

> La liste des Mahāsāṅghika, la plus courte, paraît être aussi la plus archaïque; presque toutes les règles qui y figurent étaient adoptées aussi par la plupart des autres sectes ou s'apparentent étroitement à des règles de ce genre.[111]

To this point in our examination of the differences in the Hīnayāna Prātimokṣas we have been following Dutt's lead, concerning ourselves only with a study of the pāyantika and śaikṣa dharma sections. Now we must have a brief look into the other sections, pointing out, despite their numerical agreement in all the schools, some considerable bits of diversity.

In examining the remaining sections of the Bhikṣu Prātimokṣa Sūtra, it is not my intention to point out all the differences among the respective versions of the various schools. Such a task would go beyond the limits of the current enterprise. Instead, I have selected two sets of regulations which are illustrative of the type of developmental progression of which I have spoken previously, namely :

1. Refinement of the monastic dwelling;
2. The status of the lay woman [upāsikā].

For the first issue, we shall concern ourselves with the sixth and seventh saṃghāvaśeṣa dharmas. As the entire sixth rule is rather lengthy, I shall only reproduce the critical portion of it as it appears in each of the Prātimokṣa Sūtras preserved in Indian languages :[112]

Theravādin : saṃyācikāya pana bhikkhunā kuṭiṃ kārayamānena attuddesaṃ pamāṇikā kāretabbā;
Mahāsāṃghika : svayaṃ yācikāya bhikṣuṇā kuṭī kārāpamāṇena asvamikātmoddésikāṃ kuṭīkārāpayitavyā;
Sarvāstivādin : [fragmentary]...vā asvāmikaṃ ātmoddeṣikaṃ pramāṇikaṃ kuṭiṃ kārayīta;
Mūlasarvāstivādin : svayam yācitā bhikṣuṇū kuṭiṃ kārayitvā asvā [mikaṃ, atmoddeśakāṃ] prāmāṇikā kuṭiḥ kārayitavyā.

Disregarding the slight grammatical differences among the texts, the translation is :

When a monk, by his own begging is having a hut built, having no donor and intended for himself, the hut should be built according to measure.

There is certainly nothing problematic here, as the intention of the rule is clear in all versions. However, when we read the following rule, the picture begins to change :[113]

Theravādin : mahallakaṃ pana bhikkhunā vihāraṃ kārayamānena sassāmikaṃ attuddesaṃ;
Mahāsāmghika : mahālakaṃ bhikṣuṇā vihāraṃ [kārā] payamāṇena sasvāmikakātmoddeśikaṃ;
Sarvāstivādin : [fragmentary]...[vihāraṃ kāra]...(ya) māṇa (ḥ) sasvāmikam ātmoddeśika[ṃ];
Mulasarvastivadin: [mahallakaṃ punarbhikṣuḥ] vihāraṃ kāraya [māṇaḥ sa] svāmikaṃ saṃghoddeśakaṃ.

For the first three texts, the translation is clear enough :

When a monk is having a large vihāra built, with a donor, and intended for himself...

However, in the Mūlasarvāstivādin text, atmoddeśikaṃ [intended for himself] has been replaced by saṃghoddeśakaṃ [intended for the saṃgha]. Why? Three conclusions seem possible :

1. It may be the result of an error or oversight on the part of the compiler;
2. The fact of the large vihāra being intended for the saṃgha carries no great significance at all;
3. We have discovered an instructive detail, revealing information about the maturation of early Buddhist monasticism.

The first conclusion is unlikely, as it is preserved in this form in the Tibetan text.[114]

The second conclusion is unacceptable for several reasons. First, we find numerous examples of vihāras [*i.e.* ārāmas] being donated to the saṃgha or individuals by various kings and lay disciples, but it is only in the developed Skandhaka text, illustrated by Frauwallner to be relatively later than the date which we have set for the root Prātimokṣa, that we find any mention of a superintendent of buildings [navakarmika], which the monk in the rule in question certainly seems to be.[115] Secondly, the word vihāra is generally agreed to have represented, in earliest times, the dwelling of a single monk, only later being adopted as the title for monastic dwellings in general.[116] Thirdly, the interest in monastic life is dismissed by Frauwallner as having "gained greater importance only in the course of time".[117] Thus we are led to tentatively accept the third conclusion, and can make several statements in the way of summary. In the early tradition kuṭi and vihāra are almost synonymous, while later there exists a clear line of differentiation between the two terms. If we can accept that the period in which monastic officers come to be designated is somewhat later than that of the formation of the root Prātimokṣa text [and I do], the presence of such a monk in the Mūlasarvāstivādin text, virtually acting in the role of building superintendent, indicates that their Prātimokṣa became finalized at a later date than those in which no monastic officers are hinted at. Finally, if we consider the above in the light of the enormous emphasis of the Mūlasarvāstivādins on boundary delineation [sīmā],[118] we must ascribe the prevalcnce of this school to a time period when there was great interest in the Buddhist monastic institution and its preservation, noted by Frauwallner [above] to be late.

Coming now to the second topic, that of the upāsikā, we must examine the two aniyata dharmas. These rules are similar, so I shall reproduce the critical passage only from the first :[119]

Theravādin : yo pana bhikkhu mātugāmena saddhiṃ eko ekāya raho paṭicchanne āsane alaṅkammaniye nisajjaṃ kappeyya tam enaṃ saddheyyavacasā upāsikā disvā tiṇṇaṃ dhammānaṃ aññatarena vadeyyapārājikenavā saṅghādisesena vā pācittiyena vā...;

Mahāsāṃghika : yo punar bhikṣu mātugrāmeṇa sārddha praticchannāsane alaṅkarmaṇīye ekoyaraho niṣadyāṃ kalpeya tamenaṃ śraddheya vacasā upāsikā dṛṣṭvā trayāṇāṃ dharmāṇāṃ manyatarānyatareṇa dharmeṇa vādeya pārājikena vā saṃghātiśeṣeṇa vā pācattikena vā...;

Sarvāstivādin : yaḥ punar bhikṣur mātṛgrāmeṇa sārdham ekaike [na] rahasi praticchanne āsane niṣadyāṃ kalpayed alamkaraṇīyeṇa taṃ ca śraddheyavacanopāsikā trayāṇāṃ dharmāṇāṃ anyatamānyatamadharmeṇa vadet pārājikena vā saṃghāvaśeṣeṇa vā pātayantikena vā...;

Mūlasarvāstivādin : yaḥ punarbhikṣurmātṛgrāmeṇa ekikāya rahasi praticchanne āsane niṣadyāṃ kalpayedalaṃkāmayitum / sacecchraddheyavacanopāsikā trayāṇāṃ dharmāṇāṃ anyatamānyatamadharmeṇa vadet pārājikena vā saṃghāvaśeṣeṇa vā pāyantikena vā...

The translation for the first two texts :

Whatever monk should sit down with a woman, one with the other, in secret, on

a concealed, convenient seat, and a trustworthy upāsikā, having seen that one, should accuse him according to one or another of three dharmas : [either] with a pārājika, saṃghāvaśeṣa, or pāyantika dharma...

In the second two versions, the gerund dṛṣṭvā ["having seen"] has been deleted; otherwise they read identically. The remainder of the rule in each version goes on to explain that the monk should be dealt with according to the dictate of the upāsikā in question. The intention of the rule is clear enough : the seat is convenient and suitable for sexual intercourse, and should the monk indulge, he is charged with a pārājika dharma; if he remains chaste, he is charged with one of the lesser offenses. The second aniyata rule describes a location which is unsuitable for sexual folly, but satisfactory for the monk to speak to the woman in lewd terms, resulting in the elimination of the pārājika offense, while leaving the monk open for commission of one of the other two breaches of monastic discipline. However, the substance of these rules is not the issue on which we should focus our attention. The Buddha's publicly announced distrust of woman, is widely acknowledged, and that such rules exist at all is truly remarkable. The key point is that in the first two versions, the upāsikā, no matter how trustworthy, must bring her charge against the monk only on the basis of personal, eyewitness testimony. Anything short of that seems not to be admitted as sufficient grounds for such an accusation. The second two versions have nothing to say with regard to the offense being witnessed. The upāsikā's charge against the bhikṣu is accepted simply on the basis of her word, trustworthy though it may be, laying open the very real possibility of the admissability of hearsy evidence, a notion strongly deprecated by the Buddha himself.[120] Can the omission of dṛṣṭvā in the Sarvāstivādin and Mūlasarvāstivādin versions be an oversight or error on the part of the respective compilers? Perhaps, but I think not. Rather, it seems to indicate, and further research will be necessary to validate this thesis, a gradual upgrading of the status of upāsikās, a process which puts considerable time between the finalization of the two sets of Prātimokṣa Sūtras [Theravādin and Mahāsāṃghika being early and Mūlasarvāstivādin and Sarvāstivādin being late]. We should bear in mind that we have examined only two topics and certainly, similar results might be achieved in other areas.

As far as we have now advanced in this study, a number of problems concerning the Prātimokṣa have been entertained, as well as have been some speculative solutions. At this point it would serve us well to restate these problems, stripped of the explanatory material and technical jargon, enabling us atleast to, keep them firmly rooted in our minds.

1. What was the original meaning of the term Prātimokṣa?
2. What constituted the earliest Prātimokṣa and how did it function?
3. How, when, and under what circumstances did the Prātimokṣa develop into a root monastic code?
4. What was the general shape and content of the root Prātimokṣa code?
5. How and when did the root text develop into a ritual liturgy and what changes, both internal and external, were necessary to effect such a reshaping of the Prātimokṣa?

6. What monastic ramifications resulted from the ritualizing of the Prātimokṣa?
7. How and in what categories of offenses do the various Hīnayāna Prātimokṣa Sūtras exhibit the most striking differences?
8. Are the differences in question 7 resolvable [either partially or fully] and what attempts to do so have been made?

The final question, of course, must be : what further Prātimokṣa research is necessary if we are to have any hope of arriving at a conclusive resolution of the "Prātimokṣa Puzzle?" First, all the texts preserved in the various canonical languages must be made available, in translation, to scholars. Many researchers, regardless of their linguistic skills, are simply discouraged by the huge bulk of Prātimokṣa literature. Hopefully, translations which are well done and scrupulously footnoted may break down some of this resistance. Corollary to this is the publication of translations of Prātimokṣa commentaries. It is difficult to understand why the extensive commentatorial traditions of the Theravādins and Mūlasarvāstivādins have been so long neglected when within these same traditions, commentaries on doctrinal matters have been so heavily relied upon. Next we must entertain more comparative study, not avoiding the critical topics and divergent points, as some scholars have done, but exposing them wherever and whenever possible. We must give up the old habit of reliance on numerical tricks for resolving textual differences and dating texts, and in the place of this superficial approach, establish valid techniques, such as tracing the development of concepts in the light of cross-cultural reference points, or studying the usage of various significant terms in several contexts, perhaps modelling our work after the technique employed by Maryla Falk in *Nāma-Rūpa and Dharma-Rūpa* [Calcutta : University of Calcutta, 1943]. The interest in early Buddhist monasticism must be rekindled in the hope that it may reveal data hitherto unknown. Finally, when we are fortunate enough to discover new texts, as Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana did in the 1930s, they must not be stored away in a library for thirty years to gather dust while scholars make incorrect statements about them, such as Sukumar Dutt's incorrect labelling of the Vinaya texts unearthed by Sāṇkṛtyāyana as Mūlasarvāstivādin rather than Mahāsāṃghika.[121] Only when we begin to advance in the direction outlined can there be any decisive breakthrough.

FOOTNOTES

1. On this point, see, for example : Sukumar Dutt, *The Buddha and Five After Centuries* [London : Luzac and Company, Limited, 1957], p. 76. Dutt notes :

> "The Pātimokkha forms no part of the Pāli Canon, even though the bulk of the Vinaya-piṭaaka is based upon it; it is embedded, however, in the ancient commentary called Sutta-vibhaṅga on the canon."

In using the term "paracanonical," I have followed Louis Renou and Jean Filliozat, *L'Inde Classique* [Tome II; Paris : Imprimarie Nationale, 1953], p. 351 [par. 1980].

2. W. Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa* in *Sino-Indian Studies* [Volumes IV, 1—4 and V, 1 (1951-1955)], IV, 1, p. 19.

3. For a review of these attempts, see : I.B. Horner [tr.], *The Book of the Discipline* [6 Vols.; London : Luzac and Company Ltd. (for P.T.S.), 1938-1966], I, pp. xii-xvi. Also see : Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa.* IV, 1, pp. 19-23.

4. Horner, *The Book of the Discipline*, I, p. xii.

5. E.J. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought* [2nd ed., reprint; London : Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1963], p. 16.

6. On these offenses, Miss Horner, *The Book of the Discipline*, I, pp. xx-xxiv, remarks :

> "Evidently the aim of the strictures on unchastity, with which Pārājika I. is concerned, was partly to bring the monks into line with members of other preceding and contemporary sects whose members, having renounced the household state, had to be celibate. This notion already had history behind it by the time the Sākyan Order of monks came into being. It was a notion based asmuch on common sense, as on the conviction that restraint and self-taming were indispensible factors in the winning of the fruit of a monk's life [pp. xx-xxi].
>
> Stealing is ranked as a Pārājika (Pār. II.), or the gravest kind of offence, not merely because civilisation agrees that, for various, it is wrong to take something not given. It was particularly reprehensible for a Sākyan monk to steal, since at the time of his entry into the Order he morally renounced his claim to all personal and private possessions, and should henceforth have regarded anything he used as communal property, lent to him for his needs [p. xxi].
>
> No doubt the depriving of life ranked as a Pārājika offence (Pār. III.), partly because it is the very opposite of ahiṃsā, non-violence, non-injury, which was an idea prevalent in India before the advent of Sākya. Again, the teaching on rebirth and the allied teaching on karma, both pre-Sākyan notions, would hold that the murderer, in consequence of his deed, obstructs his progress through the worlds, until he has worked off the fruit of his action [pp. xxii-xxiii].
>
> At present I can only suggest that the fourth Pārājika, of which I have shortly spoken elsewhere, is concerned more with a monk's spiritual state than with his bahavior. In this it differs from the sīlas [Skt. śīlas], and more interestingly still, from the other Pātimokkha rules [p. xxiv]."

The brackets in this quotation are mine.

7. Hermann Oldenberg [ed.], *The Vinaya Piṭakam* [5 Vols., reprint; London ; Luzac and Company Ltd., (for P.T.S.), 1964], I, pp. 96-97 [Mahāvagga I. 78. 1-5].

8. Horner, *The Book of the Discipline*, I, p. xxvi.
9. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought*, p. 16, n. 2.
10. See : Gustav Roth, "Terminologisches aus dem Vinaya der Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin, "*Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 118, [1968], pp. 341-343, and also Sylvain Lévi, 'Sur une langue précanonique du Bouddhisme,' *Journal Asiatique*, Série X, Tome XX [Novembre-Décembre, 1912], pp. 505-506.
11. Horner, *The Book of the Discipline* I, pp. xxviii-xxix, notes that "difficult to speak to" [dubbacajātika in Pāli] is rendered in the Old Commentary [Oldenberg, *The Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, III, p. 178] precisely in the same way as Anumāna's description, in the 15th sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, of a monk who is unfit to be taught or instructed. She then cites Buddhaghoṣa's commentary [Papañcasūdanī, II, p. 67] which declares that the Ancients referred to this sutta as the Bhikkhu-pātimokkha, and ponders whether this rule represents an especially old portion of the Pātimokkha.
12. The final four saṃghāvaśeṣa dharmas contain, in their text, a three-fold admonition to the monk to abandon his evil course.
13. This term is also found as mānāpya in various sources. To cite a few : Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought*, p. 18, n. 2, Étienne Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien des origines à l'ére Śaka* [Louvain : Publications Universitaires, 1958], p. 183, and Ankul Chandra Banerjee, *Sarvāstivāda Literature* [Calcutta : D. Banerjee (Calcutta Oriental Press Private Ltd.), 1957], p. 228.
14. In *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 118 [1968], pp. 343-345.
15. In *Journal Asiatique*, Série X, Tome XX [Novembre-Décembre, 1912], pp. 503-504.
16. Horner, *The Book of the Discipline*, I, p. xxxii.
17. *Ibid.*, II, p. vii. I have added the Sanskrit equivalents in brackets for the Pāli words employed by Miss Horner, and shall continue to do so, wherever pertinent, throughout.
18. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought*, p. 19.
19. Refer to : Valentina Rosen [ed. and tr.], *Der Vinayavibhaṅga Zum Bhikṣu Prātimokṣa Der Sarvāstivādins* [Berlin : Deutsche Akademie Der Wissenschaften Zu Berlin. Institut Für Orient-forschung, 1959], pp. 43-45.
20. Horner, *The Book of the Discipline*, II, p. xii. The brackets are mine.
21. See : Roth, "Terminologisches aus dem Vinaya der Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin", pp. 345-347, Lévi, "Sur une langue précanonique du Buddhisme," pp. 506-507, and Ryōzaburō Sakaki [ed.], *Mahāvyutpatti* [2 Vols.; Kyōto : Shingonshū Kyoto Daigaku, 1925], I, pp. 530-531 No. 8360].
22. Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa*, IV, I, p. 27, illustrates this point, noting that the Pāli and Chinese Mahāsāṃghika texts have 92 rules, while the Chinese Mahīśāsaka version has 91 rules. The Sanskrit Mahāsaṃghika and Mūlasarvāstivādin texts have 92 and 90 rules, respectively.
23. These headings have been outlined by Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought*, p. 20. However, I deviate considerably from his placement of the rules into the various categories.
24. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought*, p. 20.
25. Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa*, IV, I, p. 27.
26. *Ibid.*, IV. II, p. 69.
27. Oldenberg, *The Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, II,

p. 93 [Cullavagga IV. 14. 16].
28. *Ibid.*, II, p. 80 [Cullavagga IV. 4. 11].
29. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 82-83 [Cullavagga IV. 6. 2].
30. *Ibid.*, II, p. 94 [Cullavagga IV. 14. 17].
31. Horner, *The Book of the Discipline*, III, pp. 153-154, n. 6. Also see : Oldenberg, *The Vinaya Piṭakam*, II, pp. 84-85 [Cullavagga IV. 9. 1-IV. 10. 2].
32. Oldenberg, *The Vinaya Piṭakam*, II, p. 4 [Cullavagga I.4.1] and p. 86 [Cullavagga IV.12.3].
33, *Ibid.*, II., pp. 86-88 [Cullavagga IV. 13.1-4]
34. *Ibid.*, II., p. 83 [Cullavagga IV.7].
35. The verses preceding and following the Prātimokṣa Sūtra are absent in the Theravādin version, and the ritual formally is found not only before the text, but also in the Skandhaka. See : Oldenberg, *The Vinaya Piṭakam*, I, pp. 102-104 [Mahāvagga II.3.1-8].
36. See : Gustav Roth, "Bhikṣuṇīvinaya and Bhikṣu-Prakīrṇaka and Notes on the Language", *Journal of the Bihar Research Society*, LII, 1-4 [January-December, 1966], p. 32, and Ernst Waldschmidt [ed. and tr.], *Bruchstücke des Bhikṣuṇī-Prātimokṣa der Sarvāstivādin* [Leipzig : Deutsche Morgenländischen Gesellschaft in Kommission Bei F.A. Brockhaus, 1926], pp. 2-3.
37. Sukumar Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism* [revised; Bombay : Asia Publishing House, 1960], p. 125.
38. B. Jinananda [ed.], *Upasaṃpadājñaptiḥ*, Volume VI of *Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series* [Patna : Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1961], p. 3. In fact, the procedure is somewhat more complicated than Dr. Jinananda indicates. In the *Mahāvyutpatti* we find mention of jñaptikarman jñaptidvitīyakarman, and jñapticaturthakarman [Nos. 8660-8662 in Sakaki's edition], as well as prathamākarmavācanā, dvitīyā-karmavācanā, and tṛtīya-karmavācanā [Nos. 8664-8666 in Sakaki's edition]." Also, in Ankul Chandra Banerjee [ed.], "Bhikṣukarmavakya," *Indian Historical Quarterly*, XXV, 1 [March, 1949], p. 20, we find : [iyaṃ prathamā karmavācanā/evaṃ dvirapi trirapi/]. These terms are discussed in Herbert Härtel [ed. and tr.], *Karmavācanā* [Berline : Deutsche Akademie Der Wisenschaften Zu, Berlin. Institut Für Orientforschung, 1956], pp. 13-16. It appears that the following conclusions are possible : jñaptikarman=the bare resolution, jñaptidvitīyakarman=the resolution plus the first karmavācanā, and jñapticaturthakarman=the resolution plus the third karmavācanā. It is not clear why there is no jñaptitṛtīyakarman.
39. Härtel, *Karmavācanā*, p. 15, n. 27, points out : "Die ältesten Belege für kammavācā finden sich Mahāvagga IX. 3,3 ff.; Suttavibh, I, Saṃghād. 10.2; 11.2; Pāc. 80.2. überal in der spezielen Bedeutung 'Beschlussvorbringung".
40. *Ibid.*, p. 16. The brackets are mine.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 16 [and nn. 31 and 32].
42. Jinananda, *Upasampadājñaptiḥ* p. 3, and Härtel, *Karmavācunā*, p. 8,
43. Jinananda, *Upasampadājñaptiḥ*, p. 3.
44. See : Oldenberg, *The Vinaya Piṭakam*, I, p. 319 [Mahāvagga IX. 3.9], and S. Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism*, p. 125.
45. Oldenberg, *The Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, I, pp. 319-320 [Mahāvagga IX. 4.1-2] designates the proper number of monks as :

1. Four for all acts excepting ordination [upasaṃpadā], invitation [pravāraṇā], and the rehabilitation ceremony [āvarhaṇa].
2. Five for all acts excepting ordination in the middle country and the rehabilitation ceremony.
3. Ten for all acts excepting the rehabilitation ceremony.

4. Twenty for all acts.

A list of twenty-four persons not eligible to be counted in constituting the above assembly is also listed. On this point also see : S. Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism*, pp. 121 and 123. For more concerning the completeness of the sangha, see : Heinz Bechert, "Asokas 'Schismedikt' und der Begriff Sanghabheda," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens*, V [1961], pp. 21ff.

46. More shall be said later about the final three of these offenses.

47. The rules of adhikaraṇa are applied, according to S. Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism*, pp. 129-136, as follows :

1. For Vivādādhikaraṅa : Saṃmukhavinaya, or saṃmukhavinaya plus yadhūyaṣikīya,
2. For Anuvādādhikaraṅa : śaṃmukhavinaya plus smṛtivinaya, saṃmukhāvinaya plus tatsvabhāvaiṣīya, or saṃmukhavinaya plus amūḍavinaya.
3. For Āpattyadhikaraṅa : saṃmukhavinaya plus pratijñākāraka, or saṃmukhavinaya plus tṛṇaprastāraka.
4. For Kṛtyādhikaraṅa : saṃmukhavinaya.

48. In the Theravādin tradition, this commentary is referred to as the Padabhājaniya Commentary. See, for example : Horner *The Book of the Discipline*, I, p. xi.

49. Horner, *The Book of the Discipline*, I, p. xxxv.

50. Oldenberg, *The Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, I, p. xx. The brackets are mine.

51. Renou and Filliozat, *L'Inde Classique*, Tome II, p. 332 [par. 1949].

52. These summaries are taken, in part, from Erich Frauwallner, *The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature*, Volume VIII of *Serie Orientale Roma* [Rome : Instituto per il medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1956], pp. 68-129 [Chapter 4 : "Structure and Contents of the Old Skandhaka Text"]

53. It is my feeling that the Pravrajyāvastu, because of the wide scope and intricate detail of its contents, does not lend itself to a short summary. I suggest referring to Frauwallner, *The Earliest Vinaya*, pp. 70-78.

54. For a detailed description of the Śroṇa Koṭīkarṇa legend, see : Sylvain Lèvi, "Sur la recitation primitive des textes bouddhiques," *Journal Asiatique* Série XI, Tome V [Janvier-Février, 1915], pp. 401-447.

55. The suggestions for groupings 2, 3, 4, and 5, may be found on pages 70, 89, 104 and 107, respectively, of Frauwallner, *The Earliest Vinaya*. I have added 1, 6, and 7, so as to set forth a reasonable outline [which Frauwallner does not provide].

56. Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien*, p. 183,

57. Horner, *The Book of the Discipline*, I, p. xviii.

58. Thomas W. Rhys Davids and Hermann Oldenberg [trs.], *Vinaya Texts* [3 Vols., reprint ; Delhi : Motilal Banarsidas, 1965], I, pp. xxvii-xxviii.

59. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought*, p. 15, n. 1.

60. Moriz Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature* [2 Vols. ; Calcutta ; University of Calcutta, 1927, 1933], II, p. 22, n. 2.

61. Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa*, IV, 1, p. 20.

62. Oldenberg, *The Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, I, p, 103 [Mahāvagga II. 3.4].

63. S. Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism*, pp. 72-73.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 70. The Brackets are mine.

65. Thomas W. Rhys Davids and J. Estlin Carpenter [edd.], *The Dīgha Nikāya* [3 Vols., reprint: London : Luzac & Company, Ltd. (for P. T. S.), 1966], II,

pp. 49-50
66. The translation is mine, as are all others in this paper.
67. Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa*, IV, I, pp. 40-45.
68. Refer to W. Pachow and Ramakanta Mishra [edd.], " The Prātimokṣa Sūtra of the Mahāsāṃghikas, "*Journal of the Gaṅgānāth Jhā Research Institute*, X, 1-4 [November-February-May-August, 1952-1953], Appendix, pp. 42-45.
69. S. Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism*, p. 73. The brackets are mine.
70. Refer to : Bhikshu Sangharakshita, *The Three Jewels. An Introduction to Modern Buddhism* [Garden City : Anchor Books, 1970], pp. 198-200, and also Peter A. Pardue, *Buddhism* [New York : The Macmillan Company, 1968], pp. 24-25.
71. S. Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism*, pp. 73-74.
72. Frauwallner, *The Earliest Vinaya*, p. 112 [and 113], n. 1.
73. Oldenberg, *The Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, II, p. 292, and also Horner, *The Book of the Discipline*, V, pp. xv and 405 [Cullavagga XI. 1, 16]
74. See: Oldenberg, *The Vinaya Paṭikaṃ*, II, pp. 286-287, and also Horner, *The Book of the Discipline*, V, pp. 396-397 [Cullavagga XI. 1. 7].
75. Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa*, IV, II, p. 81.
76. V. Trenckner [ed.], *The Majjhima Nikāya* [Vol. I, reprint ; London : Luzac & Company, Ltd. (for P. T. S.), 1964], p. 33.
77. See : Frauwallner, *The Earliest Vinaya*, p. 79. Rhys Davids and Oldenberg in *Vinaya Texts*, I, pp. xv-xvi regarded formally as part of the Old Commentary [Prdabhājaniya], but there is no basis for this. Also see Oldenberg: *The Vinaya Piṭakam*, I, p. xix, which states, "The Mahāvagga gives precepts concerning the recital of the Pātimokkha, which put it beyond a doubt that the name Pātimokkha refers here to that text which we also possess under the same name".
78. S. Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism*, p. 75. The brackets are mine.
79. Oldenberg, *The Vinaya Paṭikaṃ* I, pp. xvi-xvii.
80. *Ibid*, p. xvii.
81. S. Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism*, p. 77.
82. Frauwallner. *The Earliest Vinaya*, pp. 107-109.
83. S. Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism*, pp. 78-79.
84. Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa*, IV, I, p. 23.
85. See : for example : V. Trenkner [ed.], *The Mlindapañho* [reprint London : Luzac & Company, Ltd. (for P.T.S.), 1962], pp. 143, 243 and 272 and also Richard Morris [ed.], *The Aṅguttara Nikāya* [Vol. I, 2nd ed., revised ; London : Luzac & Company, Ltd. (for P.T.S.), 1961], pp. 230 [III. 83.1], 231 [III.85.1], 232 [III.86.1] and 234 [III.87.1].
86. B.C. Law, *A History of Pāli Literature* [2 Vols. ; London : Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1933], I, p. 21.
87. S. Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism*, p. 76.
88. Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa* , VI, 1, pp. 25-26.
89. Gokuldas De, *Democracy in Early Buddhist Samgha* [Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1955], p. 61. The brackets are mine.
90. S. Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism*, p. 84.
91. This is pointed out by several scholars. For example, see ; Gakuldas De, *Democracy in Early Buddhist Saṃgha*, p. 63.
92. For an example of this nidāna, refer to pp. 3-5 of the Sanskrit Mahāsāṃghika text, cited in note 68 above.
93. For a discussion of pariśuddhi, see :

Horner, *The Book of the Discipline*, IV, pp. vi and xv.

94. Frauwallner, *The Earliest Vinaya*, pp. 111-112.

95. Stanislaw Schayer, "Pre-canonical Buddhism," *Archiv Orientalni*, VIII [1935], p. 124.

96. Gokuldas De, *Democracy in Early Buddhist Samgha*, p. 72. The brackets are mine.

97. *Ibid.*

98. S. Dutt, *Early Buddhist Monachism* p. 75. The brackets are mine.

99. The notion for this table, as well as much of its contents, is taken from Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa*, IV 1, pp. 27-28. Information on the Sanskrit texts was gleaned from the following sources: Mahāsāṃghika, Pachow and Mishra's text cited in note 68 above; Mūla sarvāstivādin, Ankul Chandra Banerjee [ed.], *Prātimokṣa-Sūtram* [*Mūlasarvāstivāda*], [Calcutta : Calcutta Oriental Press Ltd., 1954]; Sarvāstivādin, Louis Finot [Ed.], "Le Prātimokṣasūtra des Sarvāstivādins", *Journal Asiatique*, Série XI, Tome II [Novembre-Décembre, 1913], pp. 465-557. Due to the fragmentary character of this last manuscript, Finot's numbering system, which was kept in line with the Chinese text, is only partially correct. Although this paper focuses on the Bhikṣu Prātimokṣa, a similar chart [*and exegesis*] could be prepared for the [Bhikṣuṇī] Prātimokṣa. Invariably, such an enterprise would involve reliance on the following sources, which represent a thoroughly scholarly approach to the topic of *nuns*' Prātimokṣa : Ernst Waldschmidt [ed. and tr.], *Bruchstücke des Bhikṣuṇī-Prātimokṣa der Sarvāstivādins* [Volume III of *Kleinere Sanskrit-Texts ;* Leipzig, 1926], Gustav Roth, "Bhikṣuṇī-vinaya and Bhikṣu-Prakīrṇaka and Notes on the Language". *Journal of the Bihar Research Society*, LII, 1-4 [January-December, 1966], pp. 29-51, and Gustav Roth's recently published *Bhiksuṇī-vinaya, Manual of Discipline for Buddhist Nuns* [Patna, 1970].

100. Refer to J. F. Dickson [ed. and tr.], "The Pātimokkha, being the Buddhist Office of the Confession of Priests. The Pāli Text, with a Translation and Notes". *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, New Series, VIII [1876], pp. 84 and 111 [rule 23], and 89 and 117 [rule 82].

101. Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa*, IV, 2, pp. 61-62.

102. *Ibid.*, IV, 2, p. 62.

103. Rosen, *Der Vinayavibhaṅga Zum Bhikṣu Prātimokṣa Der Sarvāstivādin*, pp. 45-49, omits Nos. 23 and 25, but numbers only up to 90. Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa*, IV, 3-4, p. 156, records rule 25 [but not rule 23], but in the translation portion of his work, no mention is made of a 91st rule.

104. Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa*, IV, 2, pp. 59-60.

105. *Ibid.* IV, 2, pp. 59-65.

106. See, for example, André Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Pétit Véhicule* [Saigon : Êcole Francaise D'Extrême Orient, 1955].

107. Pachow, *A Comparative Study of the Prātimokṣa*, IV, 2, p. 79. I have provided full titles for the schools and the texts, as Pachow simply abbreviates them.

108. *Ibid.*

109. Refer to pp. 527-538 of Finot's text, cited in note 99 above.

110. André Bareau "La Construction et le Culte des Stūpa d'après les Vinayapiṭaka", *Bulletin De l' Ecole Francaise D'Extréme-Orient*, L. 2[1962], pp. 273-274.

111. *Ibid.*

112. These passages have been taken from the Prātimokṣa editions of Dickson, [p. 74], Pachow and Mishra [p. 8], Finot [pp. 480-481], and Banerjee [p. 10], cited in notes 100, 68 and 99, respectively.

113. These passages have been taken

from the Prātimokṣa editions of Dickson [p. 74], Pachow and Mishra [p. 9], Finot [p. 481] and Banerjee [p. 10], cited in notes 100, 68, and 99, respectively.

114. See : Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana [ed. and tr.], "So-sor-thar-pa; or, A Code of Buddhist Monastic Laws : Being the Tibetan version of the Prātimokṣa of the Mūla-sarvāstivāda School, *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, New Series, IX, 3-4 [1915], p. 42.

115. Frauwallner, *The Earliest Vinaya*, p. 123.

116. See, for example S. Dutt, *The Buddha and Five After Centuries*, pp. 71-72.

117. Frauwallner, *The Earliest Vinaya*, p. 121.

118. See : Nalinaksha Dutt [ed.], assisted by Vidyavaridhi Shiv Nath Sharma, *The Gilgit Manuscripts* [Vol. III, Parts 1-4; Calcutta . Calcutta Oriental Press Ltd., 1940-1950], III, 4, pp. 84-94.

119. These passages have been taken from the Prātimokṣa editions of Dickson [p. 77], Pachow and Mishra [p. 13], Finot [pp. 488-489] and Banerjee [p. 14], cited in notes 100, 68 and 99, respectively.

120. Although uttered in a different context, see : Morris, *The Aṅguttara Nikāya* I, p. 189 [Kālāma Sūtta].

121. S. Dutt, *Buddhist Monks and Monasteries of India* [London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1962], pp. 78-79.

Buddhism in Ancient and Early Medieval Nepal

THEODORE RICCARDI, Jr.

THE PURPOSE of this paper is to give a brief account of Nepalese Buddhism and the society in which it flourished during the fifth to the eighth centuries A.D. The study is based on the earliest and most reliable historical evidence now at hand, the Sanskrit inscriptions of the Licchavi kings.[1] Except for short references, I have tried to avoid discussion of the legendary beginnings of Buddhism. These find their way into Nepalese history far too often, and I have already discussed them to some extent in an earlier paper.[2] I also have avoided detailed discussion of the political and dynastic history of the Licchavis. These questions, too, seem to me to have been better dealt with elsewhere.[3]

The first part of this essay gives a short account of Licchavi society. For those familiar with the history of the imperial Guptas and of the emperor Harṣa, the similarities as well as the differences will be readily apparent. The second part discusses the position of Buddhism within the society. The inscriptions included in this section contain all of the known references to Buddhism from early Nepal.

I

The origins of Buddhism in the Nepal Valley are lost to us, but Buddhist doctrine and practice probably entered at a very early date, possibly during the lifetime of the Buddha himself.[4] A tradition preserved in the later chronicles states that Gautama Buddha visited Nepal and that the emperor Aśoka and his daughter, Carumati, established shrines at Patan and Deopatan.[5] While these events are by no means impossible, their occurrence is not supported by any contemporary evidence, either from Nepal itself or from Buddhist records preserved elsewhere.[6] Indeed, except for short references throughout Indian literature,[7] the history of Nepal is

almost entirely legendary until the middle of the fifth century A.D. when a rich epigraphical record provides us with sufficient information to establish the main outlines of early Nepalese society and the religions practiced within it. Even at this early period, the evidence strongly suggests that Nepalese society was highly complex. Hinduism and Buddhism existed side by side and were supported by a people that was socially, ethnically, and linguistically diverse. Buddhism was never dominant in this society, but it grew and prospered under royal patronage and its shrines were honored equally with those of Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism.

Among the various peoples living in ancient Nepal, it is difficult to say which were Buddhists, for the groups known to be Buddhist in later times are not mentioned by the inscriptions. The inscriptions do mention several peoples who are known from other Buddhist sources. These are the Śākyas, the Vṛjjikas, the Kolis, the Mallas, and possibly, the Kirātas.[8] These names are well attested in ancient Indian literature and except for the Kirātas, refer to peoples living in the plains areas contiguous to the Himalayas.[9] It is possible that some of these people migrated to the Nepal Valley after their wars with Magdha in the early centuries before Christ, but the presence of their names in the inscriptions may only indicate that the early inhabitants of the valley had preserved the memory of peoples made illustrious in Buddhist tradition.

An early inscription mentions the *varnāśramavyavastha* the caste system. Caste was of course already present among Nepalese Hindus, but whether it had begun to spread to the Buddhists, as it did later on, is not known. Brahmans are mentioned frequently. Together with the *pradhānas*, they are often addressed as the leaders of the community. Some inscriptions speak of groups of Brahmans who belong to the *taittirīya* branch of the Vedas, and one mentions a group that is composed of followers of Vasudeva.[11] There is at least one reference to the *kṣatriya* caste, and designations such as *rājaputra*, *varman*, and the surnames *Licchavi* and *Gupta*, were common among rulers and high ranking officials.[12] Several merchants are mentioned, mainly caravan traders (*sārthavāha*)[13] who presumably managed trade among Nepal, India, and Tibet,[14] but there is little else to suggest a *vaiṣya* caste. The term *cāṇḍāla* was applied to lower castes, but none of the low castes of later Nepal is named.[15]

Several inscriptions use the term *aṣṭadaśaprakṛti* or "eighteen natures", in a context that is almost certainly relevant to caste.[16] The term possibly refers to a division of peoples into eighteen subcastes within the *varṇa* structure of four major caste divisions. The divisions are comparable to those of a much later tradition, which divides the people of Nepal into four *varṇas* and thirty-six subcastes or *jāts*.[17] Unfortunately, none of the eighteen subcastes is named, nor is there any mention of the most important people of later medieval times, the Nevars. Elements of their society must have been present, however.[18] The evidence for this is almost entirely linguistic, for while the inscriptions give little evidence that any Indo-Aryan language other than Sanskrit was in use, they contain considerable evidence, mainly place names but administrative terms as well, which indicates that Tibeto-Burman languages were present in the valley at some early date. These terms probably are part of the vocabulary of old Nevari, although they also may belong to other Tibeto-Burman languages.[19]

The inscriptions record the names of over one hundred settlements. Most of these were called, *grāma*, or villages. Within each village, local organizations called *goṣṭhī* supervised water supply and drainage, transportation, sports events, music, and the

maintenance of religious images and shrines.[20] Larger than the *grāma* were two other kinds of settlement, the *tala* and the *draṅga*. A *tala* consisted of several villages combined and was administered by an official called a *talasvāmin*.[21] Several *tala* are mentioned, *Śītāṭikā tala* being one of the important ones.[22] When a *grāma* or a *tala* grew in size and commercial importance, it was designated as a *draṅga*. This change usually was effected by royal charter. The word *draṅga* meant "town" or "city," and must have had wide currency in the Himalayas at one time for it also was used in Kashmir.[23] The most important of the *draṅga* were *Yūpagrāmadraṅga*, which later grew into the medieval city of Patan, and *Dakṣiṇakolīgrāmadraṅga*, which later became part of the city of Kathmandu.[24]

The villages were governed by *pāñcālīs*, or councils made up of several members known as *pāñcālīkas*.[25] The councils administered the affairs of the villages on a day-to-day basis, but they were themselves subject to royal authority, administered through departments or agencies called *adhikaraṇa*. The *adhikaraṇas* are first mentioned in an inscription of King Vasantadeva, dated 550 A.D., and appear to have combined administrative and judicial functions.[26] They were located in or near the royal palace, and each had a separate gate (*dvāra*) through which it was entered. The agencies were run by officials variously called *dvārika*, *pratihāra*, and *mahāpratihāra*, all meaning "gatekeeper" or "guard". These officials worked closely with the *mahādaṇḍanayaka*, chief magistrates, and with the *cāṭabhaṭa*, military officers, so closely that one individual often held several of these positions at the same time.

The *adhikaraṇas* varied in number, the usual number being four, but at least eight are mentioned. Four of them—the *kuther*, *śolla*, *liṅgval*, and *māpcok*—bear non-Sanskritic names, suggesting that they may have been established by non-Aryan speakers.[28] None of these words is in common use in later Nepalese history and their exact meanings are unknown, but several areas of jurisdiction belonging to these *adhikaraṇas* are apparent. The *kuther* collected taxes due the royal treasury and administered land sales and exchanges. The *śolla* had jurisdiction over the five great crimes, the *pañcaparadha*, four of which, theft, murder, adultery, and treason, are mentioned. The *liṅgval* was responsible for irrigation and water supply, and the *māpcok*[29] regulated civil affairs, especially marriage, divorce, and matters relating to unborn children.[30]

Of the remaining agencies, the *bhaṭṭābhikaraṇa* was the most important. It is first mentioned in an inscription from the village of Bungamati, in which it is indicated that the *bhaṭṭādhikaraṇa* had jurisdiction over *dharmasaṅkara*, "the mixing of *dharma*". Presumably, by this was meant caste confusion arising through intermarriage, or possibly, as Vajracarya suggests, problems regarding caste occuptions.[31]

At an early period, a transfer of powers from the *adhikaraṇas* to the village and town councils began. Again, this change was effected through royal decree. No longer were officials of the *adhikaraṇas* allowed to enter certain villages to collect taxes, judge crimes, or mediate disputes. These powers now were entrusted to the town councils. Thus, in the case of Kicapriciṅgrāma, a village in the *tala* of Śīṭāṭika, an inscription records the order of King Gaṇadeva :

> (om) svasti mānagṛhādbappa pādānu (dhyā) to bhaṭṭāraka (1) mahārājaśrīgaṇadevāḥ kuśalī śītāṭikā (2) tale kicapriciṅgrāme yathā (pra) dhānabrāhmaṇa (3) purassarān-sarvvāneva kuṭumbinaḥ kuśalam pṛṣṭvā (4) mānayati pūrvvarājabhiryyuṣmā (kaṃ

kuther śulya)-dhikara (5) ṇābhyānna praveṣṭavyamityanugrahaḥ kṛtodhunā mayā (6) sarvvadaṇḍanayakamahāpratihāraśrībhau (ma) guptavijñā (7) pitena liṅgval māpcokādhikaraṇābhyām pañcāparādhdāvāreṇa (8) caturbhirapyadhikaraṇairnna praveṣṭavyamiti (sthitipa) (9) ṭṭakena prasādaḥ kṛtastadyuyamevaṃ (viditvā yathaiva pūrvvamājñā) (10) śravaṇavidheyāstathaivāvalagana (parā bhūtvā nirvṛtaviśvastāḥ) (11) sukhamprativatsyatha ye cāsmadvaṃśyā (rājāno) bhavitārastai (12) rapi dharmmagurubhirggurukṛtaprasādānuvarttibhiriyamā (13) jñā pratipālanīyeti dūtakascātra babbhruvarmmā bramuṅ (14) prasādaguptavārtte vyavaharatīti saṃvat 482 (14) śrāvaṇaśuklapratipadi 1

"Om. Hail. From Mānagṛha, King Gaṇadeva, the virtuous one, favored by his father, having inquired into the welfare of the pradhānas, brahmans, and other householders of the village of Kicipriciṅ in the *tala* of Śītāṭikā, does honor to them. By previous kings you were granted the favor that the kuther and śulya adhikaraṇa would not enter. Now I, through the request of the chief magistrate and high chamberlain Sri Bhaumagupta, grant the favor that the liṅgval and māpcok adhikaraṇas for the purpose of the five crimes will not enter; thus all four adhikaraṇas will not enter. This favour is done through this inscription. Knowing this, as you were ready to obey the previous order, so being ready to adhere to (the new one) fearlessly, live in happiness. And those kings of my family who follow, respectful of the law and assenting to this favor granted, shall protect it. Here the bearer of the message is Babhru Varman Brahmuṅ. Done at the time of Vārtta Prasāda Gupta. Saṃvat 482 Śrāvaṇa śuklapratipadi."

This increase in local self-rule, particularly in the fields of criminal and civil law, began at the beginning of the seventh century, and continued well into the eighth. Once the process had begun, no ruler was willing to reverse it. By the middle of the eighth century, the *adhikaraṇas* were rarely mentioned, their authority having been vested almost entirely in the village councils and other local entities.[33]

At the top of the administrative structure were the king and his ministers. Of the ministers we are told little beyond their titles. The principal ones were called *sāmaṇta* or *mahāsāmānta*, feudatory chiefs, and *amātyas*, advisers. The king himself was the chief justice and resolved all disputes that remained undecided elsewhere. He did this through the *antarāsana*, the inner court. Here, the king sat formally as the chief magistrate; it occured when a council or other entity was unable to decide a case :

yadā ca pāñcālikānāṃ yat kiñcana kāryam etadgatam utpatsyate yathākālaṃ niyamitaṃ vastu parihāpayiṣyanti tadā svayameva rājabhir antarāsanena vicāraḥ karaṇīyo...[34]

"And when some matter with regard to this should arise for the pāñcālikās which has not been decided and which they have neglected, then this is to be decided by the king himself sitting in the inner court."

The kings called themselves *licchavikulaketu*, "banner of the Licchavi family", and it is this family that provided the lawful kings until the dynasty came to an end in the latter part of the eighth century.[35] It has been assumed by some that the family was related to the Licchavis of ancient Buddhist scriptures and to the Licchavis into whose

family the imperial Guptas married in the fourth century A.D. While connections with the Indian Licchavis are possible, particularly with those of Gupta times, there is at present no evidence to link them, and we may again have the preservation of a name rather than a family. Neither the inscriptions nor the tradition are of any help on this point. As Lévi has shown, the traditional genealogy thrusts a supposed ancestor by the name of Licchavi into the middle of a makeshift lineage, which then is attached to the Indian mythical Solar dynasty.[36] This genealogy is preserved in an inscription at Paśupatināth and in some of the later chronicles, but it gives no information about Licchavi origins.[37]

The earliest member of the family about whom we have any definite information is Vṛṣadeva, who ruled sometime in the latter part of the fourth or beginning of the fifth century. There are no inscriptions from his reign, but he is said to have been a Buddhist and to have built several Buddhist monuments, including the Sīnagu Vihāra, which, if the identification is correct, is the famous caitya known later a Svayambhūnāth.[38] If Vṛṣadeva was indeed a Buddhist, he was the only Licchavi to have been so, for the kings who follow him are clearly Hindu. Mānadeva (464-90), one of the most powerful and famous of the early kings, was a Vaiṣṇavite, though he supported other sects as well.[39] It is he who is said to have built the famous shrine at Cangu Narayan. Later the kings turned to Śaivism, styling themeselves regularly as *paśupatibhaṭṭārakapādānugṛhīto*, "favored by Lord Paśupati".[40]

While the Licchavis always were the legitimate rulers, actual power often was wielded by strong feudatory chiefs. The most famous of these was Aṃśuvarman (605-631), a kṣatriya of unknown origin. He rose quickly to the rank of *mahāsāmanta*, and later styled himself as *śrīkalahābhimānin*, "he who is proud of his quarrel with Śrī."[41] During his reign, Nepal advanced greatly in art and culture. He is said to have been a Sanskrit scholar as well as an able administrator.[42] After his death, a family named Gupta, which reputedly belonged to the Abhira tribe, took control and continued to rule, with the Licchavis continuing as powerless titular kings.[43] The Guptas appear to have had a much more narrowly Hindu outlook than either the Licchavis themselves or Aṃśuvarman, and there is little to suggest that they actively supported Buddhism.[44]

The joint rule of the Guptas and Licchavis lasted until the reign of Narendradeva, who became king in about 643 A.D.[45] Narendradeva, a Licchavi, restored the legitimate dynasty to its original position of power. He appears to have done this with Tibetan support, for Chinese sources indicate that he spent his youth in exile in Tibet before returning to the throne with Tibetan aid. The sources also state that at this time Tibet exercised suzerainty over Nepal. If this is true, Tibetan rule was lightly exercised. Little from the Nepalese side supports the idea of Tibetan dominance, and Narendradeva appears, at least from his inscriptions, as an all-powerful ruler, not a vassal.[46]

The last important Licchavi king was Jayadeva II, who ruled in the first part of the eighth century. It is his inscription at the temple of Paśupatināth that gives the Licchavis' earliest genealogy.[47] By this time, however, memory of the earlier kings had faded and the genealogists were free to trace the origin of the Licchavis back to the Solar race through lines suggested by the Indian *purāṇas*.[48]

II

It has been said that the most characteristic feature of Nepalese Buddhism has been the absence of an organized celibate monkhood,[49] and many reasons have been advanced in the past as to why both monks and nuns renounced their vows to take on a more secular life.[50] When this change took place is not known, but until the middle of the eighth century at least, there was a well-established community of monks and nuns, which enjoyed the wide support of the lay community as well as of royalty.

The monks and nuns lived in *vihāras*, several of which we know by name.[51] Most *vihāras* had Sanskrit names, but a few retained native designations.[52] They are described as having walls, but we know little else about their size or appearance.[53] Some were built in widely dispersed places. The most prominent of these was Guṃ Vihāra, situated near the town of Sankhu.[54] Another was the Sīnagu Vihāra, mentioned earlier, which was located on the Svayambhū hill. Others were located in close proximity to one another. By far the largest concentration was in the town of Patan, then called *Yūpagrāma* or *Yūpagrāmadraṅga*.[55] Several of these *vihāras* were established through royal patronage : *Śrīmānavihāra* was established by Mānadeva, the most famous of the early Licchavis; *Rājavihāra*, as its name indicates, was also built by royal patronage, possibly by Aṃśuvarman. These two were among the richest and most important *vihāras* of ancient Nepal and were honored equally with the major shrines of Hinduism, especially with regard to financial support. In an inscription of Aṃśuvarman, they are mentioned prominently along with the Kharjurika, Madhyama, and Guṃ Vihāras, and the inscription states that the religious taxes to be collected from householders and landowners for them were to equal those collected for the shrines of Paśupatināth and Dolaśikharasvāmin, the two most sacred shrines of Nepalese Hinduism :

> svasti kailāsakūṭabhavanāda... ... ...(1) no bhagavatpaśupatibhaṭṭāraka (pādānugṛhīto bappapādānudhyā) (2) taḥ śrīmahāsāmantāṃśuvarmā ku (śalī) ... (3) gṛhikṣetrikādikuṭumbino yā (thārhampratimā) nyānu- (darśayati vi) (4) ditambhavatu bhavatāṅgṛhakṣetrādiśrāvaṇikādāna .. ... (5) bhirayammaryādābandhaḥ kṛtaetena bhavadbhirvyavahartavyaṃ yatra (bhava) (6) tah taḥ paśupateḥ pu 6 pa 2 dolaśikharasvāminaḥ pu 6 pa 2 (7) guṃvihārasya pu 6 pa 2 śrīmānavihārasya pu 6 pa 2 śrī rā (ja) (8) vihārasya pa 6 pa 2 kharjūrikāvihārasya pu 6 pa 2 ma (dhya) (9) mavihārasya pu 6 pa 2 sāmānyavihārānāṃ pu 3 pa 1 rameśva (10) rasya pu 3 pa 1 haṃsagṛhadevasya pu 3 pa 1 māneśvarasya pu 3 (11) pa 1 sāmbapurasya pu 3 pa 1 vāgvatīparadevasya pu 3 pa 1 dhārā (12) māneśvarasga pu 3 pa 1 parvateśvardevasya pu 3 pa 1 narasiṃha (13) devasya pu 3 pa 1 kailāseśvarasya pu 3 pa 1 bhumbhukkikāja!aśa (14) yanasya pu 3 pa 1 tad anyadevakulānām pu 2 pa 2 śrībhaṭṭāraka (15) pādānām pu 6 pa 2 sapelāpāñcālyāḥ pu 6 pa 2 sāmānya (16) pāñcālyāḥ pu 3 pa 1 rājakulavastunā niyuktamanuṣyasya (17) pa 2 pa 2 gauṣṭikānāṃ pu 2 pa 2 kṛtaprasādasya 1 brāmhaṇā (nāṃ) (18) pu 1 sāmānyamanuṣyānampu ... yaṃ vyavahārapa... ... (19) na cāyammaryādābandhaḥ kaiści (dapyanyathā karaṇī) yo yataḥ (20) prajāhitārthodyatasuddhacetasāṃ (śuva) rmaṇā śrīkalahābhimāninā (21) kathamprajā me sukhitā bhavedi (ti priyavya) vastheyamakāri dhīmatā (22) saṃvat 32 āṣāḍhaśuklatrayodasyaṃ (23)/[57]

"Hail, from Kailāsakūṭabhavana...Śrī Mahāsāmanta Aṃśuvarman, the auspicious

one, favored by Lord Paśupati and by his father, honors the householders, landholders, and other heads of family. Let this be known : the following agreement (maryādabandha)[58] for the śrāvaṇikā tax on your houses and fields is proclaimed and you shall pay according to the following scheme : Paśupati, 6 purāṇas, 2 paṇas; Dolaśikharasvāmin, 6 purāṇas, 2 paṇas; Guṃvihāra, 6 purāṇas, 2 paṇas; Mānavihāra, 6 purāṇas, 2 paṇas; Rājavihāra, 6 purāṇas, 2 paṇas; Kharjūrikavihāra 6 purāṇas, 2 paṇas; Madhyanavihāra, 6 purāṇas, 2 paṇas; other lesser vihāras, 3 purāṇas, 1 paṇa; Rameśvara, 3 purāṇas, 1 paṇa; Haṃsagṛhadeva, 3 purāṇas, 1 paṇa; Kailāśeśvara, 3 purāṇas, 1 paṇa; Bhumbhukkikājalaśayana, 3 purānas, 1 paṇa. To the other temples, 2 purāṇas, 1 paṇa: to the king, 6 purāṇas, 1 paṇa; to the Sapelāpāñcālī, 6 purāṇas, 2 paṇas; to lesser pāñcālīs, 3 purāṇas, 1 paṇa; to men designated by the royal family, 2 purāṇas, 2 paṇas; to the gauṣṭikas, 2 purāṇas, 2 paṇas; to those favored by the king, 1; to Brahmans, 1. Let no one do otherwise. This has been proclaimed by Aṃśuvarman, he who is proud of his quarrel with Śrī, he whose intention is to aid his people and make them prosperous. In the year 32, on the thirteenth day of the white half of Āṣāḍh."

We know nothing of the internal operations of the vihāras. It is evident, however, that in addition to their religious life, the monks had begun to accumulate heavy secular responsibilities. Large tracts of land were awarded to the saṅgha. Some of these included entire villages. The income derived from these communities, rather than going to the government, was paid to the vihāras. How the monks managed these business affairs is not clear. They may have had hired managers, but more likely they took care of these matters themselves, and it is perhaps this deep involvement with secular life that made it easier for them later to renounce the vows of celibacy.

Just as the village councils had privileges bestowed upon them by royal charter, so too did the vihāras. In language almost identical to that entrusting authority to the village councils, the kings granted authority over the major crimes, taxation, and civil disputes, to the saṃgha. In an inscription attesting the wealth and power of the saṃgha, King Narendradeva proclaimed the following :

(oṃ svasti) bhadrādhivāsabhavanādapratihataśāsano bhagavatpaśupatibhaṭṭārakapādānugṛhīto (1) (ba) ppapādānudhyāto licchavikulaketuḥ paramamāheśvaraparamabhaṭṭārakamahārājādhirāja- (2) (śrī) narendradevaḥ kuśalī gullaṃtaṅgagrāmanivāsinaḥ pradhānapurassarān sarvakutumbinaḥ (ku) (3) śalamābhāṣya samājñāpayati viditambhavatu bhavatāṃ yathāyaṃ grāmo bhagavatpaśupatau (sva) (4) kāritamahāpraṇālīnāmaśāṭhyena sarvetikartavyānāmanuṣṭhānārthaṃ viṣṭyājñānuvidhāyi (tve) (5) na cāṭabhaṭānāmapraveśyena śarīrakoṭṭamaryādopapannaḥ śarīrasarvakaranīyapra (ti) (6) muktaḥ kuṭumbī (?) bahirdeśagamanādisarvaviṣṭirahito gurviṇīmarkane garbhoddharaṇāya (7) (pa) ṇaśatamātradeyena sakṣatagoṣṭhāpaṃrgāpacāre sapaṇapaurāṇatrayamātradeyena (ca) (8) yuktaścauraparadārahatyāsambandhādipañcāparādhakāriṇāṃ śarīramātram rājakulābhāvyantadgṛhakṣetrakāriṇāṃ śarīramātram rājakulābhāvyantadgṛhakṣetrakalatrādisarvadravyāṇyāryasaṅghasyetyanena ca sampannaḥ śrīśivadevavihā (10) re caturdiśāryabhikṣusaṅghāyāsmabhiratisṛṣṭaḥ sīmā cāsya.....(11).....[59].....

"(Om. Hail). From the palace, Bhadrādhivāsa, the great sovereign, king of kings,

Narendradeva, who rules unopposed, the favourite of Lord Paśupati, blessed by the feet of his father, the banner of the Licchavi clan, having inquired about the prosperity of the leaders and inhabitants of Gullaṃtaṅga village, makes the following order. Know this : To the noble community of monks who live on all sides in the Śivadevavihāra, this village in the domain of Paśupati is given (under the following stipulations) : with the obedience of the orders of corvée labour and the non-entrance of military officers so that the work required for building the great canals may be done without any dishonesty; subject to restrictions upon persons and upon forts; free from work with regard to the body; free from corvée labor pertaining to travel abroad. In the case of the death of a pregnant woman or of the embryo, a fine of one hundred paṇas will be sufficient; in case of maltreatment of wounded cattle, a fine of only three paṇas is required. With thieves, adulterers, murderers, and the perpetrators of other such major crimes, the delinquent person alone will be taken by the royal functionaries, his house, his fields, his wives, and all his wealth, will revert to the venerable community..."

As in the case of village councils, the king reserves the right of decision in especially difficult cases :

asmin agra (hāre ya) di kadācidāryasaṅghasyāśakyaṃ kāryam utpadyeta tadā paramāsanena vicāraṇīyam iti...[60]

In all of Licchavi history, only one inscription openly critical of the Buddhists is known. This is a hymn to Kṛṣṇa Dvaipayana, the divine author of the *Māhābhārata*. The hymn is written on a pillar in the town of Harigaon, not far from Patan, and was composed by a poet by the name of Anuparamena, who conceived of the *Mahābhārata* both as a defense of the Vedic tradition and as an anti-Buddhist tract. He attacks the Buddhists who, he says, are immersed in evil :

(nirākṛ)tā kumatibhiraṃhasāvṛtaiḥ kutarkkikaiḥ kathamapi saugatādibhiḥ (41)
(trayī) tvayi prathitagiri prabhāviyampayonidhau saridiva vindati sthitam (42)[61]
"Repudiated by false thinkers and logicians as well as the Saugatas, who are surrounded by evil, the three Vedas find in you, the lord, of the widespread word, refuge as a river finds refuge in the ocean."

It is interesting that this, the only note of disharmony, comes from the Vaiṣṇavites, and it may reflect their waning prestige both in the community at large and among the Licchavis.

There is little to indicate that Vajrayāna doctorines were as yet widespread. The word *vajrayāna* itself does occur in one badly damaged inscription,[62] and there is mention of Vajradhāra in the hymn quoted below. On the whole, however, the Buddhism of the time appears to be a rather pure form of Mahāyāna, as yet unmixed—at least at the official level—with tantric beliefs and practices. A short fragment of an inscription from Sankhu refers to the monks there as Mahāsanghikas,[63] and another inscription written on a caitya south of Patan, praises the bodhisattvas :

oṃ akṣobyamakṣobyaśitāgramurtintathagatam staumyabhitobhiramyam (1) samantabhadrambhuvi bhadrakāriṇantathaiva sannirmalakīrtimālinam (2) yāva.....mbhaktyādya tannamata śākyamunimmunīśam (3) maitryārddha .... ṅguhyādhipaṃ vimalavajradharaṃ sahābjam (4) saddharmaratnakusumastavakācitāṅgambuddhaṃ samantakusumannamatābjavatyā (5) mañjuśriyamparamadharmavidaṅkumāra nnityañca susthitamatiṅkaruṇaikatānam (6) mahāprajñālokakṣatabhavamahāmohatimiraṃ sukhāvatyāṃ vande satatamamitābhañjinaravim (7) salokeśaṃ lokodbhavabhayaharampaṅkajadharammahāsthāmaprā(ptaṃ)...pāsnigdhamana(sam)[64]

"I praise Akṣobhya, the Tathāgata, having the indestructible dark image, which is pleasant from all sides. I praise also Samantabhadra who performs good works on earth, who wears a crown of the purest glory. Bow devotedly to Śākyamuni, the lord of sages, he who is filled with friendship, the lord of mystery, the holder of the pure vajra, the lotus. To the Buddha Samantakusuma, whose body is covered with blossoms of the jewel lotus of the true law. Praise Mañjuśrī, the compassionate prince, always, the knower of the dharma, the steadfast of mind, the compassionate. I praise Amitābha, the best, dispeller of darkness of illusion destroyed by the light of great wisdom, the light, the victor who lives in Sukhāvatī with Lokeśvara, the destroyer of the fear arising in the world, the bearer of the lotus, the possessor of great strength and affectionate heart."

Throughout the period, the lay community contributed to the support of the saṅgha. The records of some of these donations are now nearly illegible fragments.[65] The earliest inscription of all, a fragment dated perhaps to the first half of the fifth century, concerns the gift of a caitya by a woman who tells of her disgust with her own female existence and her hope for rebirth as a male:

durddharairindriyaiḥ kṛtsnā vāhyate yairiyamparajā dāsavattāni sandhārya kṛpayāparipīḍya tā dānaśīla...(1) samprāpyānuttaraṃ jñānaṃ prajā duḥkhātpramocita pramocya sarvvaduḥkhebhyo yosau śāntamyadaṅgataḥ ma...(2) saṅkhidya sucirañkālambhavanambhavavicchidaḥ kinnarījātakākīrṇannānācitravirājitam śrī (3) catvāriṃśatsapañceha yatra dhānyasya mānikāḥ varṣe varṣetha jāyante kṣetrantattādṛṣandadau...(4) bhūyaḥ saṅghasya bhaktārthaṃ pūjārtthañca mahāmuneḥ kṣetrandattantayā yatra hyaṣṭāviṃśati mānikāḥ...(5) vicitraṃ deyadharmmamme kāraitveha yacchubham strībhāvam hi virāgyaham puruṣatvamavāpya ca śokakāmamayā...(6)[66]

"The generous one, through his compassion, destroys and enslaves the unrestrained senses by which every being is carried away ..Having achieved the highest knowledge, a being is freed from suffering. He who is freed from all suffering has gone to the abode of peace.

This caitya, adorned with illustrations from the Kinnarī jātaka,[67] is built, with effort, to last for a long time.

By her was given a field such that forty-five mānikās of rice grow in it annually... Moreover, for food for the saṅgha and for the worship of the great muni, a field of twenty-eight mānikās here has been given ..That fortune which I gain through this extraordinary charity...Disgusted with existence as a woman, and obtaining manhood filled with happiness and pain..."

Later the wife of the great follower Dharmapāla (paramopāsaka) also made a gift :

..... (1) deyadharmmoyamparamopāsikāyāḥ viśiṣtadharmmapālabhoginyā mrginyāḥ yadatra puṇyam tadbhavatu samātāpitṛ bharttṛpūrvvaṅgamānāṃ sarvvasatvānāṃ (2) niśśeṣaduḥkhavinivarttaye svātmānaścagrapravaratarāmṛtakāyapratilābhāyabhūyāt gandhakuṭīprati saṃskaraṇāyatadaprayojane ca caturvviṃśa (3) mahāyānapratipannāryyabhikṣuṇīsaṅghaparibhogāyākṣanivi pratipāditā panapphunāma paścimapradeśe bhūmiśata 100 piṇḍamānyā pañcāśa 50 (4) bhūyagrāmadakṣiṇaprade (śe) bhūmi ṣaṣṭi 60 piṇḍamānya ṣaṭtriṅśa 36 gṛhaprasthaṣaṣthaśśatāya(5)[68]

"This is the gift of the wife of the distinguished Dharmapala, the great follower. Whatever merit accrues for this, may it remove all suffering for my parents, relatives, and for all beings. May the donor herself attain the supreme release. The present endowment of land is given for the repair of the vihāra and when this is no longer necessary for the twenty-four sects of the venerable community of nuns.....

West from the Pannaphu district 100 bhūmis, 50 piṇḍas, south of the same village 60 bhūmis, 36 mānikas, 600 gṛhaprasthas."

Another inscription records an act of charity by Bandhubhadra :

deyadharmoyamṇ śākyabhikṣorbāndhubhadrasya mātā pitṛpūrvaṅgamaṃ kṛtvā sarvasatvānāṃ.....[69]

".....Śākyabhikṣu Bandhubhadra has performed this act of charity for his parents and other relatives and for the (welfare) of all beings....."

Yet another, from Śvayambhūnāth, records a gift of land :

niśśeṣaṃ sāndra...sambuddhañjagadekagu (ru...m) (1)
...yatyuṇyaṃ sañcitam mayā teneyañjanatā kṛtsnā bauddham padan avāpnuyāt (2)
.....-n-ddhasya valepaścimapradeśe kṣetramasya piṇḍakaṃ varttamanaviṃsatika (yā)...mā 26 (3)
cārddhamā...taṇḍulascārddhamā.....mā 6 upalepanadhūpadapanāmmā 3 (4)
....,(5)[70]

"Strong without end,the one teacher of the world giving counsel...
Through the merit obtained by me, may all people obtain Buddhahood.
In the area to the north of—vale, a piṇḍaka of a field now (producing) at the rate of twenty..."

The inscription is a mere fragment, but it dates from the time of Aṃśuvarman. It may indicate that Svaymbhunāth continued to be a place of importance during his reign.

Finally, several inscriptions mention Avalokiteśvara :

.....sarvasattvo (1) buddho bhavet kṣetrañca bhūmi 10 bhagavatosyavalokiteśvarasya dhūpa dipena mā 2 āryasaṅghasya ca mā 5[71]

"May all beings achieve Buddhahood. A gift of ten bhūmis of land is made, two

mānikās for lighting candles at the image of Āryāvalokiteśvara and five mānikās to the noble saṅgha..."

Another records the erection of an image to him :

oṃ svasti... ...bhaṭṭārakama (hārāja śrī—)
devasya sāgram varṣaśataṃ samājñā(payataḥ) (1) sarvvasattvahitasukhārthāya bhagavata āryā(va lokiteśvaranāth pratiṣṭhāpitaḥ deyadharmmoyaṃ paramopasakamaṇiguptasya (2) bhāryyayā mahendramatyā saha yadatra puṇyaṃ tadbha(va) tu mātāpitṛpūrvvaṇgamaṃ kṛtvā sarvvasattvānāṃ sarvvākāravaropeta (3)
... sarvvajñajñānavāptaye (4)[72]
"Om. Hail. It is ordered for more than one hundred years after Śrī Mahārāja... deva... For the welfare and happiness of all beings, this (image of) Āryavalokiteśvaranāth is erected. This work of charity is done by the devout worshipper Maṇigupta together with his wife, Mahendramati.
May merit accrue to our parents, family, and to all creatures...
.....for the obtaining of the knowledge of the All-knower..."

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FOOTNOTES

1. Inscriptional references throughout are to Dhanavajra Vajracarya, *Licchavi-kalkā Abhilekh* (Kathmandu : Nepal ra Eśiyāli Adhyayan Saṃsthān, Tribhuvan Viśvavidyālaya, B.S. 2030), the most recent edition. It contains over one hundred-ninety inscriptions, more than twice the number published over twenty years ago by Raniero Gnoli in his *Nepalese Inscriptions in Gupta Characters, Part I* (Roma : Istituto italiano per il medio ed estremo oriente, 1956). Vajracarya's edition contains those published by Gnoli as well as those published later in Nepal by Nayaraj Pant, Yogi Naraharinath, Hem Raj Sakya, Gautamvajra Vajracarya, and others. In addition, Vajracarya has provided valuable translations and commentary in Nepali. My translations are based primarily on his readings, though where previous readings exist, I have compared them, particularly with those of Lévi and the admirable texts provided by Gnoli. In transliterating the inscriptions, I have followed Vajracarya in keeping words combined as they are in the original instead of breaking them apart. Reconstructed and hypothetical readings are given in parentheses; Arabic numerals in parentheses indicate line numbers.

2. "Traditional Nepalese Historiography", delivered at the Mid-Atlantic conference of the Association of Asian studies, Glassboro, 1973. See also John Brough, "Legends of Khotan and Nepal", (*BSOAS* XII, 2, 1948) pp. 333-339. For the legends themselves, see Daniel Wright, *History of Nepal* (Cambridge : University Press, 1877) *passim*.

3. See Luciano Petech, "The Chronology of the Early Inscriptions of Nepal," *East and West*, (XII, 4, 1961), pp. 227-232; T. Riccardi (Jr.) "Sylvain Lévi : History of Nepal, Part I" (*Kailash*, III, 1, 1975), pp. 5-60. In addition, the Nepalese historical journal, *Pūrṇima*, contains many articles by Dhanavajra Vajracarya on various aspects of the Licchavi period. The main conclusions of many of these articles are contained in *Licchavikalkā Abhilekh*.

4. Cf. E. Conze's remarks in G. Tucci (ed.), *Le Civilta dell'Oriente*, Vol. III, p. 784 :

"Nel Nepal la religione buddhista sembra esser esistita da tempi antichi, verosimilmente fin dai suoi inizi. Perō poco si sa del periodo anteriore al VII secolo d. C." In the absence of intensive archaeological work in the valley, any statements with regard to the origins of Buddhism must remain conjectural. It must be borne in mind, however, that the Nepal Valley, because of its proximity to the major sites of the Buddha's activities, was of easy access in ancient times and that pilgrimages in either direction would have been relatively easy. Conze's statement with regard to the state of our knowledge of the period anterior to the seventh century is, of course, very much out of date.

5. Daniel Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-11. Aśokan inscriptions have been found in the Nepalese Tarai at Rummindei (Lumbini) and Nigalisagar, but not in any of the mountain districts. For the texts of these inscriptions, see E. Hultzsch (ed.), *The Inscriptions of Asoka*, London, 1925.

The stupas at Patan, said to have been built by Aśoka, need thorough investigation before a date can be assigned to them. The memory of Carumati is said to be preserved in the name of a convent in Cā Bahil near Deopatan, but there is nothing more than tradition to connect

her with the area.

6. It is interesting to note in this connection that Nepal, so far as I know, is not mentioned at all in the early Buddhist canon.

7. For these references, see Riccardi (Jr.), *op. cit*, pp. 13-17.

8. Inscriptions 120, 123, 28, 2, and 94.

9. For a discussion of these peoples in north India, see Jagdish P. Sharma, *Republics of Ancient India* (Leiden : E.J. Brill, 1968). The word *kirāta* occurs in Nepalese inscriptions only once in a short fragment published originally by Gautamvajra Vajracarya in "Recently Discovered Inscriptions of Licchavi Nepal", *Kailash*, I, 2, (1973) pp. 117-124. It is not known whether the reference is to a specific tribe or people or whether the term is used in its general sense of "mountain savage." G. Vajracarya reads *kirātaveśadhara* and translates "wearing the dress of a Kirata"; Dh. Vajracarya (inscription 91, p. 374) reads *kirātavarṣadhara* but offers no translation.

10. Inscription 143.

11. Inscriptions 149 and 70.

12. Inscription 2 : *ksātreṇajimakhāśrayena vidhinā dikṣāśritoham sthitaḥ*...Sharma *op. cit.*, pp. 84-135, discusses the etymology of the term *licchavi.*

13. Inscription 121.

14. The inscriptions mention *bhoṭṭaviṣṭi* (no. 139), corvée labor for Tibet involving porterage (*bhoṭṭaviṣṭiheṭoḥ prativarṣam bhārikajanāḥ pañca 5 vyavasāyibhir grahītavyā)*, and *bahirdeśagamanādisarvaviṣṭi* (no. 133), corvée requiring travel abroad.

15. Inscription 129. ...*draṅgasīmābhyantarasthānām brāhmaṇapramukhānāmācāṇḍalebhyo*...

16. Inscription 22 : ...*brāhmaṇapurassarān brahmun sulhmum tepula*...*pradhānān grāmkuṭumbinaḥ sāṣṭādaśaprakṛtīn ku (śalam) pṛṣṭvā*...

17. The Nepali expression *cār varṇa chattīs jāt*, "four *varṇas, thirty-six jāts,*" is a traditional enumeration of social groups. There are, of course, more than thirty-six jats in mordern Nepal and even the fourteenth-century system recorded in the *vaṁśāvalis* as the work of Jayasthitī Malla enumerates sixty-four. The edicts of Rāma Śāha, king of Gorkhā (1606-36), mention the *aṭhāra, thar*, "eighteen clans," but it would be difficult to establish any connection here, though the use of the number eighteen in later Nepalese history suggests the possible survival of an ancient tradition. See T. Riccardi, Jr., "The Royal Edicts of King Rāma Śāha of Gorkhā," *Kailash*, V, 1 (1977) (in press).

18. It has been common for both historians and anthropologists to regard the Nevars as the indigenous inhabitants of the valley. But since the Nevars represent a complex group to which numerous outsiders have been acculturated, including Tarai Brahmans, it is difficult to identify the core group that might represent the original ancient community.

19. The oldest known specimens of the Nevari language date from the fourteenth century. Between these and the Licchavi inscriptions there is a gap of at least six centuries. No examples of Nevari are known from this intervening period.

The non-Sanskritic words of the inscriptions, although they are presented through the Sanskrit sound system, still give clear evidence of non-Aryan speech, possibly as many as three different languages or dialects. Certain suffixes can be isolated : *-gvala, -piṅ, -priṅ, dun/ -dul*, and certain items (*hāmhu, kedumbāto*) may be cognate with Nevari and Limbu. Cf. Dh. Vajracarya, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

20. The *goṣṭhī*, "group, club, organization," may survive in Nevari *guthi*, "club, religious organization". In inscriptions 70 and 145, the following *goṣṭhī* are mentioned : *arcanīya-, arcā-, indra-, taittirīya-*

śakha-, *daśamī-*, *dhūpa*, *dhvaja-*, *pānīya-*, *pranālī-*, *pradīpa-*, *brāhmaṇa-*, *brāhmaṇa-sānāthya-*, *mallayuddho-*, *vāditra-*, *vāsudevabrāhmaṇa-*, *śaptahmī-*, and *pravāhana-*.

21. Inscription 68 : *śamupasthitavicāranīyakāryyesu svatalasvāminaiva yūyaṃ vicaranīyaḥ.*

22. Inscriptions 46-9.

23. M. Aurel Stein, *Kalhana's Rājataraṅginī* (Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, reprint 1961) Vol. II, pp. 291-2.

24. While the term *draṅga* is no longer in use in Nepal, Dh. Vajracarya has pointed to a possible survival in the phrase *stharu dhuṅgā*, a term used to describe an area of Capagaon by some of its oldest residents. The term *stharu draṅga* occurs in a Capagaon inscription (Vajracarya, pp. 227-8). Vajracarya also indicates that where there was in ancient times a *drāṅgā*, there was later a *bhansār*, or office where customs duties are collected, indicating that the term *draṅga* may have also referred to the establishment of customs houses in designated villages. For an earlier but still invaluable discussion of the *draṅga*, see Sylvain Lévi, *Le Nepal* (Paris : Ernest Leroux, 1905-8) Vol. III, p. 153.

25. In all probbility, there were several *pañcalis* in each village. Many of them are named in the inscriptions, but few correspond to village names as such, indicating that the *pāñcālīs* operated on local levels within the village. Presumably within the village there existed local districts comparable to the *ṭolā* of a later period, but these find no mention.

26. Inscription 35. As are so many of these inscriptions, the word *adhikaraṇa* is difficult to interpret and may have several different meanings. It is quite possible that, rather than an agency or department, the word refers to officials who perform the duties of such agencies. At this time, however, the first interpretation seems to me to be the most plausible.

27. These terms are common in inscriptions from other areas of the subcontinent, but there the meaning is sometimes no less obscure. In this connection, D. Devahuti has remarked : "It seems, however, that many of the credentials were only technical labels of distinction. The assumption is supported by the example of Dhruva Sena I of Valabhi, who held five titles : mahāsāmanta, mahāprati-hāra, mahā-daṇḍa-nayaka, mahākartta-kṛtika, and mahārāja". *Harṣa : A Political Study* (Oxford : At the Clarendon Press, 1970) p. 163.

28. The spelling of *śollo* also occurs in the variants *śulya* and *śulli*. The remaining *adhikāraṇas* are the *pūrva paścima piṭaljyā*, and *bhaṭṭa*. The term *sarvādhikaraṇa* is also found.

29. A.W. MacDonald has informed me that the phrase *māpcok bhairab* is used in Bhatgaon, but any connection with the ancient term remains unclear.

30. Dr. Vajracarya, pp. 124-30. Divorce and widow remarriage seem to have been common practice. Great care was taken of pregnant women, should one die, the foetus had to be removed before cremation took place.

31. Inscription 71 : *yadā ca punardharmasaṅkarāṇi (kāryāṇi samu) tpadyante tadā rājakulam svayampravicāra...*

32. Inscription 47.

33. For later attempts to standardize the judicial system, see Vajracarya's commentary, pp. 570-571-1, to inscription 149.

34. Inscription 85. This is the first mention of the *antārāsana*. The inscription is of Aṃśuvarman, dated in the year 39, *i.e.* 615 A.D. For comparable institutions in India, Cf. D. Devahuti, *op.cit.* p. 183 : "The court of justice was called *dharmasthāna*, *dharmāsana*, and, in the days of the Guptas and Harṣa *adhikaraṇa*, or *dharmādhikarṇa*, the latter according to

Katyāyāna, being the place where the truth of the plaint (lit. the cause or root of dispute) is discussed according to the rule of the sacred law." In the inscriptions of Narendradeva, the term *paramāsana* is also used. Cf. inscription 128 : *yadi catra kāryam utpadyate paramāsanena vicāramātraṃ karanīyaṃ...* See also inscription 133 quoted below.

35. The phrase *licchavikulaketu* occurs for the first time in an inscription of Sivadeva, no. 54.

36. Riccardi (Jr.) "Sylvain Lèvi : History of Nepal, Part I" *Kailash*, III, 1, (1975) pp. 32-33.

37. For the genealogy as it appears in the Paśupati inscription, see note 48 below.

38. The chronicles also support this. Cf. *Gopālarājavamśavalī*, which states in the peculiar Nevari hybrid Sanskrit of the text : *tenā kṛta sīnaguvihāracaityabhaṭṭarika pratiṣṭat sampūrṇa kṛam*, "he established the Sīnaguvihāra..." Vṛṣadeva is also described in inscription 148, the Paśupati vaṃśāvalī of Jayadeva, as *sugataśāsanapakṣapati*, "adherent of the Sugata's rule."

39. Cf. Dh. Vajracarya, pp. 52-53.

40. The phrase first occurs in inscription 71 of Aṃśuvarman.

41. Aṃśuvarman's titles progress through the following stages : *śrisāmanta, śrīmahāsāmanta, śreyāṃśuvarman, mahrākjādhirājaśreyāmśuvarman*. Between Mānadeva and Aṃśuvarman, the Licchavis Vasantadeva Manudeva, Vāmanadeva, Rāmadeva, Gaṇadeva, and Śivadeva reigned. It is during Śivadeva's reign that the name of Aṃśuvarman first appears. They are mentioned together in eleven inscriptions before Aṃśuvarman begins to rule independently.

42. He is described by the Chinese as the author of a treatise on grammar. Dh. Vajracarya, *op.cit.*, pp. 396-397, proposes that one of Aṃśuvarman's ministers, Candragomin, was the same as the author of the *Candravyākaraṇa*. The evidence for this is inconclusive, however.

43. The Gupta Ahirs are listed as the first Nepalese dynasty by the chronicles, but none of the royal names given in the chronicles corresponds to those in the inscriptions. According to Vajaracarya, pp. 424-426, they were *somaraṃśin* as opposed to the *sūryavamśin* Licchavis.

44. Between Aṃśuvarman and Narendradeva there are no royal inscriptions which record donations to the saṅgha.

45. Cf. Dh. Vajracarya, pp. 460-463. This pattern of two family rule, the one *de jure*, the other *de facto*, has been characteristic of Nepalese political life through much of the country's history and is not unknown in other parts of the Himalayas.

46. The mention of *bhoṭṭaviṣṭi* in the inscriptions has been taken in the past to mean that Nepal was under Tibetan authority. The phrase is ambiguous, however, and *bhoṭṭa* may not refer to Tibet, but to northern areas outside the valley.

47. Inscription 148.

48. The geneology in inscription 148 is as follows : Brahma, the Sun, Manu, Ikṣvāku, Vikukṣi, Kakutstha, Pṛthu, Viśvagaśva, 18 unnamed kings, Sagar, Asamañjasa, Aṃsuman, Dilīp, Bhagīratha, 10 unnamed kings, Raghu, Aja, Daśaratha, 8 unnamed kings, Licchavi, 12 unnamed kings, Supuṣpa, 23 unnamed kings, Jayadeva, 12 unnamed kings, Vṛṣadeva, Śankaradeva, Dharmadeva, Mānadeva, Mahīdeva, Vasantadeva, Udayadeva, Narendradeva, Śivadeva, Jayadeva II.

49. For a recent discussion, see Michal Allen, "Buddhism Without Monks : The Vajrayana Religion of the Newars of Kathmandu Valley", *South Asia*, I, 1, 1972, pp. 1-15.

50. *Ibid*, p. 2. Also Lévi, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 26-34.; and E. Conze, *op.cit.*, pp. 822-824. The tradition ascribes the change to Śankarācārya who, according to the chronicles, visited Nepal and forced

the monks and nuns to break their vows (Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-185).

51. The following vihāras are mentioned in the inscriptions : Ajikā, Abhayaruci, Kharjūrika, Guṃ, Jīvavarma, Puṣpāṭikā, Madhyama, Māna, Calurbhālaṭasana, Rāja, Varitakalyāṇagupta, Śivadeva, Sīnagu, Sujātaprabha. Of these only Guṃ and Sīnagu have been identified with vihāras exising at present. There is some evidence (Vajracarya, pp. 502-503) that Śivadeva vihāra is to be identified with the famous stupa at Bodhanāth.

52. They may well have had both Sanskrit ąnd native designations, as many have had in later times.

53. Considering the conservative nature of Nepalese building and architecture, they probably resembled the vihāras of later medieval times. For a recent photographic inventory of the existing monuments, see Carl Pruscha *et. al*, *Kathmandu Valley. The Preservation of Physical Environment and Cultural Heritage. A Protective Inventory.* Vols. I-II. Vienna : Anton Schroll, 1975.

54. Sankhu lies a few miles northeast of Kathmandu on one of the major trade routes to Tibet.

55. It is probably this concentration of vihāras that has given rise to the notion that Patan was a university town like Nalanda or Vikramaśila.

56. Paśupatināth is still the central shrine of Śaivism. Dolaśikharasvāmin, better known as Cāngu Nārāyaṇ, is a major Vaiṣṇava shrine.

57. Inscription 77.

58. The use of the term *maryādabandha*, a term of rare occurrence in Sanskrit, indicates, according to Lévi, the possibility of a contractual arrangement arrived at after a period of negotiation (*Le Népal*, Vol. III, pp. 94).

59. Inscription 133.

60. Inscription 133.

61. Inscription 35, Vajracarya, as did F.W. Thomas before him, takes *anuparamena* as the name of the poet. Lévi (*Le Népal*, III, p. 45) takes it as an adverb meaning "sans arrêt."

62. Inscription 89. The inscription is of Aṃśuvarman. Most of it has been effaced and only the extreme right is still legible :

.....(1).....(va) jrayāna (2)..... pādānugṛhīto (3).....śrayṃśuvarmā (4) .....nāṅkuśala (5) ..... tibhuddhibhi (6).....sampadā(7).....bhūcaityabhatta (8).....ṭugrāma (9).....divasa (10)... bhū...nana.....māda....(11).....rapi prativarsa (12).....śuklapañcamyāmprātareva snātānu (13) gṛhālaṅkarabhūto...(14).....(15)

63. Inscription 136 : *deyadharmoyam śrīdharmarājikāmātya...(1) sāṃghikābhikṣusaṃghasya.....(2)*

64. Inscription 98.

65. Inscription 99 is carved on a stone now in the National Museum at Chauni, Kathmandu. It is badly damaged, but has an image of the Buddha and various Buddhist signs incised on it. According to Vajracarya, the writing is of the time of Aṃsuvarman. The first two lines read : *tvotıasaṅghāya .....(1) -anādinibandhanam samsarasya.....(1a).....yoḥ pūjarthmāśvayjaḥ kṛṣṇa.....(2).....ta pu.....rapadampa nimittā.....(2a)* Another brief inscription is no. 120: *ratnatrayam bhagavadaryyamudāravarṇṇamuddiśyasatvaparibhoganimittam eto (1) kūpañjaladravaṇikāñca śubhāya pitroḥ śākyo yatir vihitavan priyapālanāmā ...(2)* "Wishing the welfare of his parents, the monk Priyapāla Śākyabhikṣu has built this well and fountain for the use of living things in honor of the glorious three jewels..."

66. Inscription 1.

67. The *jātaka* is known as the *kaṇḍari* (for the king) and his wife is Kinnaradevi. For the text, see V. Fausboll (ed.) *The Jatakas* (London : Kegan Paul,

Trench Trubner and Co., Ltd, 1891) Vol. 5, pp. 437 ff. The tale concerns a lustful queen who leaves her husband for a cripple. It is one of several misogynous stories contained in the *Kuṇālajātaka* and was evidently used often in religious illustration. For a recent edition, see W.B. Bollée *Kuṇālajātaka* (London: Luzac and Company, 1970). Bollée (p. 148) states that "in one of his last studies Lüders showed that the name Kaḍariki written near the figure of a king on a pillar at the South Gate of the Bharhut stupa is identical with the Kaṇḍariki in Kunj vs. 21 [H. Lüders, "Die Vidyādharas in der buddhistischen Literatur und Kunst"] (ZDMG 93 (1939, l.c. foll.) Cf. Lüders ["Bhārhut und Buddhistische Literatur"] AKM 26 (1941) p. 19 foll)." "The words Kandarikannarānam were wrongly divided Kaṇḍari-kinnarānam, after which the once independent Ja no 341 was called Kaṇḍari-jataka".

Bollée also says that the tale must have reached Nepal and states that "Mr. Thakur Lal Manandhar wrote me he heard it in Nepal from the *vajrācāryas*" (p. 154).

68. Inscription 95.
69. Inscription 121.
70. Inscription 96.
71. Inscription 97.
72. Inscription 40.

17

Four Great Thinkers in the History of Modern Chinese Buddhism

BHIKSU CHANG SHENG-YEN, LITT. D.*

THE WORD "modern" in this paper denotes the period from the latter part of the Ming Dynasty to the present day. As we all know, there have not been many outstanding thinkers in Chinese Buddhism since the T'ang dynasty. Consequently, the history of Chinese Buddism after the Sung dynasty has not received much scholarly attention. However, since the end of the Ming there have arisen a number of great scholars. This paper will discuss four Buddhist philosophers who were most significant and influential in the post-Ming period. They are Ou-i Chih-hsü[a] (1599-1655), Tai-hsü Wei-hsin[b] (1889-1947), Ou-yang Chien Chin-wu[c] (1872-1944) and Yin-shun Sheng-Cheng[d] (1906-present). While three of them were monks, Ou-yang was a layman. It is a miracle that a Buddhist scholar like Ou-i Chih-hsü appeared on the scene at the end of the two dynasties of Yuan and Ming, when the record of Chinese Buddhism was almost a blank sheet. The other three appeared after the Republic era and all received outside stimulation, that of Western civilization and, especially, of Japanese and Tibetan Buddhism.

1. *From Sectarian Division to Total Unification—Ou-i Chih-hsü*

Chih-hsü's thought belonged to the Ch'an tradition, but he was opposed to both the Patriach Ch'an[e] and to Kung-an Ch'an[f]. His Ch'an was the Tathāgata Ch'an[g] based mainly on the *Sūrangama Sūtra*[h].[1] He himself said his understanding of Buddhism followed that of Aśvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna of India, and Chih[i], Cheng-kuan[j] (738-839), and Yen-shou[k] (904-975)[2] of China. As a matter of fact, his ideas were based mainly on the *Tsungching-lu*[l] of Yen-shou. However, as he was the one and only post-Sung scholar to have read through the entire Chinese Tripitaka twice, he was not fully

* See Footnotes on page 291

committed to any one of Chinese Buddhism's sectarian views.[3] Some scholars have considered him as a T'ien t'ai Buddhist, but he only adopted the T'ien-tai method of classifying Buddhist teachings (*Chiao-pan fang-fa*)[m] in commenting on the sūtras and śāstras. He did not adopt the T'ien-t'ai teaching in its entirety. Others have considered him as the Ninth Patriach of the Pure Land School. However, although he propagated Pure Land practice throughout his life, he was critical of the method of "*tsan-chiu nien-fo*"[n][4] as practiced in the tradition of the "simultaneous practice of Ch'an and Pure Land". He also criticized the method of "establishing image by pointing at the direction" (*chih-fang lihsiang*)[o] as taught by Shan-tao[p] (613-681)[5], the Second Patriach of the Pure Land School.[q] His Pure Land is not different from the "thought at the present moment" (*hsien-chien-i-nien-hsin*).[6]

This "thought at the present moment" was the special feature of Ou-i Chih-hsü's philosophy.[7] Although it was derived from the concept of "a flash of thought" (*chieh-erh i-hsin*)[r], found in Chih-i's *Mo-ke, Chih-kuan* (Great Concentration and Insight), Chih-i's "flash of thought" refers to our manovijñāna, the sixth sense or the deluded mind. Any thought within this sixth sense contains all the ten dharmadhātūs. Based on this, according to the Tien t'ai school, is the method known as cultivation by concentrating on the delusive mind. But for Ou-i Chih-hsü, the main function of "the thought at the present moment" is to explain the "True Suchness of One Mind" (*i-hsin-chen-ju*)[t] as found in the *Awakening of Faith*, and the "wonderful nature of True Suchness of the Tathāgatagarbha" (*ju-lai tsang miao-chen-ju-hsing*)[u] as found in the *Sūrangama Sūtra*, for the former is capable of being perfumed (*shou-hsün*)[v] and the latter is capable of being influenced by conditions (*sui-yuan*)[w]. An emancipated saint is one influenced by purity, while an ordinary person is one, influenced by delusion; no matter whether one is influenced by purity or delusion, is a saint or an ordinary person, the nature of True Suchness is not changed. Ordinary people cannot see this nature, but are familiar with the psychological activities of the sixth sense as experienced in daily life. This sense is not the Mind of True Suchness, and yet it is not separated from it, either. Therefore, Ou-i Chih-hsü established the philosophical concept of "the thought at the present moment" in order to explain the different theories maintained by various sūtras and śāstras and, thus, to unify the diverse views of different schools.

It is true that Ou-i Chih-hsü did not invent anything new in the method of classification of Buddhist teachings, but only adopted the method of the T'ien-t'ai school. However, he did not believe in dividing sūtras artificially into different categories. He felt that if one viewed the sūtras from the standpoint of perfection and sudden enlightenment, each and every one would be a perfect doctrine leading to sudden enlightenment, for all the teachings were streams from the same ocean : the Buddha's supreme enlightened wisdom. Though each might be designed to suit a specific situation, yet the basic quality was the same. It is wrong to divide the teachings into different streams and arouse disputes among various schools. However, if we must admit that Ou-i Chih-hsü had a methodology of his own in classifying Buddhist teachings, it would be that he divided the whole of Chinese Mahāyāna Buddhism into Ch'an, Doctrine, Vinaya (Discipline), Esoteric, and Pure Land Schools. He further divided Doctrine into Fa-hsing Tsung (Dharmatā or Dharma-Nature School) and Fa-hsiang-Tsung (Dharmalakṣana or Dharma-Character School). Vijñānavāda or the Mind-Only School was the Fa-hsiang Tsung, while T'ien-t'ai, Hsien shou (Hua-yen) and others were of the Fa-hsing Tsung.

For Ou-i, Fa-hsing and Fa-hsiang are two sides of the same coin. Looking inward to the content of the deluded mind, one discovers the "mind of thusness" in the Tathāgatagarbha, which is the foundation of the Fa-hsing Tsung. Looking outward to observe the function of the pure mind, one experiences the "transformation" of consciousness, which is the major principle of Fa-hsiang Tsung. Ou-i therefore used the terminology of *Cheng wei-shih lun* to comment on the *Awakening of Faith*,[8] and brought the idea of the mind of delusion of the T'ien-t'ai and the Mind of True Suchness of the *Cheng wei-shih lun* into harmony. Moreover, he harmonized the perfumable True Suchness of the *Awakening of Faith* with the unperfumable True Suchness of the *Cheng wei-shih lun*.[9]

Ou-i Chih-hsü also was regarded as a scholar of the Vinaya School. However, although on the surface he adopted the Four Division Vinaya[x] that Tao hsüan[y] (596-667) emphasized, and approved of the latter's effort to harmonize the Hinayāna four-division Vinaya with Mahāyāna doctrines, he strongly censored Tao hsüan's manner of setting up rules for monastic assemblies without consulting the Vinaya books of the five Hīnayāna schools.[10] Although Ou-i Chih-hsü considered it important to practice the Bhikṣu Vinaya, nonetheless, he stressed the importance of using the Bodhisattva Vinaya of the *Bramajāla sūtra* to comment on the Bhikṣu Vinaya.[11] This was the first time in the history of Chinese Buddhist discipline that such an idea had been advanced.

After the Esoteric School had disappeared as a result of the Hui-ch'ang persecution in the latter part of the T'ang dynasty, very few people studied the school's books. For the purpose of completing his book, *Yueh-tsang chih-ching*[z] ("A Guide to the Tripitaka"), Ou-i Chih-hsü studiously read all the works of the Esoteric School. Although he added nothing new to the theory of the Esoteric School, he placed much emphasis in his practice on the rituals and Dharanis. In the final analysis, whether he succeeded or not, Ou-i Chih-hsü was the first Buddhist who, not content with merely hoping to harmonize the ideas of the Chinese Buddhist schools and integrate them, actually seriously *attempted* the task.

2. *The Final Synthesizer of Chinese Traditional Buddhism—Tai-hsü Wei-hsin*

Master Tai-hsü Wei-hsin marks a milestone in modern Chinese Buddhist history. He was a pioneer in the modernization of the education of Chinese monks, and was a great religious leader, with broad compassion and deep dedication. Although he did not regard himself as a scholar steeped in Buddhist texts,[12] the extent of his scholarship and the breadth and depth of his knowledge certainly equalled or even surpassed that of Ou-i Chih-hsü. But, because his study was for the sake of religious practice and not for the sake of intellectual curiosity, he was different from other Buddhist scholars. His writings consist of eight million words in sixty-four volumes. If we consider the size of his output and the organization of his thoughts, we must include him among the great thinkers.

There are a number of similarities between Tai-hsü and Ou-i. For instance, both regard Chinese Buddhism as the starting point for all Buddhism in general;[13] they take the Tathāgatagarbha or the Mind of True Suchness of the *Awakening of Faith* and the *Sūrangama sūtra* as the supreme standard of Buddha Dharma; they use the terminology of Yogācāra to comment on the *Awakening of Faith*; they unite the eight Chinese Mahāyāna schools[14] by means of the manovijñāna (though Tai-hsü did not use the term "the thought

at the present moment"); and finally, both suggest that the eight schools are mutually complementary and equally important.[15] All this reflects the influence Tai-hsü received from Ou-i. Moreover, just as Ou-i started his training in Ch'an, Tai-hsü in his early years also studied Ch'an.[16] Though he later accorded equal importance to the eight schools, he still said, "When one reaches real understanding, one naturally comes to the Prajñā (San-lun) School and the Ch'an School of Bodhidharma."[17] This accords with Ou-i's point of view, which takes Ch'an as the foundation.

In spite of his similarities to Ou-i, Tai-hsü made contributions of his own. Although he viewed all Buddhist teachings from the standpoint of Tathāgatagarbha or the Mind of True Suchness, he emphasized the application of Yogācāra philosophy, and constantly used its terminology in his explanation of Buddhist texts. Because of this, he often was mistaken as a scholar of the Yogācāra School. In fact, he only used its terminology for the sake of explaining Buddhist philosophy, as an expedient to suit the viewpoint of modern science. However, whenever a comparison of Tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra was called for, he would remark that the latter was not the supreme doctrine. For example, he said that the *Awakening of Faith* was written by Aśvaghoṣa, who was a Bodhisattva of the eighth stage, and that Asaṅga, the Patriach of the Yogācāra tradition, was only a Bodhisattva of the first stage, while Vasubandhu, the author of the *Trimśikā*, was only on the Prayoga mārga, three steps below even the first stage.[18] Therefore, the True Suchness of the *Awakening of Faith* embodies the essence, characteristics, and function of the entire Buddha Dharma, while the True Suchness of the *Cheng Wei-shih lun* refers only to the essence, so the *Cheng Wei-shih lun* says nothing about True Suchness being perfumed.[19] By doing this, Tai-hsü not only elevated the status of the *Awakening of Faith*, but also resolved the contradiction between the two views concerning the perfumability of the True Suchness. Moreover, he explained the True Suchness in terms of the "three natures" of the Yogācāra tradition. As the three kinds of Buddha nature correspond to the three kinds of True Suchness of the *Buddhatā śāstra*, he explained it in terms of the three natures in the Yogācāra : *Cheng Wei-shih lun*, namely, the nature of wrong discrimination[aa] (parikalpita), the nature of dependence on others[ab] (paratantra), and the nature of perfect knowledge[ac] (pariniṣpanna).[20]

According to Tai-hsü, "There are many tributaries of the Dharma, yet the source is only one."[21] True Suchness, being the essence of the Dharma, is one and undifferentiated. The differences found in the treatises are there only for the sake of expedience in preaching. Tai-hsü divided the different teachings into the Prajñā (San-lun) School, which emphasized "Selectivity", the Yogācāra School, which emphasized "Existence", and the True Suchness Schools (Ch'an, T'ien-t'ai, Hsien-shou and Esoteric), which emphasized "Emptiness". He also explained the emphases in these three divisions by means of the three natures found in Yogācāra : The Prajñā School emphasizes the nature of wrong discrimination and downplays the other two natures, the Yogācāra School emphasizes the nature of dependence on others and downplays the other two natures, and the True Suchness Schools emphasize the nature of perfect knowledge and downplays the other two natures. All three are perfect teachings, but their functions are different. As far as the concept of True Suchness is concerned, the view of the Yogācāra School was considered a little narrow, for in this School the True Suchness is perfumed by only one of the four causes, namely, the direct cause, whereas in the True Suchness

Schools it is perfumed by the other three causes as well, namely, the objective condition, the sequential condition and the supporting condition.[22]

In fact, explaining the three main divisions by attaching to them the three natures of the Yogācāra School is a way of classifying Buddhist teachings unique to Tai-Hsü. In his later years, he divided Buddhist teachings into the "Fa-hsing kung-hui Tsung"[ad] (Emptiness and Insight School of Dharmata), "Fa-hsiang Wei-shih Tsung"[ae] (Yogācāra, School of Dharmalakṣana) and "Fa-chieh Yuen-chüeh Tsung"[af] (Perfect Enlightenment School of Dharmadhatu). He said, "If one studies all the Mahāyāna teachings with the theories of these three schools, nothing is unexplainable and nothing is not harmonious". However, since the Fa-hsing-k'ung-hui Tsung contains only a part of Mahāyāna and the Fa-hsiang Wei-shih Tsung does not fully coincide with True Suchness, only the Fa-Chieh Yuen-chüeh Tsung "contains the essence of all the Dharmas, for its realm covers all teachings. It is unsurpassable".[23]

In a comparison between Tai-hsü Wei-hsin with Ou-i Chih-hsü, the former comes out looking better. Although he emphasized Chinese Buddhism, he nevertheless had been exposed to the modern scientific methods used by European, American and Japanese scholars of Buddhism. He upheld his belief in the Mahāyāna *Awakening of Faith* and *Sūrangama sūtra*, and disagreed with those who studied Buddhism with what he called "evolutional historicism and scientific method",[24] for study with such an attitude would not help one's religious practice. But, after some contact with Tibetan Buddhism, he accepted without hesitation the *Śāstra of the Progress in the Bodhi Way*,[ag] which was written by Tsoṅkhapa (1357-1419). In this śāstra, practice was divided into three steps : inferior, middle and superior. This eventually was reflected in Tai-hsü's method of dividing Buddhist teachings : the Dharma common to the five vehicles, the Dharma common to the three vehicles and the Dharma unique to the Mahāyāna.[25]

3. *The Renaissance of Yogācāra studies—Ou-yang Ching-wu*

The only Chinese Buddhist School that has retained its original Indian features is the Yogācāra School. As this school placed emphasis on analysis and logic. It was not readily acceptable to the Chinese people, who were more comfortable with holistic ideas such as "benevolence", or the Way. Consequently, the study of Yogācāra, as introduced by Hsüan-T'sang[ah] (602-664) was discontinued in China after its pursuit by his second generation student, K'uei-chi[ai] (632-682). After the turmoil at the end of the T'ang dynasty, even the literary sources of the school were lost in China. Ou-i Chih-hsü, who discussed the *Cheng Wei-shih lun* without having read K'uei-chi's commentary on it, naturally could not avoid some biases and mistakes. Tai-hsü's ideas on the same treatise, being influenced by Ou-i,[26] likewise, did not represent the traditional thought of the Yogācāra School. It was only at the end of the Ch'ing dynasty, when the Yogācāra literatures found their way back to China from Japan, and the influence of the Western scientific research method was felt, that Upāsaka Ou-yang Ching-wu could exert himself in the propagation of this philosophy.

Though both Tai-hsü and Ou-yang Ching-wu lived in the same Chinese environments and in the same period, they represented two extremes : the former held that nothing but Chinese Buddhism was worthy of propagation, while the latter contended that no one

saved Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga of India deserved serious study, for Chih-i was only an ordinary person of the fifth stage, and since Hsian-shou Fa-tsang[aj] (637-714) was more or less a mere imitator of the former, he had an even lower standing.[27] In his early years Ou-yang studied Chinese Buddhism and gained a thorough understanding of the theories of T'ien-t'ai, Hua-yen, *Awakening of Faith* and the *Sūrangama sūtra*, but after studies of Nāgārjuna's theory of Emptiness and Asaṅga's theory of Existence he decided to make the propagation of Yogācāra his life-long career. He was then over forty years old.[28] He criticized Chinese Buddhist schools from the standpoint of Ch'an. According to him, although T'ien-t'ai had such books as the *Six Marvelous Entrances to Meditation* (*Liu-miou-men*[ak]) and *Great Concentration and Insight*, discussing in detail the method of Dhyāna contemplation, yet if one compares the three types of tranquility and the three types of insight meditation with the Perfect True Nature of the Yogācāra School, the former may be perfect but they are not true. Furthermore, although the Hua-yen School proclaims the various kinds of unlimited samādhi, it never has given a detailed account, so it is no more than an abstruse theory that has no base. Likewise, the Ch'an teaching introduced by Kumārajiva (344-413) was mainly a Hīnāyāna type of meditation and could not be a model for Mahāyāna practice. The Three Samādhis of the *Prajñāpāramitā sūtra* of the Śūnya (Emptiness) School are sound, but they are not as exhaustive as the four samādhis of the *Yogācārabhūmi śāstra*[al] of the Yogācāra School.[29] On the whole, he looked upon Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga, the representative figures of the two main streams of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism in the Middle Ages, Emptiness and Existence, as of equal importance, and insisted on making their theories the standard for measuring and identifying the sūtras, śāstras, and other works, including those in Sanskrit and Tibetan.[39] Therefore, Ou-yang may be considered a scholar who paid special tribute to the Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism of the Middle Ages. There were many disagreements and disputes between the Emptiness School and the Existence School at that time, and Ou-yang, being a Chinese, could not refrain from synthesizing tendencies, and tried to harmonize the two. He pointed out that since Buddha had preached differently under different conditions during his lifetime, he had covered all aspects of Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna and Emptiness as well as Existence. Nāgārjuna upheld Emptiness, consolidated the Hīnayāna and expanded the Mahāyāna who was the key point in the transition from Hīnayāna to Mahāyāna. Asaṅga, upheld the Existence School, explored only the Mahāyāna, and was the one who supplemented the theories of Nāgārjuna and made them perfect. So, the two complemented each other, and both were necessary. Asaṅga perfected Mahāyāna Buddhism, but even though he studied both schools, he propagated only Yogācāra. As for Chinese Buddhism, Ou-yang's opinion was that while Kumarajīva propagated the teachings of the Emptiness School, his followers mixed them with the ideas of Lao Tze and Chuang Tze. Paramārtha also had transmitted the works of Asaṅga, but since he translated the *Awakening of Faith*,[31] it is rather difficult to know to which school he belonged.

Only after Hsüan T'sang and his disciples synthesized the Schools of Emptiness and Existence did the "real" Buddhism become known in China. Ou-yang felt that we should not contrast Hsüan-T'sang's School of thought with the San-lun School and call them the School of Existence and the School of Emptiness respectively, because scholars of the San-lun School had not read the *Māhā-prājñapāramitā Sūtrā*, nor had they read sufficiently the works of the Emptiness School. Therefore, it was only natural that

they could not have understood the theory of Emptiness as thoroughly as Hsuan-T'sang did. In his mind, therefore, Hsüan-T'sang was the one synthesizer of the two Schools of Emptiness and Existence. Therefore, Hsüan-T'sang represented real Buddhism, not just sectarian Buddhism.[32] Ou-yang tried to unify the entire body of Buddhist philosophy with the theory of one school. This is the method of classification of Buddhist teachings adopted by most Buddhist scholars. Its special characteristic is to include all the Buddhist teachings within the scope of one's own school, thus placing the theories and doctrines of that school in the highest position. Ou-yang Ching-wu based his understanding of Buddhism on Yogācāra, which had by then become a forgotten doctrine, over a thousand years after Hsüan-T'sang and K'uei-chi's time. Ou-yang took upon himself the responsibility of reviving this broken tradition.[33] In view of this fact, his Yogācāra thought represented a later development of the tradition, coming down from Dharmapāla and Śīlabhadra of India as well as Hsüan-T'sang and K'uei-chi of China, and was, therefore, different from the earlier period of Yogācāra thought as taught by Paramārtha.

4. *Integrating Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna with the voidness of Nature Theory—Yin Shun*

Linking Mahāyāna and Hinayāna and upholding the philosophy of Emptiness, Yin-shun Sheng-cheng was a student of Tai-hsü Wei-hsin. He formulated his Buddhist philosophy after first having been thoroughly immersed in Chinese Buddhism and then having traced its source : namely, the earlier stages of Mahāyāna Buddhism in India. Generally speaking, the so-called Eight Schools of Chinese Mahāyāna came mainly from the two major schools of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga of medieval Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. The theory of Tathāgatagarbha came a little later and was followed finally by the Esoteric School. The Esoteric School reached China before it was really completed and did not become popular in China. As a result, as analyzed by Tai-hsü, there are three schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism in China. Ou-i Chih-hsü and Tai-hsü Wei-hsin followed the Tathāgatagarbha tradition and used it to harmonize the views of all schools, which is much more broad-minded than trying to explain all Buddhist teachings by the Tathāgatagarbha theory of just one particular school. Ou-yang Ching-wu, though he praised Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga, considered himself the successor of Hsuan-T'sang. The three above-named Chinese philosophers, whether talking about the mind—only of Tathāgatagarbha or the consciousness—only of Ālaya-vijñāna, could not in general free themselves from the mold of medieval Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. Yin-shun first studied Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamika śāstra*, then went on to study the Yogācāra School, and finally returned to the study of the Chinese San-lun School. He was regarded as a follower of the San-lun School by many scholars. But after some contact with the Mādhyamika philosophy of Tibetan Buddhism and the original or incipient philosophy of Emptiness as shown in the Agamas and the *Abhidharma Śāstra*, he left the San-lun School and formulated his own theory of Emptiness, thereby linking the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna traditions.[34] Although some people still call him a follower of the San-lun School, in fact, there is considerable distance between his philosophy of Emptiness and that of the Chinese San-lun School. The San-lun School based its theories on the *Mādhyamika Śāstra*, the *Śata Śāstra* and the *Dvadaśanikāya Śāstra*. It began with Kumārajiva and was completed by Chia-hsiang Chi-tsang[am] (549-623). It eventually linked up with the philosophy of idealism. Strictly speaking, therefore, it is not a philosophy of Emptiness.

Yin-shun advocated Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika thought but also praised the Yogācāra thought of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. In his view, it would not be proper to be limited to either one of them, nor would it be proper to accept both. Because, there were disagreements and disputes between these two schools. In India the picture was not as simple as what Ou-yang Ching-wu made it out to be. Yin-shun felt that there was a similarity between Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga, in that both tried to consolidate Southern and Northern Indian Buddhism, and in that both attempted to purify the philosophy of true idealism.[36] This differs from Ou-yang's view that Asaṅga's philosophy supplemented and perfected that of Nāgārjuna. Yin-shun believed that one should synthesize Southern and Northern Indian Buddhism by taking sūtras as warp and śāstras as woof, and from this to observe the evolution of Buddhist thought. This differs considerably from Ou-yang's emphasis solely on the Northwestern Indian Buddhist School or his use of śāstras as the main basis for his study.[37]

In his analysis of teachings, Yin-shun divided them into three categories as had Tai-hsü. The difference is that the latter made the division according to Chinese schools, whereas Yin-shun did so according to the views found in Indian Buddhist sūtras and śāstras. According to Yin-shun, the three categories of Mahāyāna Buddhism are :

(1) Hsing-k'ung wei-ming lun[an] (Empty Name—Only School) : This was established with reference to the Prajñāpāramitā and the sūtras, śāstras and other writings by Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Bhāvaviveka, etc.

(2) Hsü-wang wei-Shih lun[ao] (Illusory Consciousness—Only School) : This was derived from the śāstras and other writings by Maitreya, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.

(3) Ch'en-ch'ang wei-hsin lun[ap] (Real and Eternal Mind—Only School) : This was established on the basis of the *Awakening of Faith* and other Mahāyāna sūtras that teach the Tathāgatagarbha, the realm of the *Tathāgata*, the Eternal True Mind and Mahāparinirvāṇa.

Just as Tai-hsü coordinated the three Chinese Mahāyāna schools with the three natures of Yogācāra School, Yin-shun also suggested that the first school could be identified with the nature of wrong discrimination and the second with the nature of dependence on others. However, the last school could not be identified with the nature of perfect knowledge. Why? Because the nature of perfect knowledge is of the nature of emptiness, non-activity, and equality that is neither born nor destroyed. It is, therefore, not like the Mind of True Suchness in the *Awakening of Faith*, to which impurity and purity, causes and effects are attached.[38] In this way, Yin-shun criticized Ou-i and Tai-hsü as incorrect in holding that the Mind of True Suchness of Yogācāra was the same perfumable Mind of True Suchness of the *Awakening of Faith*.

According to Yin-shun, the philosophy of Emptiness is really the essence of Buddhism. The basic doctrine of Buddhism is none other than hetu-pratyaya : the hetu-pratyaya that creates dharmas, which is none other than Emptiness. All dharmas come from Emptiness. If the real nature of dharmas was not empty, it would be obstructed and thus dharmas could not be created. It is, therefore, only Emptiness that can establish all dharmas; only when we experience and identify with the essence of Emptiness, can great compassion and love emerge. If there is not Emptiness, no matter what terms may be assigned to the theories of the nature of the Ultimate Reality—Solipsism, Ātman, Rationalism, or Idealism—they are all but illusions. Terms may differ, but the basic meaning remains the same. To deny these concepts of absoluteness by means of the

Mādhyamika theory of interdependence, Emptiness and selflessness is the only way to realize that all are relative, dependent and constantly changing; only by this realization may true wisdom become manifest.[39]

Yin-shun's doctoral[40] thesis was a study of the history of Chinese Ch'an Buddhism[41]. His knowledge of Chinese Buddhism was very broad, so he was able to abandon the traditional Chinese way of thinking and return to the Mahāyāna philosophy of Emptiness, which is really the original Indian Buddhism. There is no precedent for this in the history of Chinese Buddhist thoughts.

The four modern Chinese Buddhist scholars discussed above may not be well-known to the international community of Buddhist scholars. This paper hopes to have introduced their ideas to all who are interested in Chinese Buddhist thought.

FOOTNOTES

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1. *Tathāgata Ch'an* is another name for Tathāgatagarba Ch'an. Those who practice Ch'an according to the ways set up by the Patriarchs of the Chinese Ch'an schools follow the Patriarch Ch'an; those who inquire into the *kung-an* (koan) created by the Patriarchs of the Chinese Ch'an schools follow the kung-an Ch'an; and those who practice Ch'an according to the scriptures of the Tathāgatagarba tradition follow the *Tathāgata Ch'an.*
2. Chih-hsu, *Ling-feng tsung-lun*, 5/2/20 and 9/4/16. (Japan, Koto Sholin, 1723).
3. *Ibid.*, preface. His autobiography was entitled, "The Biography of the Practitioner of Eight Negations". It meant that he did not belong to any of the existing religious schools.
4. *Ibid.*, 5/3/4. "Tsan-chin nien-fo" refers to the method of meditation that gives equal emphasis to the inquiry into the kung-an as practiced in the Ch'an tradition and to the invocation of the Buddha's name as practiced in the Pure Land tradition.
5. *Kuan-wu-liang-shou ching-shu, Chüan* 3. *Taisho*, 27/267b. In this type of meditation, one meditates on Amitābha Buddha, who is presently preaching in the Land of Bliss, which is situated in the West and is one hundred thousand billion Buddha-lands away from us. The school does not believe that the Buddha is in the mind of the person who invokes His name.
6. *Ling-feng tsung-lun*, 6/4/16.
7. *Ibid.*, 2/5/9.
8. The perfumability of the True Suchness is a theory found uniquely in the *Awakening of Faith.* It means that the unchanging True Suchness may change its manifestation depending on the purity or impurity of external causes. In accordance with the purity of external causes, an ordinary man can become a saint, but in accordance with the impurity of external causes, he remains in saṃsāra. Perfuming means to influence or to taint. Since True Suchness can be influenced by external causes and can manifest either as an ignorant person or a saint, this is called "to receive perfumation" and "to follow causes."
9. Chih-hsü, *Cheng-wei-shih-lun kuan-hsin fa-yao, Chüan 8, Wan-tze Hsü-tsang-ching* (Taiwan, Chinese Buddhist Association, photoprint edition, 1967) 82/309.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Chang Sheng-yen, *Minmatsu*

Chugoku bukkyō no kenkyū (Tokyo, Sankibo Buddhist Book Store, 1975), p. 360.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 360.

13. *Tai-hsü ch'uan-shu*, (Taiwan, T-ai-hsü *Ta-shih Ch'uan-shu*, Editorial Committee, 1959), 2/445.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 449.

15. Ou-i Chih-hsü never used the term "the Eight schools of Mahāyāna." This term was first used by the Japanese Avatamsaka scholar Giyonen (1240-1321) who divided the Japanese Buddhist schools into eight Mahāyāna schools and two Hīnayāna schools. *Hassō kōyō kōgi* (Tokyo, Hōsoken, 1968). T'ang Yung-t'ung discussed this problem in his article, "Lun Chung-huo fo-chiao wu shih-tsung" in *Che-hsieh yen-chiu*, 1962, number 3.

16. *T'ai-hsü ch'uan-shu Chüan 10*, "Tsung-i-tu" (Diagram of the essential teachings of Buddhist Schools), which is the fourth of his "Ta-ch'eng-tsung ti-tu." (Maps of Mahāyāna Schools).

17. *Ibid.*, 2/454.

18. *Ibid.*, 49/19.

19. *Ibid.*, 18/1410.

20. *Ibid.*, 10/847.

21. The three kinds of Buddha-nature according to the *Buddhatā śāstra (Chüan 2)* are : the nature of activity (*hsing-hsing* [aq]), the nature of converting (*yin-fu*[ar]), and the nature of principle (li-hsing[as]). The three kinds of Tathāgatagarba are : non-empty (*pu-k'ung*[at]), empty (*k'ung*[au]), and both empty and non-empty (k'ung-pu-kung[av]) : Among these, the non-empty and empty kinds of Tathāgatagarba come from the *Śrimala sūtra*, while the third kind of Tathāgata garba, that of both empty and non-empty kind, is an innovation of ancient Chinese Buddhists. *T'ai-hsü ch'uan-shu* 10/918, 974.

22. *Ibid.*, 2/446.

23. *Ibid.*, 18/1371-1382.

24. *Ibid.*, 2/523-525.

25. Japanese scholars who follow the lead of Mochizuki Shinkō (1869-1948) regard the *Awakening of Faith* as a Chinese forgery. Chinese scholars who follow the lead of Ou-yang Ching-wu, however, regarded the main thesis of the *Awakening of Faith* as similar to that of the Indian Sāṃkhya philosophy.

26. *T'ai-hsü Ch'uan-shu*, 2/454.

27. Ou-i Chin-hsü in his work, *Chi-hsin-lun lieh-wang-shu* (*Taisho*, vol. 44), uses the theories of Yogācāra to explain the *Awakening of Faith*. T'ai-hsü characterizes the work this way, "(Ou-i) discovered the basis of *Awakening of Faith* in the *Ch'eng wei-shih-lun* and in revealing the main tenets of the former he broke the web of doubt which had lasted for a thousand years". *T'ai-hsü ch'uan-shu*, 18/1049.

28. *Nei-hsieh*, (Hong Kong, Fu-hui Lien-shu, 1967) 2/220.

29. Tung-ch'u, *Chung-huo fu-chiao Chin-tai-shih* (Taiwan, Chung-hua Fu-chiao Wen-hua-kun, 1964), p. 663.

30. Corresponding to the three types of insight, *i.e.* empty, temporary, and the mean, The T'ien-t'ai School established three types of concentration, *i.e.*, the concentration of real essence (*ti-chen-chin*[aw]), the concentration that skilfully follows causes (*fang-pien-sui-yuan-chih*[ax]) and the concentration that stops the discrimination of the two sides (*hsi-erh-pien-feng-pieh-chih*[ay]). Altogether they are called the three types of insight and the three types of concentration.

31. *Nei hsien.* 1/16-19. The three kinds of samādhi of the *Prajñāpāramitā sūtras* are : empty, signless and wishless. The four kinds of samādhi of the *Yogācārabhūmi śāstra* are : *Ta-cheng-huang*[az] (wisdom), *Chi-fu-wang*[ba] (compassion), *hsien-shou*[bb] (not losing any good dharma) and *Chien-hsing*[bc] (strong and vigorous acts).

32. *Nei hsieh.* 3/175.

33. For Ou-yang, the problem of whether

Awakening of Faith was translated by Paramārtha or not did not exist. See note 25.

34. *Nei hsien*, 2/223,
35. *Ibid.*, 1/12.
36. Yin-shun, preface to his *Chung-kuan chin-lun*. *Miao-yün-chi* (Taiwan, 1971) 11/2/1-2.
37. Yin-shou's *San-lun-tsung-fung chien-shuo*, *Miao-yün-chi* (Taiwan, 1973) III/11/136-137.
38. *Miao-yün-chi* (Taiwan, 1972) III/7/108.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
40. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-131.
41. Cf. Yin-shun's preface to his *Chung-kuan chin-lun*, referred in note 36.

a. 藕益智旭
b. 太虛唯心
c. 歐陽漸竟無
d. 印順盛正
e. 祖師禪
f. 公案禪
g. 如來禪
h. 楞嚴經
i. 智顗
j. 澄觀
k. 延壽
l. 宗鏡錄
m. 教判方法
n. 參究念佛
o. 指方立相
p. 善導
q. 現前一念心
r. 介爾一心
s. 摩訶止觀
t. 一心真如
u. 如來藏妙真如性
v. 受薰
w. 隨緣
x. 四分律
y. 道宣
z. 閱藏知津
aa. 偏計執性
ab. 依他起性
ac. 圓成實性
ad. 法性空慧宗
ae. 法相唯識宗
af. 法界圓覺宗
ag. 菩提道次第論
ah. 玄奘
ai. 窺基
aj. 賢首法藏
ak. 六妙門
al. 瑜珈師地論
am. 嘉祥吉藏
an. 性空唯名論
ao. 虛妄唯識論
ap. 真常唯心論
aq. 行性
ar. 隱覆
as. 理性
at. 不空
au. 空
av. 空不空
aw. 体真止
ax. 方便隨緣止
ay. 息二边分別止
az. 大乘光
ba. 集福王
bb. 賢守
bc. 健行

18

Polonnaruva as a Ceremonial Complex : Sinhalese Cultural Identity and the Dilemmas of Pluralism

BARDWELL L. SMITH

IN HIS important book *The Pivot of the Four Quarters*, Paul Wheatley analyzes the origin and character of the ancient Chinese city and then sets this in comparative perspective by examining the genesis, morphology, significance and transformation of what he calls the ceremonial center or complex.

> Beginning as little more than tribal shrines, in what may be regarded as their classic phases these centers were elaborated into complexes of public ceremonial structures, usually massive and often extensive, and including assemblages of such architectural items as pyramids, platform mounds, temples, palaces, terraces, staircases, courts and stelae. Operationally they were instruments for the creation of political, social, economic, and sacred space, at the same time as they were symbols of cosmic, social, and moral order. Under the religious authority of organized priesthoods and divine monarchs, they elaborated the redistributive aspects of the economy to a position of institutionalized regional dominance...Above all, they embodied the aspirations of brittle, pyramidal societies in which, typically, a sacerdotal elite, controlling a corps of officials and perhaps a praetorian guard, ruled over a broad understratum of peasantry.[1]

Wheatley's thesis about the role of the ceremonial center and of its centripetalizing function is immensely suggestive as a way of perceiving and understanding more clearly the dynamics of Polonnaruva as the capital of Ceylon from the mid-ninth century until its final abandonment in 1293. While occupied by foreign troops or changing hands through dynastic wars during several decades of this period, it retained its function, at least symbolically, until the end and reached its apex of power and influence in the reign of Parākramabāhu I (1153-86). As such, it represents one of the great ages in Ceylonese

history and, because of its immense complexities and increasing forms of pluralism, is perhaps the most enigmatic yet compelling period for further study.

The scope of this paper covers a period in the history of Ceylon (Śrī Laṅkā) from the first, though not final, transfer of the capital from Anurādhapura to Polonnaruva during the last days in the reign of Sena I (833-853 A.D.) through the reign of Parākramabāhu II (1236-1270). This period may be referred to as the Polonnaruva era even though there were many decades (especially in the eleventh and thirteenth centuries) during which the capital was occupied by foreign troops and even though the region of Rājaraṭṭha was more or less controlled by South Indian dynasties.

The central thesis of the paper is that the relationship between the capital and the other Sinhalese kingdoms (provinces) of Dakkhiṇadesa and Rohaṇa, while central to the dynamics of this period, was only part of a whole spectrum of tensions that emerged, developed, and became more complex during this era. To these tensions several conflicting responses arose from factions within the court, the wider Sinhalese nobility, the Sangha, and a growing mercantile and agricultural community, not to mention Indian influences within Ceylon and from South India. This thesis will be approached from three different but related perspectives, described below, each of which points to the rapidly changing relationship between traditional Sinhalese culture and polity and the forces that ultimately led to their break-up and transformation. The outcome proved radically discontinuous with the past and yet, paradoxically, generated elements of continuity that both enriched and threatened Sinhalese ethnic and national self-identity. If certain pluralistic elements with which Ceylonese culture had to cope within this era were not totally unfamiliar, they were qualitatively different in scope, intensity and effect during these four centuries, especially from the eleventh century on.[2]

Though the long Anurādhapura period (third century B.C. to tenth century A.D.) had its own share of problem, the complexity of developments leading to the decline of Anurādhapura, the conquest and occupation by the Cōḷas in 993, and the establishment of their capital at Polonnaruva (Pulatthinagara) issued in a phase of Sinhalese history whose configurations extended over five centuries. While seemingly under the shadow of Anurādhapura, the latter being the capital for more than a millenium before, Polonnaruva became in all respects the political and ceremonial center of the nation when the original capital was vacated. In a variety of ways it embodied a cultural and political complex, even when occupied by enemy forces; it was a stage of history which was both in significant continuity with the past and finally, through the infusion of new elements and the structural transformation of society, was markedly discontinuous with old ways of life. Polonnaruva and the culture at large underwent a change from being essentially orthogenetic in character to a stage of being not yet heterogenetic but a precarious combination of diverse elements, some of which were incorporated into a new synthesis, others of which ultimately were rejected. At stake throughout this transformation was the nature of Sinhalese identity. The encounter with changing religious, intellectual, political and economic forces from within and abroad was both intense and relatively rapid. Responses ranged from confusion and indecisiveness to boldness and certainty. The interpretation of these forces and of responses to them is far from simple. Even the dating of the period can be argued.[3] As early as the late seventh century kings made Polonnaruva their base from time to time, though Anurādhapura remained the capital, in fact and/or symbolically, until its final collapse with the Cōḷa occupation. At the

other end of the period one may date Polonnaruva's demise with the emergence of successful Māyāraṭṭha (Dakkhiṇadesa) resistance to another invader, the Kaliṅga ruler Māgha (1215-1236), and the beginning of the Daṁbadeṇiya, Yāpahuva and Kuruṇāgala period (1232-1341). And, yet, it is clear that Polonnaruva retained its symbolic hold upon the Sinhalese imagination through Parākramabāhu III's reign (1287-1293), when it succumbed to a host of forces moving the base of operations and the critical mass of Sinhalese population to the south-west.

The present essay points to one among many ways of understanding the main forces at work in the Polonnaruva period. It was written as a counterpart to another essay published elsewhere, entitled "The Polonnaruva Period (*ca.* 993-1293 A.D.): A Thematic Bibliographical Essay", in which primary and secondary materials for examining these same approaches to the theme of identity and pluralism in tension are discussed extensively.[4] Both essays were intended to be suggestive, to raise more questions than they settle. The *first* of the approaches inquires into the political and socio-economic developments that were fundamental to this three hundred year period and to see what implications these had for Polonnaruva as well as for other regions of the country. The *second* approach is to examine the bases for legitimizing authority within this era. What alternative concepts of kingship emerged out of this changed political context and were these in continuity with notions about legitimacy that had characterized the Anurādhapura period? *Thirdly*, as part of the response to cultural and social pluralism, it is important to examine how the Buddhist Sāsana in Ceylon dealt with new forms of religious expression and with the whole phenomenon of a ceremonial complex. In the process, it is pertinent to examine developments in rite, symbol and cosmology. To what degree were these essentially continuous with traditional formulations of reality, as expressed in the Dhammadīpa mode, and to what degree were they new departures?

The theme of "Sinhalese cultural identity and the dilemmas of pluralism", therefore, reveals conflicts, stalemates, disintegration and the possibility of renewal at various points in Ceylon's history. Again, this returns to the relationship between any ceremonial complex and its related components, between change that is basically orthogenetic in nature and that which derives from a number of diverse elements. The case of Polonnaruva is only among the more interesting examples of these interwoven relationships. The present essay is the nucleus of what is hoped will eventually be a full-length study and is thus preliminary in many of its hypotheses. What is often posed in question form here must be elaborated more fully later.

A Centripetal Process and the Impact of Pluralism

Making use of Paul Wheatley's thesis that the capital is a "ceremonial complex", this essay asks in what sense Polonnaruva was a ceremonial as well as a political-military complex, inquires into the factors that led to its collapse, and begins to inspect its role and eventual fate in relation to other issues discussed in this paper. In what sense, for instance, can Polonnaruva be depicted as "orthogenetic" in its basic make-up? How did it differ in this respect from Anurādhapura? Was it incipiently "heterogenetic"? Or, was it some hybrid of both?

(*a*) An inquiry of this nature requires consideration of Ceylon's relationship to the South Indian political arena and to new political and economic devleopments not only

in South India but in the subcontinent as a whole and to areas of Southeast Asia. It also entails examining the relationship between Rājaraṭṭha (the region in north-central Ceylon of which Polonnaruva served as capital) and Dakkhiṇadesa and Rohaṇa, especially the latter. This overall picture is composed of continuing dynastic alliances and warfare, complicated by steady infusions of refugees, adventurers, mercenaries, and mercantile communities from South India. During this period, the position of kingship becomes increasingly precarious, resorting frequently to foreign assistance and marital alliances only to inflict upon itself greater burdens which, in turn, weakened its power base, fragmented the dynastic lineage, and created lasting divisions within the Sinhalese nobility through ties with Pāṇḍyan and Kāliṅgan nobility in South India.

(*b*) Part of the above picture is the relationship between different elements within the Sangha and the political power bases in Rājaraṭṭha, Dakkhiṇadesa, Rohaṇa, and even within South India. The political divisions to which this contributed reached sufficient magnitude during the reign of Parākramabāhu I (1153-1186) that it led to a purging of the Order, with implications that were unprecedented in Sinhalese history and that were motivated not simply by the desire to rid the Order of corruption but to disengage it from political involvement. It is germane to ask what effect this had upon the traditionally "symbiotic", though never conflict-free, relationship between the Sangha and the monarchy (as portrayed in the chronicles of Ceylon) and indicates the need for further research on this topic within various historical periods.

(*c*) Also of importance was the emergence of a newly-powerful class of mercantile groups and an agricultural gentry whose fortunes rose and fell with the political and military situations, contributing eventually to new and smaller-based forms of regionalism in the first half of the twelfth century and especially after the reign of Parākramabāhu I. The latter's policy of imperial centralization crushed all forms of resistance, particularly in Rohaṇa, ending what is now called the *Tisiṁhala-rajaya*, the three kingdoms or provinces of Ceylon.[5] While an effective policy under the leadership of Parākramabāhu I, it contributed to a radically centrifugal process after his death. In consequence, there emerged the forest or *vanni*, chieftains, who established power bases in areas inaccessible to the Cōḷa conquerors, and remnants of the court who secured for themselves rock fortresses that became the precursors to the post-Polonnaruva capitals of Daṁbadeṇiya, Gampola and Kandy.

All of these developments influenced the way in which Polonnaruva did and did not act as a ceremonial center over this 300-year period. At the height of its power, under Parākramabāhu I, it reigned supreme only by decimating provincial autonomy, thereby altering the traditional bases of relationship between various centers of power on the island. While effective for a short span, its success did not continue into the thirteenth century. Part of this essay's task is to assess the meaning of the centripetalizing process in this new but short-lived ceremonial complex, to view this complex in relationship to both traditional and new elements within the society and from abroad, and to question whether the impact of pluralistic forces contributed to heterogenetic forms of transformation at the price of weakening significant continuity with tradition itself, thereby calling into question the very meaning of Sinhalese identity.

As one begins to analyze the many complex factors leading to the decline of the ancient capital of Anurādhapura, the establishment of a new one, and the gestation of forces that altered Sinhalese society and culture markedly, one looks for many clues.

"The civil war of the 7th century, which lasted nearly three fourths of a century had far reaching repercussions on the political history of the island. Trends that had their origin in this period of civil strife lasted throughout the late Anuradhapura and Polonnaruva periods and only ceased to exist after the abandonment of the Raja rata. This civil war, it is true, was a dynastic struggle fought by the rival claimants to the throne with mainly mercenary troops in a limited area around the capital, but the indirect results of this period of prolonged struggle on the political conditions of the country were disastrous".[6] This statement by B.J. Perera is a helpful starting place for assessing the impact of pluralistic influences upon Sinhalese cultural identity. His identification of the key trends from the seventh to the tenth centuries sets the stage for perceiving later developments, namely : (i) dynastic struggles that contributed to regional factionalism, with Rājaraṭṭha, Rohaṇa and Dakkhiṇadesa frequently pitted against each other; (ii) Tamil mercenaries involved in these struggles and then neither sent back to South India nor absorbed into the local population; (iii) rising independence of the Sinhalese nobility in relation to the court at Anurādhapura, with Kāliṅgan elements introduced by certain monarchs to offset Sinhalese aristocratic power; (iv) economic insecurity arising out of political confusion and producing its own dynamics, which included peasant revolts and increasingly feudal structures "in which the topmost strata possessed extensive lands"; and (v) invasion and occupation by the Cōḷas, beginning in 993, largely enabled by the centrifugal tendencies preceding it and which occasioned in the end a momentum toward centralization anticipated in the reign of Vijayabāhu I (1055-1110) and confirmed under Parākramabāhu I (1153-1186).

While Śrī Laṅkā experienced incursions from South India several times in its long history (foreign presence lasting 66 years, for example, in the second century B.C.), Sinhalese political history turned a corner in the reign of Kassapa V (914-923), beginning more deeply than ever its involvement in struggles abroad. Siding with a former enemy, the Pāṇḍyas, with whom they had twice been at war in the previous century, Kassapa launched a policy of resistance to the emerging Cōḷa kingdom, creating an era whose polity and economic changes were irreversible. While no single phase of this development was solely responsible, the politics of Ceylon and South India had become so intertwined in the preceding hundred years that by the early tenth century internal conflicts within Ceylon were all but inseparable from what was happening on the continent. Whether cause or effect, dynastic entanglements abroad entailed larger numbers of often recalcitrant mercenaries (most were foreign themselves), repeated internecine struggles among Sinhalese nobility complicated by relations with Pāṇḍyas and Kāliṅgas (with frequent involvement by bhikkhus, notably of the Paṃsukūlika sect of the Abhayagiri Fraternity), and, above all, threats to fundamental unity by continuing tensions between the court and factions based in Rohaṇa to the south.

Another instructive article about the first century of the Polonnaruva period is K.A. Nilakanta Sastri's "Vijayabāhu I, the Liberator of Laṅkā", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Ceylon Branch)*, N.S., Vol. V (1954), 45-71, which not only chronicles the events of his career in mobilizing support that eventually ended the Cōḷa occupation and in establishing an important but passing period of stability, but also sheds light on the import of the Vēḷaikkāras who, as foreign mercenaries in Ceylon, exercised considerable influence throughout this century and beyond. The generation following the death of Vijayabāhu in 1110 is not known in its details, but it was obviously one of political

anarchy in which local princes settled for their own fiefdoms and the people suffered. A famous sentence in the *Cūlavamsa* captures the mood : "In their insatiability and money lust they squeezed out the whole people as sugar cane in a sugar mill, by levying excessive taxes". (*Cv.* 61 : 53) The remaining verses of this chapter afford a vivid picture of the chaos that characterized the period and set the stage for the emergence of the great hero-king and unifier, Parākramabāhu I.

By far the most suggestive recent essay on internal developments in Ceylonese society during this time is one by Keith Taylor, "The Devolution of Kingship in Twelfth Century Ceylon", in Kenneth R. Hall and John K. Whitmore, eds., *Explorations in Early Southeast Asian History : The Origins of Southeast Asian Statecraft* (Ann Arbor : Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan, 1976), 257-302. The thirteenth century (as the legacy of Parākramabāhu's policies) is viewed as "profoundly different from anything previously seen in Ceylon, in terms of its geography, economic base, and political organization" and the author analyzes aspects of the previous four centuries (with special attention to the reigns of Vijayabāhu I and Parākramabāhu I) to identify the causes. He begins by offering three conclusions. "First, the transition can be broadly identified as one which sees the end of the traditional organization of Ceylonese society and politics and the emergence of new, more fragmented, social and political patterns of which the imperial rule of Parakkamabāhu I is only the first and most successful example. Parakkamabāhu I's empire, though not an example of political fragmentation, was only possible by the destruction of the traditional order and the welding together of the resulting fragments through sheer physical force. Second, since the nature of Parakkamabāhu I's rule shows more continuity with what follows than with what went before, the breaking-point of the transition must be placed prior to his accession. Finally, the central theme of the transition was the struggle of the Ceylonese monarchy to survive in the age of Cōḷa power. Yet, while the continental pressures cannot be denied, they cannot be used as an excuse for the demise of the Ceylonese monarchy. This paper will emphasize the decline of the monarchy as a result of primarily internal difficulties". This exceptionally rich essay is difficult to summarize in a few lines, but the concept of 'transition' provides the clue to its overall thesis. The era of dynastic warfare from the death of Vijayabāhu I to the accession of Parākramabāhu I in 1153 is the breaking-point of the transition. After this, "non-traditional patterns are the rule" : (i) the collapse of old feudal patterns with strongholds particularly in Rājaraṭṭha and Rohaṇa and the shift to a pattern of personal loyalty on either the *vanni* chieftain or the imperial level; (ii) the shift from a predominantly peasant-based agriculture to one that was more diversified and included a rising merchant and artisan class; (iii) the move toward isolating the Sangha from political involvement, coupled with either more imperial supervision of Sāsana affairs or, later, the creation of more organizational structures to guarantee self-regulation; and (iv) the final crushing of Rohaṇa-stimulated movements of political resistance, which, while facilitating momentary national unity under the aegis of Parākramabāhu I, also undermined traditional centers of power and led to a more severe regionalizing of Sinhalese authority in the Southwest.

The post-Parākramabāhu I, era, through the reign of Parākramabāhu II (1236-1270), has been explored most fully by Amaradasa Liyanagamage, who devotes separate chapters in his book to the following topics : the disintegration of the Polonna-

ruva kingdom; the founding of the Dambadeṇiya kingdom and the reign of Vijayabāhu III (1232-1236); the beginnings of the reign of Parākramabāhu II and the policies of Māgha (1215-1236) ; the Jāvaka and the Pāṇḍya invasions; and the importance of the reign of Parākramabāhu II. No other treatment of comparable importance exists on this relatively neglected period in Ceylonese history.[7] Among the frequently debated topics about the Polonnaruva period is why it ended in the permanent shift of population away from the area and toward the so-called wet-zone. A number of papers have been collected in a volume, edited by K. Indrapala, entitled *The Collapse of the Rajarata Civilization in Ceylon and the Drift to the South-west* (Peradeniya : Ceylon Studies Seminar, University of Ceylon, 1971), which helps to suggest the complexity of the issues. Among the causative factors discussed are the reliance upon mercenaries, the steady influx of Tamil immigrants, the fact that trade was largely in foreign hands, the decay of the revenue system, and the breakdown of the old irrigation network. Several of the essays stress the collapse of the bureaucratic and administrative system that had previously maintained the dry-zone irrigation (followed eventually by widespread malaria which discouraged reoccupation of the area) underscoring, among other factors, the breakdown of the local infrastructure (epitomized by the *kulīnas* or local nobility) stimulated by the trend toward centralization, especially under Parākramabāhu I. This weakening of local administration and the resultant deterioration of the irrigation system (therefore, the entire economy) were unforseen consequences of centripetal trends of the twelfth century and their aftermath. Not to be minimized, however, was the impact of foreign invasions, particularly that of Māgha in 1215, which led to the dislocation of the administrative machinery, hence the neglect of the irrigation system, hence the economic decline, hence the resettlement of large numbers of people and the creation of two kingdoms (in the North and Southwest), though some believe that the collapse of the dry-zone reservoir system was a long process and thus cannot be attributed to recent forms of centralization.

That debate will continue, but at least the core of it relates to the main theme of this essay, namely, the tension between forces of centralization and provincial or localized autonomy. Further studies bearing on the economic aspects of the tensions between centrifugal and centripetal forces within the Polonnaruva period, an age of immense pluralism, could prove most instructive. Already, a number of studies on the irrigation system and on land tenure are noteworthy. Some show that, while considerable advances were made (beginning in the first century A.D.) in tank size and technical achievement, the village tank system continued alongside the great reservoirs and canals.[8] This is documented quite fully in the fifth century A.D. by regulations applying to reservoirs or tanks that were privately or corporately owned, confirming the importance of local networks as well as of the system built and run by the state.[9] Other studies indicate that the construction and maintenance of major new irrigation ventures were intrinsic to the efforts, for instance, of Parākramabāhu I toward political and economic cohesion.[10] An article by R.A.L.H. Gunawardana, "Irrigation and Hydraulic Society in Medieval Ceylon", *Past and Present*, No 53 (November 1971), 3-27, is an excellent analysis of the dynamism that existed in a society where the government was not alone in irrigation activity. The economic power of the monastic estates is stressed (monastic officials often taking the place of royal officials), as is that of the increasingly independent gentry class in various parts of the country, which thrived until Māgha (1215-36) dealt

ruthlessly both with it and the monasteries. Gunawardana's thesis is that "a multi-centered society with power devolving on the gentry and the monastic institutions in particular appears to be more true of the social structure of Ceylon than the concept of a centralized bureaucratic system of despotic rule".[11] Finally, a few articles discussing the nature of land tenure and of revenue in precolonial Ceylon shed light on this important topic. One of these, by W.I. Siriweera, maintains that, while the king did not have sole ownership over land, he did have certain rights regarding the land : *e.g.*, taxation on grain; the right to unoccupied wasteland, to abandoned land, to land with no heirs, and to various categories of royal land. Siriweera spells out the nature of service tenure *(rājakāriya)* to the king; the granting of immunities by the king to individuals, or monasteries, or other groups; the nature and extent of temple lands; the types and amount of taxation on or revenue from paddy land, trade and irrigation water; as well as other sorts of royal revenue in medieval Ceylon (1000-1500 A.D.).[12]

The above synopsis barely hints at the forces that were present in the Polonnaruva era; only a much longer study could do justice to the details.[13] The primary point to make is that, because of increasing external pressures from South India and because of a host of internal tensions, there developed patterns of alternating domestic disorder and political centralization culminating in the establishment under Parākramabāhu I of a state that gained a monopoly of power and created administrative structures that spelled the demise of long-existing regional authority. The justification for such a development, in light of foreign and domestic perils, is not difficult to see, but the results were ruinous to what had been a delicate though effective balancing of power over the centuries. In Keith Taylor's words, the effect was a "regionalizing of Sinhalese authority in the Southwest", creating over the next few centuries localized kingdoms that were remnants of the classical mode. The centripetal process, in response to exceedingly pluralistic and centrifugal forces, was paradoxically the cause of its own undoing. The very success of Parākramabāhu I, as registered in his administrative, military, economic, and religious attempts at reorganization, along with the devastation wrought by the Cōḷas earlier and by Māgha in the thirteenth century, destroyed the tissue that held together the Sinhalese social structure and that sustained its basic sense of cultural heritage. The efforts at restoration were not unimportant, nor entirely unsuccessful, but the destiny of this people was radically and permanently altered. Laṅkā's destiny as the Dhammadīpa, the preserve of the true Dhamma, seemed mocked by its political fortunes from the collapse of Rājaraṭṭha. In this perspective, the glory of Polonnaruva as a ceremonial as well as a political complex, which was considerable, seems more ironic than real, for the centripetalizing process increased the fragmentation of a society whose sense of ethnic identity was to reach a crisis long before the advent of colonialism.

The Threat of Disorder and the Legitimation of Power

Intrinsic to the centripetalizing process and to pressures resisting this process is the degree to which authority and power are legitimated and establish credibility in the eyes of power elites and, to some extent, the populace at large. Among many factors, sources of power depend upon political and military strength, economic stability, personal charisma and influence, and the effective use of traditional symbols and ceremony. The

task of interpreting the basis and use of authority necessitates reading between the lines of traditional documents, trying to distinguish betwen rhetoric and reality by comparing materials from different sources.

In a study of this sort it is crucial to recall the traditional bases of legitimacy upon which authority rested not only with Sinhalese Buddhists but within early Buddhism in India,[14] and within Brahmanic culture in and beyond India. The literature on this subject is considerable, but one needs to perceive the different norms that underwrite authority in Indian and Ceylonese contexts. From the formal establishment of Buddhism in Ceylon under Devānaṃpiya Tissa through the mission of Mahinda (dispatched in Asoka's reign) one can trace a continuing tradition of close association between the Sangha and kingship on the one hand and a subtle but pervasive grafting into Sinhalese culture of Indian customs, institutions, symbols, and cosmology. Regardless of the actual fortunes of political authority and of the steady infusion of new social and religious elements into Ceylon over the centuries, one sees an extraordinarily sustained continuity from the early establishment of Anurādhapura as a ceremonial complex to its eventual collapse and replacement by Polonnaruva.

The grounds for legitimating power in Ceylonese history is a subject on which considerable source material exists, yet there have been few specific discussions of the historic tension between the religious basis for kingship and the tradition of secular statecraft (clearly present within the Polonnaruva period, but also before). Part of the problem is that the dynamics of the tension are difficult to assess; one is often forced to speculate about motivations. While this difficulty inevitably remains, it is useful to note the principal configurations of the *dhamma-daṇḍa* tension (perceivable in the *Cūlavamsa* particularly) as another approach to the theme of Sinhalese cultural identity and the dilemmas of pluralism.

Among the possible configurations at least five exist which, in combination, help to refine analysis about the problem. The *first* concerns the very basis on which legitimate power is acquired, maintained and transferred; its preoccupation is not simply accession to the throne but accession undergirded by an ontological mandate. The *second* involves utilizing power either to maintain or reestablish basic order and stability; the monarch's role as protector of the realm is a sine qua non of legitimacy itself. The *third* is inseparable from the requirement of order and casts the king (indeed, the entire bureaucratic system) in the role of provider as well as protector, economic welfare being one with political and military security. The *fourth* combines the previous two and directs the focus upon the vocation of royal power (and all other power by derivation) to promote the well-being of the Buddha Sāsana. While patronage of other religious communities often accompanies patronage of the Dhamma, it cannot be at the latter's expense. And, *fifth*, there are symbolic, cosmological and ritualistic aspects to the definition and enactment of legitimated power that are double-edged; they are as much a challenge to power as they are its reinforcement. When minimal stability and security are absent, legitimacy collapses. These five will be discussed in order, though the fifth will be singled out for attention in the essay's final section.

1. Beginning with the reign of Sena I (833-853) we can see the handwriting on the wall both with respect to Indian *maṇḍala* politics and Rohaṇa-Rājaraṭṭha rivalry. After the seizure of Anurādhapura by the Pāṇḍyas, who left "the splendid town in a state as if it had been plundered by yakkhas", and then through involvement in the internal politics

of Rohaṇa, Sena became the first king to establish a substantial base at Pulatthinagara (Polonnaruva) as a strategic post further from Indian attack and closer to the source of potential turbulence in the south. From this point in the mid-ninth century to the end of the Polonnaruva period the chronicle is filled with discussion about the balancing of power. Involved both with what transpires in South Indian politics and with the growing threat represented by Rohaṇa and Dakkhiṇadesa, the monarchs of Rājaraṭṭha stand or fall on their ability to play the game of power (*daṇḍa*) and invest increasing resources in military expenditure. Predictable cycles unfold—with the growth of dynastic and regional factionalism comes the greater likelihood of foreign invasion and conquest, and with the tyranny and ignominy of conquest comes the invitation to strong-armed leadership to rid Laṅkā of the "blood-sucking yakkhas" and possess it.

Authority is legitimated in large part, therefore, to the degree that it proves capable of balancing power and containing the forces that would upset the balance. The Indian roots of this doctrine are ancient and, while apparent within the Anurādhapura period, became even more prominent from the ninth century on.[15] In figures such as Sena I, Sena II (853-887) and Kassapa V (914-923) one detects a finely-honed instinct for survival based upon the need to stave off greater threats by allying with lesser ones. The game of domestic and international realpolitik was a perilous one, but once undertaken it became a normative element in the authority of kingship. The first great monarch of the Polonnaruva period, Vijayabāhu I (1055-1110), was termed "wise in statecraft" as he applied with skill the "four strategies of warriors" (*caturo upāyā*), long considered means of political and military success.[16] His very selection of wives (one Sinhalese and the other Kāliṅgan) derived from this instinct and confirmed a growing trend toward political marriages with South Indian dynasties, a trend that often proved unfortunate, especially in domestic politics, throughout this era and later.

It was particularly with the reign of Parākramabāhu I, however, that one senses an immensely increased association with the trappings and the legitimizing authority of the Sanskritic tradition. For one thing, there is repeated evidence of *nītiśāstra* and *arthaśāstra* strands of material, both implicit and explicit, throughout the description of this king's reign in the *Cūlavaṃsa*. The early education of Parākramabāhu, his life-long military exploits and the stratagems used, his political maneuverings (including his reorganization of the Sangha), and his basic policy of administrative centralization all bespeak this origin. The importance of this association cannot be overemphasized, for it is fundamental to what was occurring in Sinhalese culture at this time. The Brahmanic presence is unmistakable, though in a very different sense than within the Indian context. Here there is a deliberate use of that tradition and of the Buddhist tradition, both Indian and Sinhalese, for specific Sinhalese political and ideological ends. In this setting, the Brāhmaṇa/Kṣatriya tension does not exist, even though Hindu ceremonies such as the *upanayana* and the *abhiṣeka* are administerered to princes and kings by royal *purohitas*.[17] Again, while not new in this era, the emphasis is more decided.

Equally prominent in the chronicle account is the increased weight given to auspicious signs and marks (*lakkhaṇa*) as these foretell greatness and embody legitimacy itself.[18] While the *kāvya* and *praśasti* traditions in South Asia are clearly panegyric after-the-fact, the instances in which these are used attest to the meaning of genuine legitimacy. Those whom the chroniclers so honor fit the pattern of epic heroes and are not only legitimated in the usual sense but are exemplars of kingship in the Snhalesei

Buddhist mode. Regarding the young Prince Kitti (later Vijayabāhu I and one of Ceylon's great figures) an astrologer noted his marks of power, insight and courage, saying : "Even in Jambudīpa he would, I believe, be capable of uniting the whole realm under one umbrella, how much more so in the Island of Laṅkā"! (*Cv.* 57 : 50). More dramatic, though in obvious continuity, was the scene in which Vijayabāhu sees on his daughter Ratanāvalī signs auguring true greatness : "This thy body shall be the place for the birth of a son, who will surpass all former and future monarchs in glorious qualities, generosity, wisdom and heroism, who will be able to keep Laṅkā ever in safety and united under one umbrella, who will be in perfect wise a patron of the Order, and who will display an abundant and fine activity". (*Cv.* 59 : 37-9). The son in question was the future Parākramabāhu I, who ranks with Duṭṭhagāmaṇī as Ceylon's epic king par excellence and who was born with marks on his hands and feet that led the *purohita* and other *brāhmaṇas* to exclaim : "Apart from the island of Laṅkā he is able to unite under one umbrella and to rule even the whole of Jambudīpa". (*Cv.* 62 : 49). The obvious extension of his potential domain and the resemblance of his birth story to that of Siddhattha Gotama link Parākramabāhu not only with the "pure dynasty of the Moon" but with the lineage of *cakkavatti* kings. While dynastic lineage in the usual sense remains important for succession purposes, there is here an inflation of kingship and an association of the monarch with the Buddha, an association anticipated in the tenth-century document, found in the Abhayagiri-vihāra in Anurādhapura, which claimed that only a bodhisattva could be king in Ceylon.

2. Within the Ceylonese context the legitimation of authority goes beyond Brahmanic overtones and relates specifically to Sinhalese nationalism, the protection of the Sāsana, and the furtherance of the Dhamma.[19] Part of the process of centralization is the concern to bring all Ceylon under one umbrella. This is epitomized in the soliloquy of Parākramabāhu I in Chapter 64 of the *Cūlavaṃsa*, as he weds statecraft with normative tradition in his determination to take possession of all Laṅkā and in associating himself with the heroism of old. From his lips fall names from the Jātakas, the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Mahābhārata*, from Itihāsa tales and the wisdom of Cāṇakka (Kauṭalya). Here in one canticle is *nīti* ethics solemnized and legitimated by association with the entirety of tradition. The king as protector, as the establisher of order, is being elevated by the Sāsana tradition. The Mahāsammata of old appears in new form and legitimates his power by protecting the powerless, by dispelling the forces of *adhamma*, whether yakkhas from abroad or rebels in Rohaṇa. The influence of the *Arthaśāstra* is unmistakably present not just in this monarch's words but in his whole campaign to capture power, centralize the forces of Government, establish a broad economic base, flex his military muscles abroad, unify the Sangha and disengage it from political involvement, and in his expansive artistic and cultural endowments. The clear blending of Indian and Sinhalese elements is nowhere more present in Ceylon's history than in this reign. The chronicle is replete with evidence. For one moment the tension between Sinhalese cultural identity and the forces of pluralism is exceedingly rich. The two wheels of dhamma (*dhammacakka* and *āṇācakka*, the wheel of righteousness and the wheel of power) seem to coordinate. But the moment passes and the yakkhas return.

The story of this blending and of its continually precarious nature is manifested in the importance of having the Buddha's relics (specifically the Tooth Relic and the Alms-

bowl) in the possession of the monarch, as legitimizers of authority. The saga of the Tooth Relic's fate especially, ever since it was brought to Ceylon in the fourth century, and of its intrinsic relationship to the king's role as protector is central to Sinhalese identity. Parākramabāhu's resolve to unify the sacred isle, to bring it under one umbrella, necessitates the safekeeping of these regalia as talismans of power rooted in the Dhamma. The infamy of Vikkamabāhu I (1111-1132), who used these relics "as it pleased him" and incurred the wrath of the bhikkhus, stood as one among many examples of the relationship between political chaos and the loss of legitimacy.[20]

3. The next category stresses the king's role as provider, a role intrinsic to both Brahmanic and Buddhist tradition. It is so prevalent in discussions about kingship and its obligations that it becomes de rigueur, treated almost as a ritualistic act and presented as such frequently within the chronicles. There is a deeper meaning to it, however. On the one hand, it is part of a reciprocal relationship with the Sangha, indeed, part of a more profound reciprocity between the social order and the cosmic order, between form and formlessness, to be discussed in the final section. On the other hand, it is a serious political commitment, which is breached at the monarch's peril. As in most traditional societies, there is a perceived correspondence between legitimate sovereignty and economic well being. When drought and famine strike, evil in high places is often thought to be at stake. By whomever the mandate is given, it may be removed for perceived cause. It should be no wonder then that Sinhalese monarchs, along with kings elsewhere, draw attention to the bounty brought by their reign. The most famous vow in this regard is that of Parākramabāhu the Great : "Truly in such a country not even a little water that comes from the rain must flow into the ocean without being made useful to man." (*Cv.* 68:11). The greatness of monarchs in Ceylon is frequently measured by the extent of their irrigation projects, which is in many respects a correlate of economic and social prosperity. While provision comes in many forms, often indirectly, there is a continuing suspicion that the elements and the social order are bound together. In Buddhism, this suspicion stems, of course, from the Pāli canon, where kingly righteousness and unrighteousness have their effect upon the actions of other men. The nexus of merit or of infamy has what S. J. Tambiah calls a "multiplier effect", originating in the monarch but extending to all others in the society.[21] The registers of meritorious works (*puññapotthakāni*) of pious and beneficent kings acted as a stimulus not only to other kings but potentially to all others. In summarizing the good works of Vijayabāhu I, the chronicler concludes by saying : "In the same way many courtiers and women of the court amassed many merits in many ways." (*Cv.* 60:85).

Beyond the king 's role as provider there is the symbolic identification of him with the powers of fecundity, by Paranavitana with the Hindu god Varuṇa, the guardian of the cosmic law and lord of the waters. Following the ultimate unification of Laṅkā, which was celebrated by his second consecration, Parākramabāhu I expresses his vow for the reign through this metaphor: "Those in search of help I would fain support by letting like a cloud over-spreading the four quarters of the earth, a rich rain of gifts pour continually down upon them". (*Cv.* 73 : 8). As the gods could grant or withhold the rains, so too righteous monarchs were seen to have especial powers. At the high festival of the Tooth Relic, in celebration both of its new temple (*dāṭhādhātughara)* in Polonnaruva and of the auspicious beginning of a new era, a great dark cloud threatened to dampen the occasion. With words of assurance, the king diverted the cloud around the proces-

sion. The chronicler records the peoples' cry : "In truth of great majesty is this Ruler of men, the foe-subduer; in consequence of his high merit he has appeared in Laṅkā. Here is merit, here is wisdom, here is pious devotion to the Tathāgata. Here is fame and glory and exceeding great sublimity". (*Cv.* 74 : 242-243). While *kāvya* from start to finish, such encomia were used to associate the powers of righteous authority with the sources of power itself. As Wilhelm Geiger indicates in a footnote to the above, the Pāli term *bhatti* (Sanskrit, *bhakti*) or "pious devotion" used here suggests the influence of Hinduism, though there is no question about Buddhist devotion towards the Relics, the Tathāgata himself and the Dhamma from at least the fifth century A.D. when the *Mahāvaṃsa* appeared, and in all probability much earlier. The point made is the consequence when both kings and gods serve the Buddha. Here is but one example of the confluence of Vedic, Brahmanic, Buddhist, Purāṇic and popular religious traditions.[22]

4. Beyond containing the forces of *adhamma* (staving off chaos) and beyond ensuring ample provision for the realm, those who wielded power and authority had special responsibility for the well-being of the Buddha Sāsana, particularly for the bhikkhu Sangha. Much has been written about this in recent literature and certainly the chronicles attest to endless good and bad examples. Royal patronage and support from varied sectors and levels of society appear at the outset of Buddhist tradition in India and become even more deeply woven into the fabric of numerous cultures throughout Asia. Patronage of the Sangha inheres in the notion of reciprocity, seen to exist between lay and monastic elements within the Sāsana. It is a mutuality in which both parties depend upon each other in different ways and for different reasons. At the very least, the basic needs of monks are to be met through gifts to the Order. Beyond this minimal expectation, kings and other pious laymen compete in the gaining of merit and the receiving of monastic blessing through the building of stūpas, vihāras, pirivenas and the remainder of often vast architectural complexes; through the support of elaborate festivals, including the symbolically important holding of *kaṭhiṇa* (robe-granting) ceremonies; through cultivation of learning, especially study and preservation of the Canon; and through artistic embellishment edifying to the Dhamma's cause.

A crucial and unique feature of the royal vocation is the king's responsibility for reform of the Sāsana through regulative acts (*dhamma-kamma*) in which "the king is said to have purified the doctrine (*sodhesi sāsanam*)."[23] Following the example begun by Asoka, Sinhalese monarchs from very early days were involved in monastic disputes and, at least since the early sixth century, in Sāsana reforms. During the Polonnaruva period the most important occasions of this took place in the reigns of Parākramabāhu I and Parākramabāhu II, in which *katikāvatas*, or codes of regulations agreed upon by the community of Buddhist monks, were promulgated in 1165 and 1266/7 respectively.[24] While the monarch's role in assisting the Sangha to purify itself of corruption and disunity harks back to Asoka and was not uncommon in Ceylon, these particular regulations, especially the first, afford major insight not only into the condition of the Order at these times but also into changes that were beginning to emerge in the king-Sangha relationship. These changes which accented the need for unity within the community of bhikkhus and which prefigured later developments of organizational centralization, stemmed directly from political and social events of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The calling for order and unity within the Sangha was clearly a response to the uncertain and confused nature of the times. Another document, the *Nikāya Saṅgrahava* : *Being a*

History of Buddhism in India and Ceylon, was written by Dhammakitti, who was Saṅgharāja in the reign of Bhuvanekabāhu V (1372-1408), is a concise history of the Sāsana from its beginnings in India through the middle of this monarch's reign.[25] It is especially interesting because of the focus upon heretical movements within the Sāsana, and again attests to concerns about unity. An entire history of ancient and medieval Ceylon could be written about the perceived correlation between socio-political unity and the unity of the Sangha.[26] Disunity in one is an implicit and often actual threat to the condition of the other. But it is equally true that power struggles within the body politic and/or within the Order attest to the delicacy of the tension that made up this reciprocity. In no sense was it a simple legitimation of power; it was more often than not a fragile balance in which various parties used each other.[27] If the chronicles are lyrical in their praise of righteous monarchs at times, they are filled with admonition throughout. This will be hinted at below.

Ceremonial Complex : Enacting the Sacred Through Rite, Symbol and Cosmology

Dialectically related to threats to psychic and communal identity are symbolic efforts at reintegration. The fundamental purpose of ritual, for instance, is a recalling not simply to past understandings of meaning but towards a communal self-perception that creates new insight about the framework of existence. At their best, symbols, myths, cosmological perceptions serve to enhance the means by which clearer vision can transform experienced reality. Indeed, the essence of this experience is to allow for disintegration of inappropriate images of reality and to welcome as yet unknown forms of reality, which itself can never be captured by symbol, myth, rite, let alone doctrine.

Enacting the sacred is at its core an attempted experiencing of oneness, of integration, but it paradoxically occurs only through genuine (albeit controlled) forms of disintegration. These forms are preserved, renewed, and celebrated by vital communities in ways that are profoundly religious, occurring in all contexts of life, as much in the socio-political as the esthetic. The theme of Sinhalese cultural identity and the dilemmas of pluralism, therefore, reveals conflicts, stalemates, disintegration and the possibility of renewal throughout its corporate history. Again, this is the nature of the classic relationship between continuity and transformation, between any ceremonial complex and its related components. At stake is a sustained tension between combinations of authentically orthogenetic and heterogenetic elements within and between persons and communities. Among various possible motifs for exploring this tension, four will be noted here : those of transcendence, continuity, dialectic (or ambiguity), and disintegration/reintegration.

1. As Paul Wheatley's study (referred to earlier) makes clear, a basic characteristic of societies in early stages of urbanization is the vital function assumed by a ceremonial complex. As there are many components in the genesis of ceremonial centers, so there are numerous factors involved in social and ideological differentiation. While the long history of Anurādhapura as Ceylon's capital was frequently a disrupted one, with considerable diversity and dynamism among its many elements, one preceives in the historic documents a resilience to its basic identity and an acknowledgement of its continuing centricity. From the marking off of the original *sīmā* by Devānaṁpiya Tissa, indicating the boundary of the Mahāvihāra and registering an identification bet-

ween kingship and this tradition, there was etched into Sinhalese consciousness a strain of continuity amidst innumerable discontinuities and a perceived and declared orthodoxy beyond all forms of heterogeneity. The nature and character of Anurādhapura as a ceremonial complex is not at issue here. Rather, the concern is how Polonnaruva sought to replace it and to serve as a political and ideological rallying center in an era that had become increasingly turbulent and considerably more diverse. As the first section of this paper sought to indicate, with the collapse of Anurādhapura one can detect at work innumerable forces that presented a threat to the fundamental existence of Sinhalese society as it had existed for centuries. Polonnaruva was, therefore, an attempt not only to salvage the nation politically but to rediscover the meaning of ethnic and religious self-consciousness. For this reason, the new capital cannot be regarded simply as a change of venue, as a strategic relocation of where power was based, but as a means to establish in a primal and fundamental way the nation's identity. If Anurādhapura had been able to take this identity for granted, despite its often stormy history, Polonnaruva had in fact to re-establish it. What was basically implicit in the earlier period had to become explicit after the ninth century.

It was thus not sentimentality that prompted Vijayabāhu I to choose Anurādhapura as the site for his consecration, even though Polonnaruva was by then clearly the permanent capital. Nor was it romanticism that motivated astute monarchs in the Polonnaruva era to restore the ruins of the old capital from time to time. It was instead sensitivity to the sacred, whether the motive was cynically political or deeply sincere.[28] In actuality, however, the primary kings of Polonnaruva sought not simply to keep alive the past but to establish a new ceremonial and political center to replace the old. While there was continuity in art and architecture, among other features, the two cities were very different. The basic similarity was that each represented to its own period of history an attempt to perceive the transcendent within the ephemeral, to find a basis for unity within the plural. As Wheatley put it, to inquire into the nature of a city is a metaphysical question.[29] "For the ancients, who conceived the natural world as an extension of their own personalities and who consequently apprehended it in terms of human experience, the 'real' world transcended the pragmatic realm of textures and geometrical space, and was perceived schematically in terms of an extramundane, sacred experience. Only the sacred was 'real', and the 'purely secular—in so far as it could be granted to exist at all—was the purely trivial.'...Sacrality (which is synonymous with reality) is achieved through the imitation of a celestial archetype, as a result of which such religions can be powerful transformers of landscape".[30] "There is, however, another aspect to this picture of centrality. The capital, the *axis mundi*, was also the point of ontological transition at which divine power entered the world and diffused outwards through the kingdom".[31]

While one gets accustomed to hyperbole in reading the chronicle accounts of royal munificence toward the Sangha particularly, one enters the realm of pure *kāvya* with the various descriptions of Pulatthinagara (Polonnaruva) under the building programs of Parākramabāhu I and, toward the end of its days, of Vijayabāhu IV (1270-1272). "By constructing in this way beautiful vihāras, gardens, tanks and the like he adorned with these numerous (works) the whole of Laṅkā". (*Cv.* 79 : 85). In those terse words the efforts of Parākramabāhu I are summed up, but in many previous chapters one receives a catalo- guing of an incredible program of construction, both secular and religious in nature. For one thing, it is clear that the palace (*pāsāda*) in Polonnaruva was of a much grander

scale than that in Anurādhapura, which provides a clue to the conscious attempt to associate kingship and its authority with divine and cosmological models. Comparisions with Mount Kelāsa and with Ālakamandā come easily to the chronicler's lips. The earthly blends into the transcendent, providing the former with at least the semblance of lasting glory. It is, of course, ironic that the final description we have of Polonnaruva, shortly before its ultimate collapse, was during the reign of Vijayabāhu IV, in which its majesty was claimed to exceed that of all the great Indian towns : "In this fashion the King had the town of Pulatthinagara—comparable to the city of Indra—restored, so that it surpassed Mithilā, subdued Kañcīpurī, laughed to scorn Sāvatthī, subdued Madhurā, turned to shame Bārāṇasī, reduced Vesālī to nothing and made Campāpurī tremble with her glory". (*Cv.* 88 : 121). In Wheatley's words; "With the rise of secular, or rather secularly oriented, authority, there appeared also a new feature in the monumental architecture of the ceremonial city, namely the palace, a building which inevitably became the vehicle for conspicuous display, a distillation and projection of the glory and prestige of the territorially organized state over which the king ruled".[32] One thinks immediately of another king (Kassapa, 473-491 A.D.), famous in Sinhalese history, who, it has been argued by S. Paranavitana, also sought to associate his rock-fortress architecturally with Ālakamandā, the dwelling place of Kuvera (the god of wealth and lord of the yakshas). This imaginative, though speculative, interpretation is of Kassapa's intention to ingratiate himself with the populace and gain legitimacy through association with the divine bestower of wealth.[33] The comparison is not inappropriate when one considers that Parākramabāhu I was heralded as "ruler of the middle world, he filled the chief and the intemediary regions of the heavens with festive glory". (*Cv.* 72 : 329). And, his four generals are likened to the four protectors of the world, the *lokapālas* (Yama, Varuṇa, Indra and Kubera), in the *Cūlavamsa* (72 : 59).

2. Beyond the quest to provide a cosmological framework for the political order (by extension, the entire society) there was a pervasive and deliberate association made with earlier ages in the Sāsana's history. This stress upon continuity with sacred moments and figures in the past was no less basic to the *process* of enacting the sacred than the establishment of parallelism between the macrocosmos and the microcosmos. Among key examples, the following stand out. Following the long struggle against the Coḷas, Vijayabāhu I was quick to recognize that the Sangha was in desperate straits and enabled the Order to be revived through monks from Burma invited by the king to perform the higher ordination ceremony, establishing for the first time a religious connection between these two countries. Secondly, as mentioned before, the regalia needed by monarchs to authenticate their sovereignty included the Tooth Relic and the Alms-bowl Relic. The suspicion or dubious lineage that their absence implied spelled the promise of dire consequences. When taken, they were to be retrieved at any cost. A third indication of how vital was the sense of a continuing heritage relates to the preservation not only of the Sangha but of the Dhamma in its written form. Part of Ceylon's national pride lies with the fact that the Canon was first committed to writing there (in the first century B.C.). This provides Sinhalese Buddhists with the sense of an unbroken tradition. While the *Sadhammasaṅgaha* was probably not written until a century after the collapse of Polonnaruva, it gives evidence of much earlier reverence paid to writing down and listening to the Dhamma. Along similar lines, it is noted in the *Cūlavamsa* about Vijayabāhu III (1232-36) that he ordered the Canon to be written down, as "so many books that dealt

with the true doctrine had been destroyed by the alien foe" (*i.e.*, Māgha). In fact, so bad were the consequences of that era that the very devatās, protectors of Laṅkā, had deserted the cause, implying that only the Dhamma could transmute chaos into order. (*Cv.* 81 : 40-57; 80 : 51-80).

By far the most noteworthy figure in this respect throughout the Polonnaruva period is Parākramabāhu II (1236-1270). While only forty pages are devoted to his reign in the *Cūlavamsa*, compared to six times that amount given to the figure of Parākramabāhu I, we see in the former a person at least depicted as having extraordinary liturgical insight, coupled with a sense of temporal continuity and spatial interrelatedness that were without equal in this age. How much of this belonged to the man and how much to the legends about him it is impossible to determine, but one detects at work a sensitivity that is at once shrewdly political, yet basically transcending (while including) the political. Obviously, other kings evidenced a similar sensitivity, but not to the same degree. An entire essay could be written on this topic; a few examples must suffice here.[34]

If no less realistic than others about the military and political dangers of his day, this monarch is presented as being a reconciler and healer of divisions (one sees this in his stance toward the *vanni* chieftains and toward political prisoners) and as having the ability to integrate local and national forms of popular religious expression with devout attention to and patronage of the Sangha. In fact, the impression is strong that he stimulated deeper levels of religious awareness both among bhikkhus and the laity. The concern he expressed and the lengths to which he went to facilitate pilgrimages to Samantakūṭa to reverence the Buddha's footprint (Śrī Pāda) and also to honor the god Sumana attest, if nothing else, to his recognition that Sinhalese identity and self-consciousness required a linking of these two forms of piety and that liturgical expression of this was efficacious in restoring meaning to a people severely divided and without vision.[35] His sensitivity, likewise, to the symbolic and liturgical significance of Devanagara (Sinhalese, Devundara) and therefore the need to visit himself and have restored the temple of Upulvan (Viṣṇu) on that site is of the same order.[36] His visit to Hatthavanagalla, where his own father had been cremated, and his reconstruction of the temple originally built by Goṭhābhaya (249-262) on the site where the saint-king Sirisaṃghabodhi (247-249) had sacrificed his life for his people bespeak the same effort to identify his own reign with majesty and piety known in the past. The fact, also, that the *Hatthavanagallavihāravaṃsa* was composed during Parākramabāhu's lifetime and became an exceedingly popular text, translated into Sinhalese twice in the next two centuries, confirms the need for such association felt by an entire people. While doubtlessly political in part (note the solemn declaration at the start of his reign to rid Laṅkā of the Damiḷas and his cataloguing of past kings who performed similar feats, (*Cv.* 82 : 15-27), his sights extend beyond political security in search of the metaphysical basis upon which the nation rests. Much more could be said about his elevation of the Tooth Relic festival as a means of communal transformation, the importance he attached to pilgrimage to the *Pāribhogika*)) sacred places visited by the Buddha and his insuring that these forms of reverence continued beyond his own time. Finally, it is no accident that two other chronicles of considerable importance were written during the thirteenth century (the former around 1200 A.D., the latter during his reign), namely, the *Dāṭhāvamsa*, which was translated into Pāli from a fourth century Sinhalese (Elu) text and became in the Polonnaruva period and beyond an intrinsic part of the Tooth Relic cult; and the *Thūpavaṃsa*, which is a history of the Mahāthūpa (the

Ruvanvälī) in Anurādhapura constructed by the hero-king Duṭṭhagāmaṇī, also based upon earlier sources. The fact that the *Thūpavamsa* was translated again in the mid-thirteenth century, so soon after the passing of Parākramabāhu I, whose exploits (both military and religious) could easily be compared with those of Duṭṭhagāmaṇī appears as a deliberate attempt to accent the continuity of greatness in an era when this was actually in doubt. As such, the Polonnaruva age was being woven not only into the fabric of classical Sinhalese history but into the wider cloth of the Dhamma.

3. If the quest for transcendence and the affirmation of historic continuity are two themes, another is that of ambiguity. This appears especially in the career of Parākramabāhu I, to whom exhaustive attention is given in the *Cūlavamsa*. In its two volumes, covering a period from 301 A.D. to 1815, almost forty per cent of the material deals with this figure. The word "ambiguity" is used to suggest an attitude one may find in the chronicle about this remarkable and paradigmatic monarch. In an earlier paper I suggested that, while the chronicles of Ceylon are clearly didactic and while they are written from the perspective of the Mahāvihāra, one may still detect in them a remarkable candor.[37] If righteous kings receive undiluted paeans, evil rulers are given their due. Throughout the chronicling of Sinhalese history, the moral of the lesson is made clear, including the note of ambiguity that is struck whenever the persons in question are in fact ambiguous. This portrayal of reservation about particular figures is inherent in the relationship between the Sangha and the monarchy. While it is ideally a reciprocal and mutually supportive relation, it is inevitably open to abuse from either side. If part of the Sangha's function is to provide or endorse legitimation for kingship, this endorsement is never unconditional. And, if a crucial part of society's expectation of the monarch is that he support and foster the Order, this puts certain obligations upon the Sangha (hence the periodic need for purification mentioned earlier). The basis of the relationship is ontological, not simply social; it transcends historical accidents, but it is also fundamentally ambiguous because of man's capacity for evil.

Despite the seeming approbation of Parākramabāhu throughout the account and despite the frequent images by which he is associated with the Buddha, it appears more than plausible that the overriding mood of the depiction is ambiguous and that the treatment is basically ironic. It would take further research to get at the external factors behind that attitude within the chronicle, though one can suspect that this monarch's purification of the Order and rather dramatic reorganization of the Sangha did not leave him without detractors, to put it mildly. Aside from these important considerations, the account itself is filled with ironic statements. The most prevalent trait that he manifests is that of courage. His very name means "of valiant arm" or "possessed of valiant arms". Repeatedly, he is referred to as lionhearted. His mission, indeed, can often be summed up as that of one who chases away the fear of others. The *abhaya mudrā* is made by him in one form or another throughout his odyssey. His lion's roar sounds forth whenever he senses others to be afraid or when he wishes to instill fear into foes, whether human or beast. "For the fearful I have no use, they may go where they like." (*Cv.* 72 : 153). When he learns of the fear his supporters have, he speaks in wrath : "Although they have witnessed my courage on diverse occasions and their own rescue over and over again by me from evil situations, their inborn cowardice doth not forsake these cravens". (*Cv.* 67 : 72-73). Alternately, he is wroth at their fear, amused at it, piteous of it, and all the more brazen because of it. The folly of his South Indian

military policy, where he committed troops for years at immense expenditure and with no political gain, was evidence of considerable hubris.

How literally is one to take the image of the lion's roar (the *siṃhanāda*), in Buddhist terms ? One suspects that it is not an image of profound courage, but that it is double-edged. The *Sīhanāda Suttas* (*Majjhima-Nikāya*, Vol. I, Nos. 11 and 12) and the *Sampasādaniya Sutta* (*Dīgha-Nikāya*, Part III, No. 28) call to mind the bravado of Sāriputta, the Buddha's disciple, when he emitted the lion's roar of faith in the Buddha only to be exposed for what he was claiming to know. The image of Parākramabāhu I presented within the chronicle is of a devious, ambitious, relentless figure whose ends justify his means, yet he is clearly set upon a pedestal as a paradigm in some ways for later kings. The total portrait is thoroughly ambiguous, which deepens one sense of the continuing dialectic between the Sangha and the political order. The contrast between this king and Parākramabāhu II is marked, but the full spectrum would include a marauder like Māgha. Compared with him, Parākramabāhu I would shine in splendor, but he would also represent the danger of power unchecked. A ceremonial complex thrives by the orchestration of a society's component parts. That these parts were so effectively silenced by the lion's roar raises serious questions about the difficult task of balancing centripetal and centrifugal forces, and of how one fashions authentic unity out of pluralistic elements. The transition from a basically orthogenetic society to one deeply affected by outside influences was clearly in evidence.

4. Intrinsic to all profound means of enacting the sacred is how particular forms of expressing sacrality (rite, symbol, myth, cosmology) engage persons and communities in a process that is both integrative and disintegrative. For authentic revitalization to occur there must in some sense be authentic dying. This is such a truism in the history of religions that it may easily be taken for granted and seem to occur without pain and suffering. In actuality, the reverse is more true, namely, that growth in mind and spirit do not emerge except through the sort of sobriety that can arise from suffering. More commonly, individuals and societies protect themselves, enacting the sacred, so to speak, in a manner that simulates but does not actually experience the pain of genuine self-consciousness. While we have not stressed this before, the experiencing of transcendence, historic continuity and inherent ambiguity is envitably both profoundly disruptive and profoundly recreative at its core. These motifs are suggested here because the Polonnaruva era embodied a struggle of this dimension in the communal self-consciousness of the Sinhalese people. This does not suggest that occasions of confused identity and radical self-assertion had not occurred before or that they ended with this era, but it does point to this period as one in which the dilemma was especially serious. The dilemma in question was how to combine responses to increasing pluralism (social, political, economic, and religious) without either losing a treasured cultural identity or seeking to maintain old notions of identity at all costs, through intransigence. From the evidence at hand, it is not clear in which direction the outcome proceeded. My own imprsssion is that the dilemma was mainly intensified, not resolved. Obviously, this is not necessarily unfortunate, but it is by definition painful. The political outcome of the collapsing Rājaraṭṭha civilization amounted ultimately to the demise of traditional Sinhalese culture as it had flourished for fifteen centuries. Other outcomes were more ambiguous, in that they often showed continued signs of renewal and promise. While the latter is not within the scope of this paper, there is merit in spelling out somewhat further the significance of the

disintegration/integration motif, principally because it appears so prominent a feature of the Polonnaruva era and the legacy this period left to later generations.

As a way of stimulating further research into the ethos of this historical period and its aftermath, it is appropriate to mention in passing the theoretical approaches of several scholars who have given serious attention to the dialectic between disintegration and integration. While many scholars could be mentioned, only the following are considered here : Victor Turner, Jonathan Z. Smith, H. L. Seneviratne and Guiseppe Tucci. Except for Seneviratne, none of these persons deals with Śrī Laṅkā, but their reflections are, in my judgment, helpful in understanding the problems of communal self-consciousness when threatened by forces either external or internal.

Victor Turner's analysis of religious movements and rituals has persuaded him that all social existence rests on two foundations : the familiar principle of "structural" organization and differentiation, and an equally important principle of "anti-structural" sociality.[38] The latter is embodied in what Turner calls *communitas* (a relatively undifferentiated communality experienced in concrete human relatedness); this anti-structural modality exists in dialectical relationship (both diachronically and synchronically) with all forms of social structure. In Turner's view, the achievement of *communitas* requires that normal structure be temporarily suspended or transcended, symbolically if not factually. The essential need is to recapture a sense of the ultimate contingency of all accepted social structures and to perceive their rootedness in an underlying, pre-differentiated unity. Rites expressing this promote the experience of what he calls "liminality" (of being beyond the familiar and within the strange), or of "marginality" (of being at the edges of the known). This quality of experience is participation in the very act of disordering; its pursuit is not simply enacting the sacred but discovering it. The seriousness with which the anti-structural dimension of reality is taken becomes the path toward or away from renewal and re-creation.

In an essay discussing the sacred land of Israel, Jonathan Z. Smith makes a number of comments that are equally valid for the dilemma the Sinhalese people felt with the collapse of Anurādhapura and in a more conclusive sense with the relinquishment of Rājaraṭṭha. It is normally in hindsight that earlier truths are perceived. "Whether the cosmography is expressed through the model of the sacred land as a mound in the midst of a raging desert or the world as a bubble of air in the midst of the dangerous cosmic waters which surround it, the sacred land again is the highest point—the security of the blessing and the possession of the land is not guaranteed. The walls of the 'hamlet' are always vulnerable to attack, and man must ceaselessly labor to sustain, strengthen, and renew the blessing, to keep the walls under repair."[39] This he does through mythic recall of sacred history, cultic re-enactment of death and renewal, and ways of life that are both pragmatic and humane. The ceremonial complex and its ritual "serve as the cosmic pillars or the 'sacred pole' supporting the world. If its service is interrupted or broken,...then the world, the blessing, the fertility, indeed all of creation which flows from the Center, will likewise be disrupted."[40]

The basic thrust of this essay on Polonnaruva has suggested that this is precisely what began to be experienced in a very profound sense in Sinhalese self-consciousness. What was at stake was not merely political reversals and passing disorder, but something more fundamental. While Israel obviously experienced exile in a literal sense, the word exile is not inappropriate here. "To be exiled is to be cut off from the land, from the

blessing, from the ancestors, from history, from life, from creation, from reality, from the deity. It is to enter into a new temporal period, palpably different from that which has been before. It is to descend into chaos. To be exiled is to be in a state of chaos, decreation, and death; to return from exile is to be re-created and reborn."[41] The psychic and spiritual necessity of this death can only be affirmed after the meaning of chaos and disorder has been discovered.

A good deal more research needs to be done on the rites of *upasampadā* (higher ordination of a bhikkhu) and of *paritta* (protective chants) as channels of both disintegration and of integration. The chronicles and commentaries mention with some frequency the use of *paritta* (S. *pirti*) chants, but the pertinent question here is not primarily the consequence of these chants but the need for them. For example, whether one looks at the serious plague mentioned in the reign of Sena II (*Cv.* 51 : 81) or at the famine in the time of Parākramabāhu II (*Cv.* 87 : 1-13), it is not only the efficacy of the rite that is significant but the condition of the community that caused these threats. And, the heart of the issue is what actually occurs symbolically in *paritta* ceremonies. A structural analysis would show that chaos itself, or the demonic as an alternative image, is being recognized, confronted and entered, with the result that it is thereby transformed from a reality that is menacing to one that blesses. Also, in the higher of ordination, as H. L. Seneviratne begins to point out in an earlier paper,[42] the boundary between involvement in worldly affairs and separation from the same is emphasized and crossed over within the ceremony itself as a means of underscoring not only the tension between these two forms of existence but their necessarily reciprocal relationship. The monk's dilemma is to be in the world but not of it. The Sangha's history has always shown the necessity for forms of ascetic monasticism as the means of insuring the tension, which is otherwise all too easily dissolved. Hence, the crucial distinction in Ceylon, and elsewhere in Theravāda Buddhism, between the forest monks and the village monks. Again, a structural analysis of the *upasampadā* rite would show how this is recognized to be fundamental in the vocation to be a bhikkhu.

The combination of these two processes, of disintegration (affirming the anti-structural in Turner's sense, or entering into exile in Jonathan Smith's words) and of reintegration (returning to the mundane, having been freed from its imperiousness), is beautifully summarized by Guiseppe Tucci: "In the physical world involution is redemption, a progressive process of reabsorption and of disappearance into the immediately preceding state until the complete elimination of the plane of *māyā*. In the Ego the process is one of reintegration, of return to the original unity after the subconscious has been overcome, after possession has been taken of it through symbols. Reintegration is not possible without this experience, this living in the midst of the world of *māyā* and then dissolving it, annihilating it with that conscious experience, since to know by testing means to dissolve."[43] In a way that is not easy to summarize, the struggles of the Polonnaruva period, its glory and its final ignominy, were of this order. They were an attempt to cope with powerfully centrifugal forces in a manner that tended toward centralization. They sought to fashion a new form of unity out of very diverse elements. As the problems were ambiguous, so too were their resolutions. The period remains one that is fascinating in its own right and one that calls for much more study.

FOOTNOTES

1. Paul Wheatley. *The Pivot of the Four Quarters* (Chicago : Aldine Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 225-6. For shorter treatments of related topics, see Edward Shils, "Centre and Periphery" in *The Logic of Personal Knowledge : Essays Presented to Michael Polanyi on his Seventieth Birthday* (Glencoe, Ill. : The Free Press, 1961), 117-130; S.N. Eisenstadt, "Some Observations on the Dynamics of Traditions", *Comparative Studies in Society and History : An International Quarterly*, Vol. 11 (1969), 451-475; and Robert Redfield and Milton Singer, "The Cultural Role of Cities", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1954), 53-72.

2. Because of the essentially thematic approach to this subject a variety of materials has been used to formulate the problems and explore their several dimensions. Basic to the study are primary materials such as the *Cūlavamsa*, the *Nikāya Saṇgrahava*, the *Rājāvaliya* the *Hatthavanagallavihāravamsa*, the first two of the Sāsana Katikāvatas in the Polonnaruva period, and, for historical perspective, the *Dīpavamsa*, the *Mahāvamsa*, the *Daṭhāvamsa*, the *Thūpavamsa*, and the *Saddhamma-Saṅgaha*. Portions of other pertinent materials from Pāli and Sinhalese literature, as well as Sanskrit, have been consulted. Also of major importance is the standard *University of Ceylon, History of Ceylon*, Vol. I, Pts. 1 and 2, which covers in detail the political and cultural history of this age and of the Anurādhapura period, Beyond these are a number of basic monographs covering shorter periods of time or specialized subjects. While several have been published, some of equal importance have appeared only in doctoral dissertation form. All have been consulted for use in this essay; see footnote 4 for further reference. Finally, the relevant journals have also been important to this study, including those that discuss inscriptional materials.

Beyond these more obvious sources, because of the nature of the topic, use has been made of other materials that help to illuminate aspects of the pluralism that thrived during this period. These fall essentially into two categories : (a) anthropological and (b) archeological. While the latter can be used with considerably more precision in understanding various developments during this period, the former, if used with caution, provides insight into the dynamics that have constituted Sinhalese Buddhism's relation to folk religious elements, Brahmanism and bhakti forms of Hinduism, and the continuing waves of Mahāyāna Buddhism that influenced the essentially Theravāda tradition in Ceylon. There is no lack of historic evidence in the documents, inscriptions and archeological remains about these several influences, but they are provided considerable perspective by the anthropological studies of scholars such as Obeyesekere, Leach, Yalman, Tambiah, Gombrich, Evers, Ames and others.

3. In his article "The Capital of Ceylon during the Ninth and Tenth Centuries", *Ceylon Journal of Science* (*Section G, Anthropology*), Vol. 2 (1930), pp. 141-147, S. Paranavitana makes a reasonable case for Anurādhapura's remaining the capital, however precarious its hold, during those two centuries.

4. See Bardwell L. Smith, "The Polonnaruva Period (*ca.* 993-1293 A.D.) : A Thematic Bibliographical Essay", in Bardwell L. Smith, ed., *Religion and the Legitimation of Power in Sri Lanka*

(Chambersburg, Pa. : Wilson Books. 1978).

5. This may be compared with the policy of monarchs who fostered the inter-dependence of these regions with Rājaraṭṭha remaining the *primus inter pares*. For example, see the stance of Sena I (833-853) as described in the *Cūlavaṃsa*, I, 50 : 50-61. Also, in the reign of Udaya II (885-896), when someone tries to upset the political balance among the three kingdoms (*Cv.* 51: 94-136). To be fair to Parākramabāhu I, the beginning of the end to the tripartite policy was visible in the post-Vijayabāhu I era. See *Cv.* 61. Even in Vijayabāhu's time there was "the inauguration of a policy of administrative centralisation which did away with the large degree of autonomy which the provinces, particularly Rohaṇa, had previously enjoyed." (*University of Ceylon History of Ceylon*, Vol. I, Pt. 2. p. 428.)

6. B.J. Perera. "Some Political Trends in the Late Anurādhapura and Polonnaruva Period", *Ceylon Historical Journal*, Vol. X, Nos. 1-4 (July 1960 to April 1961), 60-76.

7. Amaradasa Liyanagamage, *The Decline of Polonnaruwa and the Rise of Dambadeniya* (*circa 1180-1270* A.D.) (Colombo : Government Press, 1968). See also two chapters in the *History of Ceylon*, Vol. I, Part II, *op. cit.*, namely, Sirima Wickramasinghe, "Successors of Parakramabahu I : Downfall of the Polonnaruva Kingdom", 507-528, and S. Paranavitana, "The Dambadeni Dynasty", 613-635.

8. C.W. Nicholas, "A Short Account of the History of Irrigation Works up to the 11th Century", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (*Ceylon Branch*), N.S., Vol. VII (1959), 43-69.

9. S. Paranavitana, "Some Regulations Concerning Village Irrigation Works in Ancient Ceylon", *Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies*, Vol. 1 (1958), 1-7.

10. C.W. Nicholas, "The Irrigation Works of Parākramabāhu I", *Ceylon Historical Journal*, Vol. IV, Nos. 1-4 (Special Issue, 1954-55), 52-68.

11. For a more extensive treatment of this subject, see Gunawardana's doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of London (1965) entitled "The History of the Buddhist 'Saṅgha' in Ceylon from the Reign of Sena I (833-853) to the Invasion of Māgha (1215)". This is scheduled to be published in 1979 in the monograph series of the Association for Asian Studies. For an article on different aspects of the same topic, see E.R. Leach, "Hydraulic Society in Ceylon", *Past and Present : A Journal of Scientific History*, No. 15 (April 1959), 2-26, which tests Wittfogel's thesis about hydraulic societies and oriental despotism with respect to Ceylon and concludes that the hydraulic societies of India and Ceylon are cellular, not centralized in structure.

12. W.I. Siriweera, "Land Tenure and Revenue in Mediaeval Ceylon (A.D. 1000-1500)", *Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies*, N.S., Vol. II, No. 1 (January-June 1972), 1-49. For further bibliographical references, see my essay mentioned in footnote 4.

13. Again, the essay by Keith Taylor is recommended. Also, the following are important : (a) the Special Number on the Polonnaruva Period in the *Ceylon Historical Journal*, Vol. IV, Nos. 1-4 (July 1954 through April 1955); and (b) Sirima Wickramasinghe, "The Age of Parākramabāhu I", doctoral dissertation, University of London, 1958.

14. Three essays by Balkrishna Govind Gokhale are helpful in understanding the formative years of Buddhism's relationship to the state in India : "Dhamma as a Political Concept in Early Buddhism", *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. 46 (April

1968), 249-261; "The Early Buddhist View of the State", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 89, No. 4 (October-December 1969), 731-738; and "Early Buddhist Kingship", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XXVI, 1 (November 1966), 15-22. Frank Reynolds examines early Buddhism's combining of soteriological goals with a concern for establishing and maintaining proper order in the world : "The Two Wheels of Dhamma : A Study of Early Buddhism", in Bardwell L. Smith, ed., *The Two Wheels of Dhamma : Essays on the Theravāda Tradition in India and Ceylon* (Chambersburg, Pa. : American Academy of Religion, Studies in Religion, No. 3, 1972), 6-30.

15. Among the vast literature on Indian political theory the following are important examples : J. Gonda, *Ancient Indian Kingship from the Religious Point of View* (Leiden : E.J. Brill, 1969); Charles Drekmeier, *Kingship and Community in Early India* (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1962); John W. Spellman, *Political Theory of Ancient India* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1964); R. Shamasastry, tr., *Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra* (Mysore : Mysore Printing and Publishing House, 1967, 8th edition); Thomas R. Trautmann, *Kauṭilya and the Arthaśāstra* (Leiden : E.J. Brill, 1971); U.N. Ghoshal, *A History of Indian Political Ideas* (London : Oxford University Press, 1966); R.P. Kangle, *The Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra* (Bombay, 1965). As for the influence of Kauṭalya in Ceylon, it was Wilhelm Geiger, who discovered and first discussed it : Wilhelm Geiger, "Kenntnis der indischen Nītiliteratur in Ceylon", *Beiträge zur Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte Indiens, Festagabe für Hermann Jacobi* (Bonn, 1926), 418-421 (reprinted in : Geiger, *Kleine Schriften*, pp. 422-425). Earlier authors had misread the relevant passages of the *Cūlavamsa* (*kocallādisu nītisu* instead of *koṭallādisu nītisu* as conjectured by Geiger). The mediaeval Sinhalese used the correct form of Kauṭilya's name, *viz*. Kauṭalya, as seen from the Pāli Koṭalla.

16. *Cūlavaṃsa* 58 : 1-3. See Geiger's footnote 2 also.

17. For discussions of the classical Hindu tension between priestly and political orders, see the works of Louis Dumont. His essay "The Conception of Kingship in Ancient India", *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, Vol. 6 (December 1962), 48-77 [reprinted in his book *Religion, Politics and History in India : Collected Papers in Indian Sociology* (Paris : Mouton, 1970), ch. 4] has proven to be a stimulating and frequently debated article. A symposium on Dumont's work has recently been published in the *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XXXV, No. 4 (August 1976).

18. For discussion of this in the Pāli Canon, see the *Lakkhaṇa Suttanta*, in the *Dīgha Nikāya*, Part III, *Sacred Books of the Buddhists*, pp. 132-167.

19. For an extended discussion of this topic, see Bardwell L. Smith, ed., *Religion and the Legitimation of Power in Sri Lanka* (Chambersburg, Pa. : Wilson Books, 1978).

20. *Cūlavaṃsa* 61:48-73.

21. S.J. Tambiah, *World Renouncer and World Conqueror : A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background* (London and New York : Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 50. See also the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* II, 74 and *passim*.

22. This subject is of considerable importance and can only be reviewed in passing here. For a few of the many treatments of this theme, one may consult the following : (a) John W. Spellman, "The Symbolic Significance of the Number Twelve in Ancient India", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (November

1962), 79-88; (b) S. Paranavitana, *The Shrine of Upulvan at Devundara*, Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of Ceylon, Vol. VI (Colombo : Archaeological Department, Ceylon Government, 1953); (c) S. Paranavitana, "The Sculpture of Man and Horse near Tisāvāva at Anurādhapura, Ceylon", *Artibus Asiae*, 16 (1953), 167-190; (d) S. Paranavitana, "Sīgiri, the Abode of a God-king", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (*Ceylon Branch*), N.S., Vol. 1 (1950), 129-183, which includes an extensive discussion of this article by various scholars ; (e) G. Obeyesekere, "The Pataha Ritual : Genesis and Function", *Spolia Zeylanica*, Vol. 30, Part II, 279-296; (f) Gananath Obeyesekere, "Gajabāhu and the Gajabāhu Synchronism : An Inquiry into the Relationship between Myth and History "*Ceylon Journal of the Humanities*, Vol. I, No. 1 (January 1970), 25-56; (g) D.T. Devendra, "The Symbol of the Sinhalese Guardstone", *Artibus Asiae*, 21 (1958), 259-268; and (h) Paul Wheatley, *op. cit.*, pp. 304-5, 311, 479.

23. Wilhelm Geiger, *Culture of Ceylon in Mediaeval Times*, edited by Heinz Bechert (Wiesbaden : Otto Harrassowitz, 1960), 205.

24. See Nandasena Ratnapala, ed. and tr., *The Katikāvatas : Laws of the Buddhist Order of Ceylon from the 12th Century to the 18th Century* (München : R. Kitzinger, 1971). Cf. Heinz Bechert "Theravāda Buddhist Sangha : Some General Observations on Historical and Political Factors in its Development", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XXIX, No. 4 (August 1970), 761-778.

25. This was originally translated into English by C.M. Fernando, then revised and edited (with introduction, analytical survey, and notes) by W.F. Gunawardhana (Colombo : H.C. Cottle, 1908).

26. An excellent perspective on this for the Polonnaruva period may be seen in the doctoral dissertation by R.A.L.H. Gunawardana, soon to be published, mentioned in footnote 11.

27. Footnote 19 indicates the recent publication of a series of essays on the theme of religion and the legitimation of power in Sri Lanka. For a companion volume, see Bardwell L. Smith, ed., *Religion and the Legitimation of Power in Burma, Laos and Thailand* (Chambersburg, Pa. : Wilson Books, 1978).

28. *Cūlavamsa* 74:1-14. Here the reasons for the continued reverencing of Anurādhapura are given, *i.e.*, because of the belief that the Buddha had visited this site, because of the sacred Bodhi tree, and because various relics are there enshrined.

29. Wheatley, *op.cit.*, p. 398.

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 416-417.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 434. Cf. Redfield and Singer, *op.cit.*, p. 69, in which the point is made about "the necessity for an enlarged cultural consciousness" whenever there is rapid change or great diversity. Often, this is the context out of which "civil religion" emerges. Also, the discussion of this theme by Robert Heine-Geldern is well known, namely, the parallelism between the macrocosmos and the microcosmos, and the capital as the magic center of the empire, a miniature Mount Meru at the heart of the universe. See his "Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia", Data Paper : Number 18, Southeast Asia Program (Ithaca, New York : Cornell University, 1956), pp. 1-3. One of the most interesting recent discussions of this is by S.J. Tambiah in a chapter on the "galactic polity" within Theravāda Buddhist societies, Ceylon as well as Southeast Asia. See Tambiah, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-131.

32. Wheatley, *op.cit.*, p. 315.

33. S. Paranavitana, "Sīgiri, the Abode of a God-king", *Journal of the Royal*

Asiatic Society (*Ceylon Branch*), N.S., Vol. 1 (1950), 129-183.

34. The reader is referred to the important study, mentioned in footnote 7, by Amaradasa Liyanagamage on this period of history. This provides an excellent analysis of the forces at work.

35. *Cūlavaṃsa* 86 : 18-36. Vijayabāhu I was similarly interested (*Cv.* 60 : 64-66). For an important but speculative discussion of this site, see S. Paranavitana, *The God of Adam's Peak* (Ascona, Switzerland : Artibus Asiae, 1958).

36. *Cūlavamsa* 85:85-89. Also, see the volume by S. Paranavitana, *The Shrine of Upulvan at Devundara*, mentioned in footnote 22. It was only later, perhaps the fifteenth century, that Hindus in Ceylon identified this god as Viṣṇu, not Varuṇa.

37. Bardwell L. Smith, "The Ideal Social Order as Portrayed in the Chronicles of Ceylon", in Bardwell L. Smith, ed., *The Two Wheels of Dhamma* (Chambersburg, Pa., 1972). This essay has been reprinted in a slightly revised version in the volume mentioned in footnone 4.

38. See Victor Turner, *The Ritual Process : Structure and Anti-Structure* (Chicago : Aldine Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 125-30. I am indebted to Jonathan Woocher for first drawing my attention to this aspect of Turner's work and for his spelling out some of its implications for the problem on which I was working.

39. Jonathan Z. Smith, "Earth and Gods", *Journal of Religion*, Vol. 49 (1969), p. 110.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 117.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

42. H.L. Seneviratne, "The Sacred and the Profane in a Buddhist Rite", University of Ceylon, Ceylon Studies Seminar, 1969-70 Series, No. 7, pp. 1-31.

43. Guiseppe Tucci, *The Theory and Practice of the Mandala* (New York : Samuel Weiser, Inc., 1971), p. 16.

19

The Interaction of Jainism and Buddhism and Its Impact on the History of Buddhist Monasticism

N. TATIA

THE RELIGION OF PĀRŚVA, THE TWENTY-THIRD JAINA TIRTHAṄKARA

BOTH JAINISM and Buddhism are branches of Śramaṇism which was the rival of Brāhmaṇism. Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, the last Tīrthaṅkara of the Jainas, inherited Pārśva's religion of four *jāmas* 'restraints' (*cāujjāmo dhammo*), which he reformed into a religion of five *sikkhāpadas* 'precepts' *(paṃcasikhio dhammo).* He also introduced nudity for monks in place of the earlier practice in Pārśva's order, of using inner and upper vestments.[1]

The Buddha obviously had before him the religion of Pārśva, which he designated as *cātuyāma-saṃvara* and ascribed to Niganṭha Nātaputta (another name of Vardhāmana Mahāvīra). The contents of the *cātuyāma-saṃvara* as mentioned by the Buddha differ radically from the traditional explanation recorded in Jaina scripture, according to which the *cāujjāmo dhammo* stood for the four great vows (*mahāvratas*), namely, desisting (*veramaṇa*) from all kinds of injury to living beings (*savvāo pāṇāivāyāo*), all kinds of false speech (*savvāo musā-vāyāo*), all kinds of appropriation of things not offered (*savvāo adiṇṇādāṇāo*), and all kinds of appropriation of external things *(savvāo bahiddhādāṇāo).*[2] The Buddha however explained the *cātuyāma-saṃvara* by refering to the following four qualities of Niganṭha Nātaputta : (i) observer of all kinds of restraints (*sabba-vāri-vārito*), (ii) endowed with all kinds of restraints (*sabba-vāri-yuto*), (iii) purified by all kinds of restraints (*sabba-vāri-dhuto*), and (iv) realizer of all kinds of restraints (*sabba-vāri-phuṭo*). The first qualification appears to refer to the stoppage of the *āsrava* (inflow of *karma),* the second to the state of *saṃvara* (restraint of *karma*), the third to *nirjarā* (dissociation of *karma*), and the fourth to the state of *mokṣa* (emancipation). Thus, the *cātuyāma-saṃvara,* mentioned in the Pāli texts, most probably refers to the fundamental principles of Jaina ethics, namely, *āsrava, saṃvara, nirjarā* and *mokṣa.* The Buddha probably was not

conversant with Jainism as reformed by Niganṭha Nātaputta, inasmuch as he never refers to the five *sikkhāpadas*.

Gautama Buddha

Gautama left home at the age of twenty-nine, and roamed about for six years, practising meditation and asceticism under different teachers. At Vesālī, he learnt meditation under the guidance of Ālāra Kālāma and then at Rājagaha under Uddaka Rāmaputta. He also practised severe austerities, which resembled in many respects the same as prescribed in the Jaina scripture. Thus in the *Majjhima Nikāya* (I, pp. 109-12), the Buddha describes the asceticism practised by him as follows :

"I was unclothed (*acelako*); I did not consent (to accept food) offered to me (*abhihṭam*)[3] nor to (accept) an invitation (to a meal). I did not accept (food) straight from a cooking pot or pan...nor when two people were eating *(dvinnam bhuñjamānānam)*[4], nor from a pregnant woman (*gabbhiniyā*)[5], nor from one giving suck (*pāyamānāya*)[6]...nor fish, nor meat...I subsisted on one little offering and I subsisted on two little offerings... up to seven little offerings (*dattis*)[7]...I took food only once a day, and once in two days... I was one who plucked out the hair of his head and beard (*kesamassulocako* cf. *Ācārāṅga*, II, 15-30). I became one who stood upright refusing a seat; I became one who squats on his haunches, intent on the practice of squatting...Thus in many a way did I live intent on the practice of mortifying and tormenting my body."

"On my body there accumulated the dust and dirt of years...but it did not occur to me, Sāriputta, to think : 'Indeed now, I could rub off this dust and dirt with my hand, or others could rub off this dust and dirt for me with their hands."[8]

"Whether I was going out, whether I was returning, there was set up in me kindliness (*dayā*) even towards a drop of water, and I thought : 'Do not let me bring small creatures in their various places to destruction."

"Then I, Sāriputta, lay down to sleep in a cemetery leaning on a skeleton; cowherds' boys, having come up to me, spat and staled on me, and showered me with dust and stuck twigs into my ears. But I, Sāriputta, well know that I was not the creator of a malign heart against them."[9]

"Because I ate so little, all my limbs became like the knotted joints of withered creepers."[10]

The above account of the austerities practised by the Buddha proves beyond doubt that he was fully acquainted with the asceticism of the Jainas. The Buddha, however, was convinced at the end that such asceticism was of no use for achieving emancipation from worldly sufferings. In the Devadahasutta of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, the Buddha critically examines the plausibility of severe physical austerities as a means to emancipation. Self-imposed austerities can never help the aspirant in his path of self-purification. Intentional self-mortification cannot be a substitute for the results of past bad *karmas*. The practice of *sīla*, *samādhi* and *paññā* is bound to eradicate *rāga* (attachment), *dosa* (hatred) and *moha* (delusion), and thus nip the past *karmas* in the bud, taking away for ever their potency of fruition. This view of *karma* and its fruition, and the absurdity of self-mortification as a means to salvation also determined the nature of the punishments prescribed by the Buddha for monks and nuns for the offences committed by them.

Gautama Buddha gave a new philosophy and founded an order of monks and nuns, adapting to its needs the monastic codes that were prevalent in those days. There is a tradition that he introduced a reform in Tathāgata Vipassī's discipline by instituting an *uposatha* at which the *Pātimokkha* was to be recited regularly once a fortnight—not after a lapse of six years, as in Vipassī's times, as mentioned in the Mahāpadānasutta of the *Dīgha Nikāya*. The reason for the recitation of the *Pātimokkha* at such great intervals in ancient times is assigned by Buddhaghoṣa to the fact that the people in those days were of little impurity (*apparajakkhā*).[11]

Vardhamāna Mahāvīra

Vardhamāna Mahāvīra left home at the age of thirty and practised severe asceticism for more than twelve years before he attained *kevalajñāna* (omniscience). He used a garment during the first year of his ascetic life and then left it for ever. His parents were followers of the religion of Pārśva and he is reported to have initiated himself into the same discipline.

We have already referred to the five *sikkhāpadas* introduced by Mahāvīra. These are the same as the four great vows mentioned above, with the expansion of the last into two, namely, desisting (*veramaṇa*) from all kinds of sexual relationships (*savvāo mehuṇāo*), and all kinds of possessions (*savvāo pariggahāo*).[12] Gautama Indrabhūti, a senior disciple of Mahāvīra, explains to Kesikumāra, a monk of Pārśva's order, that the difference between the four *jāmas* and the five *sikkhāpadas* is only formal. The four *jāmas* are prescribed for those who are morally straightforward and intellectually sharp (*ujjupaṇṇā*), while the latter is meant for those who are either morally straightforward but intellectually dull (*ujjujaḍā*), or morally crooked and intellectually dull (*vaṃkajaḍā*).[13] As regards the divergence between Pārśva's discipline, approving the use of an inner and an upper vestment, and Mahavīra's innovation of nudity, the solution offered by Gautama Indrabhūti is that particular kinds of vestments and other requisites are allowed to monks in order to create faith and trust among their followers, to make their living possible, and for their easy identification by the people. He does not however consider these requisites as an essential part of monkhood, which is practised in full by the achievement of purity of knowledge, faith and conduct.[14]

In addition to the above two reforms, Vardhamāna Mahāvīra also introduced the practice of *paḍikkamaṇa*,[15] or rather made it a compulsory act, at which monks and nuns had to confess their lapses and retrace them every morning and evening. This was done in order to satisfy the demands of those who might be morally crooked and intellectually dull. This innovation of Mahāvīra's is very similar to Gautama Buddha's institution of *uposatha* at which, as mentioned above, the *Pātimokkha* was to be recited regularly once in a fortnight. The explanation given by Buddhaghosa also curiously tallies with the one mentioned above in connection with the *cāujjamo dhammo* of Pārśva.

The nudity practised by Mahāvīra had no permanent impact on his order. In fact, in the *Ācārāṅgasūtra* (I.8.4), which is the oldest available text of the Jaina scripture, mention has been made of monks who were possessed of up to three vestments and a bowl, side by side with monks who were absolutely naked. The *Ācārāṅga* and the other texts dealing with monastic life have given the list of the essential requisites of a monk, which include clothing *(vattha)*, alms-bowl (*pāya*), blanket (*kambala*), broom (*pāyapuṃ-*

chaṇa), etc. The *Chedasūtras* and the *Niryuktis* refer to a number of other articles that also were used by Jaina monks and nuns.

As regards the nature of the meditation practised by Mahāvīra, we have very little information in the Jaina scripture. It is only his austerities, penances, and fastings that are mentioned in the biographical sketches recorded in texts like the Bhāvaṇā-Ajjhayaṇa of the *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, and the *Kalpasūtra*. The final purpose of his meditation, which was nothing but the eradication of the *mohanīyakarma*[16] consisting of passions and delusions, indicates that there was no radical difference between the forms of meditation followed by Mahāvīra and Buddha. The Jainas appear to have laid undue stress on physical austerities at the cost of the importance of the meditation exemplified in the life of Vardhamāna Mahāvīra.

Pabbajjā and Upasampadā Versus Pavvajjā and Uvaṭṭhavaṇā

(a) Pabbajjā and Upasampadā

After his enlightenment, the Buddha applied himself to finding suitable disciples who could follow the path discovered by him. He approached his five old associates, and on being asked by them for *pabbajjā* (initiation) and *upasampadā* (ordination), admitted them into his discipline by simply addressing them as "etha bhikkhavo". This was the *upasampadā* of those five bhikkhus.[17] Yasa and his friends, the Bhaddavaggiyas and Jaṭilas were similarly ordained. But with the rapid growth of the saṅgha it was not possible for the Buddha to bestow ordination on all newcomers personally. He, therefore, authorized his disciples to bestow initiation and ordination under the *tisaraṇa* formula,[18] though he himself continued to ordain by his original form of address. This process was further revised in order to obviate arbitrary denial of ordination and to give the system a wider foundation. Ordination was now prescribed to be performed through a formal act of the saṅgha, called *Ñatticatutthakamma*, *i.e.*, a monastic act (*kamma*) that requires a resolution (*ñatti*) preceded by the three-fold repetition (*anussāvanā*) of the act to be performed. The act ended with a conclusion (*nigamana*) such as : *khamati saṅghassa tasmā tuṇhī evam etam dhārayām īti* (This is acceptable to the order inasmuch as it is silent—this is what I conclude).[19] The minimum number of monks whose presence was required at this ceremony was ten.[20]

With the gradual expansion of the saṅgha, the necessity was felt of efficient guides to bring discipline among the newly ordained monks and nuns. Accordingly, the Buddha approved the appointment of *upajjhāyas*, the monks assigned to each *upajjhāya* being called *saddhivihārikas*. The relation between them was to be like that between father and son.[21]

Pabbajjā and *upasampadā* were later on bifurcated. While the former remained in the hands of individual teachers as before, the latter was to be bestowed, at the express prayer of the candidate, by the saṅgha. A candidate for *pabbajjā* (initiation) normally was required to be not less than fifteen, and for *upasampadā* (ordination) not less than twenty.[22] The former was called a *sāmaṇera* and the latter a *bhikkhu*.

Ten *sikkhāpadas* (precepts, to be enumerated later) were prescribed for the *sāmaṇeras*,[23] and the *bhikkhus* were asked to observe the entire *Pātimokkha* rules to be discussed later on.[24] The *sāmaṇeras* were specially warned against the ten immoral

acts (to be enumerated later on) that would lead to their immediate expulsion from the saṅgha.[25]

In this connection, the functions of *ācariya* and *upajjhāya*, who were important officers of the saṅgha, deserve mention. The *upajjhāyas* were appointed for guiding the *saddhivihārikas* in the proper observance of the rules and regulations of monastic life. They were required to improve their knowledge and were warned against laxity in performing their responsibilities towards the *saddhivihārikas*. Sometimes, however, they had, for some reason or other, abruptly to abandon their *saddhivihārikas*, who felt lonely and forsaken as a consequence. In order to meet such exigencies, another category of officers designated as *ācariya* was instituted, and the monks assigned to them were named as *antevāsikas*. The *ācariyas* thus were a kind of substitute for the *upajjhāyas* in case of emergency. The relation between the *upajjhāya* and the *saddhivihārika* appears to be more intimate than that between the *ācariya* and the *antevāsika*. A monk had to abandon the *ācariya* as soon as his *upajjhāya* was available to him again for guidance and counsel.[26]

(b) Pavvajjā and Uvaṭṭhavaṇā

Mahāvīra is reported to have initiated himself into the discipline called *sāmāiya* with the formula : 'all sinful activity is unworthy of performance by me' (savvaṃ me akaraṇijjaṃ pāvakammaṃ).[27] He also is said to have bestowed *pavvajjā* on Gautama Indrabhūti, along with his five hundred students, immediately after his attainment of omniscience.[28] The custom of *uvaṭṭhavaṇā*, which corresponds to Buddhist *upasampadā*, appears to have been introduced into Jainism at a later stage. *Pavvajjā* now stood for a simple admission of the candidate into the order, and the *uvaṭṭhavaṇā* for his final confirmation as a monk. The period of training (*sehabhūmi*) between *pavvajjā* and *uvaṭṭhavaṇā* lasted for six months at the maximum, four months on an average, and a week in the minimum.[29] If a candidate was found fit for confirmation, the *āyariya* and *uvajjhāya* were bound to confer *uvaṭṭhavaṇā* immediately. Otherwise they had to undergo either *cheda* (break in monastic standing) or *parihāra* (special kind of penance).[30]

In *pavvajjā*, only the discipline of *sāmāyika*, by which the candidate was required to desist from sinful activities in general, was given, and the candidate was called a *sāmaṇera*. In *uvaṭṭhavaṇā*, which is also called *chedopasthāpana*, the *sāmaṇera* was raised to the status of a full-fledged monk, and was henceforth required to observe fully all the *mahāvratas*. The *uvaṭṭhavaṇā* was called *chedopasthāpanā* because there was break (*cheda*) of the *sāmaṇera*-ship and promotion (*upasthāpanā*) to monkhood. It is said that there was no such custom of bifurcation of the process of monastic admission in the discipline of Pārśva.

The causes that led to the above bifurcation were perhaps the same as were responsible for the bifurcation of the single act of admission into *pabbajjā* and *upasampadā* in the Buddhist order. The purpose was to test the bonafides of the candidates and their perseverance in the hardships of monastic life. Jainism appears to have been influenced by Buddhism on this issue, because this change took place at a much later date in Jainism. The term *upasampadā* is used in a quite different sense in Jainism. For instance, in the *Uttarādhyayanasūtra* (XXVI, 4 & 7) it is used in the sense of 'placing oneself under another teacher'.[31] The word is used in the same sense in the

Sūtrakṛtāṅga (II.7.14) where the admission of Udaa-peḍhālaputta to the Jaina order is described as his transfer or conversion (*upasampadā*, the actual expression used being *upasampajjittā*) to the discipline of Mahāvīra from the discipline of four *jāmas* (of Pārśva).[32]

The candidate fit for *uvaṭṭhavaṇā* (entry into monkhood) had to be over eight years old.[33] The age limit, therefore, was much lower than that prescribed in Buddhism. The Buddha appears to have changed the custom of child ordination that had been handed down from ancient times, in the interest of the better management of the order by people of mature wisdom and experience.

In Jainism *uvajjhāya* was the chief instructor of a group of monks. For understanding the deeper meanings of the scripture, the students had to approach the *āyariya*, who enjoyed a distinctly higher position than the *uvajjhāya*. There also were other officers, such as *thera*, *pavattī*, *gaṇī*, *gaṇāvacheiya*, *vāyaga*, etc., who had to discharge different kinds of duties.

The students attached to *āyariya* were called *antevāsīs*, and were divided into four classes according to the function of their *āyariyas* in relation to them. Thus, an *antevāsī* was called *pavvāyaṇā-antevāsī* with reference to the *āyariya* who gave him *pavvajjā*. The nature of *uvaṭṭhavaṇā-antevāsī*, *uddesaṇā-antevāsī* and *vāyaṇā-antevāsī* are to be similarly understood. The *āyariyas* were similarly designated as *pavvāyaṇā-āyariya* and so on. The *āyariya* who did not fulfil any of the above functions was called *dhamma-āyariya* and the student in such case was called *dhamma-antevāsī*.[34]

The Nissayas

A monk was required to reduce the necessities of life to the minimum. Vardhamāna Mahāvīra favoured abolishing all necessities, including even the loin-cloth. He is reported to have taken only 349 meals during an ascetic career spanning more than twelve years.[35] He neither took any medicine, nor did he live in any particular place meant for his residence during those years. Mahāvīra thus lived nearly without any of the four *nissayas*, namely vestment, food, shelter and medicine. The Buddha struck the middle path, and approved the use of requisites that were the bare necessities of life. Of course all the monks and nuns of Mahāvīra's order could not follow their master completely in this respect, but they exercised restraint as far as it was possible for them to do so.

The four *nissayas* are enumerated as follows in the *Mahāvagga* (p. 55) :

> "anujānāmi, bhikkhave, upasampādentena cattāro nissaye ācikkhituṃ—(i) piṇḍiyālopabhojanaṃ nissāya pabbajjā, tattha te yāvajīvaṃ ussāho karaṇīyo; atirekalābhosaṅghabhattaṃ, uddesabhattaṃ, nimantanaṃ, salākabhattaṃ, pakkhikaṃ, uposathikaṃ, pāṭipadikaṃ. (ii) paṃsukūlacīvaraṃ nissāya pabbajjā .. ; atirekalābho—khomaṃ, kappāsikaṃ, koseyyaṃ, kambalaṃ, sāṇam, bhaṅgaṃ. (iii) rukkhamūlasenāsanaṃ nissāya pabbajjā...; atirekalābho—vihāro, aḍḍhayogo, pāsādo, hammiyaṃ, guhā. (iv) pūtimuttabhesajjaṃ nissāya pabbajjā .....; atirekalābho—sappi, navanītaṃ, telaṃ, madhu, phāṇitaṃ ti."

These *nissayas* were accepted in some form or other in Jainism also. Elaborate rules

were prescribed for getting alms, rules that were much more stringent than in Buddhism. Special care was taken by the Jaina monks to avoid injury to life in obtaining food. Infliction of any inconvenience on the alms-giver was to be avoided. Monks were prohibited from accepting food prepared for them. This rule most probably was made in respect of meat and fish. The Buddha had also to prohibit such meat and fish in deference to popular protest. As regards use of garments, the Jaina monks were allowed five kinds of clothes, namely, those of camel's hair (*jaṅgie*), of linen (*bhaṅgie*), of hemp (*sāṇae*), of wool (*pottae*), and of *tiriḍa* (*tiriḍapaṭṭe*).[36] This relaxation—in spite of Mahāvīra's insistence on nudity—was certainly due to the influence of similar relaxations in the Buddhist order, with which the Jaina community was in close touch. As regards acquisition of permanent residences for the order, Jainisim was totally opposed, though in later times permanent establishments were built for them by their laity. As regards medicine, the Jaina monks and nuns in the beginning tried to avoid it, and were accustomed to use human urine (*moya*) as medicine in case of snakebite, etc.[37] They were, however, allowed to use ointments of oil (*tella*), clarified butter (*ghaa*), butter (*ṇavaṇīa*), fat (*vasā*), viscous sediment (*kakka*), *lodha* (*Skt. lodhra*), incense (*padhūvaṇa*), etc.[38]

The Buddha approved the use (*paṭisevanā*) of : (i) garments (*cīvara*) only for the sake of protection from heat and cold, from flies, mosquitoes, wind, sun, and snakes, and for covering nakedness; (ii) food (*piṇḍapāta*) for support and sustenance of the body, for keeping it unharmed, for furthering the *brahmacariya*, for removing and warding off pain of hunger, for faultless living in comfort; (iii) lodging (*senāsana*) for the protection from heat and cold, from flies, etc., and for warding off the inclemencies of weather and for enjoying seclusion; (iv) medicines (*bhesajja*) for warding off painful feelings and for physical well-being.[39] In the *Oghaniryukti*, 706, of the Jainas the following six reasons have been given for using clothes : (i) for protection of the body from grass, etc., (ii) for avoiding the use of fire for protection against cold, (iii) for practising *dharma*, (iv) for practising higher types of meditation, (v) for protection of the sick, and lastly (vi) for covering the dead body. For food, the *Uttarādhyayanasūtra* (XXVI. 33) enumerates the following six uses : (i) to prevent an illness, (ii) to serve the *guru*, (iii) to permit one to comply with the rules about physical movements, (iv) to permit one to comply with the rules about self-control, (v) to save one's life, and lastly (vi) to permit one to meditate on the law. Concerning lodging and medicine, the Jaina position has already been stated. A comparison of the reasons adduced above by the Buddhists and the Jainas in favour of the use of garment and food will show that Jainism puts more stress on avoiding injury to life and also that it does not approve these items for warding off hardships and privations of monastic career. The Jainas also have enumerated the advantages of nudity and fasting in this connection. The advantages of nudity are five, namely: (i) elimination of the necessities of inspection of clothes for avoiding injury to life, (ii) lightness of movement, (iii) creation of faith in the people on account of absolute freedom from any kind of possession, (iv) practice of austerities, and (v) complete restraint of the sense organs.[40] The six occasions for suspension of food by a monk are given in the *Uttarādhyayana* (XXVI.35) as follows : (i) in case of illness, (ii) in case of a disaster, (iii) to preserve one's chastity and the *guptis*, (iv) out of compassion for living beings, (v) in the interest of penance, and (vi) to make an end of one's life.

The above account of the four *nissayas* clearly indicates that the Jaina attitude towards them found a precise formulation in Buddhism. The Buddha had imbibed the idea from others, most probably from the followers of Pārśva's creed, and gave it a concrete shape, with relaxations necessary for an expanding community of monks and nuns.

In this connection, the five propositions of Devadatta deserve mention. The Buddha gave a rational basis to his monastic order, amending rules that were unnecessarily harsh and had little bearing on the aim, which was emancipation from moral and mental defilements and perversions. But, there were reactionaries in his organization, who wanted to revive ancient habits and customs of monastic life. Devadatta was one such reactionary. He proposed reformation in the life of the saṅgha, and proposed the following five rules : (i) the monks should always live in the forest and should not enter a village, (ii) they should always live on begging and never accept invitation, (iii) they should have robes made of rags taken from a dust heap, and should not accept garments from householders, (iv) they should live under trees in the open and should never live under roofs, and (v) they should never eat fish or meat, throughout their whole monastic career.[41] These were not acceptable to the Buddha for general practice, though he always favoured whatever was conducive to concentration (*samādhi*) of mind and achievement of insight into the nature of truth (*paññā*). The Buddha's confrontation with Devadatta testifies to the interaction of ideas, old and new, that were either prevalent or forged anew in those times.

The Sikkhāpadas

We already have referred to the five *sikkhāpadas* propounded by Mahāvīra in connection with the religion of Pārśva. He also propounded for his laity a twelve-fold discipline consisting of five *aṇuvvayas* and seven *sikkhāvayas*. Of these, the five *aṇuvvayas* are desisting from (i) thūlagaṃ pānāivāyaṃ, (ii) thūlagaṃ musāvāyaṃ, (iii) thūlagaṃ adiṇṇādāṇaṃ, (iv) savvamehuṇavihiṃ, excepting one's own wife, and (v) voluntary limitation on the possession and use of savvaṃ hiraṇṇasuvaṇṇa-cauppaya-khettavatthusagaḍa-vāhaṇa-ullaṇiyā-dantavaṇā-phala-abbhaṅgaṇa-uvaṭṭaṇa--majjaṇa-vattha-vilevaṇapuppha-ābharaṇa-dhūvaṇa-pejja-bhakkha-odaṇa-sūva-ghaya-sāga-mahuraya-jemaṇa-pāṇiya-muhavāsavihiṃ; the seven *sikkhāvayas* are as follows : (i) disivvaya, (ii) uvabhogaparibhogaparimāṇa, (iii) aṇaṭṭhadaṇḍaveramaṇa, (iv) sāmāiyaṃ, (v) desāvagāsiyaṃ, (vi) posahovavāsaṃ, and (vii) ahasaṃvibhāgaṃ.[42]

The ten *sikkhāpadas* prescribed for the *sāmaṇeras* in Buddhism are as follows : (i) pāṇātipātā veramaṇī, (ii) adinnādānā veramaṇī, (iii) abrahmacariyā veramaṇī, (iv) musāvādā veramaṇī, (v) surāmerayamajjapamādaṭṭhānā veramaṇī, (vi) vikālabhojanā veramaṇī, (vii) naccagītavāditavisūka-dassanā veramaṇī, (viii) mālāgandhavilepana-dhāraṇa-maṇḍana-vibhūsanaṭṭhānā veramaṇī, (ix) uccāsayanamahāsayanā veramaṇī, and (x) jātarūparajatapaṭigghaṇā veramaṇī.[43] For the laity, the first five of the above ten are prescribed, with the exception that the third is replaced by *kāmesu micchācārā veramaṇī*.[44] The *sāmaṇeras* were specially warned against the following ten immoral acts, which led to their expulsion : the violation of the first five *sikkhāpadas*, and (vi) abusing the Buddha, (vii) abusing the *dhamma*, (viii) abusing the *saṅgha*, (ix) holding wrong views, and (x) molestation of nuns (*Mahāvagga*, p. 89).

A comparison of the above precepts shows that they find a more systematic and precise classification in Buddhism. The first four *mahāvratas* of Jainism are rearranged in Buddhism in order to separate the physical sins from the vocal ones. Desisting from eating at night was not regarded as a *mahāvrata* in Jainism, though it necessarily was counted as the sixth *vrata*, along with the five *mahāvratas*. In Buddhism, however, it finds its proper place as *vikālabhojanā veramaṇī*. The *sikkhāpadas* no. 5, 7-10 are incorporated in order to give a full picture of the acts from which the *sāmaṇera* should desist. The Buddhist code for the *sāmaṇeras* is, thus, more complete than the Jaina enumeration. Buddhism therefore not only adopted the monastic code that was prevalent, but gave it a clearly-defined shape to serve its own needs. The elaborate rules regarding possession of property and limitation of the enjoyment of amenities are completely abolished in Buddhism. Some of these are however prohibited on the occasion of observing the *uposatha* prescribed for the laity. This issue will be discussed in the section on *uposatha*.

The Buddha did not want the *sikkhāpadas* (also called *sīlas*) to be considered as the goal of life. They were a stepping stone to higher attainments like *samādhi* and *paññā*. This has been made clear in the Brahmajālasutta of the *Dīgha Nikāya*, where a critical estimate is made of the *cūlasīla*, *majjhimasīla*, *mahāsīla*, and also of the false doctrines that were in vogue in those days.

Parīsaha and Parissaya

Jainism attaches extraordinary importance to *parīsahas*, *i.e.*, endurance of physical hardships. A list of twenty-two *parīsahas* has been given in the *Uttarādhyayanasūtra* (Chapter II), namely, hunger, thirst, cold, heat, flies and gnats, nakedness, discontent, women, constant wandering, unsuitable place of study and meditation, uncomfortable lodging, scolding and abuse, ill-treatment, begging, refusal, illness, pricking-grass, dirt, kind and respectful treatment, understanding, ignorance, and right faith. These were time-honoured practices, and the Buddha had also to give a respectable place to such hardships, which were, moreover, a test of the monk's power of endurance. In the Sabbāsavasutta of the *Majjhima Nikāya*, certain *āsavas* are listed as worthy of eradication by means of endurance (*adhivāsanā pahātabbā āsavā*). These are cold, heat, hunger, thirst, gnats, mosquitoes, wind, sun, snake, abuses, and intense, intolerable pains and sufferings. If not properly endured, they are liable to cause endless sufferings; they can be avoided in the future through their endurance with tranquillity and peace of mind. In the Sāriputtasutta of the *Sutta Nipāta*, these hardships are given as *parissayas* (cf. Prakrit *parīsaha*). It is obvious, therefore, that physical hardships and austerities were a respectable legacy, which no monastic order could ignore.

The Dhutaṅgas

Most intimately connected with the *parīsahas* is the ideal of *dhutaṅga*, which occupies an important place in both Jainism and Buddhism. The sixth chapter of the *Ācārāṅgasūtra* is called Dhuya-Ajjhayaṇa. *Dhuya* means abandonment of worldly attachments. Accordingly, in the first section of the Dhuya-Ajjhayaṇa, attachment to relations and friends is considered as a strong binding force, which is to be snapped before one enters the path to salvation. In the second section, the eradication of all *karmas* is

stressed, and in the third, the renunciation of all requisites of life, including the body, is prescribed. In the fourth section, all forms of pride that stand in the way of one's enlightenment are prescribed to be abandoned. In the fifth section, which is the last, the monk is required to eschew all desires for honour and admiration from the people. The Dhuya-Ajjhayaṇa thus gives a comprehensive instruction regarding desires, attachments and ambitions, which are to be shunned for the practice of monastic life, whose ultimate end is complete freedom from worldly bondage.

The ideal of *dhuta* (cf. Prakrit *dhuya*) has found a very lucid exposition in the *Milindapañha*, which is a very important Pali text, composed in the first century of the Christian era. Here thirteen *dhutaṅgas* are mentioned, and it is shown, with reference to ancient texts, that a monk could not achieve salvation without practising the *dhutaṅgas*. In the *Visuddhimagga*, one complete chapter is devoted to the subject, which is analysed in various ways. There are thirteen *dhutaṅgas*—namely (*i*) paṃsukūlikāṅgaṃ, (*ii*) tecīvarikaṅgaṃ, (*iii*) piṇḍapātikaṅgaṃ, (*iv*) sapadānacārikaṅgaṃ, (*v*) ekāsanikaṅgaṃ, (*vi*) pattapiṇḍikaṅgaṃ, (*vii*) khalupacchābhattikaṅgaṃ, (*viii*) āraññikaṅgaṃ, (*ix*) rukkhamūlikaṅgaṃ, (*x*) abbhokāsikaṅgaṃ, (*xi*) sosānikaṅgaṃ, (*xii*) yathāsanthatikaṅgaṃ, and (*xiii*) nesajjikaṅgaṃ. Of these, the first two are concerned with robes, nos. 3 to 7 are concerned with food, and nos. 8 to 12 are concerned with lodging, while the thirteenth is concerned with the cultivation of patience and endurance.[45]

The meaning of *dhuta* or *dhuya* is the same in Buddhism and Jainism. It is concerned with the mind's purification of all its impurities by giving up all attachments to worldly life. In this connection, one is reminded of the five rules proposed by Devadatta and the Buddha's refusal to make them obligatory for all monks and nuns. The attitude of the author of the *Milindapañha*, who considers the *dhutaṅgas* as indispensable, appears to represent a leaning towards austerities that were approved by the Buddha only as a means to and not as an end of monastic life.

Posaha and Uposatha

Among the vows prescribed for the Jaina laity, the *posahovavāsa*, which is the eleventh among those vows, was to be observed by the laity for one or more days at any time, though usually the eighth, fourteenth and fifteenth day of a fortnight were considered most suitable. During that period, a layman observed fasting, desisted from all sinful activities, and practically lived the life of a monk, spending the whole period in meditation and spiritual vigilance.[46] In the *Bhagavatīsūtra* (XII.I), there is a reference to a fortnightly *posaha* (cf. Vedic *upavasatha*, Pali *uposatha*) at which laymen gathered and feasted. But this was not the practice of a genuine layman, who observed the *posaha* by fasting and segregating himself from all worldly activities during that period.

In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, there is mention of two types of *uposathas* to be practised by the laity. The first type is called *aṭṭhaṅga-samannāgata* because in it the first nine *sikkhāpadas*, counted as eight, the seventh and eighth being combined into one, are fully observed by the laymen.[47] In the second type, in addition to these eight *sikkhāpadas*, another practice, *mettā* (friendliness), is prescribed, which is responsible for its designation as *navaṅga-samannāgata*.[48]

The occasion that led to the prescription of the *aṭṭhaṅga-samannāgata uposatha* throws light on how the Buddha incorporated the *uposatha* into the duties of the house-

holder. The event took place at Sāvatthī, when Visākhā Migāramātā approached the Buddha for permission to observe *uposatha*.[49] Three kinds of *uposatha*, namely *gopālaka-uposatha*, *niggaṇṭha-uposatha* and *ariya-uposatha* are described here. The first is observed by a person who recounts in the evening the courses of meal taken during the day and those to be taken on the following day. The *niggaṇṭha uposatha* is described as consisting of some rules of the Jaina *posaha*, which were not acceptable to the Buddha. It is related here that the Niggaṇṭhas advised a layman to desist from injury to creatures living beyond the distance of one hundred *yojanas* in all directions, and also to give up all clothes and to dissociate himself from all people. This is, according to the Buddha, an absurd vow because it leaves scope for injury to living beings within that distance, and also involves the fiction of disowning all people, though in fact the parents, servants, and the like continue to remain so in relation to the person observing the *uposatha*. Lastly, the merits of *ariya-uposatha* are enumerated. Such *uposatha* purifies the mind of the practitioner because in it the layman becomes fully aware of the qualities of the Tathāgata, the Dhamma, and the Saṅgha, and also of his own *sīlas*, as he has to observe fully the eight *sikkhāpadas* (enumerated above).

In the *Bhagavatīsūtra* (viii. 5), the Ājīvikas are said to have raised the issue of the continuance of a layman's proprietorship during the period he was observing the *sāmāiya* (which is a part of *posaha*). Mahāvīra solved the problem by pointing out that the proprietorship remains suspended for the period of *posaha*, but becomes operative again after the *posaha* is over. Moreover, as the layman never relinquishes his attachment to his property, his proprietorship continues intact.

The above accounts of Jaina *posaha* and the Buddhist *uposatha* clearly show that the Buddha adapted the Jaina *posaha* to the needs of his laity. Only the tenth *sikkhā-pada* (namely, jātarūparajata-paṭiggahaṇā vermaṇī) was excluded from the householder's *uposathas*, because that was impracticable for the laity according to the Buddha, as evi-denced in his criticism of the *posaha* prescribed for Jaina laity. Mahāvīra's above reply to a similar criticism, which also deserves attention in this connection, proves beyond doubt that there were lively discussions between the followers of Buddhism and Jainism, resulting in clarification of many an issue in monastic life.

In addition to the householder's *uposatha* mentioned above, the Buddha prescribed an *uposatha* for monks and nuns at which the *Pātimokkha*, containing the rules and regulations to be followed by the monastic organization, was to be recited. This was of course not an entirely new practice, as will be shown in the next section.

Paḍikkamaṇa and Pātimokkha

(*a*) *Paḍikkamaṇa*

Paḍikkamaṇa occupies a central position in the life of the Jaina monastic order. It is one of six compulsory monastic duties *(āvassaya)*, namely *sāmāiya*, *cauvīsatthava*, *vandaṇa*, *paḍikkamaṇa*, *kāussagga* and *paccakkhāṇa*. All six together constitute the very life of Jaina monasticism. The *paḍikkamaṇa*, which stands fourth in the list, requires the monk to retrace all transgressions of the rules prescribed for him. These transgressions are manifold. The major portion of them is concerned with injury to life, which is very strictly prohibited for a Jaina monk.

We give below an abridged list of acts from which the monk withdraws himself in performing the *paḍikkamaṇa* :

> all kinds of injury to life, subtle and gross, while walking or engaged in any other such movement; violations of the rules of begging; breaking the rules of study and inspection of requisites; injury caused by thought, speech and body; the three *sallas* (spiritual thorns); the three prides concerning fortune, things of enjoyment and good health; four *kasāyas*; four kinds of useless talks; transgressions of the *mahāvratas*; violation of the five *samitis* and three *guptis*; seventeen kinds of *asaṃjama*; eighteen kinds of *abaṃbha*; twenty *asamāhiṭṭhāṇas*; twenty-one *sabalas*; thirty-three *asāyaṇās*, and so on.[50]

Among the twenty *asamāhiṭṭhāṇas* and twenty-one *sabalas* referred to in the above list, are included the following, which bear close affinity with the *Pātimokkha* rules, as indicated against them in brackets :

Asamāhiṭṭhāṇas[51]

> dava-dava-cārī yāvi bhavai, appamajjiya-cārī yāvi bhavai, duppamajjiyacārī yāvi bhavai (cf. Sekhiyā, 11-20); rāiṇia-paribhāsī (Pācittiyā, 2), bhūovaghāie (cf. Pācittiyā, 11); saṃjalane (Pācittiyā, 13); piṭṭhimaṃsie (Pācittiyā, 3); abhikkhaṇaṃ abhikkhaṇaṃ ohārayittā bhavai (cf. Pācittiyā, 1); navāṇaṃ ahigaraṇāṇaṃ aṇuppaṇṇāṇaṃ uppāittā bhavai porāṇāṇaṃ ahigaraṇāṇaṃ khāmiya viuvasamiyāṇaṃ puṇodīrettā bhavai (Pācittiyā, 63); saddakare (cf. Sekhiyā, 13-14), jhaṃjhakare (cf. Saṅghādisesā, 10); kalahakare (cf. Pācittiyā, 2):

Sabalas[52]

> hatthakammaṃ karemāṇe sabale (cf. Saṅghādisesā, 1); mehuṇaṃ paḍisevamāṇe sabale (cf. Pārājikā, 1); rāibhoyaṇaṃ bhuṃjamāṇe sabale (cf. Pācittiyā, 37); āuṭṭiyāe pāṇāivāyaṃ karemāṇe sabale (cf. Pācittiyā, 61); āuṭṭiyāe musā-vāyaṃ vayamāṇe sabale (cf. Pācittiyā, 1); āuṭṭiyāe mūla-bhoyaṇaṃ vā kaṃḍa-bhoyaṇaṃ vā khaṃdha-bhoyaṇaṃ vā tayā-bhoyaṇaṃ vā pavāla-bhoyaṇaṃ vā patta-bhoyaṇaṃ vā hariya-bhoyaṇaṃ vā bhuṃjamāṇe sabale (cf. Pācittiyā, 11).

The abridged list given above contains many other items that have found their way into the *Pātimokkha* of the Buddhists under divergent terminology, and arranged in a novel way. In the act of *paḍikkamaṇa*, all possible monastic lapses are enumerated individually or under classes, with a view to reminding the participants of the transgressions they are likely to commit. They are then to withdraw themselves from their lapses, if any, in the following words :

> khāmemi savvajīve, savve jīvā khamaṃtu me;
> mitti me savvabhūesu, veraṃ majjha ṇa keṇai;
> evamahaṃ āloiya niṃdia garahia dugaṃchiyaṃ sammaṃ;
> tiviheṇa paḍikkaṃto, vaṃdāmi jiṇe cauvvīsaṃ.

"I beg pardon of all living beings. Let all beings pardon me. I have friendship with all creatures and enmity with none. I thus retrace myself in three ways by properly confessing, deprecating, disapproving and despising (my transgressions). I bow down to the twenty-four Jinas."

The *paḍikkamaṇa* is done jointly by all monks present. The text of the *paḍikkamaṇa* is recited by a monk who is proficient in it and others listen to him attentively, keeping themselves perfectly calm and quiet, with as little movement of the body as possible.

This monastic act of the Jainas is very similar to the recitation of *Pātimokkha* by Buddhist monks, though unlike the Buddhists, the Jaina laity also perform the *paḍikkhamaṇa*, with the text adapted to the religious code prescribed for them.

(*b*) *Pātimokkha*

The relation between the *paḍikkamaṇa* described above and the *Pātimokkha* prescribed by the Buddha is obviously very close. It is probable that the Buddha fashioned the *Pātimokkha* in imitation of the *paḍikkamaṇa* of the Niganṭha community. The list of offences mentioned in the *Pātimokkha* must have grown up gradually, unlike the list of transgressions in the *paḍikkamaṇa*. The offences are divided, in the *Pātimokkha*, into various classes, beginning with the heaviest, though inside each class the sequence of items follows no invariable rule. Sometimes offences of a related character are placed together in groups, but sometimes those that would naturally come together are found scattered in quite different parts of the same class.

Of the two Pātimokkhas, the Bhikkhu Pātimokkha is divided into eight sections and the Bhikkhuṇī Pātimokkha into seven (there being no *aniyatā dhammā* which constitute the third section of the Bhikkhu Pātimokkha). The first section of the Bhikkhu Pātimokkha mentions four offences under the heading *pārājikā dhammā*; the second section deals with thirteen offences under the heading *saṅghādisesā dhammā*; the third section, *aniyatā dhammā*, mentions two offences concerning the conduct of a monk with a woman; the fourth section, *nisaggiyā pācittiyā dhammā*, contains thirty restrictions to be observed by a monk when accepting gifts; the fifth section, entitled *pācittiyā dhammā*, contains ninety-two rules prohibiting monks from lying and slandering, digging earth and cutting trees, and so on. The sixth section contains four rules under *pāṭidesanīyā dhammā* meaning the offences that are purified by formal confession. In the seventh section, seventy-five instructions are given as *sekhiyā dhammā*. In the eighth section, seven methods of settling disputes are given under the title *adhikaraṇasamathā dhammā*. The Bhikkhuṇī Pātimokkha gives a number of additional offences, their total number, thus, reaching 311, whereas the Bhikkhu Pātimokkha lists 227.

A comparative look at the *paḍikkamaṇa* and the *Pātimokkha* is bound to give the impression that the latter is more systematic, in that it arranges the offences under heads suitably indicative of the nature of penance warranted by them.

Offences and Punishments

(*a*) *In Jainism*

In the *Nisīhajjhayaṇa*, four types of punishments are prescribed for offences,

which are categorized by punishment. These are *māsiyaṃ aṇugghāiyaṃ, māsiyaṃ ugghāiyaṃ, cāummāsiyaṃ aṇugghāiyaṃ, cāummāsiyaṃ ugghāiyaṃ.* In the last section (*uddesa*) of the same text, the five kinds of application (*ārovaṇā*) of the punishments have been explained.

The offences listed under the first type of punishment include, among others, the following acts that a monk performs himself or has others do, or approves :

masturbation and homosexuality; smelling any living organism; digging a water channel; sharpening a needle, razor, nail-cutter or ear-cleaner; unnecessary or unapproved begging of these requisites; getting one's own pot or stick manufactured, repaired or polished, or distributing them among others; keeping an extra garment for more than a month-and-a-half.

Some of the offences that deserve the second kind of punishment are as follows :

burning incense in the room; speaking lightly harsh or false words ; light stealing; accepting alms regularly from a particular house; permanent residence at a particular place ; begging alms from the house-owner providing residence to the monk; begging food repeatedly in a loud voice; cleaning or massaging or besmearing with ointments parts of the body; seeking royal favour; unapproved entry into the residence of nuns; laughing loudly; standing; sitting or sleeping under a tree if the ground is alive (*sacitta*).

The offences for which the third kind of punishment are prescribed are very serious. Many of these offences concern sexual relations with women. Among other such offences are :

acceptance of food from a royal family (*rāyapiṇḍa*), and curiosity to see the movement of an army and association with such movement; using harsh words against a senior monk; acceptance of food prepared for him, involving injury to living beings; misguiding a novice (*seha*) and kidnapping him; non-settlement of disputes; not properly attending to a sick monk; crossing and recrossing the boundaries of hostile kingdoms; despising the taking of food in the day and appreciating the taking in food in the night.

Some of the offences deserving the fourth kind of punishment are as follows :

standing, sitting, lying or staying for any purpose on a ground that is infested with living organisms; using abusive words to a heretic or a householder, or any kind of association with them; taking resort to vomiting and purging, and acceptance of food that is not approved; purchase of requisites and acceptance of requisites that are not approved; acceptance of food from a despicable family; riding a boat or dragging it from land to water or rowing it.

In addition to the above punishments, a list of ten *pāyacchittas* (atonements) is provided in an oft-quoted *gāthā* that runs as follows :

āloyaṇa paḍikamaṇe mīsa vivege taha viussagge/
tava cheya mūla aṇavaṭṭhayā ya pāraṃcie ceva//

These *pāyacchittas* occupy the first place among the six kinds of internal austerity, the six external austerities being concerned mainly with food restrictions.[53] While the four punishments mentioned above were exclusively concerned with the austerity of fasting, these atonements include, in addition to austerity (*tava*), other forms of punishment, namely, confession (*āloyaṇa*), retracing or repentance (*paḍikkamaṇa*), both confession and retracing (*mīsa*), giving up of further transgressions (*vivega*), practice of detachment (*viussagga*), reduction of seniority (*cheya*), uprooting of religious standing (*mūla*), temporary expulsion (*aṇavaṭṭhayā*) and permanent expulsion (*pāramciya*, cf. Pāli *pārājika*).

Of the above ten atonements, confession is the most important. When a monk has committed a fault, he should confess it before his religious superior, in his absence before an ordinary monk, in the last resort before a layman. The superior monk must show the utmost kindness to the culprit and help him as far as he can. The essence of the second atonement, *paḍikkamaṇa* is expressed in the formula *tassa micchā me dukkaḍaṃ* (my fault is due to error). The third atonement, which is called *mīsa*, combines the first two. The fourth atonement is *vivega*, which means 'giving up of what has been accepted improperly' (cf. Pāli *nisaggīya pācittiya*). The fifth atonement, namely *viussagga* (also called *kāussagga*) is repeatedly resorted to in religious observances. It is practised for the sake of cultivating complete detachment. It is a state of meditation in which all physical movements are stopped and mental equilibrium is attained, as expressed in the formula; *kāyam ṭhāṇeṇaṃ moṇeṇaṃ jhāṇeṇaṃ appāṇaṃ vosirāmi*. The sixth atonement is *tava*, also called *parihāra*, in which the monk is set aside until he has finished redeeming his fault. The four punishments mentioned above fall under this atonement. The seventh atonement, called *cheya*, consists in reduction of the seniority of a monk. This atonement is inflicted only when new faults are committed after the prescription of the *parihāra*. The *mūla*, which is the eighth atonement, is prescribed for a monk living normally in a *gaṇa*. Here, seniority is completely eliminated and the monk is required to start his career afresh. The ninth atonement, *aṇavaṭṭhayā*, is inflicted on those who have robbed or cheated Jaina or non-Jaina monks or who have given a slap on the face.[54] The tenth atonement, *pāramciya*, is inflicted on those who nourish deep ill-will and hatred (*duṭṭha*), are absolutely careless in behaviour (*pamatta*), and indulge in homosexuality (*aṇṇamaṇṇaṃ karemāṇe*).[55]

(*b*) *In Buddhism*

Punishments in the Buddhist order were preceded by ecclesiastical acts in an assembly at which the presence in person or by proxy of monks dwelling within the *sīmā* was compulsory. A brief account of these punishments is given here.

The *tajjanīyakamma* comes first in the list of punishments. It is prescribed for a monk who creates quarrels and dissensions, is foolish and given to commission of offences, and associates himself frequently with householders. The monk against whom the *tajjanīyakamma* is pronounced is debarred from conferring *upasampadā*, giving *nissaya*, taking a *sāmaṇera*, and so on. If the monk so censured faithfully observes the

restrictions, the punishment can be revoked. Next in order is the *nissayakamma*, which is inflicted on a monk who is stupid, immature, subject to transgressions of monastic rules, and who pronounces *parivāsa*, *mulāyapaṭikassanā*, *mānatta* and *abbhāna* indiscriminately against other monks. He is asked to take a teacher and abide by his instructions. The debarring of such monk from his privileges, and his reinstatement are like those of *tajjanīyakamma*. In the *pabbājanīyakamma*, which is prescribed against a monk who is a defiler of a good family and indulges in acts like garlanding, playing, singing, dancing, etc., the delinquent is temporarily removed from the monastery. The *paṭisāraṇīyakamma* is pronounced against a monk who behaves improperly with a householder and speaks ill of the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha in his presence. The punishment is revoked when the offender asks the offended householder for pardon. In the *ukkhepanīyakamma*, the monk who refuses to confess his offences is suspended and forbidden to dwell or take food with other monks. In addition to these, there are other disciplinary measures such as *paṭikkosanā*, *nissāraṇā*, and *osāraṇā*. A monk is subjected to *paṭikkosanā* for minor dereliction. *Nissāraṇā* is a general term for expulsion of a monk from the Saṅgha, while *osāraṇā* is the act of revocation of a disciplinary measure. Punishment, in the shape of *āvaraṇa* or restraint, had to be meted out to *sāmaṇera* who did not live according to the requirements of the Saṅgha.

Besides the above offences and punishments, there were others that found a systematic classification in the *Pātimokkha*. Thus the four very grave offences are classified under *pārājika*, which led to the expulsion of the delinquent monk from the order (cf. Prakrit *pāraṃciya)*. These offences are sexual acts, theft, killing of human beings, and false claim to higher attainments. A set of thirteen offences, such as voluntary discharge of semen, amorous gestures to women, infringement of the rules for construction of huts and other residences, and so on, are put under the heading of *saṅghādiśesa*, which consisted of the punishments, called *mānatta*, *parivāsa* and *mūlāyapaṭikassanā* (cf. Prakṛit *mūla* mentioned above). The other classes of offences mentioned in the *Pātimokkha* have already been enumerated in the preceding section.

A close study of the offences and punishments listed in Jainism and Buddhism will show that they were conceived and formulated in the same monastic environment. The punishments prescribed in Jainism were comparatively harsh, though every care was taken, as in Buddhism, to give adequate opportunity to the guilty monk to redeem himself.

Ahiṃsā and Karuṇā

Our main concern in this paper has been the outward activities of the monastic order. These activities are so controlled as to be conducive to the observance of *sīla* by monks and nuns. But *sīla* is not the end. It is a mere means to the higher attainments, namely *samādhi* and *paññā*. The monastic rules and regulations were framed for safeguarding *sīla* against lapses that were likely to harm the monastic community. The Buddha always kept in mind the interests of an ideal order of monks and nuns. The elaborate rules, of course, sometimes appear to overshadow the ultimate purpose. This happened both in Buddhism and Jainism, though the moral and ethical ideals always enjoyed supremacy.

While *ahiṃsā* determined the growth of Jainism, *karuṇā* asserted itself at every stage of the growth of Buddhism. Though the *sikkhāpada* of *pāṇātipātā veramaṇam* (desisting from injury to life) finds a place of unique importance in both Jainism and Buddhism, its application is not so universal and absolute in Buddhism as in the moral code of Jainism. This *sikkhāpada* acquired a wider connotation under the term *ahiṃsā*, with which Jainism identified itself. *Ahiṃsā* in Jainism is the means to as well as the end of spiritual discipline. Buddhism substitutes *karuṇā* for *ahiṃsā* and considers the former as the correlate of *paññā*, which is the highest end. *Paññā* stands for truth, and *karuṇā* for the means to the realization of truth. *Paññā* without *karuṇā* is futile. *Karuṇā* without *paññā* is impossible. By *ahiṃsā* the aspirant guards himself against impurity, while by *karuṇā* the aspirant carries others with him on the path of purity.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Uttarādhyayanasūtra*, XXIII, pp. 12-13, 26-33.
2. *Sthānāṅgasūtra*, IV. 31.
3. *Daśavaikālika*, III. 2.
4. *Ibid.*, V. 37.
5. *Ibid.*, V. 39.
6. *Ibid.*, V. 42.
7. This has obviously a reference to the *bhikkhu-paḍimās*, as described in the seventh *Dasā* of the *Dasāsuyakkhandha*.
8. Cf. *Uttarādhyayanasūtra*, II. 36.
9. Cf. *Ibid.*, II. 13; also cf., *Ācārāṅga*, I.9.3.
10. Cf. *Ibid.*, II. 3.
11. *Samantapāsādikā* (Nalanda Edition), I, p. 175.
12. *Daśavaikālikasūtra*, IV.
13. *Uttarādhyayanasūtra*, XXIII, p. 26.
14. *Ibid.*, XXIII. pp. 32-33.
15. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, II. 7.14; also *Āvaśyakaniryukti* 1244; *Mūlācāra*, VII. pp. 125-129.
16. Cf. *seṇāvaiṃ mi nihae*
    jahā seṇā paṇassai |
    evaṃ kammāṇi nassanti
    Mohaṇijje khayam gae ||
    Dasāsuykkhandha, V. 120.
17. *Āyasmā Aññātakoṇḍaññā* requested Lord Buddha as follows: *labheyyāhaṃ, bhante, bhagavato santike pabbajjaṃ. labheyyam upasampadaṃ iti* and in reply the Buddha uttered: *ehi bhikkhū ti, sā va tassa āyasmato upasampadā ahosi.* Aññātakoṇḍaññā was followed by the other four with a similar request and the Buddha ordainedthem by saying *etha bhikkhavo ti. Mahāvagga* (Nalanda Edition), p. 15.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 53-55.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
24. *Ibid,,* pp. 100-101.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
27. *Acārāṅga*, II. 15. 32.
28. *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, 1604 :
    chinnammi saṃsayammi jiṇeṇa jarāmaraṇavippamukkeṇa |
    so samaṇo pavvaito paṃcahiṃ sahakhamdiyasaehiṃ ||
    Here the word *pavvaito* stands for *pavvajjā*. The *Bṛhadvṛtti* explains it as follows: *pāpād vṛjitaḥ pravrajitaḥ.*
29. *Vavahāra*, X. 15 :
    tao seha-bhūmio paṇṇattāo, taṃ jahā: sattaraimdiyā caummāsiyā chammasiyā ; chammāsia ukkosiyā caummāsiyā majjhamiyā, sattarāiṇo jahaṇṇiya (see also *Sthānāṅgasūtra*. III, 2.41).
30. *Ibid.*, IV. 16.
31. See also *Avaśyakaniryukti*, pp. 698-99.
32. *tae ṇaṃ as udae peḍhālaputte sama-*

ṇassa bhagavao mahāvīrassa antie cāujjāmāo dhammāo pañcamahavvaiyaṃ sapaḍikkamaṇaṃ dhammaṃ uvasaṃpajjittāṇaṃ viharai.

33. *Vavahāra*, X. 17.
34. *Sthānāṅgasūtra*, IV, 3. 99.
35. *Avaśyakaniryukti*, pp. 100-1.
36. *Bṛhatkalpa*, II. 29.
37. *Ibid.*, V, pp. 47-48.
38. *Ibid.*, V, 50-52. As regards *vasā* see *Mahāvagga* (Nalanda Edition), p. 219.
39. *Majjhima Nikāya* (Nalanda Edition), I, pp. 14-15.
40. *Sthānāṅgasūtra*, V. 3. 69.
41. *Cullavagga* (Nalanda Edition), pp. 298-99.
42. *Uvāsagadasāo*, Chap. I.
43. *Mahāvagga* (Nalanda Edition), p. 87.
44. *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, Vol. IV, p. 337.
45. *Visuddhimagga* (Kosambi Ed.), Chap. II, para 88.
46. *Tattvārthasūtra*, VII.16, *Svopajñabhāṣya.*
47. *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (Nalanda Edition), I, pp. 195-197.
48. *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 33-34.
49. *Ibid.*, I, pp. 190-91.
50. See *Paḍikkamaṇāvassayaṃ* (printed in Suttāgame, Vol. II).
51. *Dasāsuyakkhandha*, first dasā.
52. *Ibid.*, second dasā.
53. *Tattvārthasūtra*, IX, pp. 19-20.
54. *Bṛhatkalpasūtra*, IV, p. 3.
55. *Ibid.*, IV. 2.

20

Shin Buddhism in Modern Japan : An Examination of the Thought of Manshi Kiyozawa

SHUNSHO TERAKAWA

THE PURPOSE of this paper is to describe the impact on modern Japan of the thought of Shinran (1173-1262), thirteenth-century founder of Jōdo Shin[1] Buddhism, as that thought was reinterpreted by Manshi Kiyozawa (1863-1903). It is through the efforts of Kiyozawa that a time-gap of some seven hundred years was overcome; that is, Kiyozawa reinterpreted Shinran's thought to meet the intellectual and emotional needs of Japanese who lived in the period of Japan's emergence as a modern state and were faced with the complexities of issues that modernization has brought about. Kiyozawa is one of the most vital religious personalities and spiritual revivers of modern Japan. He is also the founder of the present Otani Buddhist University.

Kiyozawa was born into a *samurai* family. Like eminent Christians such as Kanzō Uchimura (1861-1930) and Inazo Nitobe (1862-1933), Kiyozawa had a strong *samurai* background. In the 1890's he entered Tokyo University, under a scholarship provided by the Shin Sangha, to study philosophy and religion. He was one of the earlist Japanese to study the philosophy of Kant and Hegel. He also studied the *Āgama-sūtras*. His study of the *Āgama-sūtras*—containing the strict items of morality of Early Buddhism—was instrumental in purifying and refining his *samurai* disposition. He is said to have given people the impression that he was like a well-disciplined old-styled *samurai* or an ascetic monk. With this type of discipline and conscientious effort, Kiyozawa attempted to pursue the Dharma. Yet he was confronted by a series of problems : the Sangha in which he found himself represented vestiges of a feudal order; it was corrupt and lacked the vitality to contribute to the making of modern man. In addition, the influx of Western civilization during the Meiji period, regardless of its stimulating effects, undermined traditional social and spiritual values; Buddhism came to be considered as only a remnant of a past order.

Under these circumstances, which undermined traditional values and promoted the superiority of Western values, Kiyozawa attempted to discover the meaning of his existence. Specifically, what he sought was the meaning of self. In Buddhism, seeking the real meaning of Tathāgata, that is, seeking the salvation of an individual in the personality of Tathāgata (Buddha), is no different from seeking, discovering and establishing the real self. Hence, Kiyozawa, who was seriously seeking the real meaning of self, was at the same time, seeking the real meaning of Tathāgata. Shinran referred to all sentient beings who are seeking the real meaning of Tathāgata as the 'ocean filled with all types of sufferings (*issai-kurō-no-gunjō-kai*)'. Shinran also referred to them as the 'common, ordinary men (*bompu*)'. Through this view of men entertained by Shinran, Kiyozawa saw himself : he identified himself as being within the stream of *saṃsāra*, a world full of pain and agony. This was his way of reinterpreting what Shinran referred to as a state of *bompu*. Kiyozawa, in fact, lived with an incurable case of tuberculosis for some ten years, experienced various hardships, and died when he was only forty. Through real-life experience—the constant difficulties of life—he came to realize the significance that faith has for man in dealing with the problems of *saṃsāra*. During this period of his illness he began to engage in writing, re-interpreting the thought of Shinran. For Kiyozawa, faced with the actual pain of life, traditional commentaries on the thought of Shinran—theoretical and abstract as they were—had no meaning whatsoever. As such, from the standpoint of Shin tradition, Kiyozawa was a rebel. Of past writings, he honored three works, the *Āgama-sūtras* the *Teachings of Epictetus*, and the *Tannishō*,[2] in which he found the true meaning of life—that life is pain but that the authentic self is to be found only through the re-awakening of man through the pains of life. The *Tannishō* had the greatest impact on the life of Kiyozawa. In it is revealed the salvation of man through faith and faith alone. The *Tannishō* presupposes the fallibility of man : it is the confession of the weak and the ignorant, not a restatement of the dignity of the brave and the wise; it is the teaching of humility, not of arrogance; it requires the complete surrender of self and the awakening of that self through faith in the infinite compassion of Buddha Amitābha. The *Tannishō* (Chapter 7) says, "One who 'recites the name of Buddha Amitābha (*nembutsu*)' realizes the Direct Way of No-Hindrance"; it says that one who has taken refuge in Buddha Amitābha has acquired real freedom. In the course of Kiyozawa's life, the most difficult problem he faced was how to 'overcome Self-Power, (*jiriki*). Self-Power refers to 'human effort' or 'attachment to human effort'. Or, it refers to the 'persistent attachment to self' which is hiding under the so-called self-awareness of modern men. Kiyozawa, in his well-known exposition of his faith, entitled "Thus, I Believe in Tathāgata", says :

> In my faith, there is one crucial aspect that I am aware of : the futility of Self-Power about everything...It was an extremely difficult task for me [to get the insight into the futility of Self-Power.][3]

This insight into "the futility of Self-Power", a deep insight into human nature, was clearly described in the following words of Shinran, as recorded in the *Tannishō* (Chapter 3) : "We, who are unable to leave [the transmigration within the karmic cycle of] life-and-death by any type of practice...". Shinran's awareness that there are limits to man's self-Power was re-experienced by Kiyozawa in the environment of modern Japan. The most

important aspect of his religious experience was that he realized the futility of Self-Power, after having explored its extent and limitation. Kiyozawa's agonizing re-examination of the Shinran's teaching concerning the futility of Self-Power contributed much to reviving the original doctrinal meaning of the two terms—'Self-Power, (*jiriki*) and 'Other-Power' (*tariki*), which were formulated by Tan-luan (476-542), the author of the *Commentary on the Sukhavāvatī-vyūha-upadeśa* (*Ching-t'u lun-chu*). That is, in the world of faith, according to Kiyozawa, Self-Power exists only as an illusion and the final reality is Other-Power, or the working of the Dharma. It is within this context that Kiyozawa speaks the following words :

> Tathāgata is the absolute Other-Power. Our salvation by Tathāgata refers to our salvation through Other-Power.

Hence, our salvation by Tathāgata refers to the discovery of our self, which is totally encompassed within the working of the Dharma. To find an answer to the most basic question of life, "Who am I?", and to have faith in Tathāgata are one and the same. In this manner, Jōdo Buddhism, as interpreted by Kiyozawa, revived within the context of the religious life of modern Japanese one of the vital doctrines of Buddhism, that is, the serious insight into the nature of man.

Kiyozawa's introduction of the *Tannisho* at a period when the Japanese were exposed to the crushing impact of Western civilization gave them a means to re-evaluate their cultural and spiritual heritage. This is why we see Kiyozawa as an important religious personality of the period. He contributed significantly to reviving the spirituality, that is, the spiritual discipline, of Buddhism. We can compare Kiyozawa to a heroic soldier who courageously protected and enhanced real religious values. It is with this kind of spirit that he became founder of Otani Buddhist University, an educational institution dedicated to developing the spirituality of Buddhism and training men who must help Japan emerge as a modern state—an institution constantly striving to expand the perspective of the world. The creation of such a university was necessary to break the hard crust of feudalism under which the Buddhist Sangha had existed for some 250 years of Tokugawa rule. Because Kiyozawa seriously taught his ideas to his students, his individual faith did not disappear after his death. There were many distinguished successors in his faith, such as Haya Akegarasu (1877-1954) and Ryōjin Soga (1875-1970). These disciples of Kiyozawa have transmitted his ideas to the present-day Japanese.

The record of Kiyozawa's impact on the modernization of Japanese Buddhism is not complete without briefly noting the influence of his thought in postwar Japan. Japan's devastating defeat in World War II brought about a deep sense of futility. Again Shinran's theory of salvation through faith and faith alone emerged as a positive force to enable Japanese to recover from their spiritual devastation—a crisis not only for individuals but also for the Japanese as a whole. Some of the Buddhists who were strongly influenced by Kiyozawa played an extremely important role in this revival movement. The movement incorporated two basic elements that characterized Kiyozawa's thought :

a) Kiyozawa, following Shinran, emphasized the fellowship of men. This type of fellowship provided the basis for challenging the Buddhist "Papal" institution,[4]

which had been created during the feudalistic period and which existed even after the emperor's renunciation of his own divinity immediately after World War II.

b) From the time State Shinto was incorporated into the governmental system in the early Meiji until it was eliminated as a governmental function, State Shinto determined the religious values of the Japanese. Hence, the Japanese did not have freedom of faith. Their religious feelings were suppressed, distorted and devastated by the governmental control of religions. In reaction to this governmental control of religions, the disciples of Kiyozawa actively worked to restore the lost religious values. That is, their efforts were designed to eliminate distortions of the religious values by State Shinto and to revitalize and recover a healthy religious awareness for the Japanese. The tradition of Kiyozawa's spiritualization movement provided the basis of Buddhist revival in postwar Japan.

In conclusion, we can say that though most of the Buddhist temples and monasteries have become nothing but showcases of the past, and though their function has been largely reduced to that of conducting funeral ceremonies, nevertheless, the tradition of Kiyozawa's spiritualization movement—his concern over the condition of the individual man—is a force that cannot be ignored in discussing Japanese Buddhism today. Kiyozawa's spiritualization movement has its significance in that it is an attempt to resolve the tension between the organization man and the individual man.*

FOOTNOTES

1. In present-day Japan, there are three Buddhist traditions that still play an active role : the Jōdo (Pure Land) tradition, the Zen tradition and the tradition based on the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra* (*Taisho* 9, pp., 1-63). All three traditions—characterized by some uniquely Japanese elements—began in thirteenth-century Japan. As far as the Jōdo tradition is concerned, the Jōdo Shin (True Pure Land) School, founded by Shinran, has had the largest following.

2. This text, consisting of the sayings of Shinran, was composed by Yuienbō, one of the immediate disciples of Shinran. The English translations of this text are as follows :

a) Fujiwara, Ryōsetsu. *The Tannishō : Notes Lamenting the Differences.* Ryukoku Translation Series, Vol. II. Kyoto: Ryūkoku Translation Center, 1962.

b) Higashi Honganji Translation Committee. *The Tannishō : A Tract Deploring Heresies of the Faith.* Kyoto : Otani Press, 1961.

c) Imadate, Tosui. *The Tannishō : Tract on Deploring the Heterodoxies.* Contained in Suzuki, Daisetsu. *Collected Writings on Shin Buddhism.* Kyoto : Otani University Press, 1974, pp. 193-222.

3. Kiyozawa, Manshi. *Kiyozawa Manshi Zenshū* (The Complete Work of Manshi Kiyozawa) 8 Vols. Ed. by Haya Akegarasu & Kengyō Nishimura. Kyoto : Hōzōkan, 1953-56. Volume VI, pp. 229-30.

4. The Jōdo Shin School is unique in Japanese Buddhism in that it has a "Papal" institution, based on the hereditary succession from Shinran, which claims absolute authority in dealing with the doctrinal and financial problems of the Shin Sangha.

* This article in Japanese was translated by Mr Nobuo Haneda (Ed.).

21

Voidnesses and Totalities : Madhyamika and Hua Yen

ROBERT A. F. THURMAN

IT IS readily observable that scholars tend to manifest chauvinistic biases towards the cultures, philosophies, or individuals they study. In Buddhist studies, specialists in Chinese Buddhism may feel that the "Chinese genius" improved Buddhist doctrines, creating something new, higher, and unique, while specialists in Indian Buddhism tend to feel that the Chinese muddled their translations, Sinicized the philosophical doctrines evolved by the "Indian genius", and thus missed the finer points. The Japanophiles join the Sinophiles usually, and the Tibetophiles the Indophiles, and the result is poor communication, poor comparative grasp of the overall scope of Buddhism, and a kind of exotic second-hand sectarianism. It is all-too-ironic that this tendency should persist even in Buddhist philosophical studies, where the paramount reality is universally said to be "identitylessness" (*naiḥsvābhāvya*), *i.e.*, ultimate absence of racial, cultural, personal and phenomenal identities. Indeed, were this principle to be given its proper weight, it would follow that the superiority of a Buddhist doctrine would be inversely proportional to the degree of its cultural idiosyncrasy.

Mādhyamika thought has been said to be "negativistic" in tenor, both by its critics and its eulogists, thus being an exemplary product of the stereotyped "Indian mind", which is simplistically "transcendentalist", "world-negating", "intellectualist", "universalist", etc. Hua Yen thought has been said to be "positive" and "totalistic" in tenor, thus being an exemplary product of the stereotyped "Chinese mind", which is "pragmatic", "world-affirming", "intuitive", "particularistic", etc. There is an unwitting conscensus that each school represents the highest elaboration of Mahāyāna thought in its respective culture. I shall argue here that the two schools are in profound agreement on the major specific points of doctrine, their differences having to do with emphasis and teaching style. I have found in the process that the comparison suggests an interesting typology of liberative techniques (*upāya*), or Mahāyāna pedagogical methodology.

There are three levels of comparison : *1*) the scriptural sources, *2*) the analytic and didactic techniques employed by the scholastic masters, Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti for Mādhyamika, and Tu Shun and Fa Tsang for Hua Yen, and *3*) the soteriological implications. For the Mādhyamika, I mainly rely on Sanskrit originals and Tibetan translations, and for the Hua Yen I mainly rely on translations by Chang (1971), Cook (1975), and Unno (1975).

Both schools are based on Indian Scriptures, the Mādhyamika usually correlated with the *Prajñāpāramitā Scriptures*, the Hua Yen with the *Avataṃsaka Scriptures*, although only the *Gaṇḍavyūha* and *Daśabhūmika* sections of this latter are extant in Sanskrit, and there are unsolved problems about the remaining two-thirds of the Chinese version. However, it is simplistic to maintain that these correlations are exclusive since Nāgārjuna *et al.* draw frequently on other Scriptures, and Fa Tsang *et al.* rely very heavily on the form-equals-voidness-equation of the *Prajñāpāramitā*. In any case, there is no fundamental divergence between these Scriptures, they rather complement each other, the *Prajñāpāramitā* specializing in the profound (*gambhīra*) aspect of Mahāyāna and the *Avatamsaka* in the panoramic *(udāra)* aspect, *i.e.* respectively on wisdom and on the spirit of enlightenment (*bodhicitta)* of love and compassion, on the ultimate (*paramārtha*) and on the relative (*saṃvṛti*) or conventional (*vyāvahārika*). The *Avatamsaka* lays out and illustrates the bodhisattva paths and stages, vividly depicting the inconceivability of the universes of enlightenment (*buddha-kṣetra)*, while the *Prajñāpāramitā* delves into the profound reaches of the sixth bodhisattva stage, legislating infallibly the proper pattern of knowledge of enlightenment.

A graphic example of the complementarity of the two scriptural classes is provided by the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, wherein *Prajñāpāramitā*-type dialectic is employed in chapters three and four, and *Avataṃsaka*-type expressions of inconceivability are employed in chapters five and eight.[5] The two techniques certainly do not oppose each other in the text, but rather are indispensable to each other. Actually, a further lesson may be drawn from this text, when we interpose Vimalakīrti's famous silence between the two above techniques, giving us a pedagogical movement of : *1*) dialectical or negational analysis evincing the pattern of voidness or selflessness, á la *Prajñāpāramitā*, *2*) silence evincing the ecstatic gnosis of the holy ones (*āryasamāhitajñāna*), the realization of nonduality, and pedagogically the purposeful renunciation of authoritarian dogmatism, and *3*.) poetry, paradoxical lyricism expressing the inexpressible, or reconciliation of dichotomies (*yamakavyatyastyāhāra*), evincing the inconceivability of the miraculous, compassion-filled, dream-like universe experienced in the aftermath gnosis of the holy ones (*āryapṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna)*, á la *Avataṃsaka.*

This three-fold typology, which emerges so naturally from the sequence of chapters of the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, bears a striking resemblance to the three meditations used as framework by Tu Shun in his *Meditation of Dharmadhatu* (Chang, 1971, pp. 208-223); The three are : *1*) "meditation on true voidness", *2*) "meditation on the non-obstruction of principle against phenomenon" (*li shih wu ai*), and *3*) "meditation on the non-obstruction of phenomenon against phenomenon" (*shih shih wu ai*) (rendered for some reason "all embracing totality" by Chang). I shall now treat these meditations specifically, correlating their thought patterns with those of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. as well as with those extracted from the *Vimalakīrti.*

Tu Shun's first meditation is clearly dialectical and reductive in nature, divided

into four movements, called : *1*) "reducing form to voidness", *2*) "identifying voidness with form", *3*) "observing non-obstruction of form and voidness", and *4*) "accepting absolute negation". Several points can be made here. Although the first two movements here employ the *Prajñāpāramitā* statements "form is voidness and voidness is form", the stress is on the dialectical, negational proposition that reduces form to voidness, ending in an absolute negation of intrinsic identity of form, etc. Further, although there are some statements such as "form is not void because it is void", which appear paradoxical, the commentary reveals that a distinction is being made between a "nihilistic void", and "true voidness", or between voidness as concept and voidness as ultimate actuality, etc. Therefore, Tu Shun is maintaining philosophical coherence here, is speaking "logically", and maintains a basically negative thrust, aiming to generate a valid negative inference in his student. He is not yet using the type of paradox that admits of no inferential resolution. Of course, once this is perceived, there is no conflict between this procedure of Tu Shun and the basic procedures of the Mādhyamikas, such as the tetralemma *(catuṣkoṭi)*, or the dilemmas where both alternatives are negated (*anekārthamanānārtham*, etc.). These procedures are so familiar, I need not to cite examples, but I do need to stress that they are wrongly understood if they are considered "alogical", etc., as Nāgārjuna is very definitely including logic in what he calls "the conventional" in his famous statement— "Without depending on the conventional, the ultimate cannot be shown" (MMK, XXIV, 10). The supreme argument of this type, called the "royal reason", is : "Things have no intrinsic identities, because they are interdependently occurrent". This type of negation leads the mind to a conceptual, inferential cognition of voidness as an absolute negation of intrinsic identity (*svabhāva*). And, this is precisely what Tu Shun is up to in his first meditation, as well as the subject of the second, fourth, and fifth contemplations, (on voidness, signlessness, and birthlessness) of Fa Tsang in his *Golden Lion*. It also corresponds to the first movement in the typology culled from the *Vimalakīrti* above.

Tu Shun's second meditation concerns non.duality in terms of the ultimate equivalence of the two realities (*satyadvaya*), which he terms *li*/principle and *shih*/phenomenon, as Ch'eng Kuan comments (Chang, p. 213); "the harmonious fusion of *li* (absolute) and *shih* (relative) brings into the open a double non-duality". Tu Shun gives ten basic statements which relate the two concepts in every possible way, as identical, as different, as complementary, as self-distinct, etc. Here, the student is pushed beyond the conceptual cognition of an absolute negation arrived at in the first meditation, into the non-conceptual, direct cognition of voidness, the realm of the "silence of the holy ones" *(āryānaṃ tuṣṇīmbhava)*. As Fa Tsang says, in a strikingly Prāsaṅgika-like statement, (Chang, 164); "Inasmuch as these principles mutually negate one another, *all assertions are nullified.....*," which is instructively comparable to Nāgārjuna's "since I have no thesis, I have no fault" *(nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmānnaivāsti me doṣaḥ)* (VV, 21), or to Āryadeva or Candra on the same subject. On the other hand, the Mādhyamikas *do assert conventionally* the equivalence of voidness and relativity (*pratītyasamutpāda*), as Tu Shun does of *li* and *shih*. The paradigmatic example of this equation is Nāgārjuna's (MMK, XXIV, 18); "The interdependently occurent we call a voidness; it is a dependent designation (*prajñaptirupādāya*), and that is the middle way"; or (VV, 1); "I salute the incomparable, perfect Buddha, who declared the equivalence in meaning of voidness, relativity (*pratīyasamutpāda*), and the middle way";

or (MMK, XXV, 19); "Saṃsāra is no different from nirvāṇa; nirvāṇa no different from saṃsāra". There are many such statements. Fa Tsang also stresses this non-duality by making it the first of his ten mysteries in the *Golden Lion* and elsewhere, which he states to be the "chief principle among the ten mysteries" (Chang, p. 156). Tsoṅ Khapa calls this non-duality the "essential message of the Mādhyamika". Having established this, I must point out that pedagogically we must distinguish between the type of statment being made here and that made in the previous meditation. Tu Shun, Nāgārjuna, *et al.* are *doing philosophy* in the former mode; treating binary concepts dialectically and refuting logically all alternatives. They *do* expect to be followed inferentially until a conceptual cognition of absolute negation (voidness) is generated. In this latter mode, they start out having renounced formal philosophical talk, "private" or "independent syllogisms" (*svatantrānumāna*), having "nullified all assertions", and conventionally, (non-analytically, *avicāryamāṇa* as Candra would say), praise the realization of non-duality, recommend it to the student, praise the Buddhas for realizing it and promulgating it etc. They do *not* expect to be followed conceptually, but rather they recommend the transition from the conceptual cognition of voidness to the non-conceptual realization, to the non-dual, ecstatic knowledge. Finally, they are not speaking "poetically", in the sense that I have used it above, since they are not trying to generate (in the student) any sort of mental state such as is possibly generatable by words. They are simply recommending in a variety of ways that the students confront (*abhimukhi*) the profound reality, and they know that words used either philosophically/analytically or poetically/paradoxically will be misconstrued ontologistically by anyone who has not gone beyond subject and object into non-duality, like water poured in water.

Now, it is in the third meditation of Tu Shun, "the non-obstruction of phenomenon against phenomenon" *(Shih Shih wu ai)* that the most subtle points lie. This is really a depiction of the realm of inconceivability, for in this view, a single atom contains the whole universe while remaining just what it is and not interfering with what the universe is. Tu Shun uses an inversion of the tetralemma; "one in one, all in one, one in all, all in all", to describe this realm. This is the point where scholars have felt that Hua Yen takes a radical departure from standard Mahāyāna and Mādhyamika thoughts, as we can understand when we juxtapose this formula with one of the Mādhyamika negations of causation; "one cause cannot produce one effect, one cause cannot produce many effects, many causes cannot produce one effect, and many causes cannot produce many effects", with various reasons given for each proposition, ending in absolute negation. Having decided that Hua Yen is thus diametrically opposed to Mādhyamika, like positive *vs.* negative, these scholars have conjured up what they call a "totalistic" mode of thought, a "philosophy of totality", etc. They consider this something new, not realizing that if they take these Hua Yen formulae as *philosophical*, they are stuck in the position of equating Hua Yen with the type of extreme, naive realism of the Vaiśeṣika for example, where a whole inheres entirely in each of its parts, etc. This is selling Maitreya's tower as real estate, and packaging Indra's net as an ontology !

However, we can avoid being misled by the apparent similarity in opposition of the two formulae if we use our above typology, and understand that Tu Shun *et al.* are not speaking *philosophically* here, but rather poetically, paradoxically. They finished doing philosophy in the first meditation, they renounced assertions in the second, and in the third they are ecstatically describing the inconceivable "universe of enlightenment", likening it

to the net of Indra, the infinite net of gems each of which reflects all the others and is reflected in them, or to the tower of Maitreya which contains infinite other identical towers within it. These images do not at all suggest "totalities", rather infinities which are if anything, anullments of totality, finiteness, etc. It is merely the humor and artistry of Tu Shun and Fa Tsang that they choose to make their poetical expressions parallel to philosophical propositions, doing a take off as it were on the tetralemma, or on the negational treatment of binary opposites such as part and whole, one and many, etc. A famous metaphor used by Hua Yen masters is the numbers from one to ten, and they appear to assert that one *is* ten and ten *is* one. From this our ontologizers assume that one is realistically "asserted" to be "identical" with ten. But Fa Tsang is very clear about this (Chang, p. 159);

> "The so-called" one is not the one-with-selfhood, it is the one of dependent arising; therefore, when we say that one contains ten (or is "identical with") we mean the one of dependent arising. Because if it were the one-with-selfhood, it would be a one of self-sufficiency and of isolation, excluding all other considerations and alternatives; this sort of *svabhāva*-one, if it existed at all, would certainly contravene the truth of dependent arising. Furthermore, *a svabhāvic* one would necessarily nullify the original meaning and function of the word "one".

From this it is evident that "non-obstruction" conveys the same idea as the Mādhyamika idea of "dependent designation" *(prajñaptirupādāya)*, that things are designatively existent, relative, etc. It is used metaphorically, actually spatially, not propositionally, but it presupposes the successful dialectical negation of naive realism that clings to intrinsic identities in things *(bhāvasvabhāva)*.

Now, granting this much about Hua Yen, where is the analogous step in Mādhyamika thought and technique? Where do they engage in poetical outpourings of metaphor and paradox? They are known only for their dry, negative dialectics. We have already mentioned the cardinal Mādhyamika notion of dependent designation, which seems to be its final characterization of the relative or conventional reality *(vyāvahārikasatya)*. But what are the implications of the sheer designativeness of relativity, the causal sphere? Candra states *(Prasannapadā*, I, p. 23*)*; "in the usage of mundane conventions, such a sort of analysis (as that of Bhavya who seeks intrinsic identity [*i.e.*, hardness of earth, in this case]) is not to be employed; furthermore, the things of the world are only existent (insofar) an analytically unexamined". Connected with this is the epistomological notion that the bodhisattva, upon arising from direct, nonconceptual gnosis of nonduality etc., experiences the "aftermath gnosis" *(pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna)*, in which the entire causal realm, the relative world appears to be like a dream, illusion, echo, reflection, etc...In what sense does it so appear? Clearly, these metaphors intend to convey that the enlightenment—universe is not a "solid", realistically uniform, causally normative realm, but is rather fluid, inconceivable, magical, etc...It is true that the Mādhyamika does not stress this point, content with leading the student to nondual gnosis. But it is also true that Nāgārjuna, in *Ratnāvali* especially, and Candrakīrti, especially in chapters seven through eleven of the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, describe in graphic detail the higher bodhisattva stages, the exalted stage of Buddhahood, the magical powers, miraculous capacities, the inconceivability of the Buddha-fields, etc...Thus, Candra states, sounding very Hua Yen

(Mabh. X, ad. k. 17); "The Buddhas if they wish can manifest a universe of limitless space in a single atom, and the universe will not shrink and the atom will not expand... and they can also just by willing it manifest a single atom as pervading an entire universe of universes...". There is no way to account for a Mādhyamika's expression of such inconceivabilities if we insist that "designative existence", "non-analytic existence" and "conventional existence", mean only the ordinary, everyday reality of the common person *(pṛthagjana)* ensconced in the perceptual habits of his socially conditioned universe. And if we recognize thus the presence in the Mādhyamika tradition also of the third type of pedagogic technique, namely, the poetic/paradoxical, then we have established the essential agreement of Mādhyamika and Hua Yen on all three levels.

In this light, it appears that the ascription of a "totalistic philosophy" to the Hua Yen is a repetition of the old misconception of the Mādhyamika as an "absolutism" or "monism", the failure to distinguish between "non-dual" and "unitary", the obscuring of the limitless panorama of inconceivable universes with a net of hypothetical totality, the exquisite net of Indra becoming a jewelled trap wherein the individual sees only reflections of himself.

In conclusion, lest I too become entrapped in an absolutistic hypostatization of infinity, let us listen to Ch'eng Kuan (Chang, p. 164) and Nāgārjuna (MMK, XXV, 22-4);

> "The Sūtra says : 'The bodhisattva has a lotus flower; its vast size extends to the limits of the ten directions...Beholding it, all sentient beings pay their sincerest homage by making obeisance before it'. From this metaphor one can simultaneously draw four reflections : *1*) It symbolizes infinity, the lotus extending to the limits of all ten directions. *2*) It symbolizes limitation and distinctions; there are sentient beings who, upon seeing it "from the outside", pay homage to the flower. *3*) It implies that infinite is just limitation, infinite *li* is just limited *shih*. *4*) It implies anullment of both infinity and limitation; from *śūnyatā* viewpoint, neither actually exists."
>
> And;
>
> "In regard to all things, being void, why assert infinity? Why finitude? Why both finitude and infinitude? Why neither finitude and infinitude?"
>
> "All apprehensions are quieted. All fabrications are calmed. All is peace. No Doctrine was ever taught by any Buddha to any one at any time."

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22

The Impact of the Bhakti Movement on the Development of Mahayana Buddhism

K.N. UPADHYAYA

DESPITE VIGOROUS researches in Buddhistic studies, the history of the development of Indian Buddhism is still shrouded in considerable darkness. King Aśoka undoubtedly is one of the earliest historical personages known to have championed the cause of Buddhism and worked for its preservation and propagation. Under his patronage, the third Buddhist Council was held and missionaries were sent to Southern countries. Thus, a powerful movement was started, leading to the firm establishment of what is known as Southern School of Buddhism, disparagingly called 'Hīnayāna'. In about three to four centuries following Aśoka a rather surprising change took over Indian Buddhism, the development of what is called Mahāyāna. Although it is hard to present a sequential account of events and to connect the various facts of this development with precise persons and dates, an attempt will be made in this paper to bring the salient features of this school into clearer light and to show which of them is the most basic and from what source it is derived.

While recounting the characteristic features of the Mahāyāna School, it may be noted that it developed not by rejecting the Hīnayāna but by making a claim to superiority. It claimed to provide a Great Vehicle, as against the small one provided by the Hīnayāna. Thus, without overtly blocking the way of Hīnayāna, it adopted attractive devices to divert the traffic.

The Hīnayāna was supposed to be based upon the teachings of an historical figure—Gautama, the Buddha. In the Mahāyāna the importance of his histriocal image and actual teachings was played down, through various devices. The first device was to undermine the value of the historical event itself by pointing out that the historical birth or death of Gautama, the Buddha, is a mere shadow. The real Buddha is the *Tathatā*, the *Dharmakāya*, which is not subject to birth and death. The historical Buddha was only a *Rūpa-kāya* or *Nirmāṇa-kāya* (physical or artificial form) of the real Buddha. Moreover, the teachings

of the Buddha were said to contain two-fold truth. The outer exoteric truth was meant for ordinary people while the inner esoteric truth was meant for the highly evolved ones. Thus, we find that the Buddha who was revered in the Hīnayāna as a great human being went through a process of deification, and innumerable Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, with their highly complex mythology and metaphysics, were brought into play.

Almost on the Vaiṣṇavaite pattern of the tripartite divinity as : (*i*) Para-Brahman or Puruṣottama, (*ii*) Iśvara, and (*iii*) His incarnation or embodiment (*avatāra*), the Mahāyānist developed the theory of the three-fold body (*trikāya*) of the Buddha. The first, known as *Dharmakāya*, is the true essence of all the Buddhas. It is an eternal and immutable transcendental Reality underlying all cosmic manifestations. The second is the *Sambhogakāya*, the body of enjoyment through which the Buddhas dwell in their heavenly abodes. The third is the *Nirmāṇa-kāya* or *Rūpa-kāya*, which is an artificial human form taken by Śākyamuni or any other Buddha. Later theology regards Amitābha, Amitāyus and Śākyamuni as a series corresponding to these three bodies.

The supremacy of Mahāyāna was further indicated in terms of the three *yānas* (vehicles). The lowest one is the *Śrāvakayāna*, the vehicle of the ordinary bhikkhu who hopes to become an Arhat. The next one is *Pratyekabuddhayāna* which is meant for those rare beings who have the ability to become Buddhas themselves, but who cannot preach the Dharma to others. In constrast to both of these, there is the *Mahāyāna* or *Bodhisattvayāna*, which is meant for the exceptionally elevated beings called Bodhisattvas, who not only reach an unsurpassed state of enlightenment but also preach the Dharma to the people. Although they have the capacity to enter Nirvāṇa any time, out of sheer compassion they postpone their entry into Nirvāṇa indefinitely and continue to serve suffering humanity. Although the *yānas* essentially are one, the Great Compassionate One through his wise concession (*upāya-kauśalya*) has let them work as three to suit the diverse abilities of men.

The doctrines of three-fold body (*trikāya*), two-fold truth, and three-fold vehicle (*yānatraya*) were firmly rooted in a profound metaphysics that transformed the original atheistic religion of Hīnayāna into a powerful theological religion, accompanied by all the necessary elements of faith, devotion, prayer, worship, surrender, and the consequent salvation by grace. Amitābha was regarded as a savior, and invocation of his name was considered adequate to secure redemption. In fact, a passionate devotion, sincere prayer and dedicated worship came to be recognized as superior to mere meditation (*samādhi*). The historical Buddha was fully transformed into a savior God who is the eternal and immutable Lord of beings, unborn Creator of the world and bestower of fortune on all mankind. In the words of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarika*, the celebrated Mahāyāna work, the Buddha declares : "I am the Self-born, Father of the World, Lord of all beings and Remover of ills".[1]

Among the countless Bodhisattvas, the names of Avalokiteśvara and Mañjuśrī stand out in the Mahāyāna literature as unparallelled embodiments of mercy and knowledge who, in order to alleviate the sufferings of the world, have indefinitely postponed their entry into Nirvāṇa. In view of the fact that the mere attaining of Nirvāṇa by a bhikkhu was considered selfish and its postponement for the sake of suffering humanity by a Bodhisattva was regarded as an enormously superior ideal, the general Mahāyānist approach now distinctly favored an altruistic ethic, according to which the individual is supposed to work for the sake of the whole world. This shifting of the religious ideal from

Arhatship to Bodhisattvahood gave a pronounced preference to that religious practitioner who was engaged in social works as against one who led a merely contemplative life in seclusion. This at once strikes us as a clear echo of the attitude of the *Bhagavadgītā*.

If we carefully examine these different features of the Mahāyāna School, it is not difficult to see that the pivotal element among them is the devotion (*bhakti*) to the Bodhisattva; it is the most conspicuous development and controls all the other features, which appear as supporting accessories to it. If, therefore, we succeed in accounting for the emergence of this new element in Buddhism, we will have to solve an important historical problem about the development of the Mahāyāna School.

The main question is whether the element of *bhakti* (devotion) in Mahāyāna is a natural internal development of some element indigenous to early Buddhism or whether it is an external element incorporated later into Buddhism through some outside influence. At the very outset of our inquiry, it may be pointed out to discerning scholars that there is hardly any development in Mahāyāna that cannot be shown to have atleast its roots in early phase of Buddhism. We may briefly illustrate it with reference to some of the apparently startling features of the Mahāyāna, such as the doctrines of the three-fold body and the two-fold truth, and also the element of *bhakti*.

Although it is true that in the Pāli Tripiṭaka the Buddha is largely depicted as an historical human being, living and preaching at different places like so many other preachers, there are occasions when references are made to his higher form, which is said to be identical with the Dharma, and the words *rūpa-kāya* and *Dharma-kāya* are mentioned in the Pāli literature. When an ailing bhikkhu named Vakkali greatly desires to see the Buddha, the latter goes to him and remarks :

> "What do you gain, O Vakkali, by seeing this vile body? Whoever, Vakkali, sees the Dharma, sees me and whoever sees me, sees the Dharma."[2]

Likewise, at the time of his *parinirvāṇa*, the Buddha says :

> "The Dharma and Vinaya that I have taught and made known will be your teacher after my death."[3]

This identity of the Buddha and Dharma has been indicated in a few other places, such as the *Saṁghāti Sutta* of the *Itivuttaka*.[4]

Regarding the two-fold truth of the Mahāyāna, one may reasonably feel that it is entirely antagonistic to the original teaching of the Buddha, who has openly declared in the *Mahā-parinibbāna-Sutta* :

> "The Dharma has been taught by me, Ānanda, without making any distinction between exoteric and esoteric. The Tathāgata does not have the closed fist of a teacher with regard to the Dharma."[5]

But even here indications to the contrary may be shown. The Dharma is characterized as "profound, difficult to see, difficult to comprehend, tranquil, subtle, beyond reason"

etc., in view of which the Buddha, after his enlightenment, wondered if it would be a vain effort on his part to preach the Dharma.[6] Finally, he decided to go all the way from Bodhagayā to Ṛṣipatana (Sāranātha) to preach it to his five highly-advanced companions. The Buddha, evidently, did not preach to all people in the same way. Using his ability to know situations and other minds, he preached differently to different people.[7] He was thoroughly psychological in imparting his teachings. When Sariputta imparted the profound teachings of Anātmavāda to the devoted householder, Anāthapiṇḍaka at the time of his illness, the latter delightfully exclaimed :

> "For a long time I have been in service of the master and contemplative bhikkhus. But never before did I hear a religious discourse like this."[8]

To this Sāriputta confidentially added :

> "Such a discourse, O householder, is not comprehended by a white-clad householder. Such a discourse is comprehended by a recluse."[9]

The parable of Siṁsapa leaves, in which the Buddha says that the truth that he has disclosed is far less than what he has not disclosed,[10] may also be said to lend support to the theory of two-fold truth.

As regards the question of *bhakti* (devotion), it may be pointed out that it is closely related to *śraddhā* (faith), which is greatly emphasized in early Buddhism, and is regarded as an indispensable preliminary for making any progress in the holy pursuit. It is, of course, true that the faith that is highly valued in early Buddhism was not a baseless one (*amūlikā saddhā*), but was a rational faith (*ākāravatīsaddhā*) quite compatible with free inquiry and critical examination.[11] But the reverence and love of disciples like Sariputta and Ānanda for their master were, indeed, very deep. The idea of taking refuge in the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha (*triśaraṇa*) also may be regarded as a forerunner of the devotional surrender of the Mahāyāna. The word '*saddhā*' (faith) and '*pema*' (love) frequently occur in the early literature, and the Buddha is supposed to have observed that "even those who have mere faith and affection in me, they are all bound for heaven".[12] The fact that the Buddha, despite his initial reluctance to preach, decided to open 'the gate of immortality' to the world out of sheer compassion, may very well be said to constitute the basis for the development of the image of compassionate Bodhisattvas and devotion to them. Similarly, we find in the Pāli literature mention of many gods and angels, who surround the Buddha and reverentially listen to his discourses.

However, despite the presence of these rudimentary elements of the Mahāyāna in Pāli literature, it is hard to believe that by themselves, without any external impetus or influence, they grew up in such a way that they stood radically against their own basic ground, jeopardising the very fundamentals of the original Dharma. In other words, despite conceding the fact that the germs of the Mahāyāna existed in the early phase of Buddhism, we cannot merely on that basis accept that the inner spontaneous growth of early Buddhism led to radical revision of its own basic position after some time and turned the atheistic doctrine of wisdom and self-reliance into a theistic religion of devotion and grace. The differences brought about by the Mahāyāna are in so many ways too radical to be regarded as merely indigenous developments. For example, the

deities who surrounded the Buddha in the Pāli Tripiṭaka were mere accesssories. His teachings would not be affected if they were all removed. But the Bodhisattvas of the Mahāyāna came to occupy such a doctrinal importance that in their absence the entire edifice of the Mahāyāna would collapse.

This indicates that the early germs of Mahāyāna took a somewhat non-Buddhistic line of development under the impact of some Non-Buddhistic thought. Dr Har Dayal[13] has enumerated six factors contributing to the different tendencies of the Mahāyāna; these have been approvingly noted by Bharat Singh Upadhyaya.[14] They are as follows :

(1) The natural tendencies of development within the Buddhist church;
(2) The influence of other Indian religious sects like the Bhāgavatas and the Śaivas;
(3) The influence of Persian religion and culture;
(4) The influence of Greek art;
(5) The necessity of propaganda among new semi-barbarous tribes;
(6) The influence of Christianity.

In general, we cannot dispute the impact of non-Indian elements on the development of some Mahāyāna tendencies, because the historical evidence shows that during the period when the Mahāyāna was in the making (300 B.C. to 100 A.D.), Buddhism came into contact with several alien peoples. Gandhāra was a Persian province from 530 to 330 B.C. and in the succeeding centuries the north-western parts of India experienced the invasions and settlements of numerous alien peoples, such as Greeks from the Hellenistic kingdoms that arose after Alexander's expedition, Parthians, Śakas, Kushāṇas. The foreigners who entered India were prone to adopt Buddhism rather than Hinduism because it was at the time the predominant religion of the place and was animated by a missionary spirit, and having no prejudice of race or caste it could at once attract the semi-barbarian tribes, who had no strong religious convictions or culture of their own. Thus, Buddhism not only met the invaders on their entry into India, but sent missionaries to them so that, to some extent, they brought Buddhism with them. From all accounts, it appears that Buddhism in its contacts with alien people was more a giver than a borrower, although it could not have remained unaffected in this communicative process. The view that Buddhism was a dominant religion during that period is supported by inscriptions, buildings, and statues testifying to the piety of Buddhist donors; there is a conspicuous absence of such liberality shown to Brahmans. In the second and third centuries A.D., grants of land to Brahmans and their temples began to be recorded and in the fourth century (with the rise of the Gupta Dynasty) such grants became frequent. This cannot but point to the fact that Buddhism was a more dominant and favored religion than Hinduism from 300 B.C. to 100 A.D. After the first century A.D., however, we have first a gradual and then a rapid rise in Brahmanic influence. This was so because Hinduism overcame the first onslaught of early Buddhism and consolidated its doctrines in an attractive manner by producing highly impressive literature, including the *Mahābhārata* and the *Bhagavadgītā*[15].

Thus, so far as the development of the Mahāyāna Buddhism is concerned, the non-Indian influences seem mostly to be peripheral. The chief encounter was in India itself,

the two major rivals being Hinduism and Buddhism. Both were living, that is, changing streams of thought interacting with one another. Naturally, their development was quite parallel. If an attractive novelty appeared in one, something similar was soon to be provided by the other. In such a situation we have to examine very carefully whether the pivotal element of *bhakti* first arose in Buddhism itself or whether it developed later under the impact of the Hindu *bhakti* movement. This is, indeed, a knotty problem which requires very careful and thorough research and demands great intellectual honesty and dispassion. In our limited space, we shall try to resolve this problem by quickly calling attention to the striking peculiarity of Mahāyāna *bhakti* and by discussing which *bhakti* tradition expresses this peculiarity earlier in its literature.

It is quite clear that Mahāyāna *bhakti* is saturated with altruistic ethics, exemplified in the firm resolve of the Boddhisattvas who postpone their Nirvāṇa indefinitely for the selfless service of humanity. Now this kind of *bhakti*, which is inextricably combined with selfless service, is a common peculiarity of the Mahāyāna School of Buddhism and the Bhāgavata School of Hinduism. We have, therefore, to see which of the two traditions exhibits this feature earlier in its literature.

On the Buddhist side, one can at once point to one of the earliest and most celebrated works of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, which is universally recognized as the most representative Mahāyāna work. In the words of Winternitz :

> "He, who wishes to become acquainted with Mahāyāna Buddhism with all its characteristic peculiarities, with all its advantages and defects, should read this Sūtra."[16]

No other single work of the Mahāyāna literature, even if of earlier origin, brings out the characteristic features of the Mahāyāna as prominently and effectively as this work does. Now, the date of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* is fairly well settled. It was translated into Chinese by Dharmarakśa in 286 A.D., which clearly shows that by the third century A.D. its sanctity and eminence were already well-established. According to most Buddhist scholars, such as Nalinaksha Datta,[17] Winternitz,[18] Narendra Deva,[19] Baldeva Upadhyaya,[20] and P.L. Vaidya,[21] the work was first composed in the first century A.D., which seems to be approximately the time when the element of *bhakti* combined with selfless service exhibited itself in a full-fledged form in the Buddhist tradition.

Coming to Hindu tradition, we notice that the element of *bhakti* expressed itself in two forms, *viz.*, Śaivaite and Vaiṣṇavaite. The early expression of Śaivaite *bhakti*, however, as exhibited in a late Upaniṣad, the *Śvetāśvatara*, is mostly unconnected with the cult of disinterested action. The *bhakti* combined with the doctrine of selfless or disinterested service perhaps arose first in the Vaiṣṇavaite tradition rather than in the Śaivaite. It seems to have been brought into prominence for the first time by the followers of the Sātvata Dharma, variously known as Bhāgavata, Nārāyaṇīya, Ekāntika or Pāñcarātra Dharma.

Now, among the early literatures of this school, we may mention the *Bhagavadgītā* and the Nārāyaṇīya section of the *Mahābhārata*. Other works, such as the *Śāṇḍilya Sūtra*, the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, the *Nārada Pāñcarātra* and the *Nārada-Śūtra*, are definitely of later origin because they clearly make reference to these two earlier works.[22] Among these two, the *Bhagavadgītā*, which is frequently refered to by the Nārāyaṇaīnya sector, is

proved to be of greater antiquity. Thus, we find the *Bhagavadgītā* as the earliest work of the Bhāgavata School to inculcate a combined pursuit of disinterested action and *bhakti*.

The date of the *Bhagavadgītā* still is not altogether free from controversy. But there are some evidences that prove beyond doubt that its origin is earlier than that of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, and also that Vaiṣṇava *bhakti* is of greater antiquity. Baudhāyana, in support of his view that God accepts even the most insignificant gift, such as leaf, flower, fruit, or water offered with devotion by the devotee, quotes in his *Gṛhya-sūtra* (II.22.9), verse IX.22 of the *Bhagavadgītā* (which reiterates the same idea) and refers reverentially to Kṛṣṇa with the expression "So, said the Lord" (*tathāha Bhagavan*). Again at the end of the third *praśna* of the *Gṛhya Sūtra* he has referred to the *dvādaśākṣara mantra, viz.*, "*Om namo bhagavato vāsudevāya*" by whose muttering one is said to acquire the merit of a horse-sacrifice. So the sanctity of the *Bhagavadgītā* and the practice of *Vāsudeva-bhakti* seem to have been well-known by the time of Baudhāyana. The fairly well-settled date of Baudhāyana is 400 B.C. and according to this evidence the *Gītā* cannot be placed later than 400 B.C. On the basis of many other independent evidences, we have shown elsewhere[23] that the *Bhagavadgītā* was composed sometime between the 5th and 4th century B.C., when the growing influence of Buddhism made it essential for orthodox Hindu tradition to resuscitate and vindicate its position by making necessary adjustments and renovations. Thus, it seems that the author of the *Bhagavadgītā* prepared Hinduism to counteract in an attractive way the growing influence of Buddhist atheism and renunciation.

From the above discussion, it is evident that the pivotal element of *bhakti*, with its emphasis on disinterested action was first developed in the Bhāgavata School of Hinduism, which later on was adopted by the Mahāyāna school in its own setting. This is confirmed by a comparison of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* with the *Bhagavadgītā*. On the face of it, the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* bears a striking affinity with the *Bhagavadgītā*, and on a careful perusal of words and ideas in the two works, it seems that whichever one is of later origin was most probably written under the impact of the earlier work. We may, for illustration, briefly point out a few of their striking similarities.

In utter contrast to early Buddhism and in striking resemblance to the *Bhagavadgītā*, the very form and atmosphere in which the Buddha appears in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* is astonishingly supernatural. Like the cosmic form of Kṛṣṇa in the Bhagavadgītā, he is depicted as shedding resplendent light, dazzling the enormous space from hell to the eighteen thousand regions of Buddhas.[24] Innumerable gods and angels are contained within him and flowers are constantly showered on him from heaven. Again, on the pattern of the *Bhagavadgītā*, even a sinful man is said to be saved by seeking refuge in the Compassionate One. The Lord is said to protect his devotees and is greatly pleased by the different acts of piety and worship (*Sadd.* II. 77-98). It also is interesting to note that the Buddha in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* is said to have pointed out the essential unity of three Vehicles (*yānas*), which the Compassionate One is said to have devised through his expedient wisdom (*upāyakauśalya*) to suit the abilities of different kinds of people. This approach cannot but point to its parallel in the *Bhagavadgītā*, where the three paths of knowledge, devotion, and action are said to be essentially identical, though their expediency differs with the differences in the temperaments and situations of the people.

We may also, by way of illustration, compare here some of the words and ideas

of the two works and see how strikingly similar they are. Just as Kṛṣṇa says in the *Gītā* :

> "I am the support, father, mother, and grandfather of the world" ..... "I am the goal, sustainer, the lord, the witness, the abode, the refuge and the friend." (*B.G.* IX. 17-18)

so also the Buddha proclaims in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* :

> "I am the father of the world, the Self-born, lord of all beings and curer of ill."[24] (*Sadd.* XV. 21)

Again, as Kṛṣṇa in the *Gītā* says :

> "I am alike to all beings, none is favored or disfavored by me." (*B.G.* IX. 29),

the Buddha of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* observes :

> "I do not have to please anyone. I do not favor or disfavor any." (*Sadd.* V. 22)

It is difficult to deny that these verses echo the same sentiments and ideas which indicates that the work that is later in origin may have been composed under the impact of the earlier one.

Even a general survey of the history of the Hindu and Buddhist traditions can at once indicate that unlike the early Buddhist tradition which had no room for God and other theistic accessories, the Hindu tradition was theistic right from its early Vedic period, so that in the course of its natural development it could more easily develop a coherent theistic system. This lends support to our conclusion that the element of *bhakti* first developed in the Vaiṣṇavaite fold of Hinduism, and influenced the emergence of *bhakti* in Mahāyāna Buddhism. After the Buddha assumed the role of God on the pattern of Viṣṇu, he at once came to be reckoned by Vaiṣṇavaites as one of the incarnations of Viṣṇu. This explains why in the later works of the Bhāgavata religion, such as the *Nārada Pāñcarātra* (IV.3. 156-159 ; IV.8.81) and the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (I.3.26) the Buddha is mentioned as an incarnation of Viṣṇu, whereas he is not included in the incarnation account of the *Nārāyaṇīya* section of the *Mahābhārata* (*Śānti.* 339.100) which we have shown to be an earlier work. Later, when the *bhakti* element became full-grown and well-settled in the two traditions, theological and devotional ideas and even names came to be used almost indistinguishably in the two traditions. Avalokiteśvara of the Mahāyāna, for example, is depicted with lotus in his hand, just as is Viṣṇu and the name 'Padma-pāṇi' (lotus-handed) was used for Viṣṇu and Avalokiteśvara alike.

In closing, we may just remark that one must not forget that Buddhism (whether Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna) and Hinduism are, after all, two integral expressions of the same culture, and if the influence of Greece and Persia on them is unhesitatingly admitted, there is no reason to fight shy of admitting a more intimate relation and interaction between these two thoughts which have lived and grown together with mutual criticisms and adjustments for so many centuries.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Yam eva ham lokapitā svayaṁbhūḥ cikitsakaḥ sarvaprajān nāthaḥ.-Sadd.*XV. 21
2. *Alam Vakkali kim te pūtikāyena diṭṭhena. Yo so Vakkali dhammam passati, so mam passati, yo mam passati so dhammaṃ passati.-Samyutta*, III. 124.
3. *Yo vo, Ānanda, mayā dhammo vā vinayo vā desito paññato so vo mamaccyena satthā.-Dīgha*, II. 154.
4. *Itivuttaka*, 91.
5. *Desito Ānanda mayā dhammo anantaram abāhiraṃ karitvā na tattha Ānanda tathāgatassa dhammesu ācariyamuṭṭhi.-Digha*, II. 100.
6. *Adhigato kho myāyam dhammo gambhīro dudasso duranibodho santo paṇīto atakkāvacaro nipuṇo .. -Majjhima*, I. 167.
7. *Āsayānusayam viditvā bhagavā dhammam deseti.-Majjhima, cf. Atha bhagavā teṣām āśayānuśayam viditvā dhatum prakṛtim ca jñātvā tādṛśīm dharmadeśanām karoti.-Divyāvadāna*, 97; cf. Majjhima I. 398.
8. *Anāthapiṇḍakovāda*, (*Majjhima*, pp. 258-263).
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Saṁyutta*, V. pp. 437-8.
11. For detailed discussion of the concept of *saddhā* in early Buddhism, consult my book *Early Buddhism and the Bhagavadgītā*, pp. 251-272, (Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1971).
12. *Yesām mayi saddhāmattam pemamattaṃ sabbe te saggaparāyaṇā ti-Majjhima*, I. 142.
13. Har Dayal, *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature* (London : Kegan Paul, Trench Turner & Co., 1932), p. 30.
14. Upadhyaya, Bharat Singh, *Bauddha Darśana Tathā Anya Bhāratīya Darśana* (Calcutta : Bengal Hindi Mandal, 1956), p. 575.
15. I have argued in my paper "The Impact of Early Buddhism on Hindu Thought (With Special Reference to the *Bhagavadgītā*)" that the *Bhagavadgītā* has tried to counteract the growing influence of renunciation, atheism and *anattā* of early Buddhism by presenting an activistic philosophy based on the doctrine of the self coupled with firm faith in God. See *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. xviii. No. 3. July, 1968 pp. 163-173.
16. Winternitz, M., *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. III. (trans. by Jha Subhadra (Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1963), p. 295.
17. Datta, Nalinaksha, Ed., *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* (Calcutta : Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1953), Preface, p. 17.
18. Winternitz, M., *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II (Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1963), pp. 303-4.
19. Dev Narendra, *Bauddhadharmadarśana* (Patna : Bihar Rashtrabhaṣa Parishad, 1971), p. 142.
20. Upadhyaya, Baldeva, *Bauddhadarśana Mīmāṁsā*, (Banaras : Chowkhamba Vidya Bhawan, 1954). p. 106.
21. Vaidya, P.L., Ed., *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, (Darbhanga : Buddha Sanskrit series, No. 6, 1960), preface. p. 14.
22. For further details of these references see the author's book *Early Buddhism and the Bhagavadgītā* (Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1971) pp. 138-9.
23. See the author's book, *Early Buddhism and the Bhagavadgītā* (Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1971), pp. 16-29.
24. Compare Gītā XI. 9-50 with *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* I.1-56.

23

Observations on the History and Influence of the Buddhist Tantra in India and Tibet

ALEX WAYMAN

THE BUDDHIST Tantras constitute a vast literature, of which the most extensive portion now extant, counting basic works and commentaries, is among the Tibetan translations from Sanskrit in the Kanjur and Tanjur, supplemented by a huge Tibetan indigenous literature. A number of Tantras and their commentaries were translated into Chinese and then into Japanese.

General Historical Considerations

The problem of Tantric history is beset by unusual difficulty. The history of Sanskrit literature as a whole has a great many problems, as the specialists know, but most of this literature could be called neutral as far as history is concerned. That is to say, it neither actively seeks to preserve accurate chronicles, nor does it as a rule intentionally attempt to fabricate chronicles. In contrast, the Tantras represent "mystery schools". They appear, in their earlier stages, to have undergone historical transformations while being handed down in small closed circles. In a sense, the Tantric cults could be termed hostile to history, although there is the so-called 'history', much cited from the last part of the *Mañjuśrī-mūla-tantra*, that was separately studied by K.P. Jayaswal. The Early History of the Buddhist Tantras is parallelled by the early period of Mahāyāna Buddhism itself, since the Mahāyāna scriptures were obviously composed by persons centuries after the time of Gautama Buddha and yet ascribed to his authorship. The human authors of the basic Buddhist Tantras likewise omitted their personal names and ascribed the authorship to a celestial Buddha such as Vajradhara. The commentarial period of the Buddhist Tantra practically starts in the eighth century, just when these works—the basic Tantra and their young commentaries—first began to be translated into Tibetan; and this is more than a coincidence, since translation itself is a kind of uncovering or disclosure, as is commentary itself.

Now, while in Western writings about the Buddhist Tantras it has been general to speak about them with attributions, generally condemnatory—as though they were all of one piece, in fact, there are different types of Tantric literature with widely diversified content. Of the four classes of Buddhist Tantra standardized in the Tibetan Kanjur, the usual Tibetan division of three lower, the Kriyā, Caryā, and Yoga, and one higher, the Anuttarayogatantra, seems to rest on an historical basis that is susceptible of clarification. As I have laid down in a separate study on the symbolism of the Borobudur monument, these so-called 'lower tantras'--for example, the *Mahāvairocana Sūtra*—are the kind of Buddhist Tantra that was the geographically most widespread, having been influential in the 'Golden Isle' (Suvarṇadvīpa)—roughly Sumatra—and present-day Indonesia, and having entered into the formation of Borobudur in Java. It was the chief type of Tantric literature in the first period of Tibetan Buddhism (*sṅa dar*)—mainly eighth and first half of ninth centuries—was the main kind of Tantra that had any following in China and is the kind still current in the Shingon sect of Japan. In contrast, what the Tibetans call the 'higher' Tantra, the Anuttarayoga, for example, the *Guhyasamājatantra*, became popular in Northeast India in the last centuries of the Buddhist period, with the main commentarial tradition (9th to 12th centuries) roughly coinciding with the rapid decline and eclipse of Buddhism in India proper. But in Tibet the ascendency of this kind of Buddhist Tantra coincided with the 2nd period of Buddhism in Tibet, the restoration (*phyi dar*) beginning in the latter 10th century, and so the bulk of this kind of Tantric literature was translated into Tibetan with the help of various pandits who came to Tibet, often as refugees, and accordingly who also introduced the all-important 'lineages' of 'permission' (*anujñā*), and initiation (*abhiṣeka*) rituals. Since manuscripts were hard to preserve in the climate of India, except for the brief *dhāraṇīs*, most of the Sanskrit Tantric manuscripts at present extant belong to the latest class of Buddhist Tantra, the Anuttarayoga. Hence, the kind of Tantra most known to Western scholarship, which naturally respects the original Sanskrit text, either downgrading or having little competence in the Tibetan and Sino-Japanese translations of the Tantra—turns out to be precisely this Anuttarayogatantra. It follows that the judgment on the Buddhist Tantra one usually finds in Western survey-type books on Indian religion, inevitably rests upon this phase of Buddhist Tantra, which happens to be the type of Tantra that employs the sexual terminology, which while perhaps symbolical, nevertheless offends some sensibilities, which then retaliate by referring to this Tantra as 'left-hand'.

The foregoing is not meant to imply that in strictly historical sequence the three lower Tantras precede the Anuttarayogatantra. Different solutions have been advanced about the early history of these Tantras as texts in their present format, and I too have previously argued the date of the *Guhyasamājatantra*, placing this in its earliest form (say, the first twelve chapters) in the Fourth century A.D., thus in agreement with B. Bhattacharya but for different reasons from him. In the Bhandarkar Institute's Golden Jubilee Volume, I appealed to the remarkable diversification of commentarial glosses on the basic text of the *Guhyasamāja* as the basis for placing this Tantra long before its known commentaries. The point here is that when we actually peruse these books to see what is in them instead of referring to them without reading them, it turns out that the tradition reported from Taranātha that the Tantras were handed down in secret for three centuries before being made more public by the Siddhas in the 8th century—is indeed suggested by the internal clues in texts themselves, which prove a concomitant oral

tradition. Thus, the undeniably prior dissemination of the three lower Tantras is apparently due to their acceptability to the Buddhist missionaries who carried this kind of Tantra along with general Mahāyāna Buddhist texts into South-east Asia, and later conveyed it to China. The ritualism, along with incantations for expected fruits, seems to have enjoyed popularity in certain countries of South-east Asia that already had a deep rooted belief in spirits, both beneficent and hostile. Buddhism, with its high form of religion and accompanied with this type of ritualism, did not meet with the constant hostile competition of Hinduism, as it experienced in India proper; indeed Hindu-Buddhist syncretisms easily took place outside of India. Thus, the so-called 'lower' Buddhist Tantra which does not require apologies and might therefore be styled 'right-hand', had public influence in various parts of Asia in the time prior to the dissemination of the Anuttara-yogatantra, without necessarily being earlier in the sense of original composition, and in particular not being earlier in the sense of practices independent of the texts as we have them at present. As to the geographical situation of Tantra, there are indications that early Tantric Buddhism was found along the Eastern belt of India, starting in Assam in the north and continuing south through Bengal. The Tantric cults were syncretized in a sectarian manner in times difficult to pin down, and thus arose the Buddhist Tantras and the Hindu Tantras, whether Śaivite or Vaishnavite. There are indications that the kind of Buddhist Tantra called 'Mother Tantra', such as the *Śrīcakrasaṃvara* and *Hevajra*, has affinities with Kashmiri Śaivism that result from syncretisms of Śaivism and Buddhism in Kashmir during the Gupta dynasty and later. By this last observation, I mean especially the theory of winds in the body and their esoteric cycles, and the association with Śaivism becomes especially marked through the commentarial tradition on these 'Mother' Tantras. As I showed in my essay on *mantra* published in the Adyar Society's Library Bulletin Centenary Issue, the part of Tantra consisting of the mutterings called *mantra*, later the 'male' *mantra*, goes back to the Vedic era; while the 'female' *mantrā*, or *vidyā*, goes back to the Upaniṣads. According to Prof. R.N. Dandekar, the part with devotion to the guru may be pre-Vedic in India.

Tantra and the Decline of Indian Buddhism

The Western survey-type books, when including remarks about the disappearance of Buddhism from India, have tended to ascribe to the Buddhist Tantras the nefarious role of contributing to, if not hastening, the demise, through peculiar doctrines and practices quite at variance with the lofty ethics and practice enjoined by Gautama Buddha. There is a kind of circular reasoning here. The Tantra is labelled 'degenerative' and so destructive of Buddhism's public image; and then to buttress the argument it is necessary to say that the Tantras are composed very late, close to the time when they are credited with this share in the downfall of Buddhism. The implication is that they were public in nature. Then, if indeed these Tantras were composed much earlier, how are we to assess their later role? How are we to determine the public attitude toward Tantra, when it is a secretive cult with initiations in the old days given to certain disciples? And what of the probability that the practices themselves, apart from particular texts, may date back to cults that the Vedic Aryas attempted unsuccessfully to suppress and later had to come to terms with? Quite apart from the fact that there are different classes of Tantra, and that the more reprehended practices or tenets are not

ubiquitous in the range of Tantra, the judgement takes no account of the striking and inescapable fact that the Tantra in its Hindu form has enjoyed great popularity, and apparently has not contributed to the demise of Hinduism in any observable amount. Nor does the judgment take into account that the Buddhist Tantras were to enjoy great popularity among the Tibetan monks and lay orders, and did not reduce the tenacity of Buddhism among the Tibetans, *i.e.* their enthusiastic study of non-tantric subjects such as the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures, the Abhidharma, the Mādhyamika, Buddhist logic, and Vinaya in its Mūlasarvāstivādin variety. Accordingly, while not denying that the Tantra was sometime followed in a degenerate form, one must look elsewhere for the reasons of Buddhism's decline in India. The Buddhist Tantras do not appear to have fostered Buddhism's successes in India, nor really in any observably significant degree to have caused Buddhism's decline.

Remarks on Tantric Influence on India and Tibet

What then was the influence of the Buddhist Tantras in India? Suppose one follows the types of Buddhist literature, starting with the development of the Mahāyāna. It will be clear that in the beginning the creative writing was in the form of the Mahāyāna scriptures, the Prajñāpāramitā, Avataṃsaka, and Ratnakuṭa collections, and miscellaneous Mahāyāna scriptures such as the Lotus (the *Sadharmapuṇḍarīka)* and the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, and the śāstra-type literature such as celebrated works of Nāgārjuna, Aśvaghoṣa, the brothers Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, the logicians Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, and so on. And it also will be clear that in later Indian Buddhism, the creative writing was in the form of Buddhist Tantras. These gave rise to a corpus of so-called revealed Tantras which probably are not in sheer mass the equal of the Mahāyāna scriptures (the large Prajñāpāramitā scriptures themselves taking up much space), but which, with their commentarial and ancillary literature, over the centuries amounted to a bulk rivalling and perhaps exceeding that of the other commentarial traditions, such as the Mādhyamika, or Buddhist logic. Thus in the last period of Buddhism in India such an author as Ratnākaraśānti would write a bulky commentary on the Prajñāpāramitā exegesis, treatises of Yogācāra philosophy, and large commentaries on the Tantras. Besides this literary outpouring, the Tantras would make a significant contribution to Buddhist art. It is easy to see, by consulting B. Bhattacharyya's *The Buddhist Iconography* that after the early Buddha and Bodhisattva images, and the Jātaka and other decorations of the stupas, the iconography would become increasingly colored by the pentad of Buddhas, Akṣobhya, Vairocana, and so on, tantric forms of the bodhisattvas such as Avalokiteśvara, and then the goddess figures such as the Tārās. In India proper it does not appear that the Buddhist Tantric divinities in the form of bronzes were given to such radical departures as the Yab-yum figures of Nepalese-Tibetan art. However, it must be granted that the Indian evidence largely vanished when the Nalandā and Vikramaśīla institutions were destroyed in the 12th century. In any case, many of the prized remains of Indian Buddhist art have a Tantric provenance.

When we pass to Tibet, we find the Tantra honored with a glorified reception. This again is not of just one sort, because there are various Tibetan sects, some of them bitter rivals; and so the types of Buddhist Tantra followed may widely differ. One general statement can be made: The extraordinary vitality of Tantrism in Tibet for many

centuries represents a level of practice and understanding of these cults that could only have been equalled at the time when the Indian Siddhas and yogins first established the cult and produced the so-called 'revealed' Tantras and Explanatory (ākhyā) Tantras.

There is some evidence on the nature of this current from the works of Bu-ston (1290-1364) who edited the Kanjur and Tanjur—the translation of the scriptures and exegetical literature into Tibetan, usually from Sanskrit. Long ago, the late F.D. Lessing of Berkeley and I translated *Mkhas grub rje's Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras* (in abbreviation : *(rgyud sde spyi rnam)*, written in the fifteenth century. Now that the collected works of Bu-ston have been reprinted by Lokesh Chandra, it is easy to consult the three earlier works of this category written by Bu-ston. Recently, I surveyed these treatises, which are the small, the intermediate, and the large, to determine the extent to which Mkhas-grub-rie was indebted to Bu-ston's works. As I scanned these texts I noticed that Bu-ston frequently lists the chapters of a work, briefly stating the subject matter of each chapter. By this one can appreciate that Bu-ston, easily the most encyclopedic Tibetan of his day, who knew more than anyone else of what was in the great corpus of texts translated into Tibetan, was emphasising knowledge of the facts of the system. He wanted the Tibetans not to be content with following some specialized cult and remaining oblivious to the remarkable canon that was their birthright by virtue of the enormous hours in past generations of patient, exacting translation and the care taken to print and reprint these books. Thus, from his time many Tibetans followed his lead in using the authoritative works of the Kanjur and Tanjur—and we find this bent especially in the Gelugpa sect founded by Tsoṅ-kha-pa (1357 to 1419). This procedure emphasized a knowledge of the authorities in agreement on a given point, and of the authorities that disagreed. Recently in a conversation in New York a very learned Tibetan, Gomang Khen Rinpoche, with the help of an excellent interpreter, verified my observation. Thus it is from the time of Bu-ston that Tibet began sensitively to combine in a literary way the oral tradition with the translated word. Thus arose the wonderful mastery of the Tantras exhibited in the great Tibetan treatises. To my mind, it was also in Tibet that the interrelationship of the Tantra with the non-tantric literature has been most thoroughly investigated and worked out.

24

Some Political Factors in the Early History of Tibetan Buddhism

TURRELL V. WYLIE

THE MAIN purpose of this paper, which deals with some political factors that influenced the introduction and development of Buddhism in Tibet during the ancient monarchy, is to examine the reasons for the transfer of the royal court from the Yar-klungs valley to the Lha-sa region and then back to Yar-klungs again.[1]

First let us review the traditional source for Tibetan religious accounts of the ancient period. The genre of historiography known in Tibetan as *chos-'byung* (literally 'dharma-events') developed in the 'Land of the Lamas' after Buddhism had gained cultural dominance there. The oldest surviving example of the genre was composed in 1322 A.D. by Bu-ston Rin-po-che.[2] The format of Bu-ston's *chos-'byung* became the model for subsequent examples of the genre, which is generically concerned only with events of religious reference. Historical episodes, regardless of their political, economic, or social importance, were simply ignored by the later lama-historians if they were without relevance to the vicissitudes of Buddhism. Early in the second millennium A.D., the fabric of Tibetan religious life had become so interwoven with political and economic threads that *chos-'byung* accounts convey a balanced tapestry of Tibetan history.

On the other hand, some affairs of minor religious significance were transformed into major events by the lama-historians who attributed to them a metaphysical causality that is anachronistic at times and apocryphal at others. This is particularly true of *chos-'byung* accounts of the ancient monarchy. A good example is the story of the seventh-century king, Srong-btsan sgam-po. According to the *chos-'byung* tradition, this king, eulogized as the first Dharmarāja (Chos-rgyal) in Tibet, was a *sprul-sku* ("emanation") of Avalokiteśvara, the Bodhisattva of Mercy. He obtained two royal princesses in matrimonial alliances. The first was Bhṛkuti, daughter of Aṃśuvarman, king of Nepal; the second, Wen-ch'eng Kung-chu, was from the lineage of the T'ai-tsung Emperor of the T'ang dynasty in China. Both princesses were Buddhist and brought

icons with them to Tibet. The king built the Ra-sa 'phrul-snang temple to house the icon of the Nepalese princess, who was regarded as an emanation of the Green Tārā. The Ra-mo-che temple was built to house the image brought by the Chinese princess, who was an emanation of the White Tārā. Tārā is the popular goddess of mercy and the female counterpart of Avalokiteśvara.[3] The king at the age of eighty-two disappeared, together with the two princesses, into a self-originated statue of Avalokiteśvara at Lha-sa.[4]

This symbolic narrative bears little resemblance to historical realty. Although deified in late Buddhist tradition, Srong-btsan sgam-po in all probability was an illiterate monarch who practiced the shamanistic religion of the Tibetan people until his death in 649 A.D. A huge tumulus located in the 'Phyong-rgyas valley in the Yar-klungs region has been identified as his royal tomb.[5] The marriage of the Chinese princess is confirmed in the official history of the T'ang dynasty and her death in Tibet is recorded *sub-anno* 680. A.D.[6] This princess is mentioned as well in the Tun-huang *Annals*, which record her arrival in Tibet, her cohabitation with the king, and the observance of her funeral rites in 683 A.D.[7]

On the other hand, there is no mention whatsoever in the Tun-huang *Annals* of the Nepalese princess, Bhṛkuti. Even the pious *chos-'byung* accounts say nothing of the fate of the Nepalese princess other than that she disappeared into the image of Avalokiteśvara together with the king and the Chinese princess. There is no synchronic evidence to show that there ever was such an historical princess at the court of Srong-btsan sgam-po.[8] Perhaps the story of the Nepalese princess was a religious myth created in later times to give symbolic precedence to the tantric form of Buddhism introduced into Tibet from Nepal over the Chinese meditational school that was prescribed in the late eighth century.

Bal-po, the usual Tibetan name for Nepal, does occur in the Tun-huang *Annals*; however, it is first mentioned *sub-anno* 675 A.D. a quarter of a century after the death of king Srong-btsan sgam-po, and then it is identified as the site of the Tibetan court in summer. Bal-po is identified in the *Annals* as the site of the summer court in 14 years out of those between 675 and 723 A.D.[9] Since there is no synchronic evidence that the Tibetans had conquered Nepal, the Bal-po of the *Annals* surely must designate some place in Tibet rather than refer to Nepal.[10]

Nothing is said in the *Annals* about the construction of temples at Lha-sa during the reign of Srong-btsan sgam-po. In fact, the name Lha-sa does not occur at all in the *Annals*. It is generally acknowledged that Lha-sa, meaning 'Place of the Gods', was a later nominal substitution for the ancient name Ra-sa, 'Place of the Goats'. The ancient name is attested in the names of the two temples built in the area, namely Ra-sa 'phrul-snang and Ra-mo-che. Ra-sa occurs in the *Annals* but only once and then in reference to Chin-ch'eng Kung-chu, the second Chinese princess to marry a Tibetan king. It is said that she arrived at the 'Deer-park of Ra-sa' (*ra sa'i sha tsal*) in the year 710.[11] No other information is given in the *Annals* about Ra-sa.

The traditional *chos-'byung* accounts say that the Ra-sa 'phrul-snang temple was built to house the Buddhist icon brought to Tibet by the Nepalese princess and that the Ra-mo-che temple was constructed for the Chinese princess; yet, the same accounts reveal a close connection between the Nepalese temple and the Chinese icon. If there were, in fact, no Nepalese princess involved in those historical events, then it would

follow that the Ra-sa 'phrul-snang was originally built to house the Buddha-image brought to Tibet by the first Chinese princess. A late Chinese source indicates that the Ra-mo-che temple was actually built as a palatial residence for this princess.[12] It may even have been built as a palace for the second Chinese princess.[13] Be that as it may, the question relevant to this paper is why did the king build Buddhist temple(s) so far away from the traditional site of the Tibetan court? Ra-sa, the 'Place of the Goats', was located about 80 route miles northwest of the Yar-klungs valley.

It is the contention of this paper that the temples were built at the heretofore obscure 'Place of the Goats' far from the court in order to isolate and reduce the magical power of the foreign gods, *i.e.*, the Buddhist icons. If the temples were built in the traditional region of the court, the presence of the foreign gods would have offended the local shamanic deities who, in turn, could wreak havoc on the land and destroy the monarchy. Such a religious view helps to explain the vicissitudes of the Chinese icon. After the death of the Chinese princess, her image of the Buddha was buried in the sand. Later it was dug up and then walled-up in the Ra-sa 'phrul-snang temple. In the middle of the eighth century, it was hauled to a distant village near the Nepalese border, supposedly to protect it from the wrath of anti-Buddhist ministers. After Buddhism won favor at court, the icon was returned to the Ra-sa 'phrul-snang where it remained thereafter.

Late Tibetan tradition notwithstanding, the actual introduction of Buddhism came in the eighth century. The second Chinese princess, Chin-ch'eng Kung-chu, convinced the Tibetan king to give sanctuary to some Sarvāstivāda monks fleeing the onslaught of Islam in Central Asia. Afterwards a small-pox epidemic broke out and the Chinese princess died of the disease in 739 A.D. The anti-Buddhist faction at court blamed the epidemic on local deities who were offended by the presence of foreign monks and the monks were forced to leave the country.

Ma-zhang, chief minister and leader of the anti-Buddhist ministers at court, was entombed alive through treachery on the part of the pro-Buddhist faction. Thus, the main obstacle to the active introduction of Buddhism was removed. Monks began to come from China, spreading the meditational practices of the Ch'an school, and gurus were invited from India to teach Mādhyamika-Yogācāra doctrines. During the reign of the second Dharmarāja, Khri-srong lde-btsan (755-797), the first Buddhist monastery in Tibet, called Bsam-yas, was built. Bsam-yas was constructed on a desert plain in the Brag-dmar region, which was often the site of the Tibetan court in winter during that period.[14] The fact that it was built on a barren sandy plain may well suggest that the king did not wish to antagonize his feudal lords by appropriating scarce, arable land for a monastic institution of a 'foreign religion'.

The pacific influence of Buddhism at the court was limited in the beginning and in no way interfered with Tibetan military campaigns against China. In 763 the Tibetans captured the T'ang capital of Ch'ang-an and set up for a time their own emperor, who was a relative of the late Chinese princess, Chin-ch'eng. A Tibetan commander, returning from the Kokonor region, brought with him the tribal god of the Hor people of Mi-nyag. Originally a non-Buddhist deity, the tribal god, named Pe-har, was presumably an image or a totem representing an eagle. Placed in the Buddhist monastery of Bsam-yas, Pe-har became the guardian of its treasures.[15]

In time, Pe-har was adopted into the Buddhist pantheon and became chief of the

kings who guard the five directions. Tradition claims that Pe-har moved from Bsam-yas to the monastery of Tshal sometime after its founding near Lha-sa in the 12th century.[16] In the 17th century, Pe-har took up residence at Gnas-chung, a small monastic institution just west of Lha-sa. There Pe-har began to use a monk as his medium. In 1682 the 5th Dalai Lama died and for political reasons the regent concealed the death by claiming that the Dalai Lama had gone into meditative retreat. The regent employed the Gnas-chung monk as a medium of communication with the god, Pe-har, purportedly in close contact with Dalai Lama. This deception was kept up for some 15 years. In the same way that some bureaucratic offices are perpetuated long after the specific and limited purposes for which they were created have been fulfilled, a 'State Oracle', traditionally the Gnas-chung Chos-rje, a monk of the unreformed Rnying-ma-pa sect, continued to serve the Tibetan government down to modern times.[17]

In the last half of the eighth century, Buddhism gained favor at court and the followers of the Ch'an meditational school from China increased, as did those of the Indian Mādhyamika-Yogācāra school. Doctrinal differences between these two schools generated religious and social conflict. According to tradition, the Dharmarāja Khri-srong lde-btsan arranged a debate at the Bsam-yas monastery to determine which was to be the only school propagated in Tibet. The Chinese school was defended by the Ch'an master Ho-shang Mahayana, and the Indian school by Kamalaśīla, a personal disciple of the renowned Śantarakṣita. Whether this was actually a philosophical debate *in situ* or one conducted by an exchange of communications, tradition claims that it lasted two years (792-94 A.D.) and ended with the Indian school victorious. The king then issued an edict proclaiming that henceforth *only* the Indian school of Buddhism was to be spread in Tibet.[18]

Why did the Chinese school fail to win the debate? One might be tempted to see military pride as the reason. Two years before the debate began, the Tibetans again defeated the Chinese in the Tarim Basin and recaptured control over the so-called Silk Route to the western world. If the Chinese lost militarily in the Tarim Basin, why should they not be further humiliated by a religious defeat at Bsam-yas? On the other hand, when viewed from the point of view of political expediency, defeat of the Chinese school in Tibet would appear to have been a sociological necessity.

Chinese Ch'an Buddhism, with its emphasis on meditative practices, was noted during the T'ang dynasty for its violent anti-traditionalism. It maintained that since all dharmas are mere ideation, enlightenment can only be experienced in an *instant* devoid of egocentric, cognitive dualistic thought. Consequently traditional Buddhist practices, such as textual study, ritual observances, performances of wholesome acts, and worship of pantheonistic deities, were not only useless activities but, in reality, counter-productive to obtaining enlightenment.

One the other hand, the Indian school, while acknowledging the importance of meditation, emphasized the *gradual* path that leads to enlightenment, which results from the accumulation of wholesome karma earned by following the traditional course of Buddhist social ethics and religious conduct.

In short, acceptance in Tibet of the Chinese instant meditational method with its anti-traditionalism, could encourage anti-social behavior and even lead to anarchy. The Indian gradual method would, however, encourage acceptance of the karmically-determined *status quo*, resulting in adherence to a hierarchical social structure. Moreover,

the Indian system would allow admission of the shamanic gods and demons of the Tibetan people into its pantheon, while the Chinese system would reject them completely. Putting religious doctrines aside and keeping in mind the socio-political needs of the Tibetan king in the eighth century, it is not difficult to see why the Indian system of Buddhism won the 'debate' and why an edict was issued prescribing the Chinese meditational school.

Antagonism to Buddhism at court on the part of the anti-Buddhist ministers was exacerbated by the political policies of the third—and last—Dharmarāja, who is best known by the epithet Ral-pa-can, "Long-hair". This king, a Buddhist fanatic, ascended the throne in 815 and maintained his court at Lha-sa, close to the sacred temple(s) and icons, which had been relegated to the obscure 'Place of the Goats' (Ra-sa) by the first Dharmarāja in the 7th century.

Ral-pa-can was the first Tibetan king to appoint a Buddhist monk as chief minister. He brought to completion the *Mahāvyutpatti*, a Sanskrit-Tibetan lexicon begun by his father for the purpose of standardizing the Tibetan translations of Buddhist canonical works. Ral-pa-can's fanatical patronage of Buddhism caused him to take a politico-economic step which, in view of the predominance of faith in shamanism among his subjects, was premature to say the least. The king imposed a monastic tax on the people, making seven households responsible for the welfare of one monk. The number of Tibetans entering the monastic order was increasing and taxation to support them surely strained the purses as well as the patience of the people. Then, to add injury to penury, the king decreed that the people were not to ridicule the monks. Anyone pointing a finger at a monk in derision would have the finger cut off.

Unsuprisingly, the anti-Buddhist faction at court finally assassinated Ral-pa-can circa 836 A.D. and elevated his brother, Glang-dar-ma, nicknamed 'U-dum' 'Baldy', to the throne, Persecution of Buddhism ensued. The translation of canonical works was stopped at Bsam-yas monastery and the foreign gurus were forced to leave the country. Tibetans who had taken monastic vows were allowed to recant, embrace shamanism, or be killed. The situation is paraphrased in the religious tradition as one in which 'the lamp of the Dharma was extinguished in central Tibet'.

In 842 a devout Buddhist monk, Dpal-gyi rdo-rje of Lha-lung, exhorted by the sanguinary goddess, Dpal-ldan Lha-mo, murdered the bald king, Glang-dar-ma, with a bow and arrow. The monk-assassin made good his escape. This assassination, purportedly motivated by compassion, created an irreparable crack in the very foundation of the ancient monarchy.

The viability of the Tibetan monarchy, which had become a veritable empire by the early ninth century, depended basically on the unquestioned and undivided loyalty of the feudal lords to a singular liege. The assassinations of Ral-pa-can and Glang-dar-ma obliterated the defined line of royal descent and opened the way to political fragmentation and divided loyalties.

According to tradition, when Glang-dar-ma was assassinated, his senior queen was without issue, but the junior queen had a son and some of the ministers regarded him as the rightful heir to the throne. The senior queen then obtained the son of another woman and claimed him as her own. This split the court. Whether this story is true or not is of little importance to this paper; what is relevant here was the political aftermath of the schism.

Those ministers who appear to have been the pro-Buddhist faction at court supported the junior queen and elevated her son, 'Od-srungs, to the throne at Lha-sa. This king is said to have honored the Three Jewels *i.e.*, the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha. He was succeeded by his son, Dpal-'khor-btsan, who also honored the Three Jewels. This king was murdered by his subjects in Myang-stod, the upper reaches of the Myang River in Gtsang, the westerly province of central Tibet. The traditional accounts give no indication whether this king had moved his court from Lha-sa to Myang-stod or was simply visting in that region but, they do specify that he was put to death by 'stretching' (*snyags*).[19] After the death of this king, one of his sons established a small kingdom in the Ru-lag district of western Gtsang; however, since the Tibetan religious histories do not give an account of his kingdom or his descendants, it may be assumed that he abandoned the Three Jewels and returned to the shamanistic religion of the people. On the other hand, the other son went west and founded a kingdom in the Spu-rang region south of Lake Manasarowar. The vicissitudes of this kingdom dominate the pages of Tibetan religious history for generations simply because the so-called 'renaissance' of Buddhism began there. In fact, the traditional sources continue to chronicle the events of the western kingdom long after the Tibetan ruling lineage descended from Ral-pa-can and Glang-dar-ma was replaced by Khasa invaders.[20]

Returning to the split in the court at Lha-sa, those ministers who supported the senior queen and her adopted son, Yum-brtan, returned to the Yar-klungs valley—the traditional site of the Tibetan court before the introduction of Buddhism—and there established yet another kindgom. This symbolic return to the traditional region of the old, pre-Buddhist court apparently made the new Yar-klungs kingdom an anathema to later lama-historians for it simply disappears from the pages of their religious historiography.

By the end of the ninth century the Tibetan empire was no more and the monarchy was divided into three minor kingdoms. In time, even these fragmented and Tibet became a land of numerous hegemonies. Tibet remained without a centralized form of government until the 13th century when one was imposed upon it by the Mongols.

The rise and fall of the ancient monarchy can be directly connected to socio-political conflict between those who followed the traditional religion of Tibetan people and those who favored the propagation of Buddhism. The progression of the site of the royal court from the Yar-klungs valley to the Lha-sa area and then back to the Yar-klungs valley may be characterized by the reigns of the three kings eulogized in Tibetan religious history as Dharmarājas.

The first Dharmarāja, Srong-btsan sgam-po, appears as an illiterate animist who expanded a feudal kingdom into a monarchy and established relations with the advanced civilizations of China and India. He isolated the beginnings of Buddhist influence by building temple(s) far from the site of the court to avoid antagonizing his subjects, who followed a shamanic religion.

Over a century later, the second Dharmarāja, Khri-srong lde-btsan, appears as an astute monarch who could envision the political and social, as well as religious, benefits to be gained by the spread of the Indian *gradual* school of Buddhism in Tibet. His court in the Brag-dmar region was the capital of a vast empire and his armies won major victories against the T'ang dynasty in China. The building of Bsam-yas monastery at Brag-dmar was the beginning of the monastic community in Tibet.

The third and last Dharmarāja, Ral-pa-can, ruled at Lha-sa with religious fanaticism and political imprudence. In view of the small minority of Buddhist followers among his subjects, the tax he imposed on them to support a growing monastic community was premature. His excessive patronage of Buddhism and its monks set in motion a chain of events that led directly to the collapse of the monarchy and the fragmentation of political unity in Tibet.

In conclusion, the assassinations of Ral-pa-can and his brother, Glang-dar-ma, reflected the pernicious conflict between shamanism and Buddhism in the court at Lha-sa. That religious conflict, in turn, was an expression of the covert competition for political and economic power that undermined and finally destroyed the monarchy. Lha-sa, 'Place of the Gods', faded into political obscurity until the 17th century when it again became the capital city : not of a monarchy, but of a theocratic government brought to power by Mongol military intervention.

FOOTNOTES

1. Thanks to a Fellowship from the American Council of Learned Societies, I was able to spend the academic year 1973-1974 in Rome, researching the rise and fall of theocratic government in Tibet. The materials presented in this paper are based in part on that research.
2. D.S. Ruegg, "The Life of Bu-ston Rin Po Che", *Serie Orientale Roma* XXXIV, (Rome : Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1966), XVIII, p. 192.
3. Stephan Beyer, *The Cult of Tārā : Magic and Ritual in Tibet*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), XXI, p. 542.
4. B.I. Kuznetsov, *Rgyal Rabs Gsal Ba'i Me Long* (Leiden : E.J. Brill, 1966), Chapter 17, pp. 141-158.
5. Giuseppe Tucci, "The Tombs of the Tibetan Kings", *Serie Orientale Roma* I, (Rome : Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1956), p, 32; Alfonsa Ferrari, "mK'yen brtse's Guide to the Holy Places of Central Tibet", *Serie Orientale Roma* XVI, (Rome : Is MEO, 1958), pp. 52-53.
6. Paul Pelliot, *Histoire Ancienne du Tibet*, (Paris : Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient, 1961), pp. 4, 10.
7. Bacot, Thomas, Toussaint, *Documents de Touen-houang relatifs a l'Histoire du Tibet*, (Paris : Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1940), pp. 13, 16.
8. For a detailed study of this issue see Giuseppe Tucci, "The Wives of Sroṅ btsan sgam po", *Oriens Extremus*, 9 Jahrgang, Heft 1, (Wiesbaden : Otto Harrassowitz, 1962), pp. 121-126.
9. Chang Kun, "An Analysis of the Tunhuang Tibetan Annals", *Journal of Oriental Studies*, Vol. V, Nos. 1-2, (Hong Kong, 1959/60), pp. 155-160.
10. For a detailed discussion on the identification of Bal-po see Paul Demiéville, *Le Concile de Lhasa*, (Paris : Imprimerie Nationale de France, 1952), pp. 200-201.
11. Bacot, Thomas, Toussaint, *op.cit.*, p. 20.
12. It is said that the three-story palace faced east toward China because the princess longed for her homeland (*Wei-tsang-t'ung-chih*, Chapter VI, pp. 4-5).
13. See Demiéville, *op.cit.*, pp. 201-202.
14. Chang Kun, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-164.
15. Giuseppe Tucci, *Tibetan Painted Scrolls*, (Roma : La Libreria dello Stato, 1949), II, pp. 735-736).
16. Ferrari, *op.cit.*, p. 106.
17. Réne de Nebesky-Wojkowitz, *Oracles*

and Demons of Tibet, ('S-Gravenhage : Muton & Co., 1956), pp. 444-454.

18. R. A. Stein, *Tibetan Civilization*, (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 67-68.

19. *Snyags*, alternately given as *snyegs*, is defined as "stretched out" (H.A. Jäschke, A Tibetan-English Dictionary [London : Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1949], p. 200), but the actual significance of the word is obscure. How the death was accomplished by stretching remains unknown, but one might assume it was a method of execution that did not shed blood. The occurence of bloodless executions in the ancient period should not be ignored. Kamalaśila died from having his kidneys pinched. The Buddhist monk who served as Ral-pa-can's chief minister was executed by having cloth stuffed down his throat, and Ral-pa-can himself was assassinated by having his neck broken when his head was forced around backwards. In these cases the assassins were acting for the anti-Buddhist faction. Perhaps this king who was stretched to death was executed by his anti-Buddhist subjects.

20. Traditional religious history lists 25 kings who ruled the western Tibetan kingdom beginning with Skyid-lde nyi-ma mgon, the great-grandson of Glang-dar-ma himself, down to Pṛthvīmalla who reigned in the last half of the 14th century. Although these kings are all listed as if they belonged to the direct lineage of central Tibetan royalty, those counted from the 11th to the 16th were actually Khasa rulers and the last nine of the list were Malla kings. For a detailed study of this diverse ruling identity see Giuseppe Tucci, "Preliminary Report on Two Scientific Expeditions in Nepal". *Serie Orientale Roma*, X, (Roma : IsMEO, 1956), 153. pp. and 61 plates.

25

Premises and Implications of 'Interdependence' (Pratityasamutpada)

ISSHI YAMADA

I

IT IS GENERALLY accepted that the principle of interdependence (*paṭiccasamuppāda* in Pāli, *pratītyasamutpāda* in Sanskrit) is expressed by the four-clause formula, and that the twelve-factored interdependence (*dvādaśāṅgika-pratītyasamutpāda*) is one of many applications of this principle and the most highly-developed form of it to be found in the *Āgama*.[1] The Buddha instructs Udāyin with the four-clause formula thus :

> Wherefore, Udāyin, let the past (or beginning) be, let the future (or end) be. I will teach you Dhamma :
> "When this is, that is;
> This arising, that arises;
> When this is not, that is not;
> This ceasing, that ceases."[2]

The twelve factors are :

(1) *avijjā* or *avidyā* (being-ignorant or ignorance);
(2) *saṅkhāra* or *saṃskāra* (volitional action or *karma*-formation);
(3) *viññāna* or *vijñāna* (being-conscious or consciousness);
(4) *nāmarūpa* (mental and physical phenomena, *i.e.*, the objects of cognition or mind and body);
(5) *saḷāyatana* or *ṣaḍāyatana* (six-fold sense-faculty or five physical sense-organs and one mental sense-organ);
(6) *phassa* or *sparśa* (sensorial and mental contact);

(7) *vedanā* (sensation);
(8) *taṇhā* or *tṛṣṇā* (thirst or desire);
(9) *upādāna* (clinging or attachment);
(10) *bhava* (process of becoming or existence);
(11) *jāti* (being-born or birth);
(12) *jarāmaraṇa* (becoming-old and dying or decay and death) and also *soka-parideva-dukkha-domanass 'upāyāsa* (grief, lamentation, sorrow, distress, unrest).

The relation of the four-clause formula to the twelve-factored interdependence can be illustrated in the *Majjhima-nikāya* No. 38, *Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya-sutta :*

In the form of questions and answers, the Buddha *explains* the twelve-factored dependent origination beginning with "Through being-born are conditioned becoming-old and dying" (*jāti-paccayā jarāmaraṇaṃ*, 11/12) and ending with "Through being-ignorant are conditioned volitional actions" (*avijjā-paccayā saṅkhārā* 1/2).

Then, declaring the first two clauses of the principle, *i.e.*, "When this is, that is; This arising, that arises" *(Imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti; Imass 'uppādā idaṃ uppajjati)*, the Buddha *enumerates* the twelve factors in the *reversal* sequence beginning with *avijjā-paccayā saṅkhārā* (1/2) and ending with *jāti-pacaayā jarāmaraṇaṃ sokaparidevadukkhadomanass' upāyāsā sambhavanti* (11/12).

Then the Buddha concludes, "Such is the arising of this entire aggregate of suffering" (*evam etassa kevalassa dukhkakkhandhassa samudayo hoti*).[3]

The discussion continues in the same manner. The Buddha *explains* the twelve-factored dependent cessation beginning with "Being-born ceasing, becoming-old and dying cease" (*jāti-nirodhā jarāmaraṇa-nirodho*, 11/12) and ending with "Being-ignorant ceasing, volitional actions cease" (*avijjā-nirodhā saṅkhāra-nirodho*, 1/2).

Then declaring the last two clauses of the principle, *i.e.*, "When this is not, that is not; This ceasing, that ceases" (*Imasmiṃ asati idam na hoti; Imassa nirodhā idam nirujjhati*), the Buddha *enumerates* the twelve factors in the *reversal* sequence beginning with *avijjā-nirodhā saṅkhārā-nirodho* (1/2) and ending with *jāti-nirodhā jarāmaraṇam sokaparidevadukkhadomanass upāyāsā nirujjhanti* (11/12).

Then the Buddha *concludes*, "Such is the ceasing of this entire aggregate of suffering" (*evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa nirodho hoti*).[4]

The variations of interdependence in the Āgama can be shown as follows :

(A) *Dukkha-kkhandhassa Samudaya* or Arising of Suffering—

Principle : *Imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti;*
Imass'uppādā idaṃ uppajiati.
Application : *Ida-paccayatā* or Dependent Origination
(*a*) Natural Sequence :

jāti-paccayā jarāmaraṇaṃ	(11/12)
bhava-paccayā jāti	(10/11)
upādāna-paccayā bhavo	(9/10)
taṇhā-paccayā upādānaṃ	(8/9)

vedanā-paccayā taṇhā (7/8)
phassa-paccayā vedanā (6/7)
saḷāyatana-paccayā phasso (5/6)
nāmarūpa-paccayā soḷāyatana (4/5)
viññaṇa-paccayā nāmarūpaṃ (3/4)
saṅkhāra-paccayā viññāṇaṃ (2/3)
avijjā-paccayā saṅkhārā (1/2)

(*b*) Reversal Sequence :
avijjā-paccayā saṅkhārā (1/2)
———
jāti-paccayā jarāmaraṇaṃ sokaparidevadukkhadomanass'upāyāsā sambhavanti (11/12)

(B) *Dukkha-kkhandhassa Nirodhā* or Ceasing of Suffering—

Principle : *Imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti;*
Imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati.
Application : *Ida-nirodhatā* or Dependent Cessation
(*a*) Natural Sequence :
jāti-nirodhā jarāmaraṇa-nirodho (11/12)
———
avijjā-nirodhā saṅkhāra-nirodho (1/2)

(*b*) Reversal Sequence :
avijjā-nirodhā saṅkhāra-nirodho (1/2)
———
jāti-nirodhā jarāmaraṇaṃ sokaparidevadukkhadomanass'upāyāsā nirujjhanti (11/12)

From what is said above, it will immediately become clear that *paṭiccasamuppāda* explains how sufferings arise and how they cease, but not their first origin or final end. The arising of suffering (*dukkha-samudaya*) : (A) is "Interdependence moving onwards towards transmigration (*saṃsāra*)", whereas ceasing of suffering (*dukkha-nirodhā*), (B) is "Interdependence moving backwards towards Nirvāṇa[5] (*Nibbāna*)". (A) leads to the world of the unenlightened, while (B) to the world of the enlightened. (A) relates itself to the second truth, and (B) to the third truth of the Four Noble Truths (*dukkha-, samudaya-,*[6] *nirodhā*-and *mārga-ārya satya*) of the Buddha. Both are the central concern of the Buddha, who says :

> Formerly and now also, bhikkhus, it is just suffering and the cessation of suffering that I proclaim.[7]

In contrast to the distinction of (A) and (B), traditionally known as *anuloma* and *paṭiloma*, the distinction of (*a*) and (*b*) was often ignored by many modern writers on Buddhism, because usually only the (*b*) sequence is listed and the significance of the premises and implications involved in the (*a*) sequence has passed unnoticed.[8]

The inquiry of the Buddha begins with the sequence (*a*) therefore, it is natural and primary. This sequence leads to "interdependence". The sequence (*b*) on the other hand,

is the enumeration of the factors involved in the sequence (*b*). This sequence leads to "causation", a systematic re-arrangement of the order of conditions and consequences.

The Buddha's concern is primarily soteriological, centering around the cessation of suffering (*dukkha-nirodhā*); hence his inquiry into the twelve-factored *paṭiccasamuppāda* begins with the sequence (B-*a*), followed by other sequences; it ends with sequence (A-*b*) For him, no one sequence is complete by itself without the others, for all the sequences point to the true nature of things in reality, which cannot be grasped by the dichotomous exclusion of others.

Once the sequence (A-*b*) is established, on the other hand, it presents a systematic re-arrangement of the order of things based on conditions and consequences. The reversal sequence (*b*) becomes a clear and convenient account of the twelve factors of the causation theory. Therefore, whenever the twelve factors are mentioned in a formularized way without a full explanation, they are enumerated in the reversal sequence. For instance, in the *Desanā*[9] there is an account of the twelve aṅgas in the sequences (A-*b*) and (B-*b*); whereas the *Vibhaṅga*[10] takes up only the sequences (A-b) from the *Desanā*, and gives an explanation of each aṅga but not the relationship between them.

Consequently, this type of investigation along with the reversal sequence of the twelve aṅgas became the typical style of the Abhidharma[11] texts. Their concern centers around the analysis of each aṅga, the examination of the causal relationships between them and the establishment of a mechanical theory of karma and rebirth.[12]

Different concerns presuppose different premises, and different premises bring forth different implications.

II

1. *The Natural Sequence of the Buddha*

There is a great difference in understanding paṭiccasamuppāda, depending on whether one sees it by the natural sequence of the Buddha (*a*) or by the reversal sequence of the Abhidharma (*b*). These two sequences are quite different from the traditional *anuloma* and *paṭiloma* sequences (A & B).

The twelfth *aṅga*, "becoming-old, dying, grief, lamenting, sorrow, distress, unrest", from which the Buddha begins his explanation, is a vivid description of the state of human existence in which one finds oneself. He then asks a question, "When what condition does not exist do becoming-old and dying not exist"? The answer arrived at is "being-born" (*jāti*), the opposite of "becoming-old and dying" (*jarāmaraṇa*), because, "through being-born are conditioned becoming-old and dying". The next question is, "When what condition does not exist does being-born not exist"? The answer is "process of becoming" (*bhava*), the dialectically conceived 'unity of opposites' that includes both *jarāmaraṇa* and *jāti*. The process of becoming (*bhava*) represents "transiency" (*anityatā*), which is the observable fact of life. These three factors are simultaneous.

The process of becoming (*bhava*) contains the possibility of either going to lower or higher realms of existence.[13] Neither confirmation of bhava (*bhava-taṇhā*) nor denial of bhava (*vibhavataṇhā*) leads to the cessation of suffering (*dukkha-nirodhā*). The Arhat is said to be the one who has "gone beyond all bhava"[14] or who has "transcended *bhava*".[15]

Here again we can preceive the dialectical thinking pattern of the Buddha.

The process of becoming conditions one's mode of life, but it is also conditioned by one's mental and physical activities, which can be termed personality or inclinations in one's way of life. Thus what follows next are four factors concerning physical and mental activities. "Clinging" (*upādānā*),[16] is the manifested physical action, taking what one likes and abandoning what one dislikes; while "thirst" (*taṇhā*)[17] is the manifested mental action, desiring what one loves and hating what one detastes. Clinging and thirst are conditioned by the potential actions of "feeling" (*vedanā*)[18] which is mental and "contact" (*phassa*)[19] which is physical.

All mental and physical activities are conditioned by the basic mental action of cognition. Thus the three factors involved in the cognizing function arise, *i.e.*, "six-fold sense-faculty"[20] (*saḷāyatana*=five physical indriyas and one mental manas), "mental and physical phenomena" [*nāmarūpa*[21]=six-fold sense-object=five *viṣayas* and *dharma* corresponding to *manas*), and "being-conscious" (*viññaṇa*[22]=six-fold cognition). These three factors, which are classified as the eighteen-dhātus, are simultaneous.

Cognition (*viññāṇa*) is conditioned through physical, verbal and mental "volitional actions" (*saṅkhāra*).[23] These volitional actions are imbued with the basic nature of an unenlightened person, *i.e.*, "being ignorant" (*avijjā*)[24] regarding the Four Noble Truths and when ignorance ceases, suffering ceases.

In this way the twelve-factored interdependence explains how suffering arises from wrong views and wrong actions, and how it ceases with right views and right actions.

The twelve *aṅgas* are not so much a chain of causes in which the cause precedes the effect in rigid order, but the mutually interdependent factors of human existence.

2. *The Reversal Sequence of the Abhidharma*

On the other hand, the twelve-factored interdependence examined only from the point of view of the sequence (A-*b*) presents quite a different perspective. Then the whole notion of the twelve-factored dependent origination becomes the "chain of causation". "Ignorance" (*avijjā*) is the basic cause of suffering (*dukkha-samudaya*) and "thirst" (*taṇhā*) is its direct cause. In this perspective *avijjā* is taken as more than the mode of human existence of "being ignorant"; it is "ignorance" as the cause from which human misery originates.[25]

Ignorance (*avijjā*) causes the "karmic formations" (*saṅkhārā*). *Saṅkhārā* (plural) are the accumulation of the karmic force of the past life based on *avijjā*, which in turn influences the next element, "consciousness"[26] (*viññāṇa*). Consciousness here is taken as more than the mental function; and it is called "consciousness-body" (*viññāṇakāya*)[27] and came to be identified with mind (*citta*). Consciousness (*viññāṇa*), name-and-form (*nāmarūpa*) and the six faculties (*salāyatana*) are the three elements through which cognition takes place, *i.e.*, respectively, mind, sense-objects and sense-organs. When these three elements come into "contact" (*phassa*), there arises the result "sensation" (*vedanā*), which brings forth the mental action of "desire" (*taṇhā*), which in turn results in the physical action of "attachment" (*upādāna*). Existence (*bhava*) is the result of the past *karma* (*kamma-bhava*)[28] thus, accumulated. At the same time, it is the karmic force that determines the future life. In this way the unenlightened man (*puthujjana, pṛthagjana*) repeats "birth" (*jāti*) and "old-age and death" (*jarāmaraṇa*) in the hapless cycle of saṃsāra.

The investigation of the Abhidharmists soon developed into the theory of the "twofold causation extending to the three times",[29] which divided the twelve-links into past (1 & 9), present (3 & 10) and future (11 & 12) existences. It was a logical outcome of the understanding of the twelve-factored paṭiccasamuppāda by the sequence of (A-*b*). According to this theory, "ignorance" (*avijjā*) is the indirect cause and "karma-formations"[30] (*saṅkhārā*) are the direct causes which effect the present life. "Consciousness" (*viññāṇa*) is thus brought into existence at the first moment of conception in the mother's womb.[31] Therefore it was called the "consciousness-body of rebirth" (*paṭisandhi-viññāṇa-kāya*).[32] In this connection a theory of embryology was introduced together with the concept of the *gandhabba*[33] (*gandharva* in Sanskrit). "Consciousness", "mind and body" (*nāmarūpa*) "six faculties" (*saḷāyatana*), "contact" (*phassa*) and "feeling" (*vedanā*) are the five fruits of the present. "Thirst" (*taṇhā*) and "attachment" (*upādāna*) are indirect causes and "existence" (*bhava*) is the direct cause in the present for the fruition of the future life as "rebirth" (*jāti*) and "decay and death" (*jarāmaraṇa*). Thus the cycle of saṃsāra continues.

In this way the Abhidharma understanding of the twelve-factored *paṭiccasamuppāda* became strongly imbued with the ideas of causal law and karma theory. The chain of cause and effect was understood strictly as one-to-one[34] correlating causal relationships with the flow of time. The cause precedes the effect. The twelve factors involved are taken to explain the order of causal relationships running through man's past, present and future lives. As the elements (*dharmas*) of cause and effect, all twelve *aṅgas* are given "substantiality" as a matter of fact. The analysis of the elements constituting human existence and the world developed, and the Sarvāstivādins came to organise all elements (*dharmas*), seventyfive in number, under five[35] categories : matter (*rūpa*), mind (*citta*), mental function (*caitasika* or *citta-samprayukta-saṃskāra-dharma*), elements neither material nor mental function (*citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra-dharma*) and non-conditioned elements (*asaṃskṛta-dharma*) as opposed to the conditioned elements (*saṃskṛta-dharma*) of the former four categories. They maintained the thesis that each *dharma* keeps its self-character (*svalakṣaṇa*),[36] existing as an entity, and that the self-nature (*svabhāva*) of each *dharma* exists throughout past, present and future.[37] Their main concern became to establish the order (*dharmatā*) of existing things (*dharmas*) on the basis of the law of causality.[38] They succeeded in firmly establishing the Path of the Arhat, and yet they came to stand on a different ontological principle from that of the Buddha. It was this discrepancy that Mahāyānists pointed out and that brought forth a conception of a new ontological principle. They came to term the Abhidharma theory of *paṭiccasamuppāda* as the "*karma*-activated dependent origination theory" (Gōkan Engi Setsu 業感縁起説).

III

1. *The Reciprocal Relationship, or Aññamañña*

Among the various explanations given by the Buddha regarding the relationships between the factors (*aṅga*) of *paṭiccasamuppāda*, that of "*viññāṇa*" and "*nāmarūpa*" is not a one-directional causation but a two-way reciprocal relationship. This particular case appears in the Buddha's discourse of the *Mahānidāna-suttanta*,[39] where the nine-factored

paṭiccasamuppāda is explained. In the *Saṃyutta-nikāya*, XII, 67, *Naḷakalāpiya*,[40] Sāriputta explains the ten-factored *paṭiccasamuppāda* to Mahākoṭṭhita beginning with *jāti-paccayā jarāmaraṇaṃ* and ending with *viññāṇa-paccayā nāmarūpaṃ*, which is followed by *nāmarūpa paccayā viññāṇaṃ*. Thus the formation of the arising of suffering (*dukkha-kkhandhassa samudaya*) becomes *nāmarūpa-paccayā viññāṇaṃ, viññāṇa-paccayā nāmarū-pam, nāmarupa paccayā-saḷāyatanam*—, while that of the cessation of suffering (*dukkha-kkhandhassa nirodhā*) becomes *nāmarūpa-nirodhā viññāṇa-nirodho, viññāṇa-nirodhā nāmarū-panrrodho, nāmarūpa-nirodhā saḷāyantana-nirodho*—. Furthermore, Sāriputta explains this reciprocal relationship between "cognition" (*viññāṇa*) and "objects of cognition" (*nāma-rūpa*) using the simile of sheaves of reeds, *i.e.*, two sheaves of reeds can stand leaning against one another (*dve nalakalāpiyo aññamaññam nissāya tiṭṭheyyuṃ*),[41] but should one of them be taken away the other would fall, and *vise versa.* We shall call this the *Aññamañña* relationship.

The peculiarity of this reciprocal relationship was duly noted by the Abhidharmists,[42] but it seems the profound implications of this reciprocal relationship were overlooked by them.

2. *The Non-temporal or Akālika Relationship*

The reciprocal relationship (*aññamañña*) is at the same time, a relationship that does not involve time, *i.e.*, *akālika.* The relationship between "cognition" (*viññāṇa*), "sense-objects" (*nāmarūpa*) and "sense organs" (*saḷāyatana*) is simultaneous. We cannot posit any one of them without the others or prior to the others. Apart from the relationship between *viññāṇa* and *nāmarūpa*, the Buddha did not explicitly state the reciprocal, hence simultaneous relationship between the other *aṅgas.* It is possible, however, to understand that he implied the same type of relationship among other *aṅgas, e.g.,* the relationship between "decaying and dying" (*jarāmaraṇa*), "being born" (*jāti*) and "process of becoming" (*bhava*) as being simultaneous. Looked at from the temporal sequence, birth precedes death, hence birth is the cause of death. Looked at from the point of view of a logical relationship, the process of becoming (*bhava*) includes birth and death, hence their relationship is simultaneous and does not involve time.

The causal relationship appears to involve time, in such a manner that the cause precedes the effect; yet without cause there cannot be any effect, so without effect there cannot be any cause. The causal relationship involving time includes the logical relationship that does not involve time. The relationship that involves time, *i.e.*, the causal relationship, is physical and factual; whereas the relationship that does not involve time, *i.e.*, the *akālika* relationship, is logical and conceptual. In the *akālika* relationship, "when x is, y is" means simultaneously "when y is, x is"; furthermore there is no time difference between x and y, because the two factors are mutually dependent as "when x is not, y is not" and "when y is not, x is not".

We shall call this the *Akālika* relationship, because after the discourse on *paṭiccasa-muppāda*, including the four-clause formula and the twelve-*aṅgas* in the sequences A-*a* & *b* and B-*a* & *b*, the Buddha says :

> It is good, monks. You, monks, have been presented by me with this dhamma, which is immediately visible (*sandhiṭṭhika*), timeless (*akālika*), a come-and-see thing

(*ehipassika*), leading onwards (towards Nibbāna) (*opanayīko*), to be understood individually by the wise (*paccattam veditabbo viññūhi*).[43]

It should be noted, however, the phrase "*sandhiṭṭhiko akāliko chipassiko opanyaiko paccattam vdditabbo viññūhi*" is one of the stylistic cliches found in the Āgama,[44] which emphasizes the universality and unchangeableness of the Truth (*dharma*) that the Buddha comprehended and taught. The term "timeless", (*akālika*), which is the opposite of "*kālika*" (that which is related to time), means in the above-mentioned quotation "timeless, hence not changing along with the course of time, *i.e.*, constant". It can, however, also mean "timeless, hence not involving time, *i.e.*, simultaneous".

Secondly, the text begins with the pernicious view of Sāti Bhikkhu, a fisherman's son, who said, "In so far as I understand the dhamma taught by the Buddha, it is this consciousness (*viññāṇa*) itself that runs on, fares on, not another".[45] Strongly denying this, the Buddha explains the anātman doctrine by means of the *paṭiccasamuppāda* theory. Thus both *anātaman* and *paṭiccasamuppāda* can be the subject matter of this text, *i.e.*, "this *dhamma*" in the above quotation.

3. *The Tetralemma and Causation Theory*

The *Naḷakalāpiya* of the *Samyutta-nikāya* presents us with an interesting discussion between Mahākoṭṭhita and Sāriputta, which appears to be an almost mutual reconfirmation of how these two chief disciples understood the meaning of the Buddha's teaching of Interdependence. Mahākoṭṭhita presents the following tetralemma[46] to Sāriputta: whether "decay and death" (*jarāmaraṇa*) is self-made (*sayamkata, svayaṃkṛta*) or other-made (*paramkata, paramkṛta*) or both-self-and-other-made (*sayaṃkatañ ca paraṃkatañ ca*) or neither-self-nor-other-made (*asayamkataṃ aparamkataṃ*). To this Sāriputta replies that "decay and death" is neither of the afore-mentioned alternatives, but it is dependent on birth (*jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṃ*). In the same manner, "birth" (*jāti*) is neither of the tetralemma, but is dependent on the process of becoming (*bhavapaccayā jāti*). In this way their questions and answers regarding the other factors of interdependence continue.

The early Buddhists were well aware of the tetralemma involved in the causation theory[47]. If the effect originates from the cause, they would face the alternative that either the effect existed in the cause (*sat-kārya-vāda*), hence deriving from itself (*sayaṃkata, svayaṃkṛta*) or the effect did not exist in the cause (*asat-kārya-vāda*)[48] deriving from another (*paramkata, paraṃkṛta*). The former alternative is contradictory, because there is no necessity of something originating from itself. The latter alternative is also contradictory, because nothing can originate from an unrelated thing (*ahetuka*). The third and the fourth alternatives also do not explain the nature of the relationship.

The *idapaccayatā* then, points to the nature of the relationship among the factors of existence. It clarifies the fact of relatedness, interdependence, relativity of the factors that are conditioned (*paṭiccasamuppanna*), as well as conditioning (*paṭiccasamuppāda*), and yet it invalidates our understanding of the conditionality of factors as "cause" and 'effect", because, logically speaking, by the *principium identitatis* and *principium contradictionis*, cause and effect cannot exist simultaneously. When the cause is present, the effect cannot be present by definition; and if the effect is present, the cause cannot be present. Yet the two must be related or concommitant, otherwise their relationship cannot

be established. The fact of relatedness or the nature of their relationship, then, is beyond the ken of our understanding *i.e.*, other than the tetralemma which includes every possible way of viewing the relationship of cause and effect. Thus interdependence (*idapaccayatā*) is not only a description of the fact of relatedness or relativity of cause and effect, but it also points to the mode of existence of cause and effect that exist interdependently.[49] Without the cause the effect cannot be, and yet whenever the cause is present, the effect cannot be present. Without the effect the cause cannot be; and yet whenever the effect is present, the cause cannot be present. Cause and effect are concommitant, yet they cannot co-exist by definition. We cannot posit "own-character" (*sva-lakṣaṇa*), "own-nature" (*sva-bhāva*),[50] or "entity or substantiality" (*ātman*) to either "cause" or "effect" without the other.

4. *Parasparāpekṣā, or Mutual Interdependence*

We come to notice that the relationship of *idapaccayatā* in the Āgama we have examined so far is based on the *a priori* presupposition that the factors involved are existing things each with its "own-character" (*svalakṣaṇa*) and "own-nature" (*svabhāva*). Even the reciprocal relationship (*aññam aññam nissāya*) is concerned with the relationship between two existing things, which were *a priori* posited as existing substantially (*svalakṣaṇa* and *svabhāva*) and which were examined in such ways as "when x is, y is" and "when y is, x is".

The question can be raised regarding the nature of existence of the factors involved in this mutual dependence. If "when x is not, y is not" and "when y is not, x is not", then "what is the nature of x, which cannot exist without depending on y"? and "what is the nature of y, which cannot exist without depending on x"? We come to the conclusion that if x cannot exist without depending on y and y cannot exist without depending on x, x is not an entity in itself and y is not an entity in itself. In reality no entity exists, hence *anātman*, *niḥsvabhāva* and *śūnya*; it is the conceptualization by our intellect that posits substantiality to things that have no substantiality in themselves.

Through an investigation of mutual interdependence (*parasparāpekṣā*),[51] which is the way things exist, Buddhists came to discover that no separate entity exists (*niḥavabhāva*) in reality. This new ontological principle, which was called "emptiness" (*śūnyatā*), became the core of Mahāyāna thought. It is a description of the nature of existing things (*dharmatā*), of how things really are (*tathatā*).

Thus for Mahāyānists, *paṭiccasamuppāda* finally leads to and confirms the Buddha's teaching of *anātman*.

"Emptiness" (*śūnyatā*), as the way things are, is applicable to each *aṅga* of *paṭiccasamuppāda*. This principle is likewise applicable to all *dharmas*, including the five aggregates (*pañca-skandha*), twelve sense-organs and sense-objects (*dvādaśāyatana*) eighteen spheres (*aṣṭādaśa-dhātu*), etc. The early Mahāyāna sūtras, especially the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*, repeatedly stress that every dharma is empty (*śūnya*), without any entity of its own (*niḥsvabhāva*). This is the meaning of no-self (*anātman*).

The second century A.D. thinker Nāgārjuna, who was an heir to the early Mahāyāna sūtras and a champion of the *śūnyatā* theory, points out *ad infinitum* the contradictions that follow from "positing substantial existence" to things that are mutually interdependent (*pratītyasamuttannā dharmā*). Emptiness (*śūnyatā*) is not another entity or absolute

on which *dharmas* are based or from which phenomenal existences originate, but a new insight into reality itself.

IV

1. *The Understanding of Anātman*

The doctrine of the Four Noble Truths and the Eight-fold Noble Path is the most important among the Buddha's teachings. Underlying this soteriologically-oriented doctrine, however, two basic lines of thought of the Buddha can be seen in Āgama, *i.e.*, *paṭiccasamuppāda* and *anicca/dukkha/anattā*. *Paṭiccasamuppāda* explains how *dukkha* arises (*dukkha-kkhandhassa samudaya*) and how *dukkha* ceases (*dukkha-kkhandhassa nirodhā*). The unenlightened (*puthujjana, pṛthagjana* in Skt.) meet with suffering (*dukkha*) in life and yet do not recognize it, because they cling to the notion of Self (*ātman*). They cling to the concept of "I exist" (*aham asmi*), "This is mine" (*etam mama*) "There is Self in me" (*m'eso attā*)[52] and "All is mine, he conceives, and he delights in all" (*sabbaṃ meti maññati, sabbaṃ abhinandati*).[53] It is the deception of Self (*attavāda*) that brings forth Suffering (*dukkha*), hence when the deception of Self ceases, Suffering ceases. Thus, one has to see impermanence (*aniccatā*) and not-Self (*anattatā*) in order to recognize suffering (*dukkhatā*) properly. The Buddha declares :

> Neither do I see, bhikkhus, that clinging to a deception of Self and because of the clinging to a deception of Self there would not arise sorrow, lamentation, suffering, grief and despair.[54]

Thus, the doctrine of *paṭiccasamuppāda* is insparably related to the doctrine of *anicca/dukkha/anattā*. *Paṭiccasamuppāda* indeed confirms *anātman*. *Paṭiccasamuppāda*, which explains how *dukkha* arises and ceases, finally leads to an understanding of the reality of human existence expressed as *anātman*.

In the Khandha-vagga, which follows the *Nidāna-vagga* in the *Saṃyutta-nikāya*, the Buddha speaks thus regarding the five aggregates :

> Matter (*rūpa*), monks, is impermanent (*anicca*). That which is impermanent is suffering (*dukkha*). That which is suffering is not-self (*anattā*), and that which is not-self is not mine (*na mama*), it is not I (*na aham asmi*), there is no Self (*na attā*) in me. In this way one should see this as it really is (*yathābhūtaṃ*) with right comprehension.
> Sensation (*vedanā*), monks, is impermanent.—
> Ideation (*saññā*), monks, is impermanent.—
> Mental formations (*saṅkhārā*), monks, are impermanent.—
> Consciousness (*viññāṇa*), monks, is impermanent.—[55]

Human existence consists of five factors of physical and mental aggregates (*khandha, skandha*). Each of these five aggregates is transient, Suffering and not-Self. The Buddha's method of argument is not to deny the existence of *Ātman*, the essence of personal existence, the search for which had been the main aim in Indian philosophy. Instead he first analyses personal existence into five aggregates and then points out that each of these

aggregates cannot be identified with the *Ātman*. The non-existence of *Ātman, i.e.*, non-changing self-existing entity of personal existence such as a soul or ego, is merely suggested implicitly, for no other factor of human existence apart from the five aggregates of grasping *pañcupādāna-kkhandha* can be admitted in Buddhism. The Buddha simply points out that any conceivable factor or factors of human existence cannot be identified with an Ātman conceived of as an unchanging permanent essence. Thus in removing the view of a self based on a metaphysical self-existing permanent Self, the Buddha teaches that one should understand oneself from the basis of the actual self, which is not an unchanging entity. This actual self must be the basis from which one's ethical and religious activities should be conducted. The Buddha teaches a non-ego-centered view as the way towards enlightenment.

When we come to the Abhidharma period, the Abhidharmists, going a step further from the Buddha's not-Ātman theory, insist that Ātman does not exist, *i.e.*, No-Ātman theory. Using the simile of a chariot, for instance, Nāgasena maintains in the Milindapañha :

> It is well, you sir, understand a chariot. Even so is it for me,—because of form (*rūpa*), feeling (*vedanā*), ideation (*saññā*), the habitual tendencies (*saṅkhārā*) and consciousness (*viññāṇa*), that 'Nāgasena' exists as a denotation (*saṅkhā*), appellation (*samaññā*), designation (*paññatti*), as a current usage (*vohāra*), merely as a name (*nāma-mattam*); but according to the highest truth (*paramatthato*), the person (*puggala*) is not got at here.[56]

Then he quotes one of the verses spoken by Vajirā bhikkhunī :

> Just as when the parts are rightly set
> The word 'chariot' is spoken'
> So when there are the *Khandā*
> It is the convention to say '*satta*'.[57]

Quoting from the Āgama, Visubandhu says in his *Abhidharmakośa* that '*sattva*' does not exist, 'Ātman' does not exist, and '*pudgala*' does not exist (*nāstīha sattva ātmā ca pudgalo nopalabhyate*).[58] According to the Abhidharma system, a personal existence consists of physical and mental elements (*dharmas*), such as five *skandhas*, twelve *āyatanas* and eighteen *dhātus*. The person, as a collection of these elements, exists merely as a designation (*prajñapti*) or merely as a name (*nāma-mātra*), but does not exist from the ultimate point of view; in this way *pudgala-nairātmya* is maintained. These elements, however, exist, each with its own-character (*svalakṣaṇa*) and own-nature (*svabhāva*). Thus, all elements exist (*sarva-dharmāsti*). All phenomenal existences are analyzed into components, and they are considered to be unreal, whereas the elements (*dharmas*) that make them up are real. The *pratītyasamutpāda* theory, then, is the causal law that determines the relationship between real elements. This view of the *pratītyasamutpāda* theory is based on the principle that "When this is, that is" (*imasmiṃ sati, idam hoti*).

The Abhidharma view of *anātman, i.e.*, analyzing a person into elements which results in the non-existence of the person, was called the theory of *Śūnyatā* by Analysis

by the Mahāyānists. In addition the Mahāyānists advocated the theory of *Śūnyatā* by Non-substantiality (體空觀).

The Mahāyānists agree with the Abhidharmists' view that all things are dependently originated and by examining the nature of the existence of interdependently existing things, they come to conclude that there is no substantiality (*niḥsvabhāva*) among factors that are mutually dependent. This view of *pratītyasamutpāda* is based on the principle that "When this is not, that is not" (*imasmim asati, idam na hoti*). Thus the elements (*dharmas*), which compose a personal existence in mutual dependence, have no own-character or own-nature apart from each other (*dharma-nairātmya*). There is also no self-existing entity called Ātman in a person (*pudgalanairātmya*).[59] *Pudgala-nairātmya* and the *dharma-nairātmya* were called collectively the Great Empty (*mahāśūnya*).[60] According to the Mahāyāna understanding, the Self (*ātman*) and the elements (*dharmas*) are abstract and unreal, while the phenomenal existences that are existing in the mode of interdependence (*pratītyasamutpāda*), impermanence (*anityatā*), suffering (*duḥkhatā*) and non-substantiality (*anātmatā*) are concrete and real. At this point the Mahāyāna view stands opposed to part of the Abhidharma in the sense that the latter took the abstract as real and the concrete as unreal. The Abhidharma view was, in fact, in accordance with the traditional Brahmanic view.

By negating *Ātman* and *dharmas*, the Mahāyānists negate the play of our intellect (*prapañca*)[61] to posit "substantiality" (*svabhāva*) to actual persons or things that exist interdependently without any entity of their own. Actual existence in reality, however, is beyond human notion of "exists" or "not exists", because it cannot be grasped by any of the alternatives expressed in the tetralemma, *i.e.*, "things in reality do exist", "do not exist", "both exist and not exist" and "neither exist nor not exist". Actual existence, however, exists in a way that cannot be conceptualized, is concrete and real.

2. *The Understanding of Dharmatā*

In the *Saṃyut'a-nikāya*, the Buddha clarifies the distinction between '*paṭiccasa-muppannā dhammā*, (plural) and *paṭiccasamuppāda*. According to his explanation, the former, *i.e.*, *paṭiccasamuppannā dhammā*, refers to each factor (*aṅga*) of the *dvādaśāṅgika-pratītyasamutpāda* such as *jarāmaraṇa*, *jāti—saṅkhāra* and *avijjā*, *i.e.*, dependently originated things.

Each of these factors is said to be :

> impermanent (*annica*), conditioned (*saṅkhata*), that which has arisen dependently (*paṭiccasamuppannā*), that which has the nature of withering away (*khaya-dhamma*), that which has the nature of passing away (*vaya-dhamma*), that which has the nature of fading away (*virāga-dhamma*) and that which has the nature of coming to cease (*nirodhā-dhamma*).[62]

Paṭiccasamuppāda, on the other hand, means the relatedness of these factors such as *jāti-paccayā jarā-maraṇam*'[63]—and *avijā-paccayā saṅkhārā*, *i.e.*, the principle of dependency (*idapaccayatā*) among the dependently-originated things (*paṭiccasamuppannā dhammā*). Thus, *paṭiccasamuppāda* means the nature (*dharmatā*) of *dharmas*, *i.e.*,

pratītyasamutpāda-dharmatā of pratītyasamutpannā dharmā. In this sense '*paṭiccasamuppāda*, is the objective, unchanging, universal truth (*Dharma*); hence the Buddha says :

> Thus, monks, that which is suchwise (*tathatā*) not elsewise *(avitathatā)*, not otherwise, *(anaññathatā)*, relatedness of this to that *(idapaccayatā)*—this, monks, is called *paṭiccasamuppāda.*[64]

From this, two ways of understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda* developed. One is to take *dharmatā* as the nature of *dharmas*, hence, as the essence (Wesen) of things existing via a distinctive 'own-character' (*svaḷakṣaṇa*) and 'own-nature' *(svabhāva). Paṭiccasamuppāda*, then, means the fact of the relatedness of existing things *(dhammā)* that are causally dependent on each other in such a way as 'when this is, that is, (*imasmim sati, idam hoti*). This is the basis of the Adhidharma view, which maintained that all *dharmas* exist. For them, dependently originated things (*paṭiccasamuppannā dhammā* become phenomenal existences and unreal, while the essence of each dhamma is a noumenal existence and real.

The Abhidharma view, however, resulted in a discrepancy between the Buddha's doctrine of *anitya/duḥkha/anātman* and that of *pratītyasamutpāda*, for the former established the dictum that 'All things have no Self, *i.e.*, entity' (*sabbe dhammā anattā*)[65] while the latter led to the conclusion that 'No person exists' (*pudgala-nairātmya*) but 'All elements exist' *(sarva-dharmāsti).*

Thus the Mahāyāna view of *pratītyasamutpāda-dharmatā* developed, that takes *dharmatā* as the way or mode of existing things (Sein) which exist in such an interdependent way as 'when this is not that is not' (*imasmim asati, idam na hoti*). Without denying the fact of the relatedness of things (*paṭiccasamuppānnā dhammā*), the Mahāyānists examined the mode of existences (*paṭiccasamuppāda dhammatā*) which are interdependent and at the same time impermanent, suffering and not-self. Hence not only in a person but also in each *dharma* there remains no independent, unchanging, self-existing entity. In this way, the Mahāyānists came to deny the view that posits 'substantiality', which is an abstract conceptualization, to the *pudgala* and to *dharmas.* Their new ontological principle, *i.e.*, that each dharma has no substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvatā*), is called the theory of emptiness (*sūnyatā*). The task of Nāgārjuna in his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* is to prove that it is not possible to comprehend the reality of dependently originated things on the basis of a conceptualized essence. The emptiness theory negates misconception of reality but not reality itself. It urges one to comprehend reality as it really is (*yathābhūtatā, tathatā*). It points out the way to comprehend actual existences, which, exist in the way of *dharmatā, i.e.*, transiently (*anityatā*), without substantiality (*śūnyatā*)[66] interdependently (*praatītyasamutpāda*), beyond human conceptualization (*avikalpa*).

Looked at from the ultimate point of view (*paramārthatas*), the reality of how things exist, *i.e.*, suchness (*tathatā*), is beyond our conceptualization (*avikalpa)*, because it cannot be grasped by the dichotomous intellect, which works on the basis of a duality principle (*dvaya*). To comprehend reality, one has to go beyond the principle of duality (*advaya*).[67] Thus the Buddha's teachings, such as *anitya/duḥkha/anātman* and *pratītyasamutpāda* were considered by the Mahāyānists as the means (*upāya*) or the relative truth (*saṃvṛti-satya*) that points to the indescribable ultimate truth (*paramārtha-satya*).[68]

As the principle of existence *dharmatā* of dharmas is universal and constant Truth, *Dharma*. Thus the Buddha says concerning the principle of *paṭiccasamuppāda* :

> Whether, monks, there be arisings of *tathāgatas*, or whether there be no arising of tathāgatas this nature of things (*dhātu*) just stands, this universal nature of things (*dhamma-ṭṭhitatā*), this constant nature of things (*dhamma-niyāmatā*), namely, the dependency of this to that (*idapaccayatā*).
> This the *tathāgata* awakened to and fully comprehended; having awakened to and fully comprehended, he points it to us, teaches, lets it be understood, establishes, reveals, interprets, makes it clear, saying 'behold!'.[69]

In the same manner, the Buddha speaks about the principle of transiency (*anityatā*), of sorrowfulness (*duḥkhatā*), and of no-substantiality (*anātmatā*) as the universal and constant truth, *i.e.*, the way in which things really are :

> Whether, monks, there be arisings of *tathāgatas*, or whether there be no arising of *tathāgātās*, this nature of things just stands, this universal nature of things, this constant nature of things, namely, all phenomenal things are transient (*sabbe saṅkhkra aniccā*).
> This the *tathāgata* awakened to and fully comprehended; having awakened to and fully comprehended, he points it to us, teaches, let it be understood, establishes, reveals, interprets, makes it clear; namely (the fact that) all phenomenal things are transient.
> Whether, monks—, namely, all phenomenal things are sorrow (*sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā*).
> This the *tathāgata*—, namely (the fact that) all phenomenal things are sorrow.
> Whether, monks—, namely, all things are not-self (*sabbe dhammā anattā*).
> This the *tathāgata*—, namely (the fact that) all things are not-self.[70]

Pratītyasamutpāda, *anityatā*, *duḥkhatā*, *anātmatā*, etc., then, are the *dharmatā* of *dharmas*[71] all of which point to one mode of existence called *Dharma i.e.*, the *dharmatā* of *dharmatā* of *dharmas*. This one mode of existence is ontologically immanent in all *dharmas* and at the same time epistemologically transcendent. This is the Buddhist concept of Reality, and enlightenment means to experience Reality as it really is.

All teachings of the Buddha, such as *pratītyasamutpada*, *anityatā*, *duḥkhatā* and *anātmatā*, are various means (*upāya*) pointing to Reality or directing our mind to Reality. From this the Mahāyāna theory of *Dharma-dhātu*[72] developed.

Ida-paccayatā or *idam-pratyayatā* was accepted as the secondary truth (*saṃvṛti-satya*) as opposed to the ultimate truth (*paramārtha-satya*).[73] The secondary truth in Buddhism, however, does not mean false or wrong; it is not an opposite in a dichotomy to be negated in order to achieve the ultimate truth, but is dynamically related to the illtimate truth in such a way that without the secondary truth the ultimate truth cannot be realized.

It was the Mahāyāna understanding that the Buddha's discourses on the eighty four thousand subjects (*dharma-paryāya*) all point to one Truth, *i.e.*, *Dharma*. In fact he

uttered only one sound (*eka-svara*),[74] he preached a single message (*eka-pada-vyāhāra*)[75], Śākyamuni became the Buddha through the realization of this Universal Truth, (*Dhama*)[76], just as have all the *tathāgatas*. It is through the realization of this same Truth, Mahāyānists believe, that every being has a possibility to attain Buddhahood and that Buddhahood is open to all.

FOOTNOTES

1. Although the idea of interdependence can be seen as the basic thought of Buddha's discourses, the form of twelve-aṅgas is not mentioned in early Buddhist texts such as the *Suttanipāta*. In the *Āgama* one finds various forms of *aṅga-paṭicca-samuppāda* with different numbers of factors and different names. Among them the twelve-factors came to be regarded as the representative and most developed form of *paṭiccasamuppāda* in a long process of development.

Instead of the term "Nikāya" I have used the Sanskrit term "Āgama", indicating the five Pāli *nikāyas* of *Dīgha*, *Majjhima*, *Saṃyutta*, *Aṅguttara* and *Khuddaka*, and their corresponding Chinese versions, because the term "Nikāya" means not only these collection of texts but also the schools of Buddhism which developed after the schism (*nikāya-bheda*) of about 100 years A.N., *i.e.*, *Buddha's Nirvāṇa*.

As for the various applications of the principle of Interdependence, see K.N. Jayatilleke : *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1963, pp. 449-50.

According to Prof K. Mizuno, the doctrine of Four Noble Truths is also one of the applications of this principle (*Primitive Buddhism*, Karinbunko, Japan, 1969, pp. 116 ff.). Furthermore the doctrine of Real-state (Jissō Ron 實相論),

which was considered to stand against the doctrine of Dependent Origination

(緣起論)

'in the Buddhism of later days', is also an aspect of this principle (*Ibid.*, pp. 119 & 122). This aspect will be dealt with later in this paper.

2. *MN* No. 79, *Cūḷasakuludāyi-sutta*, Vol. II, pp. 32, 4-7. *api c'Udāya, tiṭṭhatu pubbanto, tiṭṭhatu aparanto. dhamman te dessāmi : imasmiṃ sati idam hoti; imass' uppādā idam upapajjati (sic. v.l. uppajjati); imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti; imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhatīti.*

3. Summary of the *MN*, Vol. I, pp. 261, 32-263, 8.

4. Summary of the *Ibid.*, pp. 263, 17-264, 36.

The corresponding Chinese translation of this text can be found in the *Taishō Tripiṭaka*, No. 26 *Madhyama Āgama*, under the title of *Sāti-sūtra* (Vol. I, pp. 766b-770a). In the passages corresponding to footnotes 2 and 3, the Chinese translation replaces the four-clause formula with the enumeration of the twelve-*aṅgas* in the reversal sequence (pp. 768b, 13-18 & pp. 768c, 27-769a3) as part of the bhikkhus' reply. Giving *sādhu sādhu*, the Buddha enumerates the twelve-*aṅgas* in the reversal sequence.

At this point one cannot tell whether the Pāli text contains the earlier version of the Chinese text. Towards the end of this discourse, however, when the Buddha illustrates how sufferings arise and how they cease in the life of a man, beginning from embryo to death, we find that the Pāli version is more extensive and detailed than that of Chinese (cf. *MN*, I, pp. 265, Vol. 35-271, 2 in Pāli. *Taishō* Vol. I,

pp. 769b23-c28 in Chinese).

5. K. Mizuno, *op.cit.*, pp. 120, 135 etc.

According to the *Mahā-vagga*, *Vinaya-piṭaka*, it was by realizing the universal truth through contemplating *paṭiccasa-muppāda* in the two ways of the natural and revevial sequences under the Bodhi Tree that Śākyamuni Buddha reached his final enlightenment (*Vinaya*, Vol. I, 1-2. cf. *Udāna* 1-2). Thus *paṭiccasamuppāda* came to be called *Sakkhī Dhamma* or the Truth which the Buddha comprehended in his enlightenment experience.

6. The contrast of *samudaya* and *nirodha* of suffering indicates the process of "arising" and that of "ceasing". To understand *dukkha-samudaya* as the "cause of sufferings", particularly in the case of the second *ariya-sacca*, is common. I think this is too strongly imbued with the Abhidharma interpretation of *paṭiccasamuppāda* as causation. Chinese translators usually used the terms "苦・集・滅・道"

for Four Noble Truths, in which *samudaya* was literally translated as *gathering together*.

7. *MN* No. 22 *Alagaddūpama-sutta*, Vol. I, pp. 140, 14-5.

pubbe cāhaṃ bhikkhave etarahi ca dukkhañ c'eva paññāpemi dukkhassa ca nirodhaṃ.

8. The significance of these two sequences was carefully investigated by such Japanese scholars as T. Kimura (*Genshi Bukkyō Shisō Ron*, 1923, pp. 228-269; 467-576), H. Ui (*Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū*, Vol. II, 1925, pp. 261-343); T. Watsuji (*Genshi Bukkyō no Jissen Tetsugaku*, 1927, pp. 267-386) etc. This tradition was inherited in many recent works by Japanese scholars such as Professors K. Mizuno, H. Nakamura, M. Saigusa etc., to whom I am indebted in writing this article.

The terms, Natural Sequence for (*a*) and Reversal Sequence for (*b*), are taken from the late Prof Hakuju Ui. Furthermore, in between these two sequences, he argues, there must have existed in the the thought process of the Buddha the sequence (*A-a'*), *jarāmaraṇa-paccayā jāti* (12/11)——*saṅkhāra-paccayā avijjā* (2/1), and the sequence (*A-b'*), *saṅkhāra-paccayā avijjā* (2/1)——*jarāmaraṇa-paccayā jāti* (12/11), as well as the sequence (*B-a'*), *jarāmaraṇa-nirodhā jāti-nirodho* (12/11) ——*saṅkhāra-nirodhā avijjā-nirodho* (2/1), and the sequence (*B-b'*), *saṅkhāra-nirodhā avijjā-nirodho* (2/1)——*jarāmaraṇa-nirodhā jāti-nirodho* (12/11).

The sequences of (*a*) and (*a'*), as well as those of (*b*) and (*b'*), in fact, introduce the reciprocal relationship between twelve-*aṅgas*. This aspect will be discussed later in this paper.

9. *Desanā*. *SN* Vol. II, pp. 1-2.

10. *Vibhaṅga*, *SN*, Vol. II, pp. 2-4.

The Pāli text enumerates the twelve-*aṅga-paṭiccasamuppāda* by the sequence (A-*b*), then gives an analysis of each *aṅga*. The explanation begins with *jarāmaraṇa* (12) and ends with *avijjā* (1).

The corresponding Chinese translation, which combines both *Desanā* and *Vibhaṅga* in one Sūtra, gives both enumeration and explanation by the reversal sequence (A-*b*). See *Taishō Tripiṭaka*, No. 99 *Kṣudraka Āgama*, Vol. II, p. 85all-b20.

11. Among the seven texts grouped together as the Pāli Abhidharma, the *Vibhaṅga* belongs to the earliest period. It repeats the passages found in the *Saṃyutta-nikāya*, *Nidāna-vagga*, *Nidāna-saṃyutta*, *Vibhaṅga* (Vol. II, pp. 2-4) as Suttanta-bhājaniya (pp. 135 ff.). In this way the *Abhidhamma Vibhaṅga* limits the investigation of the twelve-*aṅgas paṭiccasa-muppāda* to the sequence (A-*b*) and analysis of each *aṅga*. As *Abhidhamma-*

bhājaniya (pp. 138 ff.) it discusses eighty nine minds which constitute all kinds of mind belonging to beings in the three realms through *paccaya* (indirect cause), *hetu* (direct cause), *sampayoga* (concommitance of *citta* and *caitasikas*), *aññamañña* (reciprocal relationship between *citta-caitasikas* and *rūpa-dhammas*). These relationships are classified into twenty four kinds of causal relationship *paṭiccasamuppāda*).

The last of the Pāli *Abhidharma* texts, *Paṭṭhāna*, explains in detail the twenty four modes of causal relationship.

The interpretation concentrates the analysis of relationship between *viññāṇa* (mind, almost equal to citta), *nāmarūpa* (objects), *saḷāyatana* (sense organs) and the following *caitasikas* (mental functions). It is interesting to note that the *viññāṇa* is taken as the mind which relates itself to the mental functions. In this way a special theory of *paṭiccasamuppāda* centering round the *citta* and *caitasikas* developed in the *Abhidharma* School.

Among the six Legs (so-called in contrast to the Body, *i.e.*, *Abhidharma Jñānaprasthāna* ascribed to Kātyāyanīputra) belonging to the Sarvāstivāda of Northern Buddhists, the *Abhidharma Dharmaskandhapāda*, the date of which goes back as early as Pāli *Vibhaṅga*, discusses the twelve-*aṅgas pratītyasamutpāda* along the (A-*b*) sequence, concentrating on all kinds of causal relationship between *aṅgas* mentioned in the Āgama. It does not miss such exceptional combinations as *nāmarūpa-pratītya vijñānam* and *nāmarūpo-pratītya sparś*, both of which appeared in the *Dīgha-nikāya* No. 15 *Mahānidāna-suttanta* (*DN*, Vol. II, p. 56). See *Taishō Tripiṭaka*, Vol. 26, pp. 505a ff.

The *Śāriputra Abhidharma*, which seems to have belonged to Vātsīputrīya and which was as old as the *Dharmaskandha*, also treats the twelve-*aṅgas pratītyasamutpāda* in the similar manner.

These early Abhidharma texts do not mention either the "twofold causation extending to the past, present and future" or the embryological interpretation. We find developed theories in the later Abhidharma texts, but they *a priori* take the twelve-*aṅgas paṭiccasamuppāda* as causation Theory.

12. The late Prof Jayatilleke observed that after Burnouf 'the Chain of Causation' "has been practically the only aspect of causation in Buddhism discussed by many scholars. They have thus given a distorted view of the role of causation in these texts". Then he maintains, "Almost all scholars have said that the purpose of this 'Chain' is to explain misery. This is only partly true. From the evidence of the texts, it appears to have been used primarily to explain *rebirth and karma* without recourse to the metaphysical *ātman*-hypothesis of the Eternalists and without falling into the other extreme of Materialism." (*op. cit.*, p. 450) Italics are *mine*).

In this way he justifies the Abhidharma position. Speaking implications of *paṭiccasamuppāda*, however, it will be shown that one needs not limit oneself to this much.

13. *Saṃyutta-nikāya* says that *bhava* is three-fold : (*i*) *kāmabhava*, (*ii*) *rūpabhava* and (*iii*) *arūpabhava*. (*SN*, Vol. II, p. 3, 11. 10-12).

14. *upaccagā sabbabhavāni* (*Udāna, Nanda-vagga, sūtta 10*).

15. *bhavābhinissato* (*Theragāthā* verse No. 1089).

16. *Upādāna* is four-fold : (*i*) *kām'upādāna*, (*ii*) *diṭṭh'upādāna*, (*iii*) *sīlabbat'upādāna*, and (*iv*) *attavād'upādāna*, (*SN*, Vol. II, p. 3, 11, 13-16).

17. *Taṇhā* is six-fold : (*i*) *rūpataṇhā*, (*ii*) *saddataṇhā*, (*iii*) *gandhataṇhā*, (*iv*) *rasataṇhā*, (*v*) *poṭṭabbataṇhā* and (*vi*) *dhammataṇhā*. (*Ibid.*, pp. 11, 17-20).

18. *Vedanā* is six-fold : (*i*) *cakkhusamphassajā vedanā*, (*ii*) *sotasamphassajā vedanā*, (*iii*) *ghānasamphssajā vedanā*, (*iv*) *jivhāsamphassajā vedanā*, (*v*) *kāyasamphassajā vedanā*, and (*vi*) *manosamphassajā vedanā*. (*Ibid.*, 11. 21-25).

19. "*Phassa*" is six-fold : (*i*) *cakkhusamphassa*, (*ii*) *sotasamphassa*, (*iii*) *ghānasamphassa*, (*iv*) *jivhāsamphassa*, (*v*) *kāyasampassa* and (*vi*) *manosamphassa*. (*Ibid.*, 11. 26-29).

20. *Saḷāyatana* is six-fold : (*i*) *cakkh'-āyatana*, (*ii*) *sotāyatana*, (*iii*) *ghānāyatana*, (*iv*) *jivhāyatana*, (v) *kāyāyatana*, and (vi) *man'āyatana*. (*Ibid.*, 11. 30-33).

21. As for *nāmarūpa nāma* is five-fold : (*i*) *vedanā*, (*ii*) *saññā*, (*iii*) *cetanā*, (*iv*) *phassa* and (*v*) *manasikāra*; while *rūpa* is *cattāro mahābhūtā* and *catunnañ mahābhūtānaṃ upādāya rūpaṃ* (*Ibid.*, pp. 3, 1. 34-4, 1.3).

22. *Viññaṇa* is six-fold : (*i*) *cakkhuviññāṇa*, (*ii*) *sotaviññāṇa*, (*iii*) *ghānaviññāṇa*, (*iv*) *jivhāviññāṇa*, (*v*) *kāyaviññāṇa*, and (*vi*) *manoviññāṇa*. (*Ibid.*, p. 4, 11. 4-7).

23. *Saṅkhāra* is three-fold : (*i*) *kāyasaṅkhāra* (*ii*) *vācīsaṅkhāra*, and (*iii*) *cittasaṅkhāra*. (*Ibid.*, 11. 8-10).

24. *Avijjā* is (*i*) *dukkhe aññāṇa*, (*ii*) *dukkhasamudaye aññāṇa*, (*iii*) *dukkhanirodhe aññāṇa*, and (*iv*) *dukkhanirodhagāminiyā paṭipadāya aññāṇa*. (*Ibid.*, 11. 11-14).

25. Here Prof Mizuno's critique is important (*op.cit.*, pp. 157-8)

The theory of the twelve links of interdependence only says that by the extinction of ignorance (*avijjā*) karmic action dies out, etc...If superficially taken, this means that when ignorance dies out action etc. will die out, and this will amount to negating our own existence itself. According to the Buddha, it is not so. Prof Mizuno says, "what is said here is that if ignorance dies out, the effect of wrong actions or the effect of wrong consciousness that had arisen out of wrong actions dies out. It is not that right action and consciousness too dies out".

26. Oldenberg, Geiger etc. understood *viññāṇa* as "Erkennen" or cognition, while Walleser translated it as "Bewusstsein" and Mrs Rhys Davids as "consciousness". The differences among these scholars' understanding reflects that of *viññāṇa* as understood in the Natural Sequence of the Buddha and in the Reversal Sequence of the Abhidharma.

27. See Prof Mizuno, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-140. "In the days of Abhidharma Buddhism, consciousness (*viññāṇa*) was always regarded as a consciousness-entity (*viññaṇa-kāya*)" (insertions of Pāli terms in brackets are mine) as contrasted to the mental faculty (*caitasika* or *cittasaṃprayukta-saṃskāra*) which was a separate category.

28. Abhidharma texts present us with various interpretations of *bhava*, such as *kamma-bhava*, *upapatti-bhava*, *vipāka-bhava* etc. To take it as *kaṃma-bhava* seems to have been most popular. See Prof. Mizuno, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-2. cf. *Dharmaskandhapāda* enumerates three kinds of *bhava*, *i.e.*, (*i*) all existences in three realms of existence, (*ii*) *kamma-bhava*, (*iii*) *upapatti-bhava*. *Taishō* Vol. 26, p. 512b.

29. See Prof. Mizuno, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

Already in the *Paṭisambhidā-magga*, which can be placed in between Āgama and Abhidharma, the twelve-factored *paṭiccasamuppāda* theory is explained as causation extending to the three times. In this text, the embryological explanation is not yet fully developed.

The later Abhidarma texts, such as *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā*, *Abhidharmakoṣa*, *Abhidharmanyāyānusārī* in Northern tradition and *Visuddhimagga*, *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* in the Southern tradition, employed the two-fold causation extend-

ing to three times together with the embryological explanation as their main interpretation. See

阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 卷二十三.

阿毘達磨 俱舍論 卷九.

阿毘達磨 順正理論 卷二十五.

Taishō, Vol. 27, pp. 119a ff.
Taishō Vol. 29, pp. 48a ff.
Taishō Vol. 29, pp. 483 ff.

30. The term *saṅkhāra* (*samskāra* in Skt.) is one of the most difficult and important terms in Buddhist philosophy (See *Pāli-English Dictionary* by Rhys Davids and William Stede, pp. 123-4).

Saṃskāra derives from saṃ-(together)/ *kṛ* (to make), meaning "making together". "Making" involves physical and mental spheres, hence, in this term there is the blending of the subjective-objective view of the world, which is characteristic to Buddhist thought. In physical sphere, "what is made" comes to destruction, involving "change". Thus it means "becoming" and "phenomenal existence". *Sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā* and *sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā* are the examples of this usage. "Making" involves mental action, hence it means "purposive intention" and "volition". The fourth factor in the five aggregates is used in this sense. Also in the case of "All *saṃskāras* are of nature of delusion" (*sarva-saṃskārās ca mṛṣā moṣa-dharmāṇāḥ*, the Buddha's words quoted in the *Prasannapadā*, pp. 41, 5 & 237-8), the term means "mental formation".

In the *paṭiccasamuppāda* formula "*saṅkhāra*" is understood as the aggregates of mental conditions which induce karmic effect. In the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* (Vol. III, p. 415) *Saṅkhāra* is almost equal to *kamma*. In the Abhidharma understanding of the *Paṭiccasamuppāda* "saṅkhāra" became a purposive mental state which under the law of karma brings about the inception of *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa* or the first mental life in a newly conceived individual.

31. In the *Dīgha-nikāya* XV, *Mahānidāna-suttanta*, the Buddha asks Ānanda, "Were consciousness not to descend into the mother's womb, would name-and-form become constituted therein? (*viññāṇam va hi Ānanda mātu kucchim na okkamissatha, api nu kho nāma-rūpam mātu kucchim samucchissathâti, DN*, Vol. II, pp. 63, 2-5)" To this Ānanda replies, It "would not". cf.

長阿含. 大緣方便經.

Taishō, Vol. I, p. 61b &

中阿含. 大因經

Taishō, Vol. I, p. 579c.

Following this, the Buddha explains two other consciousnesses, one is that of the embryo in the mother's womb and the other that of the child after birth.

It is this *viññāṇa* which will be termed *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa*.

32. The entering of the *viññāṇa* into a body at conception is phrased as *viññāṇassa avakkanti* in the *Saṃyutta-nikāya* Vol. II, p., 19-20; 24; 31.

The term *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa* first appears in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, Vol. I, p. 52, and then in various commentaries such as *Vibhaṅga A*, pp. 155 ff. and *Visuddhimagga*, pp. 548, 554, 659 etc.

According to Prof Mizuno, *gandhabba*, *antarā-bhava* and *viññāṇa* in the sense of *paṭisandhi-viññāṇa* etc. were employed as an explanation in a popular mode of the doctrine of interdependence so that those of a lesser grade of understanding might grasp the meaning of this difficult doctrine (*op. cit.*, pp. 155 ff.).

33. *Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya-sūtta* of the *Majjhima nikāya* does not use the term *viññāṇa*, but it says that conception

takes place when three factors narmoniously come together, namely a coitus of the parents, the mother's season (*utunī*), and the presence of the *gandhabba* or the soul of the dead (*MN*, Vol. p. I, pp. 265, 23 ff.),

The commentary to the *Majjhimanikāya* (*MA*, II, p. 310) explains *gandhabba* as the being about to enter into mother's womb, being driven by karmic force from the state of intermediate existence (*antarābhava*).

34. Prof K.N. Jayatilleke says, "This means that B does not occur unless A is present and occurs only when A is present. Thus a one-one correlation is established between the conditions constituting the cause and their effect. This is a scientific view of causation as opposed to the practical common sense view". (*op. cit.*, p. 449).

This view is shared by many Theravāda scholars, *e.g.*, Sujib Punyanubhab says, "In essence, the Buddhist Law of Karma is the scientific principle of cause and effect, or action and reaction, on the immaterial plane, decreeing irrevocably that one will reap what one has sown, both good and evil. *Some Prominent Characteristics of Buddhism*, Thailand 1957, p. 288)

35. See Theodore Stcherbatsky, *The Central Cenception of Buddhism*, RAS, London 1923 and Junjiro Takakusu, *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, Univ. of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1947, pp. 57 ff.

The classification of dharmas under the Five Categories appears, for the first time, in the first chapter of *Abhidharma Prakaraṇa-pāda* ascribed to Vasumitra. This method of classification was adopted by so many Abhidharmists in India. The Pāli Abhidharmists, however, did not adopt this new method,

36. Yaśomitra says in his *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā, dravyataḥ svalakṣanataḥ sad dravya-sad iti.* (ed. by U. Wogihara, Reprint by Sankibo Buddhist Book Store, Tokyo, 1971, pp. 524, 29-30).

37. According to Yaśomitra, Vasubandhu says in his Abhidharmakośa, *svabhāvaḥ sarvadā cāsti* (*Ibid.*, pp. 472, 25).

Sarvadā (always) means in the past, present and future.

38. The Abhidharma texts enumerate four types of relationships :

(*i*) *Kṣaṇika* or momentary, *i.e.*, a number of factors are present in one moment, *e.g.*, killing by greed. This relationship may be the closest to the one which does not involve time (*akālika*), yet the idea is still that of a causal and not a logical relationship.

(*ii*) *Sāṃbandhika* or continuous, *i.e.*, a psychologically understood relationship going from the present life (ten *aṅgas*) to the future life (the 11th and 12th).

(*iii*) *Āvasthika* or circumstantial, *i.e.*, a karmically understood relationship which developed the two-fold causation in three times. The Abhidharmists came to favour this interpretation.

(*iv*) *Prākarṣika* or protracted, *i.e.*, special cases among karmic causation. There are three ways in which the cause manifests as effect : *i.e.*, in the present life, in the next life, and in the later life. This relationship concentrates the third case in which the karmic effect manifests after some interval of existence.

See *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā, Taishō*, Vol. 27, pp. 117c f. *Abhidharma-kośa, Taishō*, Vol. 29, pp. 48c f. *Abhidharma-nyāyānusārī, Taishō*, Vol. 29, pp. 483b f.

39. *DN*, XV, Vol II, pp. 56-7. In this

discourse *avijjā*, *saṅkharā* and *saḷāyatana* are omitted and nine-*aṅgas paṭiccasamuppāda* is discussed.

40. *SN* VII., 67, Vol. II, pp. 112-5. *Avijjā* and *saṅkhārā* are omitted.

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 114, 17-8.

42. The *Vibhaṅga*, mentions *aññamañña* within the context of discussion of the eighty nine *cittas*. *Aññamañña* is the reciprocal relationship between mind (*citta*) and mental functions (*caitasika*). See pp. 138 ff.

Also the Pāli *Paṭṭhāna* explains *aññamañña-paccaya* among its accounts and definitions of various types of relationship. See Nyanatiloka, *Guide Through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka*, pp. 118-27.

43. *MN*, Vol. I, pp. 265, 29-34.

sādhu bhikkhave. upanītā kho me tumhe bhikkhave iminā sandhiṭṭhikena dhammena akālikena ehipassikena opanayikena paccattam veditabbena viññuhi.

sandhiṭṭhiko ayam bhikkhave dhammo akāliko opanayiko paccattam veditabbo viññūhīti (*iti yan tam vuttaṃ idam etaṃ paṭicca vuttam*).

The corresponding Chinese translation is found in the *Taishō*, Vol. I, pp, 769b, 15-23 and the term *akālika* is translated as "恒不改易法."

44. *SN*, Vol. I, pp. 117-8; Vol. IV, pp. 41-2; pp. 339-40 etc.

The Chinese translation for the term "*akālika*" in the 1st and last cases is

不待時節

(*Taishō*, Vol. II, pp. 289a & 229b). There is no corresponding Chinese translation for the 2nd case.

45. Kevaṭṭaputta Sāti Bhikkhu says, *tathā 'ham bhagavatā dhammaṃ desitam ājānāmi yathā tad ev' idam viññāṇam sandhāvati somsarati, anaññan ti.* (*MN*, Vol. I, pp. 256, 15-7).

46. *In the Pāli text it is Mahākoṭṭhita who asks Sāriputta the following question : kinnu kho āvuso Sāriputta sayaṃkataṃ jarāmaraṇaṃ paraṃkatam jarāmaraṇaṃ sayaṃkatañ ca paraṃkatañ ca jarāmaraṇaṃ udāhu asayaṃkāram aparaṃkāram adhicca samuppannam jarāmaraṇan? ti. To this Sāriputta replies, na kho āvuso Koṭṭhita sayaṃkataṃ jarāmaraṇaṃ na paraṃkataṃ jarāmaraṇam na sayaṃkatañ ca paraṃkatañ ca jarāmaraṇaṃ nāpi asayaṃkāram aparaṃkāram adhicca samuppannam api ca jātipaccaya jārāmaraṇan ti.* (*SN, Vol. II, pp. 112-3*).

In the corresponding Chinese version, however, it is Śāriputra who asks the question and the answer is given by Mahākauṣṭhila or

'摩訶拘絺羅'

(*Taishō*, Vol. II, p. 81a).

47. The Buddha's answer to the questions asked by Māluṅkyaputta indicates that he was well aware of the tetralemma. Māluṅkyaputta put four questions, among which the fourth question was expressed, "whether the *Tathāgata* exists after death (*i*) or not, (*ii*) or both exists or not, (*iii*) or neither exists nor not (*iv*)"? Although other three questions had not been expressed fully (hence there are ten questions in this text), Māluṅkyaputta's questions amounted to sixteen altogether, *Majjhimanikāya* 63, Vol, I, pp. 426-432.

In China, Buddhists enumerated the questions to which the Buddha answered by silence and called them the fourteen Silences of the Buddha (*avyākṛta*).

The Buddha's answers to the questions put by Vacchagotta also indicate his approach, which can be called the negation of judgment on the basis of the duality principle, or the dialectic thinking of the Buddha. Regarding Vacchagotta's questions, see *Samutta-nikāya*, Vol. IV, pp. 391-403; *Majjhima-nikāya*, Vol. I, p. 486 etc.

48. Regarding *sat*-and *asat-kāryavāda*, see S.N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Cambridge Univ. Press 1951-5, Vol. I, pp. 257-8; 319-23 etc.

49. The term *ida-paccayatā* is actually used in the Āgama (*e.g.*, *SN*, Vol. II, pp. 25, 20 etc.). This is apparently made from the *Aṅga-paṭiccasamuppāda* such as *avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā, saṅkhārāpaccayā viññāṇam,—*. Thus *idapaccayatā* summarizes the principle of dependency in the Sequence of arising of suffering. In this sense *idapaccayatā* corresponds to the formula *imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imass'uppādā idaṃ uppajjati.*

As opposed to this, the term *ida-nirodhatā* is not used in the *Āgama.* It appears as the instrumental case such as *avijjā-nirodhā saṅkhāra-nirodho,—.*

As far as the *Āgama* concerns, *idapaccayatā* refers to the fact of relatedness of existing things. From this the Abhidharmist *a priori* presupposed the existence of elements as *dharma*, and came to contradict with the Buddha's dictum that *sabbe dhammā anattā.*

My contention is that the Mahāyānist maintained that *idam* of this *ida-paccayatā* is the hypothesis, the very thing that is presupposed and that their view comes from the consideration of *ida-nirodhatā.* Thus for them, the *paṭiccasamuppāda* means by implication the doctrine of *anattatā* as the mode of existence of *dharmas.*

50. Professor H. Nakamura, after an exhaustive examination of the Abhidharma texts, came to conclude that in the Sarvāstivāda, such terms as *svabhāva, svalakṣaṇa, vastu, dravya, bhāva,* and *dharma* etc. were used almost synonymously. See *Setsu Issai U Bu No Tachiba* or the *Standpoint of the Sarvāstivādin*, in the Festschrifts for Prof. T. Watsuji, 1957, pp. 241-60.

51. The term *parasparāpekṣā* was formulated by Candrakīrti to designate the distinctive Mahāyāna understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda* expounded by Nāgārjuna. See, *Prasannapadā* pp. 67, 11 (ad I, 1); 189, 9 (ad VIII, 12); 200, 3 (ad IX, 12); 345, 2(ad XVIII, 1): 527, 14 (an XXV, 8).

Although Nāgārjuna did not use the term *parasparāpekṣā*, the idea was repeatedly stressed in his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.* For example, in examining the reality of actual burning fire, we say that fire depends on fire-wood and fire-wood depends on fire. This relationship, however, corresponding to the reciprocal relationship (*aññamaññapaccaya*) presupposes that the two have distinct entities. Thus Nāgārjuna says :

> Fire which is different from fire-wood will unite with the latter as you contend, if and only if the two are mutually distinct existences.
> (*anya evandhanād agnir indhanaṃ kāmam āpnuyat |*
> *agnīndhane yadi syātām anyonyena tiraskṛte* || X, 7)

In reality of actual burning fire, however, fire and fire-wood are mutually interdependent (*anyonyāpekṣā. Prasannapadā*, pp. 206, 8), *i.e.*, "without fire, no fire-wood" and at the same time "without fire-wood, no fire". Hence,

> If fire is dependent on fire-wood and fire-wood on fire, then which is the one that must have had a prior completed state and to that the other depends?
> (*yadīndhanam apekṣyāgnir apekṣyāgnim yadāndhanam |*
> *katarat pūrvaniṣpannaṃ yad apekṣyāgnir indhanam* || X, 8)
> If fire is dependent on fire-wood then an already existing fire will again be effectuating itself. If so then fire-wood also will exist without fire.
> (*yadīndhanam apekṣyāgnir agneḥ siddh-*

asya sādhanaṃ |
evaṃ satīndhanaṃ cāpi bhaviṣyati niragnikaṃ || X, 9).

If an entity depends on another entity in order to realize itself, the latter also depends on the former for its manifestation. If what is to be depended on for realization already exists, then what depends on what?

(*yo 'pekṣya sidhyate bhāvas tam evāpekṣya sidhyati |*
yadi yo 'pekṣitavyaḥ sa sidhyatāṃ kam apekṣya kaḥ || X, 10).

If an entity depends on another entity for realization, but in an unrealized state, what is the manner of dependence? And again, if it depends on in an already realized state, the nature of dependence is not possible.

(*yo 'pekṣya sidhyate bhāvaḥ so 'siddho 'pekṣate katham |*
athāpy apekṣate siddhas tv apekṣāsya na yujyate || X, 11).

Thus, to speak of: (*i*) dependence, (*ii*) non-dependence, (*iii*) both or (*iv*) neither does not explain the reality of burning fire.

Fire does not exist by dependence on fire-wood nor does it exist by non-dependence on fire-wood, Likewise, fire-wood does not exist by dependence or non-dependence on fire.

(*apekṣyendhanam agnir na nānapekṣyāgnir indhanam |*
apekṣyendhanam agnim na nānapekṣyāgnim indhanaṃ | | X, 12).

Thus, Nāgārjuna concludes :

Insofar as I am concerned, those who speak of the reality of Self (*ātman*) and things (*bhāva-dharma*) on the basis of the principle of identification (*satattva=apṛthaktva=ananyatva=ekatva*) and the principle of differentiation (*pṛthak pṛthak=anyatva*) cannot be considered truly understood the meaning of the Buddha's teaching.

(*ātmanaś ca satattvaṃ ye bhāvāṇām ac*
pṛthak pṛthak |
nirdiśanti na tān manye śāsanasyārthakovidān | | X, 16).

"Parasparāpeksā", therefore, is fundamentally different from *aññamaññapaccaya*. *Aññamaññapaccaya* points out the fact of relatedness of existing things. *Parasparāpekṣā*, however, points to the nature of existence of mutually, interdependently existing things. This nature of existence or how existing things exist, cannot be grasped by the conceptualizing process of our intellect on the basis of the principle of identification and that of contradiction. *Pratītyasamutpāda* as understood by Nāgārjuna as *parasparāpekṣā* immediately leads to *niḥsvabhāva*, *śūnyatā* and *anātman*. See: "It would thus follow that what is dependent on other(s) is *anātman*" (*pratītya parabhāvaṃ yaḥ so 'nātmety upapadyate| MMK.* XXII, pp. 3a-b).

52. *SN*, Vol. III, pp. 22, 4-5 etc.

53. *MN*, Vol. I, pp. 4, 1-2.

54. *MN*, 22, *Alagaddūpama-sutta*, Vol. I, pp. 137, 28-31,

sādhu bhikkhave. aham pi kho taṃ bhikkhave attavādupādānaṃ na samanupassāmi yaṃ sa attavādupādānaṃ upādiyato na uppajjeyyuṃ sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā.

Note that the doctrine of non-attachment, one of the most important teachings of the Buddha, is not abandoning, being indifferent to or escaping from life, but is detaching oneself from one's own deception about Self. This is the meaning of the doctrine of *Anātman*.

55. *SN* Vol. III, pp. 22, 3-16.

rūpam bhikkhave aniccaṃ, yad aniccaṃ taṃ dukkhaṃ yaṃ dukkhaṃ tad anattā, yad anattā taṃ n'etam mama n'eso 'ham asmi na m'eso attā ti. evam etaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbaṃ.

vedana aniccā,.....
saññā aniccā,.....
saṅkhārā aniccā, ...

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If an entity depends on another entity for realization, but in an unrealized state, what is the manner of dependence? And again, if it depends on in an already realized state, the nature of dependence is not possible.

(*yo 'pekṣya sidhyate bhāvaḥ so 'siddho 'pekṣate katham |*
athāpy apekṣate siddhas tv apekṣāsya na yujyate || X, 11).

Thus, to speak of: (*i*) dependence, (*ii*) non-dependence, (*iii*) both or (*iv*) neither does not explain the reality of burning fire.

Fire does not exist by dependence on fire-wood nor does it exist by non-dependence on fire-wood, Likewise, fire-wood does not exist by dependence or non-dependence on fire.

(*apekṣyendhanam agnir na nānapekṣyāgnir indhanam |*
apekṣyendhanam agnim na nānapekṣyāgnim indhanaṃ | | X, 12).

Thus, Nāgārjuna concludes :

Insofar as I am concerned, those who speak of the reality of Self (*ātman*) and things (*bhāva-dharma*) on the basis of the principle of identification (*satattva=apṛthaktva=ananyatva=ekatva*) and the principle of differentiation (*pṛthak pṛthak=anyatva)* cannot be considered truly understood the meaning of the Buddha's teaching.

(*ātmanaś ca satattvaṃ ye bhāvāṇām ac pṛthak pṛthak |*
nirdiśanti na tān manye śāsanasyārthakovidān | | X, 16).

"Parasparāpeksā", therefore, is fundamentally different from *aññamaññapaccaya. Aññamaññapaccaya* points out the fact of relatedness of existing things. *Parasparāpekṣā*, however, points to the nature of existence of mutually, interdependently existing things. This nature of existence or how existing things exist, cannot be grasped by the conceptualizing process of our intellect on the basis of the principle of identification and that of contradiction. *Pratītyasamutpāda* as understood by Nāgārjuna as *parasparāpekṣā* immediately leads to *niḥsvabhāva, śūnyatā* and *anātman.* See: "It would thus follow that what is dependent on other(s) is *anātman*" (*pratītya parabhāvaṃ yaḥ so 'nātmety upapadyate| MMK.* XXII, pp. 3a-b).

52. *SN*, Vol. III, pp. 22, 4-5 etc.

53. *MN*, Vol. I, pp. 4, 1-2.

54. *MN*, 22, *Alagaddūpama-sutta*, Vol. I, pp. 137, 28-31,

sādhu bhikkhave. aham pi kho taṃ bhikkhave attavādupādānaṃ na samanupassāmi yaṃ sa attavādupādānaṃ upādiyato na uppajjeyyuṃ sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā.

Note that the doctrine of non-attachment, one of the most important teachings of the Buddha, is not abandoning, being indifferent to or escaping from life, but is detaching oneself from one's own deception about Self. This is the meaning of the doctrine of *Anātman.*

55. *SN* Vol. III, pp. 22, 3-16.

rūpam bhikkhave aniccaṃ, yad aniccaṃ taṃ dukkhaṃ yaṃ dukkhaṃ tad anattā, yad anattā taṃ n'etam mama n'eso 'ham asmi na m'eso attā ti. evam etaṃ yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya daṭṭhabbaṃ.

vedana aniccā,.....
saññā aniccā,.....
saṅkhārā aniccā, ...

viññāṇam aniccaṃ,.....

56. *sādhu kho tvaṃ mahārāja ratthaṃ jānāsi, evam eva kho mahārāja mayham 'pi (kese ca paṭicca lome ca paṭicca-pematthulungañ ca paṭicca) rūpañ ca paṭicca vedanañ ca paṭicca saññañ ca paṭicca saṅkhāre ca paṭicca viññāṇañ ca paṭicca Nāgaseno ti sankhā samaññā paññatti vohāro nāmamattaṃ pavattati; paramatthato pan' ettha puggalo nūpalabbhati.* (*Milindapañha*, pp. 27, 30-28, 5)

57. The *gathā* quoted in the *Milindapcañha* (pp. 28, 7-8) is the second verse recited by Vajirā bhikkhunī in the *Saṃyutta-nikāya* :

kinnu satto ti paccesi māra diṭṭhigataṃ nu te |
suddhasaṅkhārapuñjo yaṃ nayidha sattūpalabhati | |
yathā hi aṅgasambhārā hoti saddo ratho iti |
evaṃ khandhesu santesu hoti satto ti sammuti | |
dukkham eva hi sambhoti dukkhaṃ tiṭṭhati veti ca |
nāññatra dukkhā sambhoti nāññaṃ dukkhā nirujjhati | |

(*SN*, Vol. I, pp. 135, 18-23)

58. See *A-kośa-vyākhyā*, IX *Pudgala-viniścaya*, p. 704, 23f. According to the corresponding Chinese translation, Vasubandhu is quoting the Buddha's sermon to a Brahmin called Bādari (婆伽梨) from the *Saṃyukta Āgama*. This passage, however, cannot be found in the extant Pāli texts.

59. It is in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* that we find the terms *pudgalanairātmya* and *dharma-nāirātmya*.

Moreover, with regard to all *dharmas*, the *saṃskṛta-dharmas* as well as the *asaṃskṛta-dharmas*, the bodhisattva comprehends correctly two kinds of *nairātmya, i.e., pudgala-nairātmya* and *dharma-nairātmya*.

Firstly, the *pudgala-nairātmya* is (to comprehend that) the existing dharmas are not *pudgala*, and (that) apart from the existing *dharmas* there is no *pudgala*.

Secondly, the *dharma-nairātmya* is (to comprehend that) regarding everything which is to be designated by verbal expression, there is no dharma which has an entity that is verbally expressed.

In this way, indeed, the bodhisattva comprehends correctly that all *dharmas* are *anātman*.

(*punaḥ sarva-dharmāṇāṃ bodhisattvaḥ saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛtānāṃ dvi-vidhaṃ nairātmyam yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti | pudgala-nairātmyaṃ dharma-nairātmyam ca || tatredam pudgala-nairātmyam | yan naiva te vidyamānā dharmāḥ pudgalāḥ | nāpi vidyamāna-dharma-vinirmukto 'nyaḥ pudgalo vidyate | | tatredaṃ dharma-nairātmyam yat sarveṣv abhilāpyeṣu vastuṣu sarvābhilāpa-svabhāvo dharmo na samvidyate | | evaṃ hi bodhisattvaḥ sarva-dharmā anātmāna iti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti | |* *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, ed. by U. Wogihara, pp. 280, 18-281, 1).

Nāgārjuna, however, uses the terms *sattva-śūnyatā* (衆生空) and *dharma-śūnyatā* (法空) as the two kinds of *śūnyatā* corresponding to *pudgala-nairātmya* and *dharma-nairātmya*. See the *Mahāparajñāpāramitā Upadeśa*, *Taishō* No 1509, Vol. 25, p. 287b.

Candrakīrti, on the other hand, uses *ātma-nairātmya* and *ātmīya-nairātmya* in commenting on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārika* ad. XVIII, kārikā 2.

evaṃ yogino yadaivātma-nairātmyaṃ pratipadyante tadaivātmīya-skandha-vastu-nairātmyam api niyataṃ pratipadyante|
(*Prasannapadā*, pp. 346, 2-3).

60. It is the *Yogācārabhūmi* which calls *pudgala-nairātmya* and *dharma-nairātmya* collectively the great śūnyatā

(大空).

Taishō No. 1579, Vol. 30, pp. 833b 20.

61. Nāgārjuna, *Mūlamadhyamakakārika, Namaskāra-kārikā.*

anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam| anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam|| yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ prapañcopaśamam śivam| deśayāmāsa saṃbuddhas tam vande vadatāṃ varaṃ ||

Chinese translates *prapañca* as "playful argument" (戲論)

62. See *SN*, Vol. II, pp. 26-8 ff.

katame ca bhikkhave paṭiccasamuppannā dhammā? jarāmaraṇaṃ bhikkhave aniccaṃ saṅkhataṃ paṭiccasamuppannaṃ khaya-dhammaṃ vaya-dhammaṃ virāga-dhammaṃ nirodha-dhammaṃ.

jāti bhikkhave aniccā...

63. See *SN*, Vol. II, pp. 25, 17-8.

katamo ca bhikkhave paṭiccasamuppādo? jāti-paccayā bhikkhave jarāmaraṇaṃ.

64. *Ibid.*, pp. 26, 4-6.

iti kho bhikkhave yā tatra tathatā avitathatā anaññathatā ida-paccayatā, ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave paṭiccasamuppādo.

65. *Dhammapada* verses 277, 278 and 279 say :

sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā,
sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā,
sabbe dhammā anattā.

66. Nāgārjuna says in his *Mūlamadhyamakakārika :*

We declare that whatever is interdependently originated is śūnyatā. It is a provisional name for the (fact of) mutual dependency and, indeed, it is the middle path.

(yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe|
sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā|| XXIV, 18)

67. The most beautiful exposition of "la doctrine de la non-dualité" (*advayadharmamukhapraveśa*) is found in the Chapter VIII of the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa.* See Prof Ètienne Lamotte's translation, *L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti*, Université de Louvain, 1962, pp. 301ff.

68. The *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra* says that only the Tathāgata knows all *dharmas* as they really are, *i.e., ye ca te dharmā, yathā ca te dharmā, yādṛśāś ca te dharmā, yal lakṣaṇāś ca te dharmā, yat svabhāvāś ca te dharmāḥ, ye ca yathā ca yādṛśāś ca yal lakṣaṇāś ca yat svabhāvāś ca te dharmā iti.* (ed. by U. Wogihara, pp. 29, 3-7). However, "when they explain dharmas that have their own causes in themselves, Tathāgatas do so by means of skilfulness (*upāyakauśalya*), by the display of wisdom, arguments by reasons, fundamental ideas, interpretations and provisional conceptualizations; by these various expedient means they can release beings who are attached to one point of view or another". (*svapratyayān dharmān prakāśayanti vividhopāyakauśalyajñānadarśanahetukāraṇanirdeśanārambaṇaniruktiprajñaptibhisir taista upāyakauśalyais tasmiṃstasmiṃl lagnān sattvān pramocayituṃ. Ibid.*, pp. 28, 11-14).

Nāgārjuna says in his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* :

The teaching of the dharma by the various Buddhas is based on towfold truth *i.e.*, the relative truth and the truth from the ultimate point of view.

(dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā|
lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ|| XXIV, 8)

Without relying on the relative truth, the absolute truth cannot be shown. Without approaching the ultimate truth, Nirvāṇa cannot be achieved.

(vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate|
paramārtham anāgamya nirvāṇaṃ nādhigamyate|| XXIV, 10).

69. *SN* Vol. II, pp. 25, 18-23 and pp. 25,

31-26, 3.

uppādā vā tathāgatānam anuppādā va tathāgatānaṃ ṭhitā'va sā dhātu dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā idapaccayatā| taṃ tathāgato abhisambujjhati abhisameti, abhisambujjhitvā abhisametvā ācikkhati deseti paññāpeti paṭṭhapeti vivarati vibhajati uttānīkaroti passathāti cāha||

See the corresponding Chinese translation

若佛出世. 若未出世 此法常住或住法界

(dharma-dhātu) (*Taishō* Vol. II, 84b16-7).

70. *AN*, Vol. I, pp. 286, 8-25.

uppādā vā bhikkhave tathāgatānaṃ anuppādā vā tathāgatānam ṭhitā'va sā dhātu dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā| taṃ tathāgato abhisambujjhati abhisameti, abhisambujjhitvā abhisametvā ācikkhati deseti paññāpeti paṭṭhapeti vivarati vibhajati uttānīkaroti sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā ti || uppādā vā...sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā| taṃ tathāgato...sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā ti||uppādā vā...sabbe dhammā anattā | taṃ tathāgato.....sabbe dhammā anattā ti||

71. Mahāyāna developed the notion of "dharmāṇāṃ dhormatā and dharmadhātu" besed on what was expressed as "ṭhitā dhātu, dhammaṭṭhitatā and dhammaniyāmatā" in the above-qouted Pāli passages. Quoting from *Āgama*, Candrakīrti says in his *Prasannapadā* :

utpādād vā tathagātānām anutpādād vā tathāgatānāṃ sthitaivaiṣā dharmāṇām dharmatā| (pp. 40-1).

Daśabhūmīśvaro nāma Mahāyānasūtraṃ, which is a chapter in the *Avataṃsakasūtra*, says thus :

api tu khalu punaḥ kulaputraiṣā sā sarvadharmāṇāṃ dharmatā|utpādād vā tathagātānām anutpādād vā sthitaivaiṣā dharmatā dharmadhātusthitiḥ|yad idaṃ sarvadharmaśūnyatā sarvadharmānupalabdhiḥ|

(ed. by Ryūkō Kondō, Tokyo, 1936, p. 136, 7-9);

Laṅkāvatāra says :

dharmadhātusthititotpādād vā tathāgatānām anutpādād vā tathāgatānāṃ sthitaivaiṣā dharmāṇāṃ dharmatā dharmasthititā dharmaniyāmātā paurāṇanagarapathavan Mahāmate.

(ed. by B. Nanjō, Kyoto 1923, p. 143, 11-14)

Saddharmapuṇḍarīka has this to say :

dharmasthitiṃ dharmaniyāmatāṃ ca
nityasthitāṃ loki imām akampyāṃ|
buddāś ca bodhiṃ pṛithvīya maṇḍe
prakāśayiṣyanti upāyakauśalam||
(II, 103)

(ed. by U. Wogihara, Tokyo 1958, pp. 51, 18-21).

72. The theory of universal causation and interdependence of *Dharmadhātu*

(法界緣起說)

was developed chiefly in China based on such Mahāyāna-sūtras as *Avataṃsakasūtra* and *Gaṇḍavyūha*. The *pratītyasamutpāda* of *Dharmadhātu* is the climax of all causation theories. It expounds the theory that the universe is universally co-originating, mutually interdependent, universally immanent, totally non-obstructing and harmonius.

73. The opponent objects saying, "if things do not originate from itself, from others, from both or without any cause (*i.e.*, from neither), then why did the Buddha say that dependent on ignorance there arise karmic formations" ? To this Candrakīrti answers, "(because what the Buddha said) is the worldly truth. It is not (the absolute) truth". (atrāha, *yadi svataḥ parata ubhayato hetutaś ca nāsti bhāvānām utpādas tatra katham avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā' ity uktaṃ bhagavatā ?|| ucyate, samvṛtir eva na tattvaṃ|| Prasannapadā*, pp. 54, 9-10).

Again he says, "the Buddha said this much, 'at this point there is the provisinoal dharma (*dharmasaṃketa* which is synonymous with *vyavahāra, prajñapti, saṃvṛti* etc.), *i.e.*, when this is that is, this

arising that arises, *i.e.*, depending on ignorance there arise karmic formations, depending on karmic formations there arises consciousness, and so on." (*bhagavatāpy etāvan mātram evoktaṃ| "tatrāyaṃ dharmasaṃketo yad utāsmin satīdaṃ bhavati; asyotpādād idam utpadyate, yad utāvidyāpratyayaḥ saṃskārāḥ, saṃskārapratyayaṃ vijñānam ity ādi."* *Ibid.*, pp. 55, 8-10).

See also *Ibid.*, p. 159, 4-160, 10. Here Candrakīrti negates those who take *asmin satīdam bhavati, asyotpādād idam* utpadyate, *yad utāvidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā...*, as the ultimate truth (*paramārthasatya*).

Commenting on Nāgārjuna's *Mulamadhyamakakārikā*, Piṅgala (青目)

declares that the Chapter 26, *Dvādaśāṅga-(pratītyasamutpāda)-parīkṣā*, and the Chapter 27, *Dṛṣti-parīkṣā*, are the examination through the Śrāvaka Doctrine. *Taishō* Vol. 30, pp. 36b18-9 and c25-6.

74. According to the *Samayabhedoparacanacakra*, the Mahāsaṅghika school introduced the theory that the Buddha preached Dharma with a single message :

佛以一音說一切法

(異部宗輪論

Taishō No. 2031, Vol. 49, pp. 15b28). See also *Taishō* No. 2032, p. 18b13; No. 2033, pp. 20b28-9. Also *Tibetan Tripiṭaka* No. 5639, Vol. 127, pp. 250-3, U 170b4.

In spite of the objection by Sarvāstivādins (cf. *Abhidārmamahāvibhāṣā*, Taishō No. 1545, Vol. 27, p. 410a), the theory that the Buddha preached Dharma with a single message but the listeners understood it in many ways was expounded by Mahāyānists.

For instance, the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* says in a verse :

bcom ldan ḥdas kyis *gsuṅ gcig* rab tu phyuṅ ba yaṅ,
ḥkhor rnams kyis ni gsuṅ la tha dad rnam par rig,
ḥgro ba dag gis raṅ gi don bzin rnam rig pa,
de ni rgyal baḥi ma ḥdres saṅ rgyas mtshan lags so.

(*TTP* No. 843, Vol. 34, pp. 75-3, Bu 183a7-8; cf. *Taishō* No. 475, Vol. 14, pp. 538a2-5; No. 476, Vol. 14, pp. 558c-19-22).

See Prof, Étienne Lamotte, *L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti*, pp. 109-110 and footnote No. 52.

Le Bien heureux s'exprime par un son unique (ekasvareṇodāharati), et les êtres, chacun selon sa categorie, en obtiennent l'intelligence; chacun se dit que le Bienheureux parle sa langue : c'est là une carachéristique exclusive (āveṇikalakṣaṇa) du Victorieux (jina).

75. Among the vows made by Samudrareṇu, who is to become Śākyamuni Buddha in future, we find his vow to preach his followers *i.e.*, *bhikṣu*, *bhikṣuṇī*, *upāsakā* and *upāsikā*, a single message with one voice (*ekapadavyāhāreṇa dharmaṃ deśayeyaṃ*) in the *Karunapuṇḍarīka* (ed. by I. Yamada, SOAS, University of London, 1968, pp. 249, 11). The text (*KP*, pp. 249, 11-256, 8) lists, moreover, various ways in which the Buddha's followers understood the Dharma which he preached with a single message. See my *Introduction* to the *Karuṇāpunāḍarīka*, Vol. I, p. 97.

76. *Suttanipāta*, Verse No. 884 says- "*ekam hi saccam, na dutīyam atthi*". cf. "*ekam santam bahudā kalpayanti*" (*Ṛg Veda* I, 164, X, 114, 4; *Bhagavad-gītā* Vol. X, 41 etc.).

26

Buddhism in a Pre-Modern Bureaucratic Empire : The Chinese Experience

E. ZURCHER

I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

THE STUDY of Chinese Buddhism is largely study in acculturation. It deals with the various ways in which a huge and heterogeneous body of foreign beliefs and practices, itself subject to constant accretion, change and diversification, came to be incorporated into the even more complex fabric of Chinese culture. The process of adaptation probably had started already in the second century A.D., when a number of primitive translations of Buddhist scriptures were produced by the first "mixed" translation teams, and it went on even after the last fresh impulses from abroad had ceased. In some respects it is still going on today.

In all its aspects—religious beliefs and practices, monastic organization, attitude towards the temporal authorities, relations between clergy and lay believers, philosophical speculations and scholastic studies, literary expression, economic and welfare activities, material culture and art—Buddhism was deeply influenced, and in some sectors completely transformed, by a great variety of forces, tensions, attitudes and orientations that were part of the Chinese cultural environment. Taken as a whole, Chinese Buddhism can be regarded as a classical illustration of the process of cultural transmission and adaptation, as it shows all degrees and varieties of response, ranging from total absorption of some elements (even to the point of practically losing their Buddhist identity) to total rejection, with all intermediary types of selective adoption, adaptation, hybridization, amalgamation, compartmentalization and restructuring.

In this paper I shall not attempt to present a chronological survey of the integration of Buddhism into the ethical, political educational, economic and social life of the Chinese. Nor shall I venture into the tricky and somewhat fruitless subject of periodization, mainly because in dealing with such an extremely complex and articulated phenomenon evolving

in time, it is virtually impossible to devise a scheme of periodization that will hold good for all parts of the complex. Thus, if we want to define the first major turning point in the history of Chinese Buddhism, we could opt for 311 A.D. (the occupation of northern China by barbarian invaders and the beginning of a long period of disunity and regional growth) if we want to focus on geographical diversification; doctrinally, we should prefer the activities of Kumārajīva and his school in the early fifth century; and economically, the most obvious watershed would be the outburst of large-scale clerical landholding coupled with industrial and financial enterprises in the early T'ang, say around 600 A.D.

In this paper I shall concentrate on the cultural environment, the Chinese matrix in which Buddhism came to function. I have chosen this approach because it seems to fit the nature of symposium devoted to the study of Buddhism in a comparative framework. In such a perspective, little would be gained by a mere juxtaposition of descriptive accounts dealing with Buddhism in various regions of Asia. The varieties of Buddhism may become more significant if we place them in their respective contexts, and try to compare the ways in which Buddhism functions in various types of societies. The underlying assumption is, of course, that there *is* such a thing as a typology of political and socio-economic systems, and that, in other words, a number of essential features of Chinese Buddhism in the pre-modern period are not just due to random development, fate, or the "genius of the Chinese people", but that they can be related to the basic orientations of a pre-modern, agrarian-based, centralized bureaucratic empire with a dominant élite of scholar-officials and a universalistic state ideology. Of course such a correlation should not be seen as a simple, mechanistic, one-to-one correspondence. In some cases the relations are obvious and direct : thus the typical T'ang institution of bureaucratic control of the Buddhist clergy through the Bureau of Sacrifices, an organ of the Ministry of Rites, can be directly associated with some well-known traits in the political system. In other cases the link is more tenuous and somewhat speculative : the strong emphasis on the realization of the transcendent Buddha-nature may have been stimulated by the deep-rooted notion of the perfectibility of man, which in turn is the individualized counterpart of one of the basic assumptions in the traditional ideology : the perfectibility of human society. But even if we can assume that this Confucian assumption provided a certain stimulus, or atleast created a certain familiarity with the ideal of moral and spiritual self-cultivation, it is obvious that the whole orientation of the Buddhist ideal is fundamentally different. The ideal of perfect man has, so to speak, become de-socialized, and that was precisely the reason why it was attached by Neo-Confucian thinkers as anti-social and therefore useless. In the same way, it may be true that one of the most characteristic phenomena of Chinese Buddhism, the T'ien-t'ai doctrine, a complicated scholastic attempt to reorganize the whole body of the Buddha's teaching into a chronological and methodological scheme devised to explain away all doctrinal differences between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna teachings, basically was an expression of the Chinese urge to avoid conflict and to harmonize different opinions, which in turn is deeply rooted in the traditional norms of social and political behaviour. Or, it may be regarded as an expression of the Chinese genius for classification and organization. But here again, the link is at best indirect. If we attempt to draw the contours within which Chinese Buddhism developed, we can only tentatively indicate a configuration of forces that stimulated some developments while curbing others, an indication of certain zones of tension and potential conflict, alternating with neutral spaces which Buddhism was free to

fill up. It should never become a deterministic scheme that excludes the possibility of autonomous and creative activity of the human mind, and the free choice between alternatives. But even so, I believe that for a comparative study this approach may be fruitful, because it would enable us to contrast the functioning of Buddhism in a pre-modern bureaucratic empire with its behavior in, say, a patrimonial tribal state, or a feudal system, or a commercial oasis kingdom, or—why not ?—a modern industrial state, or a developing country in the process of nation-building and cultural integration.

Before I present, in skeleton-form, a survey of what I suppose to be the major factors that have been active in shaping the course of Chinese Buddhism, three more warnings.

In the first place : as any sinologist will immediately recognize, the table mainly reflects the world-view of a small ruling élite : the court, the top of the imperial bureaucracy, and the highest level of the literate minority—altogether perhaps five per cent of the population, probably even less than that. Of course this political and intellectual élite was of supreme importance, but we should remember that the recorded history of Chinese Buddhism is mainly the history of the confrontation and interaction of a tiny top of courtiers, administrators and prominent literati and an equally minuscule élite from among the clergy : the minority of prominent clerics, learned scholiasts, and cultured defenders of the faith. Only very rarely, as in the case of the Tunhuang documents, do we have primary materials containing information about developments among the mass of the population and among the lower strata of the literate minority. This is important for our approach, because it is obvious that the whole pattern would be quite different from the one I am presenting here, if we were to focus on the mass of the population rather than on the cultured minority. In many cases, the picture would have to be reversed. To mention only one example : the privileged position claimed by the Buddhist monastery (in terms of independence from secular authorities, exemption from taxes and corvée labour, relative freedom from Government interference, and the possibility of engaging in various forms of economic enterprises) forms an obvious zone of conflict and tension if seen from the standpoint of the ruling minority, because it conflicts with several principles, as listed below : the theory of the all-inclusive nature of imperial authority, the need to control local communities, the need to have sufficient manpower for taxation and corvée labour, and in general, the negative attitude towards non-agricultural economic activities beyond Government control. But as soon as we switch over to the perspective of the mass of the exploited population, it becomes clear that at that level the relative independence of the Buddhist monastery was not a source of tension, but rather a positive integrating factor : at that level, the monastery could function as a haven of refuge, as a means to escape oppressive taxation, to obtain a minimum of social security, to get atleast some education, or as an outlet for marginal elements and drop-outs. An element eliminated at the top level can become highly productive at the popular level : the idea of karmic retribution by rebirth has not been able to influence even to the slightest extent the official ideology : there is no trace of it in any systematization of Confucian doctrine. On the other hand, it has become a basic theme in popular literature and popular art down to the present day where it obviously has an integrative function. In other words : the scheme should be refined by paying due attention to social stratification.

Secondly : the scheme suggests a static, unchanging cultural environment, which is misleading. The some cases, a factor exerts a powerful influence on the development

of Chinese Buddhism, too powerful to be excluded, but only during a certain period. Cases in point are the role of the large landed estates and the privileges of the great semi-aristocratic families, which do not extend beyond the ninth century, or the existence of a large centralized empire, which always maintained itself as a kind of political ideal (and therefore always influenced the thought of the élite), but which only was realized (and imperfectly realized, at that) during less than one-half of the period under consideration.

In the third place : the impression of a stable matrix in which Buddhism is developing, is misleading. Precisely by its attempts to digest Buddhism, the matrix itself is changing. If the Buddhist clergy is subjected to secular government control, something happens with secular government itself, for it comes to incorporate a religious function which it did not have before : it becomes, as it were, contaminated with a doctrine of individual salvation and monastic discipline by assuming responsibility for it. In the same way, if the Buddhist clergy, atleast from the sixth century onward, is praying for the emperor's health and well-being, it is not only a clerical adoption of a well-known bureaucratic custom. It also means that a bit of Buddhist devotion—or magic—has become incorporated into the court ceremonial, and into the ritual justification of imperial rule, *i.e.*, into the very heart of the Great Tradition of Confucianism. Or, to adduce a somewhat paradoxical example : the very denial of Buddhism has no doubt been one of the shaping forces in the Neo-Confucian revival; by its very rejection Buddhism helped to change Confucianism.

But after these cautionary remarks, which may have done much to undermine the very basis of this paper, let us turn to what I would consider the major factors in the Chinese cultural environment that have been instrumental in shaping Chinese Buddhism.

II. THE CHINESE ENVIRONMENT

A. Political system and Ideology

1. The persisting ideal (only realized in certain periods) of a unified, centralized bureaucratic empire.
2. The supernatural sanction of imperial rule : the "Mandate of Heaven", hence the conception of all-embracing imperial authority, including the sphere of religious beliefs and practices.
3. Sino-centric view of the world : fundamental superiority of the Chinese social and political order.
4. The perfectibility, in a moral sense, of human society, and the (re)creation of perfect society based on hierarchical order and harmony, as the ultimate aim of government; "transformation by (moral) instruction" (*chiao hua*).
5. The bureaucracy as the instrument of imperial rule, including the latter's religious functions.
6. Recruitment of future officials on the basis of "merit", *i.e.*, (theoretically) moral standing and literary training, first through a system of recommendation, later through competitive literary examination.
7. The notion of the organic interrelation of state and cosmos : portents and miraculous happenings indicating the moral well-being or decadence

of the ruling house.

8. Composite nature of, and tensions within, the ruling élite : the court (the emperor, his family and relatives-in-law, (imperial favorities, eunuchs); the bureaucracy; (until the Late T'ang) the leaders of the "great families"; regional powers.
9. Ruling élite and the local communities : very limited possibilities of effective political control, hence constant fear of "subversive" movements at grass-roots' level, and attempts to exert some measure of supervision through heads of local groups with collective responsibility.

B. Social

1. The family and well-ordered family life as the basis of society; gentry ideal of the large patriarchal family; codification of family mores ("family instructions"); official sanctions against transgression of family morals.
2. Important role of "associations" (with various social, economic, religious, and welfare functions) at the local level, usually under gentry leadership, often organized as pseudo-kinship groups.
3. Subordinate position of women, both in the family system and in other forms of social organization.
4. Rigid class divisions in medieval Chinese society; after the Late T'ang the oligarchy of "great families" gradually changes into domination by a larger "gentry" class.

C. Economic

1. The agrarian basis of the state; negative attitude of the ruling élite towards merchants and other "non-productive" occupational groups.
2. The scarcity of manpower subject to taxation and corvée labour.
3. Periodic bankruptcy of the state, and the urge to find additional sources of income.
4. Growth of large *latifundia* since the early medieval period; economic privileges of the large landowners.
5. Financial activities and industrial enterprise in the great landed estates.
6. The growing importance of the cities as centers of economic activity, and the increasing prosperity of urban groups below the level of the élite.

D. World-view and Religion

1. The conception of the perfectibility of man as a social-being.
2. The concept of "sin" as a disturbance of the natural order, and expiation of sin through self-incrimination.
3. Diffuse religion : religious practices traditionally embedded in social and political structures (community cults, ancestor worship, sacrifices made by emperor and officials, etc.).
4. Ritualized religion; belief in the efficacy of sacrificial rites and formulae; very

few traces of devotionalism among the cultured élite.

5. Semi-materialistic conception of the universe : *yin-yang* and the Five Elements; *ch'i* "ether" (in various degrees of condensation and rare-faction) as the substance of all phenomena.
6. Traditional demonology; vague and conflicting ideas about the afterlife.
7. Limited and concrete representation of time and space; in general, a strong tendency to express abstract notions by means of concrete images.
8. Negative attitude of the cultured èlite towards local ("vulgar") religious cults; distinction between "officially approved" and "heterodox" religious beliefs and practices.
9. The existence of a Taoist religious and philosophical tradition, some elements of which at times became influential among a part of the cultural élite (mystic realization of Unity-in-diversity; non-activity; retirement from office to preserve one's purity; the cult of Nature; rejection of conventional norms).

E. Literary and Educational

1. Long-standing literary and scholarly tradition; prestige of scholarship and learning.
2. Moralistic orientation of traditional scholarship and literature.
3. Early development of historiography, based on a conception of history that is partly moralistic, partly derived from early cosmological speculations.
4. The use of a script that transcends dialectical differences.
5. Almost universal use of a petrified classical Chinese as the medium of literary expression.
6. Standardization of literary and scholastic training due to the examination system.

III. AN ILLUSTRATION : BUDDHIST LEGITIMATION OF DYNASTIC RULE

The influence of the configuration of environmental forces and the interaction of these forces with certain elements of Buddhism may be illustrated in some detail by the various ways in which Buddhism was used by the state (and in particular by the court) to provide a legitimation of imperial rule and a magic support to the dynasty.

The traditional legitimation of imperial rule was based on the well-known political myth of the Mandate of Heaven, according to which the founder of the dynasty (and by inheritance, but in a diminishing degree, his successors) was charged by Heaven to preserve order and harmony in the world of man. The Mandate was manifested through the signs of Heaven (auspicious omens if the ruler's virtue was up to standard; warning portenta if it was declining), by signs of popular support, and by conditions of peace and prosperity. The special relations between the emperor as *pontifex maximums* and Heaven was symbolized by elaborate rules of ritual behavior; his unique position was constantly stressed in terminology and in traditional historiography; it was manifested by imperial prerogatives such as the promulgation of the calender and the periodic change of reign periods. The impressive ritual of the imperial sacrifice to Heaven served as the annual manifestation of the emperor's "filial" relation with the highest principle

of Cosmic Order, therefore as the clearest confirmation of legitimacy.

This traditional complex was after the fourth century, and particularly in the Sui and T'ang periods, reinforced by adoption of a number of elements of Buddhist inspiration. The main elements that Buddhism could supply as additional means of legitimation and magic protection were the following :

(*a*) The notion of the *cakravartin*, the pious universal king, and the Buddhist legendary account of Aśoka's conversion and devotion;
(*b*) The manifestation of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas in the world, coupled with the concept of *upāyakauśalya*, the "skill in expedient means", which enables them to manifest themselves in any form they choose, and to use any means to convert and save their audience;
(*c*) The stereotyped series of miraculous signs (many-coloured rays of light, apparitional flowers, several kinds of earthquake, "sweet dew", etc.) that were believed to have accompanied auspicious happenings, such as the Buddha's birth, his Enlightenment, his intention to preach an important *sūtra*, etc.;
(*d*) The karmic efficacy of prayer, chanting of sacred texts, and sacrifice of incense and flowers;
(*e*) The belief that the karmic "merit" amassed by pious works—including those mentioned above—can be transferred to another person or group;
(*f*) The supernatural powers acquired through the practice of the religious life;
(*g*) The spiritual protection promised to devotees and to benefactors of Buddhism.

It should be noted that in their original context these traits do not belong together; they are taken from various sectors of Buddhist religious lore. However, in China they became integrated into a new complex with a specific function.

From early times the *cakravartin* ideal became popular among the Chinese Buddhist élite. The Buddhist image of the pious universal monarch could not but remind them of the traditional Chinese ideal of the saintly ruler, bearer of the Mandate of Heaven, to whose authority the whole world comes to submit. In fact, the attempt to find remains of the 84,000 stūpas of Aśoka in China (which, being part of Jambudvīpa, once should have been part of Aśoka's empire) resulted after the fourth century in a curious kind of pious archaeology that yielded a rich harvest of relics and other objects. Many of these were reported to the court as "auspicious omens". This again accorded with Chinese custom. Atleast since Han times, the discovery of "auspicious objects", often accompanied by luminous emanations and other supernatural signs, had been regarded as tangible proof of virtuous government. The so-called relics of Aśoka—often found by people with close connections with the court—not only proved the existence of Buddhist in China in a distant part, but also served as "auspicious responses" (*jui-ying*) of Heaven, confirming the legitimacy of imperial rule.

In two cases Chinese emperors are known to have consciously identified themselves with the *cakravartin* ideal : the fervently Buddhist emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty (reigned 502-549), who probably did so in a sincere attempt to imitate Aśoka, and the ruthless founder of the Sui dynasty, emperor Wen (581/589-605), who may have used the Buddhist theme as a matter of political strategy.

Emperor Wen even followed Aśoka's example by distributing "relics" and by

building more than a hundred shrines all over the empire, which in turn led to a spate of new discoveries of relics found at the most improbably places : in the course of the year 601 the emperor and the empress repeatedly discovered them in their food when they were eating. The propagandistic element was obviously very strong : there was a steady flow of reports about auspicious signs and objects that manifested themselves in or near the shrines, including such typically Chinese ominous objects as inscribed jades and auspicious animals. This again shows how Buddhist notions had merged with Chinese tradtional symbols and practices of supernatural dynastic legitimation.

Both monarchs were also styled "Bodhisattvas", just as previously the rulers of the Northern Wei empire had been held to be manifestations of the Tathāgata, and as the early T'ang empress Wu-Tse-t'ien would justify her usurpation of the throne by posing as an incarnation of Maitreya. In fact, since the early seventh century, many rebellious leaders have used this legitimation.

But although few rulers actually went so far as to pose as incarnations, it became a regular custom to place the dynasty under the magical protection of a special class of monks within the *Saṅgha*. This was done by the institution of a peculiar type of official temple, founded and materially supported by the state, with the express duty to perform religious ceremonies for the well-being of the emperor and his ancestors, the prosperity and stability of the state, and the spiritual comfort of soldiers who had died in battle. A whole series of such "national temples", established in the provincial capitals, and all bearing the same name, was founded by successive imperial decrees : The Ta Hsing-kuo temples under the Sui, the Kuo-fen temples under the T'ang emperor Kao-tsung, the K'ai-yuan-ssu under Hsüan-t'sung, etc. In good Mahāyāna fashion, the merit resulting from prayer and the reading of scriptures could be transferred to another being or collective body—but in this case it was the dynasty and the state. It was also, to some extent, the Buddhist version of the traditional Chinese belief that the dynasty can be magically supported by sacrifice, prayer, and abstinence. Accordingly, one of the most popular scriptures to be read in the national temples was the "scripture on the Benevolent King that gives protection to the state" (*Jen-wang hu-kuo ching*).

In this example two important facts can be observed. In the first place, is the process of "restructuring", by which a number of originally disparate Buddhist elements were combined into a new complex. Secondly, it should be noted that in this particular case Buddhism played a positive, supporting role *vis-a-vis* the official ideology. It accorded with certain traditional ideas and practices, and was at the same time able to enrich them. Apart from its obvious affinity with certain traditional means of ideological justification, it was also in agreement with some other environmental factors such as the mechanistic nature of prayer and sacrifice, ancestoral worship, and the traditional distinction between official, government-approved cults and the "vulgar" world of popular religion.

IV. TYPES OF INTEGRATION

If Chinese Buddhism can to a large extent be analysed in terms of response to environmental factors, this does not mean that we can do so on the basis of one single model of integration. The whole process is far too complicated to be explained by one single mechanism of cultural transmission.

In some cases, a completely new development is "triggered" by the introduction of a Buddhist element, in a way that reminds us of stimulus diffusion. Thus, Buddhism introduced certain basic ideas about the management of monasteries, but in China this impetus eventually led to a complicated system of monastic ranks and offices, disciplinary rules, and administrative procedures, which does not seem to owe anything to foreign examples.

In other cases, however, a complex of Buddhist ideas is less productive, or even totally unproductive : the body of alien notions is then "compartmentalized" in a certain closed milieu without exerting a creative stimulus on the wider cultural environment. To some extent, this applies to the limited influence of the extremely technical Vijñānavādin doctrine, always the domain of a tiny élite of specialized scholar-monks, certainly so if we compare it to the huge impact of the Mādhyamika doctrine. The totally encapsulated position of the study of Indian logic is another example.

An extremely interesting case of compartmentalization can be observed in the whole complex of Buddhist notions concerning cosmology, cosmography, geography and, in general, ideas concerning the nature and composition of the physical world. The first signs of this phenomenon date from around 400 A.D., when Chinese clerics in their own writings began to use terms and concepts borrowed from the alien system. It marked the beginning of a remarkable dichotomy in Chinese proto-science : the Indian "Four Great Elements" operating alongside Yin-Yang and the Five Elements; the "Four Continents" around Mt. Meru *versus* traditional Chinese geographic notions; the vast Buddhist panorama of cosmic periods and of the periodic destruction and reintegration of the universe *versus* the Chinese belief in a recorded human history of a few millennia and an unbroken cyclic movement of dynastic rise and decline; the Buddhist plurality of inhabited worlds and innumerable world-systems *versus* the Chinese earth-centered cosmos, etc. This process of juxtaposition, in which a large body of Indian Buddhist lore was borrowed *in isolation*, without in any degree influencing the "official" world-view (as, *e.g.*, represented in the Chinese official compendia) reached its highest point in T'ang times. If we compare the first chapters of the seventh century Buddhist encyclopaedia *Fa-yüan chu-lin* with the corresponding sections of the official *T'ai-p'ing yü-lan*, the two accounts seem hardly to have anything in common, though both profess to describe our own physical universe. We must conclude that here again the alternative world conception was virtually restricted to "pockets" of specialized Buddhist learning without affecting traditional Chinese lore to any significant degree. It is therefore not comparable to the massive introduction of themes taken from pagan antiquity into Christian civilization during the European Rennaissance, because in that case the two traditions had never been quite separated and easily merged into a new synthesis.

If we would try, for the purpose of analysis, to define the various selective mechanisms that were at work in the formation of Chinese Buddhism, the following types could be suggested, together with a summary indication of some examples:

(1) *Total absorption* is a marginal category, because, strictly speaking, it should be reserved for cases in which originally Buddhist elements have been completely digested by the receiving environment, even to such a degree as to lose their Buddhist connotations. As far as the culture of the élite is concerned, one may think of certain concepts of Buddhist origin that have been incorporated into the Neo-Confucian synthesis, or, in the field of social organization, of various latter-day charity and welfare institutions managed by the

Confucian gentry, but going back to Buddhist prototypes. In general, however, examples of total absorption are far more numerous at the popular level : digestion of many originally Buddhist elements in the syncretic pantheon of popular religion and in folk art; the use of the "prosimetric form" (going back to the alternation of prose and *gāthās* in Buddhist scriptures) in oral literature, etc. The same can be observed in architecture, *e.g.*, the pagoda being used to neutralize evil influences in the proto-science of geomantics; other examples are the ornamental arch (*p'ai-lou*), the lion-pillar (*hua-piao*), and many features of architectural decoration.

(2) *Adoption* of an alien Buddhist element without apparent change in form and character can only play a limited role, if it indeed occurs at all. Even if at first sight an element has retained its original character, it must be remembered that by being integrated in a new cultural context it will always have acquired new connotations. Thus, the simple element of "tonsure" as an outward sign of monkhood may seem to be a case of pure adoption, but in the Chinese context its symbolic content was altered (atleast among the opponents of Buddhism) in a negative sense, by its association with bodily punishment, self-mutilation and hence unfilial conduct. The same is true of such apparent cases of "pure adoption" as the vegetarian diet, the chanting of Sanskrit *dhāraṇī*, etc.

(3) *Selection and change of emphasis* may be the most important mechanism, active in the introduction and adaptation of larger complexes. Both the nature of the selected elements and the change of emphasis within the complex are closely related to co-existing patterns of preference in the receiving culture. Two random examples : the selection of the doctrine of universal Emptiness as focus of interest in the fourth century, with special emphasis on the relation between Being and Non-Being, clearly corresponding to the popularity of mystic "Neo-Taoist" speculations among the cultured élite. Selection of the Mahāyāna doctrine of the possibility of accumulating karmic merit on behalf of other beings, with special emphasis on the ceremonial means to relieve the suffering of *pretas*; obvious connection with traditional practices to appease tormented spirits and with the filial duties towards ancestors.

(4) *Restructuring* : The integration of disparate elements into a new complex can be frequently observed in all sectors and at all levels; it has been illustrated in section III by the way in which different Buddhist elements were combined into the new complex of "legitimation of dynastic rule". The most impressive products of restructuring are the all-inclusive systems based on the principle of *p'an-chiao* ("differentiated teaching") of which the T'ien-t'ai scheme has become the most outstanding example : attempts at reintegration of all scriptural teachings in an all-embracing system of periodization and methods of preaching, a hierarchical structure leading up to one basic scripture (in the case of T'ien-t'ai, the *Lotus sūtra*) as the highest revelation.

(5) *Compartmentalization* : The isolated existence of a Buddhist complex of ideas and practices within the receiving culture, without drastic changes in form or content and with little or no influence on the outside world. It has been illustrated by some examples above. It seems that the insular situation cannot be maintained indefinitely, and that such elements are eventually rejected, or at best relegated to an absolutely marginal position.

(6) *Hybridization* : A complete merger of Buddhist and "native" notions or practices different from "total absorption" in that in a hybrid the Buddhist characteristic inspiration is maintained throughout. The figure of the "mad monk" in Chinese Buddhism is a good example of complete amalgamation of traditional stereotypes (the unconven-

tional Taoist recluse; the idea of "hidden saintliness") and the Mahāyānist notions of *upāyakauśalya* and the rejection of worldly norms and conventions.

(7) *Stimulated development* : The creation of new and original complexes in which Buddhism acted as "trigger mechanism" has been illustrated above by the independent development of internal monastic organization. Many other examples could be cited : economic institutions created by the Buddhist Church in medieval times; the development of Chinese Buddhist historiography and bibliography; the eschatological "subversive" movements based on the idea of the final disappearance of the dharma and the impending arrival of Maitreya, etc. It should be noted that in such cases Buddhism acted as stimulus, but that in all other respects the further development was closely related to basic features is the receiving culture (monastic organization : link with well-developed systems in bureaucracy and large corporate bodies; economic institutions : link with analogous developments in the large landed estates; historiography and other scholarly activities : link with strong secular tradition of scholarship; eschatological movements : traditional ideas about dynastic decline and the change of the Mandate of Heaven).

(8) *Rejection* : Like pure adoption, complete rejection is rarel attested. In some cases we may assume that the absence of certain features was caused by very strong antagonism between a Buddhist element and some basic political or moral assumptions of the receiving culture. Thus, if food-begging by monks, though very often mentioned in translated scriptures and prescribed by the Vinaya rules, was never practised as a regular custom in China, this may have been due to a deep-seated negative attitude towards begging. In the same way, moral considerations, rooted in family ethics and Confucian prudishness, may have eliminated the sexual component from Tantric Buddhism in China.

It should be repeated that the analytical treatment of Chinese Buddhism in terms of cultural interaction and types of response is a somewhat one-sided approach one that will never be able to supplant other types of description. By its emphasis on environmental aspects it is bound to stress function rather than content. If applied mechanically, it can easily lead to barren determinism, and it deliberately overlooks the influence that great individual minds and personalities may have on the course of events. It may, however, have some use as an instrument for comparative analysis.

27

On Bhaisajyaguru and His Cult

LEONARD ZWILLING*

AMONG THE more common divine forms to be found among the world's religions are deities of medicine and healing.[1] The worship and propitiation of such deities has always been regarded as one means of allaying the universal human anxiety over sickness and mortality, and the effectiveness of such practices is attested to by their enduring popularity in many parts of the world down to the present day.

Unlike the literate religious traditions of the ancient Near East and Mediterranean, non-Buddhist India lacked a well developed cult of a healing deity, although the Aśvins and Dhanvantari perform that function in the Veda and Epics.[2] We also find deified physicians such as Ātreya[3] and numerous gods and demons connected with illness, such as Śītalā. Early Buddhism of course lacked any healing deity as such; however Śākyamuni is often metaphorically described as a physician (bhisakka) in the Pāli scriptures, and cures, both ordinary and miraculous, are ascribed to him.[4] With the rise of the Mahāyāna a crowd of specialized Buddhas and Bodhisattvas were incorporated into the pantheon such as Avalokiteśvara, Mañjuśrī, Kṣitigarbha, etc., and the deity with which we are concerned here, Bhaiṣajyaguruvaiḍūryaprabharāja, or more simply, Bhaiṣajyaguru, the central figure of the scripture which bears his name[5] and the focus of an important cult in Inner and East Asia for well over a millennium.

Bhaiṣajyaguru's major role is that of a healer and restorer of the sick; his curative powers, however, are not limited to physical illnesses, since the Buddhist conception of illness embraces spiritual and emotional afflictions as well as corporeal.[6] His function as "divine physician" is reflected in his portrayal as the teacher of Ayurveda in the well-known medical treatise *rGyud bzi*, in which he assumes the role of Dhanvantari and Ātreya in the *Suśrutasaṁhitā* and *Carakasaṁhitā* respectively.[7]

Given the uncertainty surrounding the chronology of the Mahāyāna scriptures, it is not possible to ascertain with any exactitude the origin and development of Bhaiṣajyaguru.

Since no icon of this deity has yet come to light of the Indian sub-continent, we must rely entirely on textual evidence in attempting to trace the history of this figure and his cult. As is the case with many Mahāyāna scriptures, a lower limit may be fixed by the date of the earliest Chinese translation, in our case that which is attributed to the Kuchean monk Śrīmitra (317-420), although the attribution is by no means certain.[8] While we will make certain inferences regarding the chronology of texts and cultic elements, these must remain speculative, due to the limitations noted above. We shall, however, share the assumption of all previous students that there is a relation between him and other figures found in Mahāyāna texts (other than his own) and that this relation is based mainly on a similarity of names rather than on functional and iconographic congruences. We shall assume that deities bearing essentially the same name as Bhaiṣajyaguru, but lacking most of the attributes found in the fully-developed healing divinity of the Bhaiṣajyaguru scripture, represent earlier stages in the evolution of a continuous symbolic complex.

While there are references to divine beings with names similar or identical to Bhaiṣajyaguru in several early Mahāyāna texts,[9] it is only in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, a scripture which had taken shape by the 2nd century B.C. or earlier[10] that we meet with detailed references to cognate, if not directly antecedent figures—Bhaiṣajyarāja and Bhaiṣajyasamudgata. While these two Bodhisattvas do not have explicitely healing functions in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*[11] their names alone are sufficiently indicative of a connection with medicine and they do share some of the attributes of Bhaiṣajyaguru. Bhaiṣajyarāja is by far the more clearly delineated of the two; chapter XXII is wholly, and chapter XXV is primarily devoted to describing his former career. He is, in addition, mentioned in chapter X where he is addressed by the Buddha as a representative of 80,000 Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas, in chapter XVI where he declares that he will expound the scripture in the future, and in chapter XXI where the pronounces a series of talismanic words (dhāranī-padāni) for the protection of those who keep the scriptures. The relative importance given by Bhaiṣajyarāja in this text may be a mark of the existence of a popular contemporary cult devoted to this deity. In his connection with light Bhaiṣajyarāja resembles Bhaiṣajyaguru; in chapter XXV both he (*i.e.* Bhaiṣajyarāja) and his brother Bhaiṣajyasamudgata are said to have mastered several samādhis whose names incorporate the element of light, *viz.*, nakṣatrarāja or tārāditya, vimalanirbhāsa, and vimalābhāsa.[12] In chapter XXII he is described as having been a Bodhisattva many aeons ago under the Tathāgata Candrasūryavimalaprabhāśrī.[13] Furthermore, the self-immolation of Bhaiṣajyarāja described in this chapter may be connected with the luminescent qualities attributed to Bhaiṣajyaguru; the blaze of his body is declared to have lit up countless world systems.[14] One should note the frequent appearance of the number seven in this chapter which is of great significance in the scripture of Bhaiṣajyaguru (see below). Finally, women are promised rebirth as men through devotion to the teaching of this chapter;[15] this is similar to Bhaiṣajyaguru's eighth vow.[16]

While noting these apparent parallels, we cannot overlook the lack of any attribution of healing powers to either Bhaiṣajyarāja or Bhaiṣajyasamudgata in *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra.* However, there does exist in Chinese translation a short sütra entirely devoted to these two Bodhisattvas,[17] which does include healing as part of their repertory of accomplishments. Bhaiṣajyarāja, for example, states that when he achieves Buddhahood "every medicine will rain down from my two hands to cleanse living-beings and take away every

illness".[18] The text also states that "if a living-being meditates on the ten fingers of this Bodhisattva (Bhaiṣajyarāja) the 404 diseases will be spontaneously eradicated".[19] He is also associated with "myrobalan, the excellent medicinal herb of the Himālayas,"[20] which Bhaiṣajyaguru is usually depicted as holding.[21] Nevertheless, the emphasis in this text is more on the ability of these two Bodhisattvas to cure the ills of emotional and intellectual affliction (kleśa) through teaching "the medicine of the Buddha's wisdom"[22] rather than upon the alleviation of physical illness. This text may well have been based on the *Bhaiṣajyagurusūtra* in part, which it resembles, as well as the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* and *Sukhāvatīvyūha*. In China and Japan Bhaiṣajyarāja and Bhiṣajyasamudgata were assimilated into Bhaiṣajyaguru's cult. Their worship was included in rites of repentance dedicated out : to Bhaiṣajyaguru which were performed in Japan from the 7th to 9th centuries,[23] and they were also considered by some Japanese commentators to be among the eight Bodhisattvas who Bhaiṣajyaguru declares will show his devotees the way to Sukhāvatī.[24]

The figure with whom Bhaiṣajyaguru seems to have the closest affinity is the Buddha Amitābha, who reigns over the Western paradise of Sukhāvatī. As his name implies Amitābha is characterized primarily by his immeasurable light and this feature is shared by Bhaiṣajyaguru as well. Indeed, the first two of twelve vows which he made as a Bodhisattva are concerned with the luminescence of his future Buddha-body; his light will be infinite and "immeasurable, incalculable, unlimited world systems" will shine with it (First Vow),[25] his body will be radiant and pure like a valuable *lapis lazuli* and its rays will outshine the sun and moon enabling living-beings in any part of the universe to find their way in the dark, and causing those who are touched by them, to "perform virtuous actions (Second Vow)".[26] His Buddha-field, called Vaiḍūryanirbhāsa, is made out of lapis and precious stones and lacks "the faults of desire, the sounds of suffering of the lower states of existence, and women"; in none of this is it particularly distinctive and the *Sūtra* explicitely states that it resembles Sukhāvatī.[27] However, it is in the manner in which their Buddha-fields are described that the essential dichotomy between Amitābha and Bhaiṣajyaguru can be observed. Sukhāvatī is portrayed at great length and in fulsome detail in the *Sukhāvatīvyūhasūtra*, and nearly all of the future Amitābha's vows are concerned with the benefits to be enjoyed by those who will be reborn there. "Vaiṣūryanirbhāsa" on the other hand is depicted only once, and cursorily, there is no mention of the benefits which accrue to those born there, and no procedure is described for them to do so; in fact, the wish to reborn in his paradise was never a feature of the Bhaiṣajyaguru cult; however, one of the boons that he does dispense is to enable those who have heard his name and observed certain vows to be reborn in Sukhāvatī. Bhaiṣajyaguru's vows, with the exception of the first two which are concerned with his effulgence, are all concerned with living beings involved in some form of saṃsāric existence, and the extirpation of their spiritual and physical distress. He promises to cause living-beings to have intact moral discipline (Fifth Vow), to practice the Mahāyāna (Fourth Vow), and turn away from wrong views (Ninth Vow), to free prisoners from unjust punishment (Tenth Vow), cure all illnesses (Seventh Vow), to free women from "that despicable feminine nature afflicted with the several hundred faults of womanhood" (Eighth Vow), to feed the hungry (Eleventh Vow) and clothe the poor (Twelfth Vow)—in short, to provide inexhaustible enjoyments to limitless realms of living-beings making sure that none lacks anything (Third Vow).[28] Bhaiṣajyaguru then is clearly nót an other worldly savior in

the manner of Amitābha, offering surcease to his devotees in a fantasmogoric paradise after death; he is seen rather as a divine healer who assuages concrete physical and mental sufferings and injustice in this world, and furthers the spiritual progress of living-beings outside of his Buddha-field. His benefits extend to future lives as well; recollection of his name (another analogue to Amitābha worship) will neutralize the effects of various non-virtuous actions performed in this life and cause the rebirth of the devotee in favorable material and spiritual circumstances.[29] In China, Japan and Tibet Bhaiṣajya-guru is invoked exclusively for the welfare of the living, to avert or eliminate illness or disaster and to increase the span of life;[30] in China he is distinctly regarded as presiding over the realm of the living, in contrast to Amitābha's rule over the spirits of the dead.[31]

Despite the emphasis given to Bhaiṣajyaguru's luminous character, he is not to be regarded as a mere personification of the Sun; the subordination of the celestial lights to his divine effulgence is shown by the two Bodhisattvas who attend him, Sunlight and Moonlight (Sūrya and Candraprabha), as well as by the explicit statement that his light outshines the Sun and Moon. Nevertheless, the contention of De Visser-that Bhaiṣajya-guru personifies the healing light of the Sun[32] cannot be dismissed out of hand. The location of Bhaiṣajyaguru's Buddha-field in the East suggests a connection with the dawn like that possessed by the Aśvins, who wield similar healing and protective power in the Brahmanical tradition. One of the more anomalous powers ascribed to Bhaiṣajyaguru is his power to restore the dead to life. This may bear some relation to the psychopompic function of the Sun out : in Rg Veda IV. 54.2 and to the resurrectionary beliefs associated with the Sun in various primitive religions;[33] he is also associated with agricultural abund-ance and childbirth[34] which shows a connection with another aspect of the solar complex, *i.e.*, fertility.[35] Bhaiṣajyaguru is described as being surrounded by 12 yakṣa generals[36] who were associated with the signs of the zodiac in China and Inner Asia.[37] Another piece of evidence, suggestive of a solar or celestial origin of the Bhaiṣajyaguru complex, is to be found in the *Saptathāgatapūrvapraṇidhānaviśeṣavistarasūtra*[38] in which Bhaiṣajyaguru appears as the last (and most important) member of a series of seven healing Tathāgatas. This group inevitably suggests the seven "planets" known to the ancient world, including India, with Bhaiṣajyaguru, the dominent divinity in this work, representing the Sun.

Among the more interesting activities of Bhaiṣajyaguru is his protection of those who remember his vows from having their vital energy (ojas) stolen, and his restoration of that vital energy to those from whom it has has been taken. This is considered a matter of sufficient importance to warrent three seperate mentions in the *Sūtra*;[39] the second within the context of listing the attributes of sons born to women who invoke Bhaiṣajyaguru during childbirth : "his vital energy will not be able to be stolen by non-humans". The fear of having one's vital power stolen *via* witchcraft or demonic devices is a common motif in folklore and archaic religion[40] and its inclusion here is evidence of the broad popular audience at which this scripture was directed.[41]

An interesting feature of the *Bhaiṣajyagurusūtra* is the ritual for restoring the dead to life alluded to above.[42] The text makes reference to the writing down of the individual's good and bad deeds by his co-natal deities[43] and a judgement by Yāma. Friends and kins of the deceased are instructed to take refuge in and worship Bhaiṣajya-guru after which the soul (vijñāna) may return to the body in 7, 21, 35, or 49 days with recollection of its after death experience. The revived person, having had direct

experience of the judgement of evil actions will thenceforth sin no more. The exact role of Bhiṣajyaguru in this process is not specified and it may be of significance that this ritual is taught neither by Bhaiṣajyaguru nor the Buddha but by a Bodhisattva named Trāṇamukta which is suggestive of an extra-canonical origin.[44]

It is also noteworthy that the soul is said to return to the body in 7, 3 times, 7, 5 times 7 or 7 times 7 days. This recalls the *Bardo Thodrol* (Bar Do Thos Grol) in which the afterdeath experience is organized into 7 day cycles, up to a limit of 49 days, after which the soul is expected to have definitely taken rebirth.[45] The number 7 also appears in the ritual to be performed for the recovery of a gravely ill person; the worshippers are to take the upavasatha vows for 7 days, light 49 lamps, make "more than 49 flags" and erect 7 (unspecified) images in front of which 7 huge lamps, the size of cartwheels, should be lit; if the lamps stay lit for 49 days the success of the ritual is assured. It is tempting to speculate that the extensive use of 7 in this text betokens a possible origin in N.W. India or Serindia where Buddhism was in contact with Near Eastern religious traditions for whom this number was of special significance.[46] The number 7 is, however, commonly found in Buddhist and non-Buddhist sources.[47]

The cult of Bhaiṣajyaguru was not permanently fixed in the form presented in the *Bhaiṣajyagurusūtra*, but underwent changes over the centuries tending towards an elaborate tantric ritualism. The basic text of the *Sūtra* itself was enlarged into the aforementioned *Saptatathāgatapūrvapraṇidhānaviśeṣavistarasūtra*,[48] Where it is found almost in its entirety preceded by a description of the powers and vows of the other six Tathāgatas.[49] Their vows, by and large, duplicate to those of Bhaiṣajyaguru, and their Buddha-fields are merely named; they lack any sufficiently distinctive individuating characteristics. Their origin is uncertain, although it can simply be ascribed to the general proliferative tendency of later Mahāyāna theology. They may have developed from the seven images to be erected in the healing ritual of Bhaiṣajyaguru[50] or by analogy to the six physician-ṛṣis associated with Dhanvantari.[51] The scripture of the Seven Tathāgatas enjoyed a great deal of popularity and even partially eclipsed Bhaiṣajyaguru's own scripture; it forms the basis for all Tibetan liturgies devoted to the worship of Bhaiṣajyaguru[52] and after the 9th century for the most frequently performed Bhaiṣajyaguru ceremonies in Japan.[53] In both Tibet and Japan rituals based upon it were used to assure the health of the ruler and the well-being of his realm.[54]

The most compelling sign of the tantracization of the Bhaiṣajyaguru cult found in the scripture of the Seven Tathāgatas is the emphasis placed upon dhāranīs. The first dhāranī to occur in the text is recited by the third Tathāgata, Suvarṇabhadravimalaratnaprabhāsavrata; its recitation is said to purify the sins of all who worship it, and cause them to be born in his Buddha-field.[55] The second dhāranī, the "long" dhāranī of Bhaiṣajyaguru is recited by the seven Tathāgatas in unison (according to the Chinese version, and by the Buddha alone in the Tibetan).[56] There are in addition two other dhāranīs presented for the purpose of worshipping the seven Tathāgatas,[57] the latter of the two being offered by the Bodhisattva Vajrapāṇi. This Bodhisattva was incorporated into the worship of the Seven Tathāgatas by medieval Japanese tantrics[58] and he is also found depicted with Bhaiṣajyaguru in Tibet.[59] There are no mantras or dhāranī in the *Bhaiṣajyagurusūtra*; however, in I-tsing's version of the scripture of the Seven Tathāgatas, the "short" dhāranī of Bhaiṣajyaguru is to be found in that portion of the text which contains the *Bhaiṣajyagurusūtra*.[60] Since this dhāranī is not to be found in any version of the

Bhaiṣajyagurusūtra (its inclusion in Hsuan-t'sang's translation being regarded by the editors of the Taisho as an interpolation) or even in the Tibetan version of the scripture of the Seven Tathāgatas, it must be regarded as a later interpolation.[61] The inclusion of dhāranīs in the scripture of the Seven Tathāgatas accords with the trend of the later Mahāyāna to increasingly utilize magical formulae under the influence of Tantrism.

The tantricization of the Bhaiṣajyaguru cult remained incomplete in Tibet; there evolved no Tantric ritual cycle around the figure of Bhaiṣajyaguru or the Seven Tathāgatas, and those rituals which do exist contain no specifically tantric features. However, the inclusion of the *Bhaiṣajyagurusūtra* and the *Saptatathāgatapūrvapraṇidhānaviśeṣavistarasūtra* in the Tantra section of the Kangyur rather than in the *sūtra* collection may imply that in the opinion of the compilers of the canon, the Bhaiṣajyaguru literature, with its strong ritual emphasis, does have an affinity with *Tantra per se*. In Chinese there are to be found four Tantric rituals for the worship of Bhaiṣajyaguru, two of which were translated by the eminent Tantrikas Vajrabodhi and Amoghavajra,[62] while in Japan the cult took on a fully Tantric character with the development of a Tantric ritual based upon one of these texts.[63] In addition, Bhaiṣajyaguru became variously identified with the Tantric Buddhas—Akṣobhya and Mahāvairocana.[64]

Despite the vicissitudes of texts, cult and iconography, the essential character of Bhaiṣajyaguru has endured : he is the luminous divine healer and comforter, delivering living-beings from the pangs of disease and tribulation in this life and from the consequences of their sinful acts in future lives. The figure that emerges from the literature is that of an ideal type, perhaps after all merely a deification of Śākyamuni's attributes as spiritual physician. Yet despite the overlapping of many of his characteristics with those of Amitābha and other celestial Buddhas, Bhaiṣajyaguru retained a discrete identity, and his cult attracted a large following in Tibet, China and Japan, with many shrines and temples dedicated to him, even in the face of the enormous success of the Amitābha cult in those countries, especially in China and Japan. For many centuries, and to millions of pious Buddhists, Bhaiṣajyaguru offered release from sickness and suffering, and in so doing played a vital role in Buddhist religious life.

FOOTNOTES

*(I should like to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Michael J. Sweet for his invaluable assistance in reading the Chinese materials utilized in this study).

1. For a general survey, see Walter Jayne, *The Healing Gods of Ancient Civilizations* (1925; rpt. New Hyde Park, N.Y. : University Books, 1962).

2. E. Wasburne Hopkins, *Epic Mythology* (1915; rpt. Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1974), pp. 58, 89, 168-169.

3. J. Filliozat, *Classical Doctrine of Indian Medicine* (1949; tsltn. Delhi. Munshi Ram Manoharlal, 1964), pp. 2, 7-11.

4. S.K. Nanayakkara," Bhaiṣajyaguru," *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*, 1968, Vol. II, Fasc. 4, p. 663.

5. The Sanskrit text of the *Bhiṣajyaguruvaiḍuryaprabharājasūtra* was discovered among the Gilgit manuscripts and edited and published by N. Dutt in *Gilgit Manuscripts (*Srinagar and Kashmir, 1939) Vol. I, pp. 1-32. This edition has been reprinted in P.L. Vaidya, ed. *Mahāyāna-Sūtra-Samgraha* (Darbhanga : Mithila Institute, 1961), Vol. I, pp. 165-173. References to the *Bhaiṣajyagurusūtra* are to this latter edition. The *Sūtra* is cited four times by Śāntidēva in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*; see P.L. Vaidya, ed. *Śikṣāsamuccaya of Śāntidēva* (Darbhanga : Mithila Institute), 1961. The passage ascribed to the *Sūtra* at Vaidya, p. 11. 8-11 is not to be found in any extent version. The passage at 97.3-8 closely resembles Vaidya, *Mahāyāna-*...p. 170. 5-10; that at Vaidya, p. 97.9-21 resembles Vaidya *Mahāyāna-*...p. 170. 15-19; Vaidya, pp. 97.22-98.2 resembles Vaidya *Mahāyāna*...,pp. 168.26-169.7. Vaidya, p. 97. 24 reads Amitābha whereas Vaidya *Mahāyāna*..., p. 167.29 reads Amitāyus. There are three Chinese translations; the first by Śrīmitra of the Eastern Chin (317-420) is to be found as the twelfth chapter of the *Fo-shuo-kuan-ting-ching*, T. 1331; the second is an independent translation by Dharmagupta done in 615, T. 449; the third version is by Hsuan-t'sang, done in 650, T. 450. The work also exists in Tibetan translation, Toh. 504.

6. Reinhold F. G. Muller, "Die Krankheits-und Heilgottheiten des Lamaismus, "*Anthropos*, Vol. xxiii, 1927, p. 988.

7. J. Filliozat, *Etude de demonologie indienne* (Paris : Imprimerie National, 1937), p. 134.

8. On Śrīmitra, see E. Zurcher, *Buddhist Conquest of China (*Leiden : E.J. Brill, 1959), Vol. I, pp. 103-104. On the attribution of the *Kuan-ting-ching* T. 1331, see *Ibid.*, pp. 316-317.

9. Bhaiṣajyaguruvaiḍūryaprabharāja and Bhaiṣajyaguruvaiḍūryarāja in P.L. Vaidya, ed. *Mahāyānasūtrasamgraha, Part II* [Mañjuśrīmulakalpatantra] (Darbhanga : Mithila Institute, 1964), pp. 5, 8, 24, 44; Bhaiṣajyarāja in P.L. Vaidya, ed. *Lalitavistara* (Darbhanga : Mithila Institute, 1958), p. 120; Bhaiṣajyaguruvaiḍūryaprabha in P. Ghosh, ed. *Śatasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā* (Calcutta : Bibliotheca Indica, 1910), Vol. I, p. I.

10. P.L. Vaidya, ed. *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra* (Darbhanga : Mithila Institute, 1960), p.x.

11. It is rather to the text itself that such power is ascribed; see Chapter XXII.

12. Vaidya *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*, p. 258.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 236.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 237.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 242.

16. Vaidya, *Mahāyāna-Sūtra-Samgraha*, p. 166.

17. The *Fo-shuo-kuan-yao-wang-yao-shang-ehr-p'u-sa-ching*, T. 1161, translated

in 424 by Kālayaśas.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 665c.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 662e.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 665c.
21. Bhaiṣajyaguru is often dipicted in painting and sculpture holding a myrobalan in his right hand and an alms, or medicine bowl in his left or *vice-versa*; see Siegbert Hummel, "Sman-gyi-bla, "*Bulletin of Tibetology*, Vol. II, No. 2, 1965, pp. 9-15 and Siegbert Hummel, "Der Medizin-Buddha und seine Begleiter, "*Sinologica*, Vol II, 1950, pp. 81-106 for the iconography of Bhaiṣajyaguru. On myrobalan see Muller, *op. cit.*, p. 985 f.n. 150.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 664c; 665a, c; 666a,b.
23. M.W. De Visser, *Ancient Buddhism in Japan* (Leiden : E.J. Brill, 1935), Vol. I, pp. 293-309.
24. De Visser, *op. cit.*, Vol II, p. 555.
25. Vaidya, *op. cit.*, p. 165.
26. *loc. cit.*
27. *Ibid.*, p. 167.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 166-167.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 168-169.
30. See Holmes Welch, *The Practice of Chinese Buddhism* (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 196-197; De Visser, *op. cit.*, Vol I, pp. 293-309, Vol II pp. 358-571; L.A. Waddell, *Tibetan Buddhism* (1895; rpt. New York : Dover, 1972) pp. 353-354; oral communications from Prof. Geshe L. Sopa, University of Wiscons in-Madison and Mr. Khamlung Tulku.
31. Welch, *op. cit.*, p. 203.
32. De Visser; *op. cit.*, Vol I, p. 19.
33. Mircea Eliade, *Patterns in Comparitive Religion* (Cleveland : The World Publishing Company, 1958) pp. 134-135.
34. Vaidya, *op. cit.*, pp. 170, 172.
35. Eliade, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-135; 149-150.
36. Vaidya, *Ibid.*, p. 172.
37. On the yakṣa generals, see Hummel, "Die Medizin-Buddha...", pp. 86-93; De Visser, *op. cit* , Vol II, pp. 516, 551-557.
38. Translated in 707 by I-tsing, T. 451. The text is also available in Tibetan translation, Toh. 503.
39. Vaidya, *op. cit.*, pp. 169, 170.
40. *E.g.* the tales of the theft of *ching* (vital essence) from men by female demons in the form of vixens; see Robert H. Van Gulik, *sexual Life in Ancient China* (Leiden E.J. Brill, 1961), pp. 9, 316-317; Michael Harner, "Jivaro Souls," *American Anthropologist*, 64 (1962), pp. 258-272.
41. The theme of ojas-stealing is referred to elsewhere in Buddhist literature : see P.L. Vaidya, ed. *Saddharmalaṅkāvatārasūtra* (Darbhanga : Mithila Institute), p. 106 : P.L. Vaidya, ed. *Divyāvadāna* (Darbhanga : Mithila Institute, 1959), p. 182; S. Bagchi, ed. *Mahāvastu Avadāna* (Darbhanga : Mithila institute, 1970), Vol. I, p. 201; P.L. Vaidya, ed. *Jātaka-Mālā* (Darbhanga : Mithila Institute, 1959), p. 43; Mahāvyutpatti 4285 ojaḥ-pratyāhaṇi (in a list of mantras).
42. Vaidya, *Mahāyāṇa,.....*, p. 172.
43. Sahajadeva. For references to the co-natal deities in Buddhist literature, see J. Filliozat, "The Devas of Aśoka," *Studies in Aśokan* Inscriptions (Calcutta : Indian Studies Past and Present, 1967), pp. 36-37 and f.n. 6, p. 37. They appear in the *Bardo Thodrol* performing the same function differing only in the manner in which they reckon up the good and the bad (with white and black stones); see W.Y. Evans-Wentz, ed. *The Tibetan Book of the Dead* (1927; rpt. New York : Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 165-166. In their scribal activity they recall Citragupta, Yāma's secretary.
44. Perhaps there is here a parallel with Yāma's restorative power; see Hopkins, *op. cit.*, p. 114.
45. Evans Wentz, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7, 20. This feature alongwith the presence of the co-natal deities appear to confirm

Tucci's suspicion of a connection between the *Bhaiṣajyagurusūtra* and the Tibetan Book of the Dead; see G. Tucci, *Tibetan Painted Scrolls*, Vol. II, p. 36.

46. Conze similarly speculates with respect to the Prajñāpāramitā. See E. Conze (*Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies*; London : Cassirer, 1967), p. 49. On the number seven, see Mircea Eliade, *Shamanism* (Princeton ; Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 274-275, f.n. 65, p. 274.

47. *E.g.* the seven jewels of a *cakrāvartin*, the seven steps of the newborn Gautama, the seven precious substances; see also Hopkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-112.

48. See above, f.n. 37.

49. The other six Tathāgatas are : (1) Suparikīrtitanāmaśrīrāja, (2) Ratnacandrapadmapratimaṇḍitapaṇḍita (?) tejaḥsvaraghoṣarāja, (3) Suvarṇabhadravimalaratnaprabhāsavrata, (4) Aśokottama, (5) Dharmakīrtisāgaraghoṣa, (6) Dharmasāgaravaramativikrīḍitābhijñārāja.

50. This suggestion is made by S.N. Nanayakkara, *op. cit.*, p. 664.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 662 f.n. 6 for the names of the ṛṣis and references to them in Buddhist literature.

52. All of the Bhaiṣajyaguru liturgies which I have examined are based upon a series of three liturgies for the worship for the seven Tathāgatas written by Śāntarakṣita, *viz.* : *Saptatathāgatapūrvapraṇidhānaviśeṣtavistarasūtrāntopadeśa* (Toh. 3132), *Saptatathāgatapūrvapraṇidhānaviśeṣavistarakalpavacanavidhisūtrāntsaṃkṣepa* (Toh. 3133), *Saptatathāgatapūrvapranidhānaviśeṣavistaranāmasūtrāntavacana Saptatathāgatapūjāpraṇidhānaabhinirhāravidhisūtrevicitāntavacana* (Toh. 3134).

53. The Shichi-butsu Yakushi-hō which replaced the earlier Yakushi-kekwa, see De Visser, *op. cit.*, Vol. II pp. 567-571.

45. De Visser, *loc. cit.* See also the colophon to the *Saptatathāgatapūrvapraṇidhānaviśeṣavistarasūtrāntopadeśa* in Daisetz T. Suzuki, *The Tibetan Tripitika* (Tokyo-Kyoto : Tibetan Tripitika Research Institute, 1957), Vol. 80, p. 52, plate 5, lines 1-2.

55. Suzuki, *op. cit.*, Vol. 6, p. 129, plate 22, lines 4-5.

56. Suzki, *op. cit.*, Vol 6, p. 134, plate 4 line 8 to plate 5 line 3; and T. 451, p. 417a.

57. Suzuki, *op. cit.*, Vol. 6, p. 135, plate 1 line 8 and plate 2 lines 6-7.

58. Perhaps because he is an emanation of Akṣobhya who was equated with Bhaiṣajyaguru; see De Visser, *op. cit.*, Vol. II pp. 564-570.

59. Hummel, "Die Medizin.....,", p. 85.

60. namo bhagavate bhaiṣajyaguru vaiḍūryaprabharājāya tathāgatāya arhate samyaksaṃbuddhāya tadyathā Oṃ bhaiṣajye bhaiṣajye bhaiṣajya samudgate svāhā, T. 451 p. 414b-c.

61. In the *Āryatathāgatavaiḍūryaprabhānāmabaladhanasamādhidhāraṇī* Toh. 505 we find the "short" Bhaiṣajyagrudhāraṇī known to Tibetan tradition; bhaiṣajye bhaiṣajye mahābhaiṣajye bhaiṣajyarāja samudgate svāhā which appears more appropriate to Bhaiṣajyarāja and Bhaiṣajya-samudgata than to Bhaiṣajyaguru. See Suzuki, *op. cit.*, Vol. 6, p. 139, plate 5 lines 7-8.

62. T. 923 translated by Vajrabodhi; T. 924ab translated by Amoghavajra; T. 922 translated by I-tsing; T, 925 translated by the Tibetan Shalopa during the Yuan.

63. The Yakushi-hō based on T. 922; see De Visser, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 565.

64. De Visser, *op.cit.*, Vol. II p. 564.

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The Editor

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STUDIES IN PALI & BUDDHISM

(A homage volume to the memory of Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap)

Editor **Dr. A.K. Narain**

A memorial volume in honour of the great Indian Scholar of Pali and Buddhism, Mahathero Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap, edited by Professor A.K. Narain, with an international editorial board of H. Bechert, I. B. Horner, P.S. Jaini, H. Nakamura, N.H. Samtanj, C.S. Upasak and Alex Wayman, is in fact a comprehensive volume dealing with various important aspects of Buddhism based on the researches of Scholars in Buddhist Studies from all over the world, as may be noted from the list of authors and the titles of their contributions (in alphabetical order): H.B. Aronson, "Equanimity (*Upekkha*) in Theravada Buddhism"; A.C. Banerjee, "The Theravada School of Buddhist Thought"; H. Bechert, "Remarks on Four Buddhist Sanskrit Works Composed in Sri Lanka"; G.D. Bond, "The Nature and Meaning of the *Netti-Pakarana*"; J.R. Carter, "The Notion of 'Refuge' (*Sarana*) in the Theravada Buddhist Tradition"; R.J. Corless, "The Garland of Love : A History of Religious Hermeneutic of Nembutsu Theory & Practice"; D.D. Daye, "Methodological Remarks on 20th Century Studies of Buddhist Inference (*Anumana*)"; T.L. Dowling, "Karma Doctrine and Sectarian Development"; I. Fiser, "Pali *averam*, *Dhammapada 5*"; B. G. Gokhale, "On Buddhist Historiography"; H. V. Guenther, "A Structural Analysis of the *Abhidharmakosa* : First Chapter"; I.B. Horner, "The Buddha's Co-Natals"; L. Hurvitz, "The Eight Deliverances"; Jan Yun-hua, "A Ninth-Century Chinese Classification of Indian Mahayana"; P.S. Jaini, "On The Buddha Image"; L. M. Joshi, "The Meaning of Nirvana"; Y. Kajiyama, "Mahayana Buddhism and the Philosophy of Prajna"; C. V. Kher "Buddhism and the non-philosophical Brahmanical Literature"; Y. Krishan, "Buddhist Challenge and Hindu Response"; T. Ling, "Buddhism in India : Residual and Resurgent". A.W. MacDonald, "A Tibetan Guide to some of the Holy Places of the Dhaulagiri-Muktinath Area of Nepal"; K. Mizuno, "Dharmapadas of Various Buddhist Schools"; H. Nakamura, "A Process of the Origination of Buddhist Meditation in Connection with the Life of the Buddha"; K.R. Norman, "Magadhisms in the *Kathavatthu*", C.S. Prasad, "Meat-Eating and the Rule of Tikotiparisuddha"; C.S. Prebish, "Recent Progress in Vinaya Studies"; W. Rahula, "Zen and the Taming of the Bull", G. Roth, "Notes on the Introduction of the *Bhiksu-Pratimoksa-Sutra* of the *Arya-Mahasamghika-Lokottaravadin*"; H. Saddhatissa, "Literature in Pali From Loas"; N.H. Samtani, "Buddha-The Teacher Extraordinary"; B.L. Smith, "Religious Assimilation in Early Medieval Sinhalese Society"; C.S. Upasak, "The Role of Uruvela Kassapa in the Spread of Buddhism"; A. Wayman, "The Twenty Reifying Views (*Sakkayaditthi*)"; O.H. de A Wizesekera, "The Etymology of Pali gotrbhu; A.N. Zelinsky, "The Buddhistic Cosmos and Tibetan Tradition"; E. Zelliot, "The Indian Rediscovery of Buddhism 1855-1956"; L. Zwilling, "The *Visesas tava* of Udbhattasiddhavamin".

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